Me,us and them: Political identification and the third-person effect in the 1993 Australian federal election

Three days prior to the 1993 Australian federal election 54 Australian university students who identified with one of the two major political parties were surveyed regarding their perceptions of media campaign impact on self and others. Results provided evidence of a third-person effect (Davison, 1983) wherein respondents judged others us more influenced by the election campaign than themselves. Consistent with predictions derived from social identity theory and self-categorization theory (e.g. Turner, Hogg, Oakes, Reicher and Wetherell, 1987), political ingroup members were also judged as less injuenced by campaign content than political outgroup members. Respondents who identified strongly with their preferred party judged self and ingroup members as less influenced by campaign content than did other respondents, and showed more evidence of positive intergroup differentiation. At the same time, however, these respondents exaggerated self–ingroup differences, challenging the theoretical assumption that intergroup diferentiation is associated with ingroup assimilation. Judgements of media impact on self and other also depended on the direction of the campaign message. Respondents believed ‘voters in general’ were persuaded in line with the intent of campaign content, while outgroup members were seen to be persuaded by material favouring their own side but to be uninfluenced by counter-attitudinal content. Election propaganda, irrespective of direction, was seen to amplify existing party preferences in self and ingroup members. Hence the relative invulnerability of self to media impact was pronounced when respondents judged the impact of pro-outgroup messages. Results suggest that perceptions of self–other differences in media vulnerability are influenced by the subjectively salient social relationship between self and other, and are governed by motivational needs, such as self-esteem, social-identity, and differentiation from others (cf. Brewer, 1991; Hogs and Abrams, 1993).     

WHO CARES? THE EFFECT OF GENDER AND CONTEXT ON THE SELF AND MORAL REASONING

Theorists suggest that gender differences in moral reasoning are due to differences in the self-concept, with women feeling connected to others and using a care approach, whereas men feel separate from others and adopt a justice approach. Using a self-categorization analysis, the current research suggests that the nature of the self–other relationship, rather than gender, predicts moral reasoning. Study 1 found moral reasoning to be dependent upon the social distance between the self and others, with a care-based approach more likely when interacting with a friend than a stranger. Study 2 suggests that when individuals see others as ingroup members they are more likely to utilize care-based moral reasoning than when others are seen as outgroup members. Further, traditional gender differences in moral reasoning were found only when gender was made salient. These studies suggest that both the self and moral reasoning are better conceptualized as fluid and context dependent.     

Benefitting from a different perspective: The effect of a complementary matching of psychological distance and habitual perspective on emotion regulation

Psychological distance in terms of its purpose as a psychological adjustment is currently not well understood. Some researchers claim that psychological distance serves as an emotion regulator, while others argue that psychological distance has the reverse effect, leading to cognitive avoidance and rumination. To elucidate upon this discrepancy, we propose that a complementary matching of psychological distance to one's habitual psychological distance perspective may lead to better emotion regulation when compared to the original perspective (i.e. fixing on either psychological immersion or distance). This study hypothesizes that a complementary matching of psychological distance to one's habitual perspective generally leads to better emotion regulation; specifically, individuals with high avoidant attachment, who habitually distance themselves from their experiences, may benefit from psychological immersion, while individuals with high anxious attachment, who habitually immerse themselves in their experiences, may benefit from psychological distancing. A total of 83 participants completed measures of adult attachment orientations; read a conflict scenario, triggering their attachment systems; and then rewrote that scenario using designated pronouns, thereby employing psychological immersion or psychological distance. Participants in the self‐immersed condition were asked to write from the first‐person perspective, whereas those in the self‐distancing condition were asked to write from the third‐person perspective. The results support our hypothesis of a complementary matching of psychological distance and habitual perspective.     

