What's Fair When a Child Testifies?1

Undergraduates (N = 385) watched a 2-hr, videotaped, mock trial of a child sexual abuse case. The child testified in open court, with a barrier between the child and the defendant, or via closed circuit television. Students enacted the role of a juror, sibling of the defendant, or sibling of the mother of the victim. The judge either did or did not warn jurors that the barrier or video should not be considered evidence of the defendant's guilt. Use of the barrier or video did not influence guilty votes, the credibility of witnesses, nor the perceived fairness of the trial for jurors. Siblings of the defendant perceived these procedures to be biased and their use as unfair. Increased publicity about the use of barriers and closed-circuit television when children testify is recommended to reduce objections to these procedures.     

Bias in Jurors vs Bias in Juries: New Evidence from the SDS Perspective

Prior research by Kaplan and Miller (1978) suggested that juries are generally influenced less by extralegal, biasing information than individual jurors are. A social decision scheme (SDS) analysis of this question by Kerr, MacCoun, and Kramer (1997) suggested (a) that Kaplan and Miller's conclusion should hold only for relatively extreme legal cases (i.e., cases where the probability of conviction, without biasing information, was either very high or very low) and (b) that the opposite pattern should hold for moderate cases (with moderate conviction rates)—i.e., juries should show even greater sensitivity to biasing information than should individual jurors. An experiment is reported that compared juror vs jury sensitivity to biasing information (viz., prejudicial pretrial publicity) for versions of a legal case with a moderate and an extreme conviction rate. Consistent with the SDS analysis, juries were more biased than jurors for the moderate-case version, but the reverse was true for the extreme-case version. The implications of these findings and the more general utility of the SDS model for studying group processes are discussed.     

Of private talk and public print: General pre-trial publicity and juror decision-making

The term ‘general pre-trial publicity’ refers to trial-related information that is prominently in the news, and that affects jurors in wholly unrelated cases. Two experiments explored the impact of general pre-trial publicity on juror decision-making. In Experiment 1 mock jurors who earlier read a newspaper article about a defendant mistakenly identified and subsequently convicted of a crime he did not commit were less likely to convict the defendant in an unrelated case than were jurors who read instead about a series of heinous crimes or who had no pre-trial publicity. Experiment 2 demonstrated that this effect is somewhat stronger when the general pre-trial publicity concerns a case that closely resembles the one jurors must decide than when the two cases are dissimilar. These data are discussed in terms of the availability of relevant information in memory. People may evaluate the probability of a defendant's guilt by the ease with which similar or relevant examples come to mind.     

Negative and positive pretrial publicity affect juror memory and decision making

The experiment examined the effects of exposure to pretrial publicity (PTP) and delay on juror memory and decision-making. Mock jurors read news articles containing negative PTP, positive PTP, or unrelated articles. Five days later, they viewed a videotaped murder trial, after which they made decisions about guilt. Finally, all participants independently attributed specific information as having been presented during the trial or in the news articles. Half of the jurors rendered their verdicts and completed the source-memory test immediately after the trial, while the other half did so after a 2-day delay. Exposure to PTP significantly affected guilty verdicts, perceptions of defendant credibility, juror ratings of the prosecuting and defense attorneys, and misattributions of PTP as having been presented as trial evidence. Similar effects were obtained for negative and positive PTP. Delay significantly increased source-memory errors but did not influence guilt ratings. Defendant's credibility and juror ratings of prosecuting and defense attorneys significantly mediated the effect of PTP on guilt ratings. (PsycINFO Database Record (c) 2008 APA, all rights reserved).     

Effects of Prejudicial Pretrial Publicity From Physical and Witness Evidence on Mock Jurors' Decision Making1

The effects of prejudicial pretrial publicity (PTP) from physical and witness evidence on decisions made by trained and untrained mock jurors were compared. Mock jurors viewed a videotaped rape trial and participated in jury deliberations. Training consisted of completion of a university course on psychology and law. As expected, physical evidence PTP produced more guilty votes than witness or no PTP. Both types of PTP influenced untrained mock jurors' punishment preferences and perceptions of satisfaction and fairness, whereas trained mock jurors' opinions on these measures were unaffected by PTP. Deliberations of trained mock juries were more task‐oriented and focused on relevant evidence and legal issues than that of their untrained peers. Limitations of this mock jury study were discussed.     

