A neurocognitive and socioecological model of self-awareness

In the past, researchers have focused mainly on the effects and consequences of self-awareness; however, they have neglected a more basic issue pertaining to the specific mechanisms that initiate and sustain self-perception. The author presents a model of self-awareness that proposes the existence of 3 sources of self-information. First, the social milieu includes early face-to-face interactions, self-relevant feedback, a social comparison mechanism that leads to perspective taking, and audiences. Second, contacts with objects and structures in the physical environment foster self-world differentiation in infants; this environment also contains self-focusing and reflecting stimuli, such as mirrors and video cameras. Third, the self can develop bodily awareness through proprioception and can reflect on itself using imagery and inner speech. Furthermore, self-awareness is mainly mediated by the prefrontal lobes. The author establishes various links among these different neurological, social, ecological, and cognitive elements of the model.     

Unconscious symmetrical inferences: A role of consciousness in event integration

Explicit and implicit learning have been attributed to different learning processes that create different types of knowledge structures. Consistent with that claim, our study provides evidence that people integrate stimulus events differently when consciously aware versus unaware of the relationship between the events. In a first, acquisition phase participants sorted words into two categories (A and B), which were fully predicted by task-irrelevant primes-the labels of two other, semantically unrelated categories (C and D). In a second, test phase participants performed a lexical decision task, in which all word stimuli stemmed from the previous prime categories (C and D) and the (now nonpredictive) primes were the labels of the previous target categories (A and B). Reliable priming effects in the second phase demonstrated that bidirectional associations between the respective categories had been formed in the acquisition phase (A<-->C and B<-->D), but these effects were found only in participants that were unaware of the relationship between the categories! We suggest that unconscious, implicit learning of event relationships results in the rather unsophisticated integration (i.e., bidirectional association) of the underlying event representations, whereas explicit learning takes the meaning of the order of the events into account, and thus creates unidirectional associations.     

A cross-order integration hypothesis for the neural correlate of consciousness

One major problem many hypotheses regarding the neural correlate of consciousness (NCC), face is what we might call "the why question": why would this particular neural feature, rather than another, correlate with consciousness? The purpose of the present paper is to develop an NCC hypothesis that answers this question. The proposed hypothesis is inspired by the cross-order integration (COI) theory of consciousness, according to which consciousness arises from the functional integration of a first-order representation of an external stimulus and a second-order representation of that first-order representation. The proposal comes in two steps. The first step concerns the "general shape" of the NCC and can be directly derived from COI theory. The second step is a concrete hypothesis that can be arrived at by combining the general shape with empirical considerations.     

Assessment of affect integration: validation of the affect consciousness construct

Affect integration, or the capacity to utilize the motivational and signal properties of affect for personal adjustment, is assumed to be an important aspect of psychological health and functioning. Affect integration has been operationalized through the affect consciousness (AC) construct as degrees of awareness, tolerance, nonverbal expression, and conceptual expression of nine discrete affects. A semistructured Affect Consciousness Interview (ACI) and separate Affect Consciousness Scales (ACSs) have been developed to specifically assess these aspects of affect integration. This study explored the construct validity of AC in a Norwegian clinical sample including estimates of reliability and assessment of structure by factor analyses. External validity issues were addressed by examining the relationships between scores on the ACSs and self-rated symptom- and interpersonal problem measures as well as independent, observer-based ratings of personality disorder criteria and the Global Assessment of Functioning (GAF) scale from the Diagnostic and Statistical Manual of Mental Disorders (4th ed. [DSM-IV]; American Psychiatric Association, 1994).     

Identification and integration of sensory modalities: Neural basis and relation to consciousness

A key question in studying consciousness is how neural operations in the brain can identify streams of sensory input as belonging to distinct modalities, which contributes to the representation of qualitatively different experiences. The basis for identification of modalities is proposed to be constituted by self-organized comparative operations across a network of unimodal and multimodal sensory areas. However, such network interactions alone cannot answer the question how sensory feature detectors collectively account for an integrated, yet phenomenally differentiated experiential content. This problem turns out to be different from, although related to, the binding problem. It is proposed that the neural correlate of an enriched, multimodal experience is constituted by the attractor state of a dynamic associative network. Within this network, unimodal and multimodal sensory maps continuously interact to influence each other’s attractor state, so that a feature change in one modality results in a fast re-coding of feature information in another modality. In this scheme, feature detection is coded by firing-rate, whereas firing phase codes relational aspects.     

