Self-efficacy and Strategy on Complex Tasks

The mediational role of strategy in the relationship between self-efficacy and performance on complex tasks is analysed. Within an individual's multidimensional self-efficacy belief system, perceived capabilities for conducting searches in different modalities and for the processing of information, including the use of tools to overcome cognitive limits, are predicted to have differential impacts on the use of judgmental heuristics and biases and the choice of strategies. Search efficacy is predicted to differ across search modalities, such as experimentation, interpersonal questioning, electronic search and passive study, as a function of differences in personal and situational determinants. Processing efficacy is predicted to generalise across a much wider range of cognitive tasks, depending upon perceived similarities in the content of tasks (e.g. verbal versus quantitative) and the tools used. Low search efficacy is predicted to lead to greater use of the availability heuristic, while low processing efficacy is predicted to lead to greater use of the anchoring and adjustment and representativeness heuristics. Choices of specific strategies are predicted from different combinations of weak and strong efficacy beliefs for exploratory search and deliberative processing.     

应激对风险和社会决策的影响

应激是有机体在受到真实或者潜在的威胁刺激时所表现出来的全身性非特异性反应, 伴随着紧张和焦虑的心理体验, 交感神经系统的兴奋, 糖皮质激素分泌的增多以及脑干−边缘系统−前额叶神经环路的改变。应激对个体在风险决策行为中的风险寻求和风险回避倾向, 社会决策行为中的利己和利他倾向都会产生重要影响。策略使用异常、习惯化和自动化反应增强、反馈学习过程以及奖惩敏感性的改变是应激影响决策行为的认知基础; 应激激素的分泌, 及杏仁核、前额叶等在决策过程发挥重要作用的脑区活动的改变则为应激作用于决策行为的神经基础。未来研究应重点关注：应激的个体差异与应激对决策影响效应多样性的关系; 综合多种指标对应激进行测量; 考察应激的时序效应; 揭示个体的最佳应激水平; 加强对慢性应激影响决策以及应激对决策影响效应可逆性的研究; 揭示应激影响决策的神经机制。     

奖赏和损失情境下男性海洛因戒断者的风险决策缺陷

摘 要 采用修改版的多伦多赌博任务考察决策情境对海洛因戒断者风险决策的影响。研究结果主要发现,海洛因戒断者在损失情境下的风险寻求决策比率与吸毒年限显著正相关,这种相关提示了风险决策背景下海洛因成瘾者持续使用毒品与其较低的损失敏感性之间的复杂交互作用。其次,海洛因戒断者在做出风险决策后收到消极反馈时的风险规避倾向可以负向预测其风险寻求决策比率,这可能进一步反映了海洛因戒断者风险感知的钝化或其对消极反馈信息的整合加工存在异常。     

Variance-sensitive choice in lemurs: constancy trumps quantity

Numerous studies have demonstrated that animals’ tolerance for risk when foraging can be affected by changes in metabolic state. Specifically, animals on a negative energy budget increase their preferences for risk, while animals on a positive energy budget are typically risk-averse. The malleability of these preferences may be evolutionarily advantageous, and important for maximizing chances of survival during brief periods of energetic stress. However, animals adapted to living in unpredictable conditions are unlikely to benefit from risk-seeking strategies, and instead are expected to reduce energetic demands while maintaining risk-aversion. We measured risk preferences in lemurs, a group of primates restricted to the island of Madagascar. Lemurs have evolved diverse anatomical and behavioral traits for survival in a harsh and unpredictable ecology, and these traits have been explained as forms of anatomical and behavioral risk reduction. We therefore predicted that lemurs would also be risk-averse in a behavioral task that offered subjects a choice between a small certain reward, and an uncertain but potentially large reward. In Experiment 1, the average rewards associated with the constant and variable options were equal and lemurs exhibited high levels of risk-aversion, replicating a phenomenon that has been demonstrated in dozens of taxa. In Experiment 2, we gradually increased the average value of the variable option relative to the constant option. Lemurs’ preferences tracked these changes and subjects became more risk-seeking as the risk premium increased. However, many subjects maintained high levels of risk-aversion even when the average payout of the variable option yielded double that of the constant option. These results are consistent with the notion that lemur cognition has evolved to minimize risk in an unpredictable island environment.     

