Disgust as embodied moral judgment

How, and for whom, does disgust influence moral judgment? In four experiments participants made moral judgments while experiencing extraneous feelings of disgust. Disgust was induced in Experiment 1 by exposure to a bad smell, in Experiment 2 by working in a disgusting room, in Experiment 3 by recalling a physically disgusting experience, and in Experiment 4 through a video induction. In each case, the results showed that disgust can increase the severity of moral judgments relative to controls. Experiment 4 found that disgust had a different effect on moral judgment than did sadness. In addition, Experiments 2-4 showed that the role of disgust in severity of moral judgments depends on participants' sensitivity to their own bodily sensations. Taken together, these data indicate the importance-and specificity-of gut feelings in moral judgments.     

Pavlovian Disgust Conditioning and Generalization: Specificity and Associations With Individual Differences

Although studies have identified differences between fear and disgust conditioning, much less is known about the generalization of conditioned disgust. This is an important gap in the literature given that overgeneralization of conditioned disgust to neutral stimuli may have clinical implications. To address this knowledge gap, female participants (n = 80) completed a Pavlovian conditioning procedure in which one neutral food item (conditioned stimulus; CS+) was followed by disgusting videos of individuals vomiting (unconditioned stimulus; US) and another neutral food item (CS–) was not reinforced with the disgusting video. Following this acquisition phase, there was an extinction phase in which both CSs were presented unreinforced. Importantly, participants also evaluated generalization stimuli (GS+, GS?) that resembled, but were distinct from, the CS after each conditioning phase. As predicted, the CS+ was rated as significantly more disgusting and fear inducing than the CS? after acquisition and this pattern persisted after extinction. However, disgust ratings of the CS+ after acquisition were significantly larger than fear ratings. Participants also rated the GS+ as significantly more disgusting, but not fear inducing, than the GS? after acquisition. However, this effect was not observed after extinction. Disgust proneness did predict a greater increase in disgust and fear ratings of the CS+ relative to the CS? after acquisition and extinction. In contrast, trait anxiety predicted only higher fear ratings to the CS+ relative to the CS? after acquisition and extinction. Disgust proneness nor trait anxiety predicted the greater increase in disgust to the GS+ relative to the GS? after acquisition. These findings suggest that while conditioned disgust can generalize, individual difference variables that predict generalization remain unclear. The implications of these findings for disorders of disgust are discussed.     

Will you touch a dirty diaper? Attitudes towards disgust and behaviour

Individuals differ in their willingness to engage with disgusting stimuli (e.g., dirty diapers). We propose that such differences are associated with attitudes towards disgust. Specifically, we predicted that people with less negative attitudes towards disgust (i.e., those who evaluate disgust less negatively) would be more willing to engage with disgusting stimuli. We asked participants to engage with disgusting stimuli in the laboratory and used two measures that assess behavioural and affective or cognitive components of attitudes towards disgust. As predicted, less negative attitudes towards disgust were associated with greater engagement with disgusting stimuli, above and beyond the current experience of disgust and the tendency to experience disgust. These findings stress the importance of attitudes towards emotions in understanding emotion-relevant behaviour.     

Imagine no religion: Heretical disgust,anger and the symbolic purity of mind

Immoral actions, including physical/sexual (e.g., incest) and social (e.g., unfairness) taboos, are often described as disgusting. But what about immoral thoughts, more specifically, thoughts that violate religious beliefs? Do heretical thoughts taint the purity of mind? The present research examined heretical disgust using self-report measures and facial electromyography. Religious thought violations consistently elicited both self-reported disgust and anger. Feelings of disgust also predicted harsh moral judgement, independent of anger, and were mediated by feelings of “contamination”. However, religious thought violations were not associated with a disgust facial expression (i.e., levator labii muscle activity) that was elicited by physically disgusting stimuli. We conclude that people (especially more religious people) do feel disgust in response to heretical thoughts that is meaningfully distinct from anger as a moral emotion. However, heretical disgust is not embodied in a physical disgust response. Rather, disgust has a symbolic moral value that marks heretical thoughts as harmful and aversive.     

On the role of goal relevance in emotional attention: Disgust evokes early attention to cleanliness

Prior evidence has shown that aversive emotional states are characterised by an attentional bias towards aversive events. The present study investigated whether aversive emotions also bias attention towards stimuli that represent means by which the emotion can be alleviated. We induced disgust by having participants touch fake disgusting objects. Participants in the control condition touched non-disgusting objects. The results of a subsequent dot-probe task revealed that attention was oriented to disgusting pictures irrespective of condition. However, participants in the disgust condition also oriented towards pictures representing cleanliness. These findings suggest that the deployment of attention in aversive emotional states is not purely stimulus driven but is also guided by the goal to alleviate this emotional state.     