Within or without: negotiating psychic space with an adolescent at risk of developing a narcissistic personality structure

This paper examines a 22-month once weekly psychotherapy with an adolescent young man. My patient was one of a group of adolescents who, due in part to excessive aggression, envy, anxiety or confusion, has chronically evaded the intimate and dependent psychic contact with others that is necessary for psychological development. In my view, this comes about through a combination of external factors and internal predisposition, with the quality of care received during infancy playing a crucial role. These adolescents appear to be developing narcissistic modes of being in the world which if allowed to persist into adulthood would be seen as deeply entrenched clinical psychopathology. Managing separation and loss is one of the central aspects of adolescence, but these young people tend to intrude or merge with others with such aggressive force that recognising difference between self and other becomes difficult. In psychotherapy, this often takes the form of the patient’s inability to tolerate experiencing the therapist as a separate person, and when knowledge of the therapist as separate impinges on their view, they frequently react in a variety of primitively destructive ways. This paper seeks to explore these central ideas through a detailed examination of psychotherapy with a young man in whom such struggles predominate.     

A continuing sense of self in the lived experience of dementia

ABSTRACT

Diagnosis with dementia often leads to an overwhelming fear of loss of self, which is assumed in the social discourse about the condition. After my own diagnosis with dementia in 1995, I reflected on this fear from a Christian theological perspective and was nonetheless able to discover a sense of hope. Highlighting what remains in dementia, as seen through the lens of the lived experience, provides a counter-story to the views of outside observers, which have dominated the literature to date. Although people with dementia experience a change in their cognitive sense of self, there are still important aspects of self that remain, which are: a sense of being an embodied self, in relationships with others and with God, and being able to find meaning in the present moment. By demonstrating that people living with dementia have a continuing sense of self, the aim is to prompt improved pastoral care and ministry.     

Conceptions of the self and others across time

People are full of plans, goals, hopes, and fears-future-oriented thoughts that constitute a significant part of the self-concept. But are representations of others similarly future oriented? Studies 1a and 1b demonstrate that the future is seen as a larger component of the self than of another person. Study 2 found that because self-identity is tied to an unrealized future, the self is thought to be less knowable than others in the present. Study 3 indicates that people believe that others need to know who they are striving to be in order to be understood-more so than they believe they need to know others' strivings to understand them. Studies 4a and 4b tested an important implication of these findings, that because so much of who they are is tied to the future, people believe they are further from their ideal selves than others are. Implications for judgment and decision making are discussed.     

Perceptions of and Preferences for Skin Color,Black Racial Identity,and Self‐Esteem Among African Americans1

The purpose of the present study was to examine the role of skin color (i.e., lightness–darkness), as it pertains to racial identity development theory and self‐esteem among 113 African American college students of various skin colors. Findings revealed that the sample preferred skin color of a medium tone, rather than exhibiting self‐preference for either lighter or darker skin tones. There was also a significant relationship between one's perceptions of and preferences for his or her skin color and the skin tones idealized by others (e.g., opposite gender, family). Lighter skin color was positively related to higher levels of racial identity attitudes (immersion/emersion); the more satisfied darker skinned individuals were with their skin color, the lower their self‐esteem, and gender differences existed in perceptions of others’ preferences for skin color. Implications of this study for providing therapeutic clinical services and fostering the healthy psychological development of African American men, women, and children are discussed.     

Meta-perception for pathological personality traits: do we know when others think that we are difficult?

The self allows us to reflect on our own behavior and to imagine what others think of us. Clinical experience suggests that these abilities may be impaired in people with personality disorders. They do not recognize the impact that their behavior has on others, and they have difficulty understanding how they are seen by others. We collected information regarding pathological personality traits--using both self and peer report measures--from groups of people who knew each other well (at the end of basic military training). In previous papers, we have reported that agreement between self-report and peer-report is only modest. In this paper, we address the question: Do people know that others disagree with their own perceptions of themselves? We found that expected peer scores predicted variability in peer report over and above self-report for all 10 diagnostic traits. People do have some incremental knowledge of how they are viewed by others, but they do not tell you about it unless you ask them to do so; the knowledge is not reflected in ordinary self-report data. Among participants who expect their peers to describe them as narcissistic, those who agree with this assessment are viewed as being less narcissistic by their peers than those who deny being narcissistic. It therefore appears that insight into how one is viewed by others can moderate negative impressions fostered by PD traits.     

