Preattentive guidance of eye movements during triple conjunction search tasks: The effects of feature discriminability and saccadic amplitude

Eye movements were monitored during the performance of triple conjunction search tasks. Stimuli varied in color, shape, and orientation. Across trials, the target was either present or absent, and displays consisted of 6, 12, or 24 stimuli. Stimulus discriminability was manipulated for the shape dimension, with half of the participants seeing displays of Es and Fs (low-discriminability [LD] condition) and half seeing displays of Cs and Ts (high-discriminability [HD] condition). Participants in both conditions performed two search tasks. In the single-feature (SF) task, the target stimulus shared one feature with each of the distractors, whereas in the two-feature (TF) task, it shared two features with each distractor. An examination of saccadic endpoints revealed that participants were more likely to fixate on distractor stimuli sharing color (SF task) or color and shape (TF task) with the target. This was a robust finding, being observed across participants, saccades of different amplitudes and sequential position, and following short and long latencies to move. The extent to which participants made use of shape information increased with discriminability.     

The conceptualisation of forgiveness among Turkish children and adolescents

This study examined (a) how Turkish children and adolescents define forgiveness, (b) the association between self‐reported forgiveness and the concepts participants hold and (c) the association between self‐reported forgiveness and age. Three hundred and sixty‐seven Turkish children in primary (N = 220) and secondary schools (N = 147) were involved in the study. Participants were asked to define forgiveness, and the study used the Enright Forgiveness Inventory for Children (EFI‐C). Participants' conceptions of forgiveness were categorised into four groups: conditional forgiveness, reconciliation, ignoring the hurtful event and affective reactions. Half of all the participants in the study were found to be in the conditional forgiveness category. Turkish children were found to be mostly in the category of conditional forgiveness, reconciliation and affective reactions compared with adolescents. Adolescents were mainly found to be in the ignoring the hurtful event category. The highest self‐reported forgiveness mean was in the affective reactions category. Participants were commonly offended by friends, siblings, teachers and fathers. No correlation was found between self‐reported forgiveness and age. The present results expand the literature of forgiveness by presenting evidence that Turkish children's and adolescents' understanding of forgiveness moderately relates to theoretical definitions.     

The influence of action on visual search: behavioral response toward stimuli modifies the selection process

In five experiments, we investigated how simple actions (as assessed via a go/no-go task) influence visual search. In Experiments 1 and 2, participants responded (go) when a color name (cue) matched a colored shape (prime), and did not respond (no-go) when they mismatched. Participants then searched a visual array for a tilted line, either embedded within the prime (valid prime) or within a different shape of a different color (invalid prime). For go trials, but not for no-go trials, the validity of the prime influenced search behavior so that faster RTs were observed when the prime was valid as compared with when it was invalid. In Experiment 3, the go/no-go task was based on the shape of the prime. The color of the prime, but not the shape, was re-presented in the search array, and its validity produced a similar pattern as in Experiments 1-2. In Experiment 4, participants responded when the color name and prime mismatched. Reaction times indicated that attentional set had an influence on the validity differences in Experiments 1-3. In Experiment 5, the go/no-go task was based on whether a digit matched a digit appearing within the prime. Go trials produced similar validity effects as observed in Experiments 1-3.     

Orientation in trapezoid-shaped enclosures: implications for theoretical accounts of geometry learning

Human participants learned to select 1 of 4 distinctively marked corners in a rectangular virtual enclosure. After training, control and test trials were interspersed with training trials. On control and test trials, all markers were equivalent in color, but only during test trials was the shape of the enclosure manipulated. Specifically, for each test trial, a single long wall or short wall of the enclosure increased twice as long as or decreased half as long as that present in the training enclosure. These manipulations produced 8 unique trapezoid-shaped enclosures. Participants were allowed to select 1 corner during control and test trials. Performance during control trials revealed that participants selected the correct and rotationally equivalent locations. Performance during test trials revealed that participants selected locations in trapezoid-shaped enclosures that were consistent with those predicted by global geometry (i.e., principal axis of space) but were inconsistent with those predicted by local geometry (i.e., proportion of rewarded training features present at a location). Results have implications for theoretical accounts of geometry learning.     

Indicative conditionals,conditional probabilities,and the “defective truth-table”: A request for more experiments

While there is now considerable experimental evidence that, on the one hand, participants assign to the indicative conditional as probability the conditional probability of consequent given antecedent and, on the other, they assign to the indicative conditional the “defective truth-table” in which a conditional with false antecedent is deemed neither true nor false, these findings do not in themselves establish which multi-premise inferences involving conditionals participants endorse. A natural extension of the truth-table semantics pronounces as valid numerous inference patterns that do seem to be part of ordinary usage. However, coupled with something the probability account gives us—namely that when conditional-free ? entails conditional-free ψ, “if ? then ψ” is a trivial, uninformative truth—we have enough logic to derive the paradoxes of material implication. It thus becomes a matter of some urgency to determine which inference patterns involving indicative conditionals participants do endorse. Only thus will we be able to arrive at a realistic, systematic semantics for the indicative conditional.     