On the role of goal relevance in emotional attention: disgust evokes early attention to cleanliness

Prior evidence has shown that aversive emotional states are characterised by an attentional bias towards aversive events. The present study investigated whether aversive emotions also bias attention towards stimuli that represent means by which the emotion can be alleviated. We induced disgust by having participants touch fake disgusting objects. Participants in the control condition touched non-disgusting objects. The results of a subsequent dot-probe task revealed that attention was oriented to disgusting pictures irrespective of condition. However, participants in the disgust condition also oriented towards pictures representing cleanliness. These findings suggest that the deployment of attention in aversive emotional states is not purely stimulus driven but is also guided by the goal to alleviate this emotional state.     

A bad taste in the mouth: gustatory disgust influences moral judgment

Can sweet-tasting substances trigger kind, favorable judgments about other people? What about substances that are disgusting and bitter? Various studies have linked physical disgust to moral disgust, but despite the rich and sometimes striking findings these studies have yielded, no research has explored morality in conjunction with taste, which can vary greatly and may differentially affect cognition. The research reported here tested the effects of taste perception on moral judgments. After consuming a sweet beverage, a bitter beverage, or water, participants rated a variety of moral transgressions. Results showed that taste perception significantly affected moral judgments, such that physical disgust (induced via a bitter taste) elicited feelings of moral disgust. Further, this effect was more pronounced in participants with politically conservative views than in participants with politically liberal views. Taken together, these differential findings suggest that embodied gustatory experiences may affect moral processing more than previously thought.     

Disgust,creatureliness and the accessibility of death‐related thoughts

From an existential terror management theory perspective, disgusting stimuli are threatening to human beings because they make salient people's vulnerability to death. Two studies were designed to assess this proposition by measuring implicit death‐related ideation after individuals were presented with stimuli that either were or were not disgusting, under conditions in which the similarities of humans to other animals or the uniquely human aspects of people were made salient. In Study 1, in which rather extreme disgust‐eliciting pictures were used, disgusting stimuli led to higher death‐thought accessibility than neutral pictures regardless of whether or not participants had previously been primed with similarities between humans and other animals. In Study 2, in which milder verbal disgust‐eliciting stimuli were used, disgusting stimuli led to heightened death‐thought accessibility only when human‐animal similarities were first primed. Implications for the regulation and humanization of the human body and its functions are discussed. Copyright © 2006 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.     

厌恶情绪影响道德判断的发展研究

厌恶情绪的产生是为了回避潜在的病菌的威胁。研究发现,相比中性情绪状态下,厌恶情绪让人们更反对违背道德的行为,认为这些行为更错。目前,对于厌恶情绪对道德判断影响的发展还没有相关的研究。本实验以小学一年级,四年级及成人为研究对象来考察厌恶情绪对道德判断影响的发展。实验中被试被随机分入厌恶启动组和控制组,完成厌恶情绪任务和行为的道德判断任务。研究结果显示,在启动厌恶情绪之后,四年级和成人被试对道德违背行为的错误程度判断更为严格,同时四年级被试对行为的回避程度更高。一年级被试在厌恶情绪和控制条件下道德判断差异不显著。研究结果说明厌恶情绪对道德判断的影响是从无到有逐渐发展的。     

Consequences of agreement versus disagreement on physical disgust: How do people perceive the cleanliness and morality of someone who expresses inappropriate disgust

We examined how people perceived a person who expressed inappropriate physical disgust—a person who was either under-disgusted by physically disgusting stimuli or over-disgusted by neutral stimuli. Participants formed an impression of a target after receiving information on how s/he rated disgusting (Studies 1, 2) or neutral (Studies 2, 3) pictures, and disgusting or angering scenarios (Study 4). Studies 1, 2 and 4 found that a target person who failed to experience disgust was seen as disgusting, immoral (but only to the extent that s/he was also seen unclean), and not socially desirable. A target who rated neutral stimuli as disgusting was not judged as disgusting but was nevertheless judged as immoral and not socially desirable (Studies 2, 3). Our results show that a target whose judgments of physical disgust deviate from one's own by showing either too much or too little disgust is perceived to be immoral.     

Is it disgusting to be reminded that you are an animal?