Comment on “The Self‐Care of Psychologists and Mental Health Professionals” (Dattilio, 2015)

Professor Frank Dattilio's article “The Self‐care of Psychologists and Mental Health Professionals” provides an overview of stress and related mental health problems among psychologists, and a proposition that psychologists are not vigilant in regard to self‐care. Dattilio offers a range of self‐care strategies and recommendations, and highlights self‐care practices within various psychology frameworks, and concludes with some “healthy tips” for managing stress. In my commentary I underscore Dattilio's message that self‐care is of critical importance in psychology practice, given the responsibility of caring for others inherent in the work psychologists undertake. However, I raise additional points of consideration and suggest an alternative approach to addressing the self‐care needs of the profession. My commentary makes the following points: (a) the need to distinguish between psychology trainees and practising qualified psychologists when addressing stress and self‐care requirements in the profession; (b) the importance of developing a culture of self‐care among psychologists by providing self‐care instruction during training; (c) the need to temper research findings on stress and mental health among psychologists by the methodological weakness of the studies in this area; (d) adhering to the recent call from colleagues to shift from a focus on pathology and punishment to a positive acceptance, mindfulness, and values‐based approach for encouraging self‐care among psychologists; (e) the use of a systematic framework for organising the presentation of self‐care strategies that makes them more accessible; and (f) an appeal to professional bodies to take their responsibility in promoting self‐care in the profession.     

Scenes of shame,social roles,and the play with masks

This article explores various scenes of shame, raising the questions of what shame discloses about the self and how this self-disclosure takes place. Thereby, the common idea that shame discloses the self’s debasement will be challenged. The dramatic dialectics of showing and hiding display a much more ambiguous, dynamic self-image as result of an interactive evaluation of oneself by oneself and others. Seeing oneself seen contributes to the sense of who one becomes. From being absorbed in what one does, one might suddenly become self-aware, shift viewpoints and feel pressed to put on masks. In putting on a mask, one relates to oneself in distancing oneself from oneself. In being at once a moral agent and a performing actor with an audience and norms in mind, one embodies and transcends the social roles one takes. In addition to the feeling of shame, in which the self finds itself passively reflected, the self’s active reflections on its shame are to be taken into account. As examples from Milan Kundera, Shakespeare’s King Lear, a line from Kingsley Amis, a speech by Vaclav Havel and Adam Smith’s Theory of Moral Sentiments indicate, self-(re)presentation in the public and the private sphere is a complex hermeneutical process with surprising twists.     

On mirroring in group psychotherapy

“A woman has two images. There is a magical person seen or remembered by those who love her, her finest qualities are flesh and spirit illuminated. She herself knows this ideal self; she projects it, if she is confident; or she daydreams her ideal self; or she recognizes it with gratitude in the admiring eye of others. There is at the same time a second image; the woman as seen by those who dislike or fear her. This cruel picture has an all too powerful mirror in her own negative idea of herself. She sees with fear her own ravaging impulses and most painful of all, a graceless, freakish, and unlovable physical self, this was the mirror her parents held before Edith. Her brothers saw her with love. She herself knew both images. Her life, and her poetry, constituted a flight from the second one.”     

Ego,self and otherness

The concept of self has been introduced as a core concept in several contemporary psychoanalytical theories. This study undertakes a critical examination of the historical and theoretical presuppositions of the concept of self and its corollary, the object. The proposed thesis is that the concept of self on a theoretical level has grown out of ego-psychology and the ambition is to bring consistency into the ambiguous concept of the ego left by Freud. On a clinical level, the concept of self is seen as an attempt to adjust psychoanalytical theory and technique to what, broadly speaking, we call non-neurotic patients. While the concept of self on a theoretical level dates back to Hartmann, it was left to those following the tradition of ego-psychology to work out the implications for our understanding of the pathology of the self and its proper treatment. The work of Heinz Kohut is seen as an exponent for those analysts who have been wrestling with the task of adjusting psychoanalytical theory and technique to our understanding and treatment of non-neurotic patients. A re-reading of the Freudian concept of the ego allows the author to present an alternative to ego-psychology and self psychology. While the concept of the self implies a re-centred theory of subjectivity, the author points to the de-centeredness of classical psychoanalytical thinking. Freud did not find an independent concept of the self necessary. On the contrary, psychoanalytical theory rejected the idea of the psyche as a complete and unified entity. Defining the ego as a representative of the divided psyche encompassing the other, the author suggests that incorporating contributions from French psychoanalytical thinking and the ideas of Winnicott places the self as a concept in accordance with classical psychoanalytical thinking.     