Reasoning about scientific evidence: effects of juror gender and evidence quality on juror decisions in a hostile work environment case.

This study examined whether participants were sensitive to variations in the quality of an experiment discussed by an expert witness and whether they used heuristic cues when evaluating the expert evidence. In the context of a hostile work environment case, different versions of the expert testimony varied the presence of heuristic cues (i.e., whether the expert's research was generally accepted or ecologically valid) and evidence quality (i.e., the construct validity of the expert's research). Men who heard expert testimony were more likely to find that the plaintiff's workplace was hostile than were men who did not hear the expert testimony; expert testimony did not influence women's liability judgments. Heuristic cues influenced participant evaluations of the expert testimony validity, but evidence quality did not. Cross-examination did not increase juror sensitivity to evidence quality. Implications for science in the legal system are discussed.     

An editorial overview

Now is an excellent time to be doing research at the intersection of psychology and law. In the last few years, both the legal system and the legal academic community have taken more and more interest in the empirical findings of cognitive and social psychologists. Much of this interest has been provoked by the large number of convicted people who have been exonerated by DNA evidence. Examination of their cases reveals that most are associated with one (or more) of the following problems: bad eyewitness testimony, a false confession, or flawed forensic evidence. These issues are ones that psychologists have been investigating for years. For those of you new to this area, we recommend Elizabeth Loftus’s foundational work on so many areas of memory, Gary Wells’s work on eyewitness identification, Saul Kassin’s work on false confessions, and Reid Hastie’s work on jury decision making. All have written for both psychological and legal audiences.     

Enhancing the credibility of complainants in child sexual assault trials: the effect of expert evidence and judicial directions

This study investigated the knowledge and misconceptions of jury‐eligible citizens about children's reliability as witnesses and responses to child sexual assault (CSA), and examined the influence of expert evidence and judicial directions in challenging common misconceptions. Community volunteers (N = 130) read one of five versions of a simulated jury trial, and completed a pre‐ and post‐trial questionnaire to provide measures of their knowledge of children's responses to sexual abuse, perceptions of victim credibility, and verdict. Results revealed that endorsement of CSA misconceptions negatively impacted ratings of complainant credibility and verdicts. Judicial directions provided before the child complainant testified enhanced complainant credibility, which in turn predicted guilty verdicts. Comparisons of the effectiveness of two procedural legal mechanisms to manage juror misconceptions and improve knowledge about CSA provide guidance for future researchers investigating ways to increase fairness in cases of CSA. Copyright © 2010 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.     

Preference for modes of dispute resolution as a function of process and decision control

Research on procedural justice has suggested that the distribution of control among participants can be used to classify dispute-resolution procedures and may be an important determinant of preference for such procedures. This experiment demonstrates that control can be meaningfully divided into two components: control over the presentation of evidence and control over the final decision. The experiment placed subjects (law students and undergraduates) in a situation of conflict and varied two between-subjects factors: (1) Role, whether subjects expected to role-play third parties (law students) or litigants (undergraduates), and (2) Orientation, whether individuals focused on equity claims (appeals to a norm of fairness) or legal claims (appeals to a strict, legal interpretation of events). As a control, a third-party neutral-orientation condition was included. In addition, subjects were presented with four dispute-resolution procedures which varied in third-party control over the presentation of evidence (Process Control) and third-party control over the final decision (Decision Control) as within-subjects factors. Results revealed that both litigants and third parties preferred high rather than low third-party decision control. Litigants with an equity orientation preferred low third-party control over the presentation of evidence, particularly when third parties had high rather than low decision control. Third parties and litigants with a legal orientation preferred low rather than high third-party process control only when there was high third-party decision control. Litigant preferences were more affected by variation in process control than variation in decision control while third-party preferences were more affected by variation in decision control than in process control. As a check on external validity, military judges given a neutral orientation were asked to evaluate and express preferences for the four dispute-resolution procedures. Their results were not detectably different from those of the law students who role-played third parties in the main portion of the study.     