Six studies (Ns?=?65, 96, 120, 129, 40, 200) tested the hypothesis that being reminded of our animal nature makes us feel disgust. Participants from three cultural groups indicated the intensity of their disgust reactions to pleasant and unpleasant animal reminder stories and pictures as well as to a statement directly reminding them of their animal nature. Findings did not support the hypothesis: Pleasant animal reminders reminded respondents of their animal nature (even more powerfully than did unpleasant ones), but were not disgusting. The direct reminder of our animal nature was not disgusting. There was no significant correlation between disgust and being reminded of animal nature for disgusting (unpleasant) animal reminders. Thus, some disgusting events remind us of our animal nature, but they are not disgusting because they remind us of our animal nature. Animal reminders per se are not disgusting.     

“May I present you: my disgust!” – Declared disgust sensitivity in the presence of attractive models

Disgust sensitivity differs among men and women, and this phenomenon has been observed across numerous cultures. It remains unknown why such sex differences occur, but one of the reasons may relate to differences in self-presentation. We tested that hypothesis in an experiment comprising 299 participants (49% women) randomly allocated into three groups. Each group completed the Three Domains Disgust Scale (TDDS) and rated how disgusting they found olfactory, visual, gustatory, and tactile disgust elicitors either when a male experimenter was present, a female experimenter was present, or no experimenter was present. We hypothesised that male participants in the female experimenter group would declare decreased levels of disgust sensitivity, and female participants in the male experimenter group would declare increased levels of disgust sensitivity. Results showed that despite sex differences in pathogen and sexual disgust, attractive experimenters did not evoke any differences in declared disgust across groups with one exception–both men and women self-presented as more sensitive to sexual disgust in the presence of the female experimenter. We discuss our findings in the light of evolutionary and social theories.     

Be aware of the rifle but do not forget the stench: differential effects of fear and disgust on lexical processing and memory

The aim of this study was to investigate the role of discrete emotions in lexical processing and memory, focusing on disgust and fear. We compared neutral words to disgust-related words and fear-related words in three experiments. In Experiments 1 and 2, participants performed a lexical decision task (LDT), and in Experiment 3 an affective categorisation task. These tasks were followed by an unexpected memory task. The results of the LDT experiments showed slower reaction times for both types of negative words with respect to neutral words, plus a higher percentage of errors, this being more consistent for fear-related words (Experiments 1 and 2) than for disgust-related words (Experiment 2). Furthermore, only disgusting words exhibited a higher recall accuracy than neutral words in the memory task. Moreover, the advantage in memory for disgusting words disappeared when participants carried out an affective categorisation task during encoding (Experiment 3), suggesting that the superiority in memory for disgusting words observed in Experiments 1 and 2 could be due to greater elaborative processing. Taken together, these findings point to the relevance of discrete emotions in explaining the effects of the emotional content on lexical processing and memory.     

Dissociable effects of fear and disgust in proactive and reactive inhibition

Numerous studies have demonstrated that negative emotional distracters impair inhibitory control. Nevertheless, two issues have emerged in prior studies. First, fear and disgust were inappropriately treated as a single category, which is particularly concerning given that they have been recently demonstrated to exert different impacts on inhibitory control. Second, inhibitory control might not be a unitary construct, as it can be further divided into proactive and reactive inhibition. Therefore, the present study aimed to investigate whether fearful and disgusting distracters have differential effects on proactive and reactive inhibition. Twenty-four female participants were instructed to perform a modified stop-signal task superimposed on a fearful, disgusting, or neutral image cue. Results showed that fearful distracters improved reactive inhibition when compared to disgusting and neutral distracters, while disgusting distracters enhanced proactive inhibition when compared to fearful distracters. Further, reactive and proactive inhibition was positively correlated under fearful, disgusting, and neutral contexts. This study is the first to provide evidence that fear and disgust may affect proactive and reactive inhibition differently. These results add to a growing literature linking emotion and inhibitory control, and they expand our understanding of the relationship between emotion and inhibition.     

Enhanced recall of disgusting relative to frightening photographs is not due to organisation

Previous research has shown that disgusting photographs are better remembered than frightening photographs, even when the two image types have equivalent valence and arousal. However, this work did not control for potential differences in organisation between the disgusting and frightening stimuli that could account for enhanced memory for disgusting photographs. The current research therefore tested whether differences in recall between disgusting and frightening photographs persist when differences in organisation are eliminated. Using a set of disgusting and frightening photographs matched for interrelatedness, Study 1 found that participants recalled more disgusting photographs than frightening photographs. This effect was mediated by increased attention to the disgusting photographs. Study 2 used Latent Semantic Analysis to further interrogate the relatedness of the photographs, providing converging evidence that organisation does not account for enhanced recall of disgusting photographs. Taken together, these results suggest that dimensional models of emotion cannot fully account for emotion’s effects on episodic memory. Instead, disgust appears to enhance recall via a distinctive, attention-mediated mechanism.     