A tale of two similarities: comparison and integration in conceptual combination

The perception of semantic similarity derives from distinct processes of comparison and integration. A dual process model of conceptual combination claims that attributive combination (e.g., umbrella tree) entails comparison, while relational combination (e.g., pancake spatula) requires integration. The present research uses similarity as a test of this dual process model. Participants (N = 168) were presented attributive and relational conceptual combinations. Half of the participants interpreted the combinations before rating the similarity of their constituent concepts, while the other half provided similarity ratings without interpreting the concepts together. The experiment revealed that attributive combination decreased the perceived similarity of the constituent concepts, whereas relational combination increased the similarity of the constituents. This result indicates that attributive and relational combination occur via distinct processes. Results of a post‐test (N = 60) suggested that these effects were specific to the particular concepts compared or integrated, and do not generalize to other concepts not compared or integrated. The present research thus supported a dual process model of conceptual combination by demonstrating differential effects of comparison and integration on the perception of semantic similarity.     

UK responses to the asylum issue: A comparison of lay and expert views

There is much political and media discussion about asylum in Britain and opinion polls indicate public hostility towards asylum seekers. The current research aims to contribute towards a greater understanding of public responses to this issue by exploring the social representations of asylum seekers. Social representations theory provides a useful framework for research on asylum as it conceptualizes public understandings of new and challenging social objects. Semi‐structured interviews conducted with lay participants and experts working in support of asylum seekers were thematically analyzed and the results were compared with existing media representations. These comparisons suggest that public representations of asylum seekers differ from formal discourses and are closer to media portrayals. Public respondents perceived public hostility to be greater than the attitudes evinced by the current sample would suggest. The findings suggest that opinion polls may exaggerate public negativity towards asylum seekers and indicate the need for accurate information to be disseminated through publicly accessible sources and for public engagement in debate about the issue. Copyright © 2008 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.     

Unity and diversity of views on intelligence and consciousness: Where the East meets the West

Intelligence is a cognitive function. Cognitive processing is a common base for cognitive theories of intelligence in both the East (India) and in the West (Europe and America). I first review the Eastern view of intelligence and its relation to consciousness. I argue that the study of consciousness has been accepted in Western psychology as a legitimate topic since William James, then present further discussion on the topic from Hindu and Buddhist philosophies. In essence, it is about awareness and the means of achieving a pure state of awareness through self-directed attention to internal thoughts, rather than external objects. The validity of a first-person observation of consciousness then becomes an important issue as well as the question of a non-physical mind. The paper concludes that using introspective reflection as a tool to explore consciousness is supported by both views.     

Two theories of consciousness: Semantic pointer competition vs. information integration

Consciousness results from three mechanisms: representation by firing patterns in neural populations, binding of representations into more complex representations called semantic pointers, and competition among semantic pointers to capture the most important aspects of an organism’s current state. We contrast the semantic pointer competition (SPC) theory of consciousness with the hypothesis that consciousness is the capacity of a system to integrate information (IIT). We describe computer simulations to show that SPC surpasses IIT in providing better explanations of key aspects of consciousness: qualitative features, onset and cessation, shifts in experiences, differences in kinds across different organisms, unity and diversity, and storage and retrieval.     

Role of consciousness in temporal integration of semantic information

Previous studies found that word meaning can be processed unconsciously. Yet it remains unknown whether temporally segregated words can be integrated into a holistic meaningful phrase without consciousness. The first four experiments were designed to examine this by sequentially presenting the first three words of Chinese four-word idioms as prime to one eye and dynamic Mondrians to the other (i.e., the continuous flash suppression paradigm; CFS). An unmasked target word followed the three masked words in a lexical decision task. Results from such invisible (CFS) condition were compared with the visible condition where the preceding words were superimposed on the Mondrians and presented to both eyes. Lower performance in behavioral experiments and larger N400 event-related potentials (ERP) component for incongruent- than congruent-ending words were found in the visible condition. However, no such congruency effect was found in the invisible condition, even with enhanced statistical power and top-down attention, and with several potential confounding factors (contrast-dependent processing, long interval, no conscious training) excluded. Experiment 5 demonstrated that familiarity of word orientation without temporal integration can be processed unconsciously, excluding the possibility of general insensitivity of our paradigm. The overall result pattern therefore suggests that consciousness plays an important role in semantic temporal integration in the conditions we tested.     

Accessing directorships: comparison of views of Canadian and Australian women directors

Compared are views of Canadian and Australian women directors concerning the difficulties women face in accessing the most privileged level of management-directorships of companies. The Canadian data are from a study of 278 women directors of corporate boards in Canada while the Australian results are from a study of 47 women directors of publicly listed companies in Australia. Despite the different time periods and geographical locations in which the studies were carried out, the profiles and responses of the two groups are quite similar. Both groups believe the current mix of directors is not adequate and that barriers still exist in nominating women to boards.     