压力下一搏：压力如何影响个体风险寻求

压力促使个体风险寻求已得到许多研究的验证和支持, 但对于该现象背后的根本机制缺乏深入探讨和整合。模型指出, 压力诱发认知资源损耗和心理需要失衡, 导致个体执行控制功能减弱, 奖赏寻求增加, 这两者引起对风险选项价值的高估、风险感知的降低和启发式决策策略的使用, 最终导致风险寻求。期望效用论、预期理论、双系统理论和风险敏感理论的视角能各有侧重地解析模型中的路径。最后, 基于模型梳理了边界条件, 并提出未来可关注压力下执行功能、认知和情绪的交互以及慢性压力的影响和调控。     

The similarity heuristic

Decision makers often make snap judgments using fast‐and‐frugal decision rules called cognitive heuristics. Research into cognitive heuristics has been divided into two camps. One camp has emphasized the limitations and biases produced by the heuristics; another has focused on the accuracy of heuristics and their ecological validity. In this paper we investigate a heuristic proposed by the first camp, using the methods of the second. We investigate a subset of the representativeness heuristic we call the “similarity” heuristic, whereby decision makers who use it judge the likelihood that an instance is a member of one category rather than another by the degree to which it is similar to others in that category. We provide a mathematical model of the heuristic and test it experimentally in a trinomial environment. In this environment, the similarity heuristic turns out to be a reliable and accurate choice rule and both choice and response time data suggest it is also how choices are made. We conclude with a theoretical discussion of how our work fits in the broader “fast‐and‐frugal” heuristics program, and of the boundary conditions for the similarity heuristic. Copyright © 2009 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.     

Contribution of conversation skills to the production of judgmental errors

An impressive body of evidence has accumulated demonstrating that many of the judgmental ‘errors’ or ‘biases’ formerly thought due to purely cognitive shortcomings actually reflect the operation of communication goals and strategies that people rely upon to comprehend and generate meaningful conversation. This study examines the effects of individual differences in conversational skills on the production of biased responses using six judgmental heuristics tasks: base-rate error, conjunction error, dilution effect, underuse of consensus information, primacy effect, and confirmation bias. Clarke's (1975) ‘method of reconstruction’ was used to obtain two measures of conversational sophistication: relevance-seeking and (un)responsiveness. A path analysis predicting biased judgments from the skill variables demonstrates that a combination of these variables, which we term ‘Pragmatic Competence’, is predictive of two independent subsets of the heuristics tasks. Our model provides convergent evidence with other, parametric studies for the proposition that biased social judgments are, at least in part, artifacts of participants' reasonable (and unreasonable!) expectations concerning experimenter cooperativeness. ‘The process of forming an integrated mental model of premises is nothing more than the proper comprehension of discourse: it is required in order to grasp the full impact of what the speaker has to say’ Johnson-Laird (1983, p. 119). © 1998 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.     

Suppressing natural heuristics by formal instruction: The case of the conjunction fallacy

A basic principle of probability is the conjunction rule, p(B) p(A&B). People violate this rule often, particularly when judgments of probability are based on intensional heuristics such as representativeness and availability. Though other probabilistic rules are obeyed with increasing frequency as people's levels of mathematical talent and training increase, the conjunction rule generally does not show such a correlation. We argue that this recalcitrance is not due to inescapable “natural assessments”; rather, it stems from the absence of generally useful problem-solving designs that bring extensional principles to bear on this class of problem. We predict that when helpful extensional strategies are made available, they should compete well with intensional heuristics. Two experiments were conducted, using as subjects adult women with little mathematical background. In Experiment 1, brief training on concepts of algebra of sets, with examples of their use in solving problems, reduced conjunction-rule violations substantially, compared with a control group. Evidence from similarity judgments suggested that use of the representativeness heuristic was reduced by the training. Experiment 2 confirmed these training effects and also tested the hypothesis that conjunction-rule violations are due to misunderstanding of “B” as “B and not A.” Changes in detailed wording of the propositions to be ranked produced substantial effects on judgment, but the pattern of these effects supported the hypothesis that, for the type of problem used here, most conjunction errors are due to use of representativeness or availability. We conclude that such intensional heuristics can be suppressed when alternative strategies are taught.     

Cognitive biases and decision making in gambling

Heuristics and cognitive biases can occur in reasoning and decision making. Some of them are very common in gamblers (illusion of control, representativeness, availability, etc.). Structural characteristics and functioning of games of chance favor the appearance of these biases. Two experiments were conducted with nonpathological gamblers. The first experiment was a game of dice with wagers. In the second experiment, the participants played two bingo games. Specific rules of the games favored the appearance of cognitive bias (illusion of control) and heuristics (representativeness and availability) and influence on the bets. Results and implications for gambling are discussed.     