A Test of Voir Dire as a Remedy for the Prejudicial Effects of Pretrial Publicity1

The present experiment asked two questions: Does prejudicial pretrial publicity produce bias that may impair juror objectivity and, if it does, can extended, defense attorney-conducted voir dire (jury examination procedure) remedy its untoward effects? Subjects were 68 college undergraduates who had or had not read pretrial publicity one week before viewing a mock murder trial. Just prior to viewing the trial, subjects experienced either minimal or extended voir dire. Both pretrial publicity and voir dire produced significant main effects on subjects' perceptions of defendant culpability. Subjects exposed to pretrial publicity perceived the defendant as more culpable than subjects not exposed to pretrial publicity. Subjects who experienced extended voir dire perceived the defendant as less culpable than subjects who experienced minimal voir dire. The interaction between pretrial publicity and voir dire was nonsignificant, indicating that, contrary to our hypothesis, voir dire did not reduce the impact of pretrial publicity.     

A Maturing of Research on the Behaviour of Eyewitnesses

More than a decade of sustained, vigorous research has resulted in an applied cognitive psychology of eyewitness behvaviour that is a rapidly maturing body of knowledge. Several developments now would police forces to increase the sensitivity, reliability, and fairness of eyewitness memory retrieval. The juror's task of estimating the effects of certain variables on the accuracy of eyewitness report can now be a much more informed one, the relevant research literature now being relatively clear and consistent. Across studies the effect size of a number of these variables is moderate or greater. Equally important has been the consistent failure to document several results that would be predicted from the common-sense intuition of juror and jurist alike.     

Inspection time: An index for intelligence?

Recent publicity has been given to reports of high correlations between IQ and “inspection time”, a measure derived from simple discrimination which is assumed to provide an estimate of the time taken by a basic component of the decision process. However, this publicity has not recognised that the inclusion of mentally retarded participants in the experiments concerned may have led to inflated correlations, because of the marked extent to which the performance of retarded subjects is inferior to that of nonretarded subjects. Evidence from the performance of nonretarded subjects in three studies suggests that although speed of decision is related to IQ, the degree of association is smaller than recent publicity has suggested. Inspection time does not appear at present to hold promise as an index from which a “culture-fair” measure of intelligence might be derived.     

An Aiibi Witness' Influence on Mock Jurors' Verdicts1

The impact of alibi testimony on juror decision making is not yet clear because it has been examined empirically infrequently. This study was designed to determine the impact of alibi witness' testimony, the impact of an alibi witness with a relationship in comparison to one without a relationship to the defendant, and the impact of an eyewitness' confidence on juror decision making. Results indicated that mock jurors acquit a defendant more often when an alibi witness with no relationship to the defendant testified on his behalf. Participants did not believe an alibi witness who had a relationship with the defendant even though the witness was not a family member. Implications for these results are discussed.     

Effects of pre‐trial publicity and jury deliberation on juror bias and source memory errors

We examined the effects of exposure to pre‐trial publicity (PTP) and jury deliberation on juror memory and decision making. Mock jurors either read news articles containing negative PTP or articles unrelated to the trial. They later viewed a videotaped murder trial, after which they either made collaborative group decisions about guilt or individual decisions. Finally, all participants independently attributed specific information as having been presented during the trial or in the news articles. Exposure to PTP significantly affected guilty verdicts, sentence length, perceptions of defendant credibility, and misattributions of PTP as having been presented as trial evidence. Jury deliberation had significant effects on jury verdicts, perceptions of defendant credibility, source memory for trial items, and confidence in source memory judgements, but did not affect sentences or critical source memory errors. Copyright © 2006 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.     

