Make them endure,give them space: On the loss of academic cynicism

In this autoethnographic essay, I explore how an intersection of personal, cultural, intellectual and professional conditions led me to embrace a cynical attitude towards academic life and why I've come more recently to lose that cynicism.     

Beat them or ban them: the characteristics and social functions of anger and contempt

This article reports 3 studies in which the authors examined (a) the distinctive characteristics of anger and contempt responses and (b) the interpersonal causes and effects of both emotions. In the 1st study, the authors examined the distinction between the 2 emotions; in the 2nd study, the authors tested whether contempt could be predicted from previous anger incidents with the same person; and in the 3rd study, the authors examined the effects of type of relationship on anger and contempt reactions. The results of the 3 studies show that anger and contempt often occur together but that there are clear distinctions between the 2 emotions: Anger is characterized more by short-term attack responses but long-term reconciliation, whereas contempt is characterized by rejection and social exclusion of the other person, both in the short-term and in the long-term. The authors also found that contempt may develop out of previously experienced anger and that a lack of intimacy with and perceived control over the behavior of the other person, as well as negative dispositional attributions about the other person, predicted the emergence of contempt.     

It’s one thing to rule them all and another thing to bind them

In this paper we offer a response to one argument in favour of Priority Monism, what Jonathan Schaffer calls the nomic argument for monism. We proceed in three stages. We begin by introducing Jonathan Schaffer’s Priority Monism and the nomic argument for that view. We then consider a response to the nomic argument that we presented in an earlier paper (Baron and Tallant in Philos Phenomenol Res 93:583–606, 2016). We show that this argument suffers from a flaw. We then go on to offer a different response to the nomic argument. The core idea is that the current laws of physics are not integrated in the manner that Schaffer requires to get the nomic argument for monism off the ground.

     

Goals and responses to failure: Knowing when to hold them and when to fold them

The ability to disengage from hopeless situations is critical to goal attainment and effective self-regulation. Two experiments investigated the effects of striving to attain success (approach goals) versus striving to avoid failure (avoidance goals) on persistence. Participants completed anagrams designed so that less persistence during an initial set of unsolvable anagrams was beneficial. In Study 1, participants reported how motivated they were by approach and avoidance goals. In Study 2, participants were primed to set approach or avoidance goals. Participants with avoidance goals persisted longer during failure, with more intense and enduring emotional distress, than those with approach goals. Greater anger predicted spending more time on subsequent unsolvable anagrams and accounted for differences in persistence. The results suggest that people with approach goals are better able to identify when they should disengage during failure, and disengage more completely, than people with avoidance goals. An earlier version of this article was presented at the Society for Personality and Social Psychology conference, Palm Springs, CA, January, 2006.     

If you can't join them, beat them: effects of social exclusion on aggressive behavior.

Social exclusion was manipulated by telling people that they would end up alone later in life or that other participants had rejected them. These manipulations caused participants to behave more aggressively. Excluded people issued a more negative job evaluation against someone who insulted them (Experiments 1 and 2). Excluded people also blasted a target with higher levels of aversive noise both when the target had insulted them (Experiment 4) and when the target was a neutral person and no interaction had occurred (Experiment 5). However, excluded people were not more aggressive toward someone who issued praise (Experiment 3). These responseswere specific to social exclusion (as opposed to other misfortunes) and were not mediated by emotion     

Vague objects for those who want them

The authors would like to express their thanks to an anonymous reader for Philosophical Studies, who supplied extremely thorough and helpful comments on an earlier draft of this paper. We also would like to thank our colleague Thomas Blackson for helpful criticism of the penultimate draft of the paper.     

Detecting objects is easier than categorizing them

Two experiments compared performance in an object detection task, in which participants categorized photographs as objects and nonobject textures, and an object categorization task, in which photographs were categorized into basic-level categories. The basic-level categorization task was either easy (e.g., dogs vs. buses) or difficult (e.g., dogs vs. cats). Participants performed similarly in the detection and the easy-categorization tasks, but response times to the difficult-categorization task were slower. This latter finding is difficult to reconcile with the conclusions of Grill-Spector and Kanwisher (2005) Grill-Spector, G. and Kanwisher, N. 2005. Visual recognition: As soon as you know it is there, you know what it is. Psychological Science, 16: 152–160. [Crossref], [PubMed], [Web of Science ®] , [Google Scholar] who reported equivalent performance on detection and basic-level categorization tasks and took this as evidence that figure–ground segregation and basic-level categorization are mediated by the same mechanism.     

Detecting objects is easier than categorizing them

Two experiments compared performance in an object detection task, in which participants categorized photographs as objects and nonobject textures, and an object categorization task, in which photographs were categorized into basic-level categories. The basic-level categorization task was either easy (e.g., dogs vs. buses) or difficult (e.g., dogs vs. cats). Participants performed similarly in the detection and the easy-categorization tasks, but response times to the difficult-categorization task were slower. This latter finding is difficult to reconcile with the conclusions of Grill-Spector and Kanwisher (2005) who reported equivalent performance on detection and basic-level categorization tasks and took this as evidence that figure-ground segregation and basic-level categorization are mediated by the same mechanism.     

Children use vowels to help them spell consonants

English spelling is highly inconsistent in terms of simple sound-to-spelling correspondences but is more consistent when context is taken into account. For example, the choice between ch and tch is determined by the preceding vowel (coach, roach vs. catch, hatch). We investigated children's sensitivity to vowel context when spelling consonants in monosyllabic nonwords. Second graders (7-year-olds) tended to use vowel context correctly when spelling word-final consonants (codas). This use of context was progressively stronger for third and fifth graders as well as for college students. The increase is not due to differences in vocabulary because the contextual patterns are similar in reading materials targeted at all four age groups. Vowel letters (graphotactics) had a stronger influence than did vowel pronunciation. Children also used vowel context when spelling word-initial consonants (onsets); this effect was as strong for second graders as for adults. Thus, novice spellers take advantage of graphotactic information.     