Heuristic and linear models of judgment: matching rules and environments

Much research has highlighted incoherent implications of judgmental heuristics, yet other findings have demonstrated high correspondence between predictions and outcomes. At the same time, judgment has been well modeled in the form of as if linear models. Accepting the probabilistic nature of the environment, the authors use statistical tools to model how the performance of heuristic rules varies as a function of environmental characteristics. They further characterize the human use of linear models by exploring effects of different levels of cognitive ability. They illustrate with both theoretical analyses and simulations. Results are linked to the empirical literature by a meta-analysis of lens model studies. Using the same tasks, the authors estimate the performance of both heuristics and humans where the latter are assumed to use linear models. Their results emphasize that judgmental accuracy depends on matching characteristics of rules and environments and highlight the trade-off between using linear models and heuristics. Whereas the former can be cognitively demanding, the latter are simple to implement. However, heuristics require knowledge to indicate when they should be used.     

The Landslide Victory That Wasn't: The Bias Toward Consistency in Recall of Election Support1

Experiments that test for the judgmental bias that results from a preference for cognitive consistency often contain two threats to their internal validity. First, the subjects are asked to make judgments about themselves. Thus, the biases that result may be explained in terms of cognitive consistency or the motivation to see oneself in a positive light. Second, the decision subjects are asked to make is often difficult to verify objectively. The present research sought evidence in support of cognitive consistency using a methodology that avoided these two confounds. The context chosen was the tendency of perceivers to use the outcome of a group decision to make inferences about the magnitude of group members’ support for the outcome. The present experiment examined whether people in Richmond, Virginia, would use the outcome of a gubernatorial election to make decisions regarding the percentage of people in favor of the winning candidate. Although the winner won by less than one-half of one percent of the popular vote, we found that the subjects significantly overestimated the degree of voter support he received and underestimated the degree of support his opponent received. Moreover, this tendency was exacerbated over time.     

多项式加工树模型在再认启发式中的应用

摘 要 再认启发式利用再认线索进行决策。以往研究采用一致率、击中率、虚报率和区分指数来表示再认启发式使用,然而这些方法都存在局限。多项式加工树模型能够分离不同的认知加工过程,为了解决再认使用与知识使用的混淆,研究者提出一种多项式加工树模型 r-model 测量再认启发式的使用。本文将重 点介绍 r-model,具体包括 r-model 的内容、数据分析以及考虑个体差异的分层 r-model。最后,从 r-model 的模型修正和边界条件两个方面提出未来研究方向。 关键词 再认启发式;流畅启发式;多项式加工树;贝叶斯分层模型     

判断预测的心理偏差及产生机制

心理学对判断预测的研究主要关注预测的偏差及产生机制。判断预测中的偏差有两类：偏见和不一致。偏见主要表现：趋势阻尼;提高效应;给预测结果增加随机噪音。不一致包括：信息获得导致的不一致;信息加工导致的不一致。偏差的出现一是与信息加工过程有关,二是与序列的特征与呈现方式有关。研究发现提供反馈、分解、组合和建议采纳等策略可以增进判断预测的准确性。     

Framing decisions: Hypothetical and real

This paper addresses the general issue of whether the practice of investigating human decision making in hypothetical choice situations is at all warranted, or under what conditions. A particularly relevant factor that affects the match between real decisions and hypothetical decisions is the importance of a decision’s consequences. In the literature experimental gambles tend to confound the reality of the decision situation with the size of the payoffs: hypothetical decisions tend to offer large payoffs, and real decisions tend to offer only small payoffs. Using the well-known framing effect (a tendency of risk-aversion for gains and of risk-seeking for losses) we find that the framing effect depends on payoff size but hypothetical choices match real choices for small as well as large payoffs. These results appear paradoxical unless size of incentive is clearly distinguished from the reality status of decision (real versus hypothetical). Since the field lacks a general theory of when hypothetical decisions match real decisions, the discussion presents an outline for developing such a theory.     

Motivation,heuristics, and the psychology of prediction

The present study was designed to test whether or not the use of representativeness and causality heuristics in decision-making results from insufficient or nonvigilant information processing rather than from an inherent deficiency in human information-processing ability. It was hypothesized that subjects who were distracted while making predictions (field-dependent subjects who were continuously aware of other subjects' performance in the experimental session) would fail to use the base rate to a greater extent than would nondistracted subjects (field-dependent subjects who were not aware of the other subjects' performance, and field-independent subjects). As predicted, when other subjects' performance was public, field-independent subjects conformed more to the base rate than did field-dependent subjects. In the private condition, however, the opposite pattern emerged. The results were discussed in terms of the drive theory of social facilitation and non-vigilant information processing.We would like to thank Matthew R. Marler for his comments on an earlier draft of this paper.     