Abstract reasoning and the interpretation of basic conditionals

Studies examining the interpretation that is given to if–then statementstypically use what are referred to as basic conditionals, which give contextless relations between two unrelated concrete terms (If the ball is blue, then the shape is square). However, there is some evidence that basic conditionals require a more abstract form of representation. In order to examine this, we presented participants with truth-table tasks involving either basic conditionals or conditionals referring to imaginary categories (If it is a bori, then it has red wings), and standard conditional inference tasks with abstract and familiar premises. As expected, fewer typical defective conditional interpretations were given to basic conditionals. In addition, partial correlations showed a unique relationship between the interpretation of basic conditionals and abstract inferential reasoning. Results suggest that people process basic conditionals as a form of abstract reasoning, and that the interpretation of conditionals must consider the semantic context.     

Salience drives overt selection of two equally relevant visual targets

In the present study, we investigated whether salience determines the sequence of selection when participants search for two equally relevant visual targets. To do this, attentional selection was tracked overtly as observers inspected two items of differing physical salience: one a highly salient color singleton, and the other a less salient shape singleton. Participants were instructed to make natural eye movements in order to determine whether two line segments contained within the two singletons were oriented in the same or in different directions. Because both singleton items were task-relevant, participants had no reason to inspect one item before the other. As expected, observers fixated both targets on the majority of trials. Critically, saccades to the color singleton preceded saccades to the less salient shape singleton on the majority of trials. This demonstrates that the order of attentional object selection is largely determined by stimulus salience when task relevance is equated.     

Effects of context on the rate of conjunctive responses in the probabilistic truth table task

The probabilistic truth table task involves assessing the probability of "If A then C" conditional sentences. Previous studies have shown that a majority of participants assess this probability as the conditional probability P(C│A) while a substantial minority responds with the probability of the conjunction A and C. In an experiment involving 96 participants, we investigated the impact on the rate of conjunctive responses of the context in which the task is framed. We show that a context intended to lead participants to consider all the possible cases (i.e. the throw of a die known to allow six possibilities) elicited more conjunctive responses than a context assumed not to have this effect (an unfamiliar deck of cards). These results suggest that the step of inferring the probability can distort our assessment of participants' interpretation of conditional sentences. This might compromise the validity of the probabilistic task in studying conditional reasoning.     

Conditional reasoning in context: A developmental dual processes account

The way individuals interpret “if p then q” conditionals varies with content and context, often resulting in a biconditional reading. Surprisingly, truth table tasks reveal the existence of two different types of biconditional interpretations: equivalence, as for promises and threats, and defective biconditional, as for causal conditionals or indicative conditionals involving binary terms. The aim of this study was to determine how the interpretation of indicative conditionals is affected in children, adolescents, and adults, by restricting their context of enunciation to only one possible alternative for both the antecedent and the consequent. Moreover, we wanted to determine what is the exact nature of the biconditional interpretation induced by these restricted contexts. For this purpose, third, sixth, and ninth graders and adults performed a truth-value task on indicative conditionals presented either in restricted on non-restricted contexts. Restricted contexts had no effect on children who have a conjunctive interpretation of the conditional, but elicited a predominant defective biconditional reading in adolescents and adults. These results corroborate the developmental dual process account of conditional reasoning proposed by Gauffroy and Barrouillet (2009).     

The role of causal models in multiple judgments under uncertainty

Two studies examined a novel prediction of the causal Bayes net approach to judgments under uncertainty, namely that causal knowledge affects the interpretation of statistical evidence obtained over multiple observations. Participants estimated the conditional probability of an uncertain event (breast cancer) given information about the base rate, hit rate (probability of a positive mammogram given cancer) and false positive rate (probability of a positive mammogram in the absence of cancer). Conditional probability estimates were made after observing one or two positive mammograms. Participants exhibited a causal stability effect: there was a smaller increase in estimates of the probability of cancer over multiple positive mammograms when a causal explanation of false positives was provided. This was the case when the judgments were made by different participants (Experiment 1) or by the same participants (Experiment 2). These results show that identical patterns of observed events can lead to different estimates of event probability depending on beliefs about the generative causes of the observations.     