Self‐esteem and its relationship to bullying behaviour

From the rapidly growing literature on bullying, it is increasingly recognised that peer relationship problems as manifested in being bullied are associated with low self‐esteem. However, the literature on self‐esteem in relation to children who bully others is controversial. The objective of this paper is to elucidate further our understanding of the relationship between self‐concept and bullying behaviour. Data from a nationwide study of bullying behaviour carried out in Ireland during 1993‐1994 have been reviewed. The relevant results from 8,249 school children aged 8 to 18 years are presented. The paper examines the global and dimensional nature of self‐esteem and how it relates to children and adolescents who either have been victimised or bullied others. A distinction is made between “pure victims,” “pure bullies,” and children and adolescents who were both bullied and who bullied others. In other words, pure victims were those who had not bullied others, and pure bullies had not themselves been bullied. Those who were both bullied and bullied others were subdivided further into victims who bully occasionally, sometimes, and frequently and bullies who are victimised, occasionally, sometimes, and frequently. The results show that children of both primary and post‐primary age who were involved in bullying as victims, bullies, or both had significantly lower global self‐esteem than did children who had neither bullied nor been bullied. However, the pure bullies, in contrast to the pure victims, placed the same value on their physical attractiveness and attributes and on their popularity as did their peers who had not bullied others or been bullied. The bully‐victims of all ages had the lowest self‐esteem of the subgroups in the study. Also, the more frequently children were victimised or bullied others, the lower was their global self‐esteem. The typology and frequency of bullying and the age of the children when they were involved in bullying influenced the status of the specific domains of self‐esteem. There were, e.g., significant differences in anxiety between the pure bullies of post‐primary age and their peers who had not bullied others or been bullied. The post‐primary children who bullied most frequently were the least anxious. The results indicate that high self‐esteem protects children and adolescents from involvement in bullying. Thus, in view of the strong relationship between self‐esteem and bullying that has been found in the present paper, it is recommended that top priority be given by parents and teachers to preventing and reducing feelings of poor self‐worth among children and adolescents. Aggr. Behav. 27:269–283, 2001. © 2001 Wiley‐Liss, Inc.     

Workers' self‐objectification and tendencies to conform to others

Recent research showed that workers' self‐objectification—their self‐perception as objects rather than human beings—leads to detrimental intrapersonal consequences. In the present research, we explored whether this phenomenon may also affect interpersonal relations, by increasing workers' tendencies to conform. In a correlational study, Italian workers who perceived their work as more objectifying self‐objectified more—self‐attributed less human mental states and self‐perceive as more instrument‐like than human‐like—and, in turn, were more inclined to conform with others. The second study experimentally confirmed this pattern, showing that British workers who recalled an objectifying (vs. a non‐objectifying) work experience self‐objectified more. Self‐perception as instrument‐like was associated, in turn, with an increased tendency to adapt to others' opinions. The implications for organizational and social psychology are discussed.     

