Literalism as a marker of hypnotic "trance": disconfirming evidence

The responses given by highly hypnotizable, hypnotic subjects and those of unhypnotizable subjects who simulated hypnosis to questions of the type, "Do you mind telling me your name?" and "Do you mind standing up?" were contrasted. The purpose was to examine Erickson's (1980) assertion that literalism (answering "yes" or "no" verbally or nonverbally without any cognitive elaboration) is a marker of hypnotic "trance." Simulators exhibited a greater rate of literalism than hypnotic "virtuosos" (i.e., extreme scorers on both group and individual hypnotizability measures). Hypnotized subjects and nonhypnotized subjects approached in the campus library responded comparably. Because less than a third of hypnotic virtuosos responded literally, our results strongly refuted Erickson's assertion that literalism is a cognitive feature of hypnosis.     

Children''s understanding of belief and disconfirming visual evidence

Data from 3- to 5-year-old children show that even the youngest have an understanding that a story character cannot think an object is in a box when the character looks into the empty box. This understanding is, however, limited to the case where children share the same visual perspective with the character. When visual perspectives are different the relevant knowledge develops shortly after 4 years at about the time that children master the false belief task. These results are interpreted as young children using an implicit constraint that “think” cannot be applied in view of disconfirming visual evidence. This implicit knowledge becomes explicit and, thus, perspective independent with some delay.     

The tilt-constancy theory of visual illusions

The authors argue that changes in the perception of vertical and horizontal caused by local visual cues can account for many classical visual illusions. Because the perception of orientation is influenced more by visual cues than gravity-based cues when the observer is tilted (e.g., S. E. Asch & H. A. Witkin, 1948), the authors predicted that the strength of many visual illusions would increase when observers were tilted 30 degrees. The magnitude of Z?llner, Poggendorff, and Ponzo illusions and the tilt-induction effect substantially increased when observers were tilted. In contrast, the Müller-Lyer illusion and a size constancy illusion, which are not related to orientation perception, were not affected by body orientation. Other theoretical approaches do not predict the obtained pattern of results.     

Expectation-based and data-based illusory correlation: the effects of confirming versus disconfirming evidence

The present study (n=154) examines the effects of expectations and stimulus information on the perception of illusory correlation. There have been few studies attempting to integrate expectation-based and data- (distinctiveness-) based processes. These studies suggest that data-based illusory correlation can be overruled by prior expectations, but it is not clear whether this is a consequence of a confirmation bias. In the present study, where participants were not exposed to the specific stimulus information, expectation was manipulated by stating that group B behaved more negatively than group A. Moreover, participants were provided with information contained in a statement-rating task that allowed for the confirmation and disconfirmation of the prior expectations. Participants rated the desirability of these behaviours and also performed the standard illusory correlation tasks. Based on self-categorization theory and Alloy and Tabachnik (1984), we predicted that in the absence of prior expectations, completing the rating task before the illusory correlation tasks would produce stronger illusory correlation than the reverse order. However, in the presence of prior expectations we expected the rating task to undermine illusory correlation, because the information obtained in this task tends to disconfirm prior expectations. Results support the predicted interaction between task order and expectation. We discuss some implications for research on confirmation bias.     

A mathematical theory of optical illusions and figural aftereffects

If it is assumed that spurious enhancement of receptive field excitations near the intersection of image lines on the retina contributes to the cortical determination of the geometry of two-dimensional figures, an equation based on the least-squares fit of data points to a straight line-can be obtained to represent theapparent line. Such a fit serves as anextreemum on the precision with which a data set can be represented by a straight line. The disparity between theapparent line and the actual line that occurs in the case of peripheral (and to a lesser degree in more central regions of the retina) vision is sufficient to produce the perceptual errors that occur in the Poggendorff, Hering, and Mueller-Lyer illusions. The magnitude of the Poggendorff illusion as a function of the line angle is derived and experimentally tested. Blakemore, Carpenter, and Georgeson’s (1970) experimental data on angle perception are shown to fit this same function. Theapparent curve is derived for the Hering illusion. The Mueller-Lyer illusion is found to be a variation of the Poggendorff illusion. The equations are further developed and used to derive Pollack’s (1958) experimental results on figural aftereffects. The results involve onlyone experimentally determined coefficient that can be evaluated, within the limits of experimental error, in terms of physiological data. The use of these concepts provides a foundation for the abstract modeling of the initial phases of the central nervous system data reduction processes, including receptive field structure, that is consistent with the physiological limitations of the retina as a source of visual data, as well as with the findings of Hubel and Wiesel (1962).     

A criticism of the diffraction theory of some geometrical illusions

Chung Chiang (1968) invoked diffraction in the eye to explain Poggendorff’s illusion and extended the discussion to account for other geometrical illusions produced by intersecting lines. But diffraction in the eye cannot account for the displacement and rotation of lines assumed by Chung to produce Poggendorff’s illusion. And even if displacement and rotation do occur, the theory does not account for all illusions of the type considered. I am grateful to R. H. Day and M. Coltheart for critically reading a draft of this paper.     

"罗斯悖论"研究述评

道义逻辑作为广义模态逻辑的一个分支,它研究的是含有"应该"、"允许"、"禁止"等道义模态词的语句的逻辑特性及它们之间的推理关系.研究道义逻辑,无法回避"道义悖论"问题.作为20世纪50、60年代兴起的新兴学科,道义逻辑正是在与各种各样的"悖论"的交锋中发展的."道义‘悖论'是驳斥某些成问题的道义演算的有力武器,也是驳斥普通的道义语句所做的某种天真解释和分析的有力武器."[1]反过来,对"道义悖论"的分析也有助于认识、了解和促进道义逻辑的发展和完善.