A theory of belief

A theory of belief is presented in which uncertainty has two dimensions. The two dimensions have a variety of interpretations. The article focusses on two of these interpretations.The first is that one dimension corresponds to probability and the other to “definiteness,” which itself has a variety of interpretations. One interpretation of definiteness is as the ordinal inverse of an aspect of uncertainty called “ambiguity” that is often considered important in the decision theory literature. (Greater ambiguity produces less definiteness and vice versa.) Another interpretation of definiteness is as a factor that measures the distortion of an individual's probability judgments that is due to specific factors involved in the cognitive processing leading to judgments. This interpretation is used to provide a new foundation for support theories of probability judgments and a new formulation of the “Unpacking Principle” of Tversky and Koehler.The second interpretation of the two dimensions of uncertainty is that one dimension of an event A corresponds to a function that measures the probabilistic strength of A as the focal event in conditional events of the form A|B, and the other dimension corresponds to a function that measures the probabilistic strength of A as the context or conditioning event in conditional events of the form C|A. The second interpretation is used to provide an account of experimental results in which for disjoint events A and B, the judge probabilities of A|(A∪B) and B|(A∪B) do not sum to 1.The theory of belief is axiomatized qualitatively in terms of a primitive binary relation ? on conditional events. (A|B?C|D is interpreted as “the degree of belief of A|B is greater than the degree of belief of C|D.”) It is shown that the axiomatization is a generalization of conditional probability in which a principle of conditional probability that has been repeatedly criticized on normative grounds may fail.Representation and uniqueness theorems for the axiomatization demonstrate that the resulting generalization is comparable in mathematical richness to finitely additive probability theory.     

Interpretational factors in conditional reasoning

Two experiments examined the role of necessity and sufficiency relationships in conditional reasoning. The results indicated that perceived necessity and sufficiency predicted variability in reasoning performance for four pragmatic relations (permission, obligation, causation, and definition), for both determinant and indeterminant syntactic forms, and for both a conditional arguments and a truth table evaluation task, as well as when the temporal relationship between the antecedent and consequent events was reversed. These data support the general utility of perceived necessity and sufficiency in the interpretation and evaluation of conditional relationships. However, the effects of necessity and sufficiency were smaller for reversed than for forward statements, which suggests that necessity/sufficiency-based interpretations may be more useful for evaluating some types of conditional relations than others. In addition, people were more likely to accept valid rather than invalid arguments, regardless of necessity/sufficiency relations, a finding that suggests that abstract, content-free representations may play a functional role in conditional reasoning.     

Interpretation of ambiguous emotional information in clinically anxious children and adolescents

Cognitive theories of anxiety based on adult data predict that individuals vulnerable to anxiety should show threat - related interpretations of ambiguous material and it is proposed that this is an important maintaining factor in anxiety disorders. In the present study, interpretation of ambiguous emotional/neutral information was examined in child and adolescent anxious patients. Two groups of participants, anxious patients (n = 17) and healthy controls (n = 40), were presented with a series of homographs, each with a threatening and a neutral interpretation. For each homograph, the participants were asked to construct a sentence using the homograph. Anxious children and adolescents produced significantly more sentences consistent with threatening homograph interpretations and less consistent with neutral interpretations than did normal controls. Regression analyses revealed no relationship between age and this interpretive bias. Preliminary developmental and theoretical implications are discussed.     

Spatial and nonspatial working memory and visual search

It has been indicated that visual search is interfered with in spatial working memory (WM), although not in nonspatial WM. In this study, the effects on visual search of individual differences in spatial and nonspatial WM were examined. Two visual search conditions were used: a conjunction search condition comprising two features (color and shape) and a disjunction condition comprising only one feature (color or shape). 96 participants (42 men, 54 women, M age = 20.9 yr., SD = 3.5) participated in this study. The participants were divided into high and low WM groups based on their spatial and nonspatial WM test scores. As a result, statistically significant group differences in the conjunction search rate were observed in spatial WM but not in nonspatial WM. These results suggest there is a relationship between visual search and the individual spatial WM ability, but this does not hold for nonspatial WM.     

Categorization influences illusory conjunctions

Illusory conjunctions (ICs) provide evidence for a binding problem that must be resolved in vision. Objects that are perceptually grouped are more likely to have their features erroneously conjoined. We examined whether semantic grouping, determined by category membership (letter vs. number), also influences illusory conjunction rates. Participants were instructed to detect an “L” or a “7” among briefly presented character strings and to report its color. Despite high shape discrimination accuracy, participants often made color conjunction errors, reporting instead the color of a distractor character, “O”. This distractor could be ambiguously interpreted as a letter or a number. The status of the “O” was determined by other noncolored flanker characters, which were either letters or numbers. When both the target and flankers were of the same category, participants made more ICs than when the target and flankers were of different categories. This finding demonstrates that alphanumeric categorization can precede and subsequently influence binding.     