Disjunctive illusory inferences and how to eliminate them

The mental model theory of reasoning postulates that individuals construct mental models of the possibilities in which the premises of an inference hold and that these models represent what is true but not what is false. An unexpected consequence of this assumption is that certain premises should yield systematically invalid inferences. This prediction is unique among current theories of reasoning, because no alternative theory, whether based on formal rules of inference or on probabilistic considerations, predicts these illusory inferences. We report three studies of novel illusory inferences that depend on embedded disjunctions—for example, premises of this sort: A or else (B or else C). The theory distinguishes between those embedded disjunctions that should yield illusions and those that should not. In Experiment 1, we corroborated this distinction. In Experiment 2, we extended the illusory inferences to a more stringently controlled set of problems. In Experiment 3, we established a novel method for reducing illusions by calling for participants to make auxiliary inferences.     

Pragmatic norms in science: making them explicit

The present work constitutes an attempt to make explicit those pragmatic norms successfully operating in empirical science. I will first comment on the initial presuppositions of the discussion, in particular, on those concerning the instrumental character of scientific practice and the nature of scientific goals. Then I will depict the moderately naturalistic frame in which, from this approach, the pragmatic norms make sense. Third, I will focus on the specificity of the pragmatic norms, making special emphasis on what I regard as a key idea underlying them, namely, the view, vigorously advocated by classical pragmatists like C. S. Peirce and G. Vailati, that the best test for objectivity is the test of action. Finally, I am going to put forward a tentative list of pragmatic norms that can be abstracted from a careful observation and analysis of scientific practice as provided by current philosophers of experimentation (A. Franklin and F. Steinle among others). The norms will be divided into four classes corresponding to four aspects of science in which they rule, that is, self-correction, prediction, explanation and both experimentation and computation. In the following account, the formulation of those pragmatic norms successfully governing science will be understood as a contribution that scientifically-oriented pragmatism can make to the normative naturalistic project in epistemology.     

Phantom arcs: now you see them..

A new visual illusion is reported and illustrated. The illusion, dubbed 'phantom arcs', survives manipulations of contrast, scale, and hue. The arcs can be seen in printed versions as well as in images displayed on CRT or LCD monitors. Data collected in an undergraduate perception class reveal that the illusion can be seen by untrained observers.     

People avoid situations that enable them to deceive others

Information advantage enables people to benefit themselves by deceiving their counterparts. Using a modified ultimatum bargaining game with an exit option, we find that people are more likely to avoid settings enabling them to privately deceive their counterparts than settings which do not enable deception. This tendency is explained by people's reduced desire to become responsible for the other's outcomes when deception is possible. Results of three experiments show that people avoid entering a setting that enables deception by appearing fair while being unfair (Exp. 1–3). Experiment 2 showed that this tendency was reduced when interaction partners were displayed as competitive rather than cooperative. Experiment 3 showed a stronger tendency to avoid tempting situations that enable private deception than to approach situations in which one can privately benefit others. We conclude that when navigating through social space, people avoid situations enabling them to deceive others.     

An age-related dissociation between knowing rules and using them

Four experiments examined children's ability to use their knowledge to guide their behavior in a dimensional change (color-shape) card sort. In Experiment 1, 3- and 4-year-olds were told to sort cards first by one dimension (e.g., color: “Yellow ones go here; green ones go there”) and then by the other. The majority of 3-year-olds continued to use the preswitch rules on the postswitch phase, despite expressing knowledge of the postswitch rules by pointing to the appropriate location when asked about each rule. Experiment 2 found that this dissociation between knowledge and its use occurs even after a single preswitch trial. Experiments 3 and 4 demonstrated that the dissociation also occurs when verbal rather than manual responses are required. Together, the findings indicate that knowing rules is sometimes insufficient to permit their use. According to the cognitive complexity and control theory, the growth of reflection between 3 and 5 years of age underlies increases in control over thought and action by allowing children to integrate incompatible pairs of rules into a single rule system.     

How dogs know when communication is intended for them

Domestic dogs comprehend human gestural communication in a way that other animal species do not. But little is known about the specific cues they use to determine when human communication is intended for them. In a series of four studies, we confronted both adult dogs and young dog puppies with object choice tasks in which a human indicated one of two opaque cups by either pointing to it or gazing at it. We varied whether the communicator made eye contact with the dog in association with the gesture (or whether her back was turned or her eyes were directed at another recipient) and whether the communicator called the dog's name (or the name of another recipient). Results demonstrated the importance of eye contact in human-dog communication, and, to a lesser extent, the calling of the dog's name--with no difference between adult dogs and young puppies--which are precisely the communicative cues used by human infants for identifying communicative intent. Unlike human children, however, dogs did not seem to comprehend the human's communicative gesture when it was directed to another human, perhaps because dogs view all human communicative acts as directives for the recipient.     

Us and them: Mood effects on ingroup projection

Mood states affect judgments in general and intergroup judgments in particular. The aim of the present research was to show that ingroup projection is influenced by affective states in a similar way as ingroup bias. Varying mood states and relevance of the intergroup situation orthogonally, the results supported the hypotheses that positive mood in conjunction with low relevance and negative mood in conjunction with high relevance elicit higher levels of biased prototypicality perceptions compared to the other conditions of the design. Given substantial evidence from previous research that mood in conjunction with perceived relevance moderates motivated versus heuristic processing, we propose that the present results correspond with motivation‐ versus cognition‐based ingroup projection and suggest different processes underlying the phenomenon of relative ingroup prototypicality. Copyright © 2013 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.