A feel for disgust: tactile cues to pathogen presence

One function of disgust is to act as a pathogen-avoidance system preventing contact with substances harbouring disease-causing organisms. Avoiding pathogens, however, requires systems for their detection. Whereas previous research on disgust has focused on visual and olfactory detection cues, one largely overlooked modality is touch. Here we examine whether tactile cues play a role in pathogen detection and activate the disgust response. Participants briefly touched and then rated stimuli varying along dimensions predicted to correlate with pathogen presence: moisture, temperature, and consistency. Results show that participants rated wet stimuli and stimuli resembling biological consistencies as more disgusting than dry stimuli and stimuli resembling inanimate consistencies, respectively. No main effect for temperature was found. We report on predicted interactions, the relationship between disgust ratings and perceived infection risk, and individual differences. Taken together, these data suggest that touch is an important modality providing information for disgust-related processes.     

When pooping babies become more appealing: the effects of nonconscious goal pursuit on experienced emotions

In this report, we argue that the intensity of the emotions people experience is partly determined by the goals they nonconsciously pursue, and that this effect is functional in nature: Emotions are modulated in ways that may increase the probability of goal achievement. To test this hypothesis, we primed female participants with a motherhood goal and then measured their level of disgust in response to mildly disgusting pictures. Priming led to a reduction of disgust in response to goal-relevant stimuli (e.g., pictures of babies with runny noses) but not goal-irrelevant stimuli. This effect was moderated by the women's probability of conception, a proxy of their ability to pursue the motherhood goal.     

Is Disgust Prepared? A Preliminary Examination in Young Children

Children may be prepared to associate adult disgust reactions with adult disgust elicitors. To test this, three-year olds (and adults) were presented with two images and an emotive vocalization. The images and vocalizations included stimuli adults found disgusting, fear-provoking, and sad. On one set of trials, the main dependent variable (DV) was time spent looking at each image and on a second set of repeat trials the DV was knowledge of image-sound matches. Fear and disgust vocalizations were both more effective at orienting a child's attention to adult fear and disgust images, than sad vocalizations. Parental disgust sensitivity was associated with this effect, moderated by explicit matching knowledge. Matching knowledge was poor in children and good in adults. These data suggest that in children, fear and disgust vocalizations may both promote attention to stimuli that adults find disgusting and/or fear-provoking, suggesting that “preparedness” may not be wholly emotion-specific.     

Is disgust sensitive to classical conditioning as indexed by facial electromyography and behavioural responses?

Earlier studies provided preliminary support for the role of classical conditioning as a pathway of disgust learning, yet this evidence has been limited to self-report. This study included facial electromyographical (EMG) measurements (corrugator and levator muscles) and a behavioural approach task to assess participants’ motivation-to-eat the actual food items (conditioned stimuli, CS). Food items served as CS and film excerpts of a woman vomiting served as unconditioned stimuli (US). Following acquisition the CS+ (neutral CS paired with US disgust) was rated as more disgusting and less positive. Notably, the conditioned response was transferred to the actual food items as evidenced by participants’ reported lowered willingness-to-eat. Participants also showed heightened EMG activity in response to the CS+ which seemed driven by the corrugator indexing a global negative affect. These findings suggest that classical conditioning as a pathway of disgust learning can be reliably observed in subjective but not in disgust-specific physiological responding.     

厌恶与恐惧面孔的记忆编码、保持、提取

情绪记忆增强效应在负性情绪记忆研究中被反复证实。尽管厌恶和恐惧同属负性情绪, 提示威胁的存在, 但由于它们的进化意义和生理功能不同, 可能导致它们对记忆的编码、保持、提取三个阶段不同的调节方向或调节强度。本文采用延迟再认任务, 采用事件相关电位考察健康成年被试对唤醒度和效价相当的恐惧和厌恶面孔的记忆编码、保持和提取。结果显示, 1)在记忆编码的早期, 被试主要加强了对恐惧面孔的注意(P1)和结构编码(N170), 而厌恶信息的加工受到了抑制; 2)从记忆编码晚期到记忆保持的整个阶段, 被试对厌恶信息的精细评估(编码阶段P3)和复述保持(保持阶段的负走向慢波)均强于恐惧信息; 3)相比于恐惧面孔, 厌恶面孔可能在工作记忆系统形成了更强的表征, 从而使被试在记忆提取时可回忆起更多的细节, 对记忆提取的信心更足(提取阶段P3)。这后两条发现是导致行为层面上厌恶情绪记忆优于恐惧情绪记忆的原因。本研究为“厌恶比恐惧具有更强的记忆增强效应”提供了高时间分辨率的脑活动层面的证据, 从而进一步揭示了负性情绪增强记忆的认知机制。