Getting a New Lease on Life

Abstract

A significant number of marriages today arc interchurch, that is, marriages in which each spouse belongs to a different Christian church or denomination. The limited research on interchurch couples suggests that they are more at risk for divorce than same-church couples. A qualitative study and a national telephone survey were conducted by the Center for Marriage and Family at Creighton University to better understand interchurch marriages. Based on findings from these studies, clinical implications for premarital counseling with interchurch couples are presented. The findings suggest not only how to work with interchurch couples, but how religion can potentially impact all couples regardless of their denominational affiliation.     

Sacred Canopies or Religious Markets? The Effect of County-Level Religious Diversity on Later Changes in Religious Involvement

Secularization theories, such as Berger's Sacred Canopy argument, hold that religious diversity leads to a decline in religious participation. Religious market models (e.g., Finke and Stark) argue the opposite. Voas, Olson, and Crockett found that nearly all of the vast research exploring this important question prior to 2002 was flawed due to a previously unrecognized noncausal statistical relationship between measures of religious diversity and measures of religious participation. Since 2002, this methodological issue has largely stymied research on this important topic. We first describe how, following Voas et al.’s recommendations, longitudinal models can overcome these problems. We then apply these methods to data measuring the religious composition of all U.S. counties found in the Religious Congregations and Membership Studies from 1980, 1990, 2000, and 2010. Using multilevel longitudinal regression models, we find that greater county-level religious diversity is followed by later declines in county-level religious participation rates. The negative effect size of religious diversity is large and robust to changes in the control variables and different methods of measuring religious diversity.     

Changing Patterns of Attendance at Religious Services in Canada, 1986–2008

According to the General Social Survey, the combined rate of weekly and monthly attendance at religious services in Canada has declined by about 20 points from 1986 to 2008. Approximately half of this decline stems from the increase in the proportion of people reporting no religion, who, for the most part, do not attend religious services. The other portion of this decline is attributable to eroding attendance rates among Catholics, particularly older Catholics, and Protestants in Québec. Attendance rates for Protestants outside of Québec show signs of increase. The reported increase in weekly attendance in Canada by the Project Canada surveys and cited by Bibby as a possible indicator of a religious renaissance is revealed as an artifact in the data due to an oversample of Protestants. I find another weighting problem in the Canadian Survey of Giving, Volunteering and Participating that leads to underestimates of aggregate religious attendance rates.     

政府在世俗化过程中的角色

本文以北京东岳庙的恢复为例,讨论政府在社会变迁过程中的作用及其角色的多面性。世俗化和非世俗化是国际社会学家对50多年来世界不同地区宗教消沉或复兴的描述方式。在20世纪的中国政府对传统宗教的管理是世界世俗化运动的特殊表现。本文认为最近30年中国形成了新的宗教市场,政府的参与说明中国的世俗化力量还没有彻底摆脱传统宗教的生存形态。     

Reaching the Limits of Secularization? Turkish‐ and Moroccan‐Dutch Muslims in the Netherlands 1998–2006

This research note focuses on Muslim minorities living in a secular context, the Netherlands. The question is whether mosque attendance among Turkish‐ and Moroccan‐Dutch changed between 1998 and 2006, testing mechanisms of religious decline and religious vitality. Elaborating on previous research of the same Muslim groups, this study examines a longer time span and adds contextual‐level explanations. Whereas previous research reported a linear trend towards secularization over time and over generations, in recent years the trend has become more complex. The revival of religious attendance among the second generation is most striking. Forces of secularization such as educational attainment and generational replacement gradually lose their predictive power. Over time, processes of secularization are therefore not inevitable.     

Measuring Long‐Term Patterns of Political Secularization and Desecularization: Did They Happen or Not?

Political secularization theories have predicted religion's decline in public and political life, and desecularization theories have predicted the reverse trend. However, there is little agreement on the timing of either phenomenon or even their existence. Until now, deep empirical tests of any of these were hampered by lack of historical country‐level data on religious preferences of governments (previously used data sets go back only to 1990). However, the new Government Religious Preference data set (GRP) measures state religion from 2015 back to the 1800s. Using GRP data, this article offers the first long‐term quantitative measurement of political secularization and in doing so, weighs in on competing claims regarding its timing. This article finds strong support that political secularization happened gradually over the long 19th century, accelerated after World War II, and peaked in the 1970s or 1980s. In contrast, the article finds only tepid support for the existence of political desecularization overall.     