Singularity and consciousness: A neuropsychological contribution

In common sense experience based on introspection, consciousness is singular. There is only one ‘me’ and that is the one that is conscious. This means that ‘singularity’ is a defining aspect of ‘consciousness’. However, the three main theories of consciousness, Integrated Information, Global Workspace and Recurrent Processing theory, are generally not very clear on this issue. These theories have traditionally relied heavily on neuropsychological observations and have interpreted various disorders, such as anosognosia, neglect and split-brain as impairments in conscious awareness without any reference to ‘the singularity’. In this review, we will re-examine the theoretical implications of these impairments in conscious awareness and propose a new way how to conceptualize consciousness of singularity. We will argue that the subjective feeling of singularity can coexist with several disunified conscious experiences. Singularity awareness may only come into existence due to environmental response constraints. That is, perceptual, language, memory, attentional and motor processes may largely proceed unintegrated in parallel, whereas a sense of unity only arises when organisms need to respond coherently constrained by the affordances of the environment. Next, we examine from this perspective psychiatric disorders and psycho-active drugs. Finally, we present a first attempt to test this hypothesis with a resting state imaging experiment in a split-brain patient. The results suggest that there is substantial coherence of activation across the two hemispheres. These data show that a complete lesioning of the corpus callosum does not, in general, alter the resting state networks of the brain. Thus, we propose that we have separate systems in the brain that generate distributed conscious. The sense of singularity, the experience of a ‘Me-ness’, emerges in the interaction between the world and response-planning systems, and this leads to coherent activation in the different functional networks across the cortex.     

Temporal integration of face view sequences and recognition of novel views

When faces are learned from rotating view sequences, novel views may be recognized by matching them with an integrated representation of the sequence or with individual views. An integrated-representation process should benefit from short view durations, and thus from the inclusion of views in a short temporal window, allowing the distribution of attention over the entire sequence. A view-matching process should benefit from long view durations, allowing the attention to focus on each view. In a sequential comparison task, we tested the recognition of learned and novel interpolated and extrapolated views after learning faces from rapid and slow sequences (240 ms or 960 ms for each view). We found a superiority of rapid over slow sequences, in favour of the integrated-representation hypothesis. In addition, the recognition pattern for the different viewpoints in the sequence depended on the absence or presence of extrapolated views, showing a bias of the distribution of attention.     

A terror management analysis of self-awareness and anxiety: The hierarchy of terror

Abstract

In this article, we apply terror management theory to the operation of self-awareness processes. According to the theory, self-esteem consists of accepting a cultural conception of reality and believing that one is living up to the standards of value inherent in that conception. The function of self-esteem is to buffer the anxiety that results from the awareness of human vulnerability and mortality that results from our capacity for self-awareness. We argue that self-awareness leads to comparisons with standards, and to behavior aimed at reducing any discrepancies that are detected, because of the potential for existential terror that self-awareness creates. Existential terror is seen as the emotional manifestation of the instinct for self-preservation. Management of this terror is conceptualized as the superordinate goal in a hierarchy of standards through which behavior is regulated. A hierarchical terror management model is proposed. This structure provides a unique analysis of the self-system and its relationship to other attitudes, values, and beliefs. The theory posits several dynamic principles that specify how self-awareness and disruptions determine the movement of conscious attention through various levels of the hierarchy. The implications of this analysis for unresolved theoretical questions about self-awareness processes, unconscius sources of motivation, and clinical problems are discussed.     

A comparison of UFO and near-death experiences as vehicles for the evolution of human consciousness

This study compares unidentified flying object experiencers (UFOErs) with near-death experiencers (NDErs) in regard to changes in attitudes toward self, others, and life in general, toward religious or spiritual orientation, and toward psychic abilities and beliefs. Kenneth Ring's questionnaires administered to NDErs (1984) were given in this study to 93 persons whose UFOE included either a light experience, an object experience, or a close encounter. The author concludes that the UFOE, like the NDE, provides impetus toward spiritual growth, but neither as consistently nor as strongly.This paper was derived in part from her M.A. thesis submitted to John F. Kennedy University.     

A French version of the situational self-awareness scale

ObjectiveThis paper presents the findings of three studies aimed at validating a French version of the situational self-awareness scale (Govern & Marsch, 2001). The 9-item scale measures the extent to which people focus their attention on private or public aspects of themselves or on their surroundings. The scale was translated into French. The first study examined the factor structure, the second study focused on consistency and reliability, and the third study examined the convergent and discriminant validity of the scale.MethodFactor analyses were performed on data collected among 397 students. Internal consistency and test-retest reliability were assessed using Cronbach's alpha and correlation analyses. Finally, we induced public and private self-awareness and assessed awareness to test the validity of the scale.ResultsThe results show that the scale has a three-factor structure and support the reliability of the scale over time. However, doubts remain over the construct validity of the public and private self-awareness dimensions. As expected, the data indicate that SSAS was sensitive to situational variations, in line with previous studies.DiscussionThe discussion focuses on the arguments supporting the use of the original scale and the practical implications of the scale.