Confusions of self with close others

This article explores the cognitive underpinnings of interpersonal closeness in the theoretical context of "including other in the self" and, specifically, the notion of overlap between cognitive representations of self and close others. In each of three studies, participants first rated different traits for self, close others (e.g., romantic partner, best friend), and less close others (e.g., media personalities), followed by a surprise source recognition task (who was each trait rated for?). As predicted, in each study, there were more source confusions between traits rated for self and close others (e.g., a trait rated for self recalled as having been rated for the close other) than between self (or close others) and non-close others. Furthermore, several results suggest that the greater confusions between self and close others are due specifically to interpersonal closeness and not to greater familiarity or similarity with close others     

Orientation,Outcome, and Other-Serving Attributions

In this research, I examined the role of a communal orientation in producing other-serving attributional biases often found in jointly produced performance tasks. I hypothesized that the other-serving attributional responses, which are commonly found in dyadic decision-making tasks, originate from dispositional qualities that reflected an other-oriented construal of the self. Subjects completed a Communal Orientation Scale that purports to measure a dispositional tendency toward communal relationships with others. Next, they participated in a joint decision-making task with a partner for which they were given success or failure feedback. Then, subjects attributed responsibility for that performance. Results support the dispositional orientation hypothesis. Subjects who scored high in a communal orientation toward others gave more credit to their partners after a successful performance and blamed them less following failure. Attributions to the self remained unaffected by communal orientation. Implications of these data for future work in the areas dyadic interaction and cross-cultural attributions are considered.     

On being peripheral: effects of identity insecurity on personal and collective self‐esteem

We examined collective self‐esteem and personal self‐esteem as a function of anticipated changes in one's prototypicality within a valued ingroup. In Study 1 (N = 80), all participants received information that they were currently peripheral group members. Expectations for the future were then manipulated, with some expecting to become more prototypical and others expecting they would be even more peripheral in the future. In addition, the source of future movement (either the group or the self) was varied. It was found that when the group was the source of movement, those who expected to shift to a more prototypical position in the future had higher collective self‐esteem than those who expected to change to an even more peripheral position. In contrast, those who anticipated an even more peripheral position had higher personal self‐esteem than those who expected to become more prototypical in the future. In Study 2 (N = 100), intragroup position at present (peripheral versus prototypical) and future intragroup position (peripheral versus prototypical) were manipulated orthogonally. It was found that future expectations only affected self‐esteem among those with an insecure current identity, but not among those who were currently prototypical of the ingroup. In addition, ingroup favoritism was mediated by self‐esteem changes among those whose identity was insecure. The importance of a dynamic framework for investigating group processes is stressed. Copyright © 2002 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.     

Sometimes inclusion breeds suspicion: Self‐uncertainty and belongingness predict belief in conspiracy theories

In the present contribution, the author investigated the idea that messages communicating inclusion by others lead to stronger conspiracy beliefs about impactful societal events than messages communicating exclusion by others. These effects of belongingness, however, were expected only among people who experience high levels of self‐uncertainty. In Study 1, a manipulation of belongingness predicted belief in conspiracy theories only among people with unstable self‐esteem (an individual difference indicator of self‐uncertainty), while controlling for self‐esteem level. In Study 2, a manipulation of belongingness influenced belief in conspiracy theories only among participants who were experimentally induced to feel uncertain about themselves. It is concluded that among self‐uncertain people, inclusion breeds suspicion about the causes of impactful and harmful societal events.     

Jung's dissociable psyche and the ec-static self

Abstract :  Much of Jung's later work assumes that the self is an  a priori  phenomenon in which centripetal dynamics dominate. There is, however, another current in Jung's writings which recognizes the self to be an emergent phenomenon. This view is increasingly prevalent in post-Jungian discourse, and Louis Zinkin's exploration of a post-Jungian-constructivist model of the self can be seen as part of this tendency.
My paper privileges an emergent understanding of the self by focusing on the 'unravelling', 'de-centring', centrifugal experiences of otherness in the psyche. It offers a post-Jungian reading of a number of writers who have been influenced by the psychoanalyst Jean Laplanche and proposes a model of the self which focuses on our fantasies, terrors and longings about coming undone and bringing others undone.
This model is then linked to Judith Butler's understanding of the self as an ec-static phenomenon, in which the self is, of necessity, outside itself, such that 'there is no final moment in which my return to myself takes place'. I suggest that Jung's early clinical researches into the dissociability of the psyche and the clinical tools which he developed as a result of this work are especially suitable for engaging with these emergent, centrifugal dynamics.