Religiosity,Secular Participation,and Cultural Socialization: A Case Study of the 1933–1942 Urban English Cohort

The nature of secularization is of enduring interest in the social science of religion. Numerous recent papers have established downward cohort trends as characterizing religious change. We examine potential mechanisms by assessing cultural participation and secular engagement during the formative period of one cohort. We provide estimates of active and nominal religiosity, nonreligion and religious belief for those born between 1933 and 1942, using multiple surveys fielded between 1957 and 2018. We model the association between religiosity and secular cultural and social participation for this cohort in 1957, then examine how cultural socialization in childhood relates to religiosity in their later adulthood using surveys fielded between 2005 and 2007. Increased secular competition is found to be associated with less active religiosity. These trends were underpinned by an ethic of increasing autonomy for the young. We conclude by affirming the link between increasing secular competition, long-run modernization, and changing cultural socialization.     

Which Societies Provide a Strong Religious Socialization Context? Explanations Beyond the Effects of National Religiosity

Religious socialization occurs within the immediate family as well as in the broader social context. Previous research has shown that parents’ religiosity matters less for the transmission of religious beliefs in devout than in secular nations, implying smaller costs of religious socialization. In this article we test which other societal factors affect the transmission of religious beliefs: anti‐religious policies in formerly socialist countries, economic development, and income inequality. Our results indicate that societies with high levels of income inequality seem to provide the most favorable context for religious socialization. Individuals develop strong religious beliefs even if they only received little religious socialization within the family. Formerly socialist nations increased socialization costs through the overall suppression of religious practice. Economic development has no impact on socialization effects, suggesting that inequality is a more important driver of religious change than previously thought.     

Secular Tolerance? Anti‐Muslim Sentiment in Western Europe

The literature about secularization proposes two distinct explanations of anti‐Muslim sentiment in secularized societies. The first theory understands it in terms of religious competition between Muslims and the remaining minority of orthodox Protestants; the second understands it as resulting from value conflicts between Muslims and the nonreligious majority. The two theories are tested by means of a multilevel analysis of the European Values Study 2008. Our findings indicate that, although more secularized countries are on average more tolerant towards Muslims and Islam, strongest anti‐Muslim attitudes are nonetheless found among the nonreligious in these countries.     

“Secularization of Consciousness” or Alternative Opportunities? The Impact of Economic Growth on Religious Belief and Practice in 13 European Countries

This research note contributes to an evaluation of the validity of secularization theory by studying the relationship between economic modernization and patterns of religious change. Both the disenchantment narrative of Berger and Weber and the existential security perspective of Inglehart hypothesize that economic development should be accompanied by a weakening of religious values. Using macro‐level panel regressions, my analysis reveals that while economic growth is directly associated with diminishing church attendance rates, it is not directly associated with a decline in belief. The relation between economic growth and religious decline is therefore not primarily mediated by a “secularization of consciousness.” Findings instead indicate that economic prosperity leads to a change in consumption patterns on the part of individuals due to increased income and availability of alternative, secular opportunities to meet needs previously fulfilled by traditional religion. A decline in religious belief may occur as a secondary consequence of this behavioral change, since diminishing worship attendance rates reduce the influence of religion on value socialization.     

Does Education Develop or Diminish Spirituality in Taiwan?

There has been little research on the effects of education on religion and spirituality in Chinese societies. This gap is addressed through quantitative analysis of a new dataset, the Religious Experience Survey in Taiwan, in conjunction with the repeated cross‐sectional Taiwan Social Change Survey. In Taiwan, people with higher education are less likely than others to say that they have a religion, to worship or pray frequently, and to regard those activities as important. They are more likely, however, to express an interest in mystical or supernatural things, and to report a variety of religious experiences. This paradox arises not because the educated Taiwanese are spiritual but not religious, but rather because they are somewhat polarized: those who have no religion and those reporting religious experiences are not the same individuals. Although education is highly correlated with both birth cohort and income, the findings strongly suggest that education is the key explanatory variable. The official promotion of Confucian thought and its adoption by the educated elite helps to explain the surprising conjunction of declining religious affiliation and increased engagement with spirituality.