认知老化对于老年人决策过程的影响:动机的调节作用

有关老化和决策制定的研究并没有发现一致的年龄差异。从决策过程的角度,论述了老化对于决策制定的多层面影响。从认知层面来讲,流体认知能力的衰减会使老年人在决策制定前搜索更少的信息,使用非补偿性策略,基于属性进行信息搜索和比较;晶体认知能力的相对保持则在一定情况下弥补了这种消极影响;从动机层面来讲,关注情绪管理目标的老年人会倾向于寻求更多积极的信息,为了避免权衡诱发的消极情绪而更多地使用非补偿性策略。动机对于认知老化的消极影响有调节作用。具体来说,社会情绪选择理论和选择性投入假设认为,当决策任务符合老年人的社会目标,即情绪管理目标时,能够激活老年人投入认知资源的动机,从而缓解认知资源的衰减对于老年人决策表现的消极影响。未来的研究需要通过实验设计进一步探索动机与认知的交互作用,将多种过程追踪技术结合起来,明晰动机和认知能力在老年人决策制定中的作用。另外考虑到在社会目标方面的年龄差异,对于老年人决策质量的衡量应该更加注重主观决策质量。     

Sadness and susceptibility to judgmental bias: the case of anchoring

In a wide range of empirical paradigms, sadness has been associated with more extensive and detail-oriented thinking than happiness, resulting in reductions in judgmental bias that arise from reliance on stereotypes and other simple decision heuristics. It was hypothesized that anchoring would constitute a significant exception to this general pattern. Recent research on anchoring indicates that an active thought process underlies the emergence of this bias. If sad people are likely to think more actively about the judgmental anchor than their neutral-mood counterparts, their subsequent judgments should be more likely to be assimilated toward this reference point. This prediction was confirmed in two experiments demonstrating that sad people are indeed more susceptible to anchoring bias than are people in a neutral mood. Moreover, this effect generalized over judgments in positive, neutral, and negative content domains.     

Bias and error in human judgment

Currently prevalent views of human inference are contrasted with an integrated theory of the epistemic process. The prevailing views are characterized by the following orienting assumptions: (1) There exist reliable criteria of inferential validity based on objectively veridical or optimal modes of information processing. (2) Motivational and cognitive factors bias inferences away from these criteria and thus enhance the likelihood of judgmental error. (3) The layperson's epistemic process is pluralistic; it consists of a diverse repertory of information-processing strategies (heuristics, schemas) selectively invoked under various circumstances. By contrast, the present analysis yields the following conclusions: (1) There exist no secure criteria of validity. (2) Psychological factors that bias inferences away from any currently accepted criteria need not enhance the likelihood of error. (3) The inference process may be considered unitary rather than pluralistic. The various strategies and biases discussed in the literature typically confound universal epistemic process with specific examples (or contents) of such processes. Empirical support for the present analysis is presented, including evidence refuting proposals that specific contents of inference are of universal applicability; evidence suggesting that people do not, because of a reliance on subnormative heuristics, underutilize nonnative statistical information—rather, people seem unlikely to utilize any information if it is nonsalient or (subjectively) irrelevant; and evidence demonstrating that the tendency of beliefs to persevere despite discrediting information can be heightened or lowered by introducting appropriate motivational orientations.     

Decision Theory and the Sale of Alcohol1

Two studies examined the role of representativeness in determining the legal age of customers seeking to purchase alcohol. In Study 1, subjects were presented with a series of common grocery products along with an alcoholic beverage and a shopper. Results indicated that products which cued an older consumer produced higher age estimates of the shopper and decreased the likelihood that they would be asked to provide proof of legal age. Study 2 extended these findings in two important ways: (a) The target was presented as either a college student or parent and (b) individual differences in self-consciousness were related to susceptibility to manipulations of representativeness. Results indicated that the parent/student manipulation affected both the decision to request identification and age estimates of the target. Age estimations were positively related to individual differences in public self-consciousness, whereas the decision to request identification depended upon individual levels of social anxiety and private self-consciousness. Implications of these data for restricting access to alcohol among minors are considered.