Implicit learning for probable changes in a visual change detection task

Previous research demonstrates that implicitly learned probability information can guide visual attention. We examined whether the probability of an object changing can be implicitly learned and then used to improve change detection performance. In a series of six experiments, participants completed 120–130 training change detection trials. In four of the experiments the object that changed color was the same shape (trained shape) on every trial. Participants were not explicitly aware of this change probability manipulation and change detection performance was not improved for the trained shape versus untrained shapes. In two of the experiments, the object that changed color was always in the same general location (trained location). Although participants were not explicitly aware of the change probability, implicit knowledge of it did improve change detection performance in the trained location. These results indicate that improved change detection performance through implicitly learned change probability occurs for location but not shape.     

Facilitating a benign interpretation bias in a high socially anxious population

Previous research has shown that high socially anxious individuals lack the benign interpretation bias present in people without social anxiety. The tendency of high socially anxious people to generate more negative interpretations may lead to anticipated anxiety about future social situations. If so, developing a more benign interpretation bias could lead to a reduction in this anxiety. The current study showed that a benign interpretation bias could be facilitated (or 'trained') in a high socially anxious population. Participants in the benign training groups had repeated practice in accessing benign (positive or non-negative) interpretations of potentially threatening social scenarios. Participants in the control condition were presented with the same social scenarios but without their outcomes being specified. In a later recognition task, participants who received benign interpretation training generated more benign, and less negative, interpretations of new ambiguous social situations compared to the control group. Participants who received benign training also predicted that they would be significantly less anxious in a future social situation than those in the control group. Possible implications of the findings for therapeutic interventions in social phobia are discussed.     

Task switching and shifting between stopping and going: Developmental change in between-trial control adjustments

This study set out to investigate developmental differences in the ability to switch between choice tasks and to shift between Go/NoGo and choice tasks. Three age groups (7-year-olds, 11-year-olds, and young adults) were asked to consider the shape or color of a bivalued target stimulus. The participants performed a switch task in which a cue signaled the task to be performed (i.e., respond to shape vs. respond to color) and a shift task in which a cue instructed them to make a choice reaction to the shape of the stimulus or to respond (Go) versus inhibit (NoGo) to the color of the stimulus. The ability to switch was examined by considering choice-choice switches versus choice-choice repeats. The ability to shift was examined by considering NoGo-to-choice shifts versus choice-choice repeats and NoGo-to-Go shifts versus Go-Go repeats. The results showed that responding on Go trials was delayed following response inhibition on a NoGo trial. This delay did not discriminate between age groups. Responding on choice trials was considerably slowed when following response inhibition on NoGo trials. This slowing decreased with advancing age. Finally, responses on switch trials were slower compared with repeat trials, and this slowing was disproportionately large in young children compared with the other two age groups. This pattern of findings was interpreted in terms of a generic mechanism involving between-trial control adjustments in the setting of response thresholds that are likely to be mediated by a complex neural network implicating the dorsolateral prefrontal cortex and the presupplementary motor cortex.     

Interpreting elliptical verb phrases

Elliptical verb phrases are anaphoric expressions whose correct interpretation depends on the exact form of the preceding text as well as its meaning. However, people are not very good at remembering surface details of what they read or hear, so how do they understand such expressions? One alternative to a linguistically based interpretation of elliptical verb phrases is to assign them meanings that are plausible, given general knowledge about the situation being described. In an experiment, subjects read passages in which context provided a plausible interpretation for an elliptical verb phrase that either was or was not at odds with the linguistically correct interpretation. There was a tendency for subjects to assign plausible, but incorrect, meanings to elliptical verb phrases. This tendency increased with the distance between the elliptical verb phrase and its antecedent. Incorrect interpretations were assigned slowly, and the speed of assignment increased with distance from the antecedent. These results suggest that people try to interpret elliptical verb phrases correctly, but that they are not always able to do so. Furthermore, they indicate that the intuition that elliptical verb phrases are easy to interpret is misleading. If text is to be comprehensible, speakers and writers must use such expressions with care.     

On Bound Variable Interpretations: The LF-Only Hypothesis

Under what conditions do perceivers prefer to assign a bound variable interpretation to a pronominal that is ambiguous between a bound variable and a coreferential interpretation? Several experiments were designed to test the hypothesis that language perceivers prefer a bound variable over a coreferential interpretation of a pronoun because the former only requires consultation of a logical form (LF) representation, while the latter requires access to a discourse representation. The hypothesis was disconfirmed in two respects. First, although bound variable interpretations show a processing advantage over coreferential interpretations in VP ellipsis constructions, the preference for bound variable interpretations is not general--it does not extend to other quantificational contexts. Second, the preference for bound variable interpretations in VP ellipsis constructions is not limited to examples in which the antecedent and the ellipsis site occur in the same sentence. If the bound variable advantage were due to the ready availability of the LF for the current sentence, the advantage should disappear across sentence boundaries. An alternative hypothesis is then considered which could explain the source of the bound variable advantage in VP ellipsis contexts.