Plaintiff life-taking: the effect of mock juror attitudes toward suicide on assignment of negligence and damages in a civil suit

Social scientific and legal scholars have examined the potential of a variety of case-relevant biases to distort juror decision-making (inter alia, death penalty attitudes, attitudes toward corporations, attitudes toward physicians, etc.). However, previous research has yet to address empirically the impact of attitudes toward suicide on juror decision-making. This study sought to examine the impact of mock juror's attitudes toward, and experiences with, suicide on assignment of negligence and damages in a civil suit. While results suggest that mock juror attitudes toward suicide do not directly affect a juror's assignment of negligence or damage awards, they do suggest that jurors may be susceptible to a reactance effect. As a result, attorneys should exercise caution when considering whether to directly address issues of possible plaintiff suicide.     

Understanding pretrial publicity: predecisional distortion of evidence by mock jurors

Prejudicial pretrial publicity (PTP) constitutes a serious source of juror bias. The current study examined differences in predecisional distortion for mock jurors exposed to negative PTP (N-PTP) versus nonexposed control participants. According to work by K. A. Carlson and J. E. Russo (2001), predecisional distortion occurs when jurors bias new evidence in favor of their current leading party (prosecution or defense) rather than evaluating this information for its actual probative properties. Jury-eligible university students (N=116) acted as jurors in a mock trial. Elevated rates of guilty verdicts were observed in the N-PTP condition. Predecisional distortion scores were significantly higher in the N-PTP condition and reflected a proprosecution bias. The effect of prejudicial PTP on verdict outcomes was mediated by predecisional distortion in the evaluation of testimony. Results are discussed in relation to motivated decision making and confirmation biases.     

Visual evidence

Visual and other demonstrative evidence has become increasingly prevalent in American and other courtrooms in recent years. However, there have been relatively few experimental studies of the effects of this kind of evidence in legal settings. As a consequence, little is known about when and how it affects legal decision making. In this article, I survey the extant research, including studies of photographs, videos, computer animations, and PowerPoint displays. The research shows that visual evidence affects legal decisions in some circumstances but not in others. It also indicates that visual evidence sometimes enhances legal judgment by improving recall and understanding but sometimes impairs judgment by prompting undue emotional responses, cognitive and perceptual biases, and/or peripheral processing. The limitations of the research are discussed, and directions for future research are suggested.     

Dilution in legal decision making: Effect of non-diagnostic information in relation to amount of diagnostic evidence

Judgments about others are often based on information that varies in terms of its diagnosticity or usefulness in predicting a certain outcome. Previous studies have demonstrated a “dilution effect” in which the addition of nondiagnostic or irrelevant information yields less extreme judgments than those based solely on diagnostic information. Two studies investigated the dilution effect in a juror decision making context in which no midpoint of a scale was provided by researchers. Study 1 examined the inclusion of positive, negative, or neutral character information in a criminal case and found that this nondiagnostic information affected attitude toward the defendant but did not “dilute” guilt judgments. The cases in Study 1 contained a larger amount of diagnostic information than studies that demonstrated the dilution effect. Thus, the amount of diagnostic evidence provided was varied in Study 2, and the results showed “diluted” judgments only when a small amount of diagnostic information was presented. Limitations to the dilution effect were discussed.     

Dilution in legal decision making: Effect of non-diagnostic information in relation to amount of diagnostic evidence

Judgments about others are often based on information that varies in terms of its diagnosticity or usefulness in predicting a certain outcome. Previous studies have demonstrated a “dilution effect” in which the addition of nondiagnostic or irrelevant information yields less extreme judgments than those based solely on diagnostic information. Two studies investigated the dilution effect in a juror decision making context in which no midpoint of a scale was provided by researchers. Study 1 examined the inclusion of positive, negative, or neutral character information in a criminal case and found that this nondiagnostic information affected attitude toward the defendant but did not “dilute” guilt judgments. The cases in Study 1 contained a larger amount of diagnostic information than studies that demonstrated the dilution effect. Thus, the amount of diagnostic evidence provided was varied in Study 2, and the results showed “diluted” judgments only when a small amount of diagnostic information was presented. Limitations to the dilution effect were discussed.