ON TWO ISSUES IN SCIENCE AND RELIGION: A RESPONSE TO DAVID GRIFFIN

Abstract. In responding to David Griffin's critique of my book, Issues in Science and Religion , I suggest that most of the points which he initially presents as differences between us concerning reduction and emergence are resolved in the second half of his article. I spoke of the emergence of higher-level "properties" and "activities," rather than "entities," but my analysis of whole and parts is similar to his, although it was perhaps not always clearly articulated. We agree also that Alfred North Whitehead's God is involved in every event in ways which avoid the problems of the supernatu-ralist "God of the gaps," but we differ as to whether God's action might be taken into account in a new "post-modern" science.     

Lacking <Emphasis Type="Italic">lack</Emphasis>: a reply to Joldersma

First I would like to thank Clarence Joldersma for his review of our Poststructuralism, Philosophy, Pedagogy (Marshall, 2004-PPP). In particular, I would thank him for his opening sentence: “[t]his book is a response to a lack.” It is the notion of a lack, noted again later in his review, which I wish to take up mainly in this response. Rather than defending or elaborating our particular contributions to PPP—the latter would be a great indignity to my colleagues as I would not write over them—I will take the opportunity to develop the theme of a lack, as I believe that Joldersma has raised a very important issue. But first I will respond briefly to some of Joldersma’s general and opening statements about the book, and my philosophical position in particular.

ETHICS AND OBSERVATION: DEWEY,THOREAU, AND HARMAN

Abstract: In 1929, John Dewey said that “the problem of restoring integration and cooperation between man's beliefs about the world in which he lives and his beliefs about the values and purposes that should direct his conduct is the deepest problem of human life.” Using this as its theme, this article begins with an examination of Gilbert Harman's reasons for denying the existence of moral facts. It then presents an alternative account of the relationship between science and ethics, making use of the writings of Dewey and Henry David Thoreau. For both Dewey and Thoreau, the dichotomy between a scientific approach to the world and an ethical approach to the world is a false one. The article explores the reasons for believing that the dichotomy is a false one, agreeing with Thoreau that there “is no exclusively moral law—there is no exclusively physical law.”     

《周易·系辞》“文”释

"文"是中国古代文化研究中的一个关键词,值得引起学术界的足够重视。本文借鉴梭罗和杜威两位美国思想家的智慧,对在《周易·系辞》中出现的"文"的意义和用法进行了深入的探讨。本文认为,"文"体现了中国古代先哲对于真理锲而不舍的追求及其所取得的成就,而这不论是对于我们认识《周易》本身的价值,还是对中国当下的文化研究和文化建设,都具有不可忽视的意义。     

William James and the unconscious: redressing a century-old misunderstanding

Contrary to received wisdom in psychology, William James did not oppose postulating unconscious processes. This mistaken belief stems from a misreading of a passage in his Principles concerned with disproving the metaphysical notion that mental states are composed of elementary mental units. The term unconscious had been co-opted by individuals who supported this position. Unconscious did not mean then what it means now. Analysis of the rest of the Principles , his later works, and his reactions to the works of others reveals that James actually supported what we would now term unconscious processes. He even contributed to their study with his notions of the "fringe,""habit," and "subconscious incubation." Causes and effects of this misunderstanding are discussed.     

NONDOMINATION AND NORMATIVITY

Abstract:  In an earlier paper, "The Indeterminacy of Republican Policy," I argued that in an important class of cases, republican political theory, as formulated by Philip Pettit, does not have determinate implications for policy. Pettit has replied that my argument was based on a conception of freedom as nondomination that is not his own. In the present paper, I explore the two ways of understanding republican freedom. I first suggest that they may not, in the end, be very different. I then note that if a sharp difference is restored, my conception may have some desirable features.     

Groups as social network members: Overlooked sources of social support

In a study of the link between physical disability and social relationships among the elderly, questions about social network and social support evoked a surprisingly large number of group responses. People mentioned "my grandchildren," "the people in my building," "people at the senior center," and other groups in ways that suggested that the real unit of support was extraindividual and could not be accurately understood by reference to individual people within those groups. This paper describes the frequency of such responses and the circumstances under which they emerged. Definitions of social support and of social network should not be restricted to dyadic relationships between individuals; better understanding of social support processes would derive from consideration of the kinds of social support functions best offered by groups vs. individuals and consideration of differences in the ways in which support is derived from groups and individuals.     

Why we need a theory of suffering, and lots of other theories as well: commentary

In the first section of his article, "The Role of Suffering and Community in Clinical Ethics," Erich Loewy sketches a theory of suffering. His conviction is that clinical medical ethics is not clearly rooted in theory and is inadequately grounded because of this. While acknowledging the merits of virtue ethics and casuistry, Loewy quickly dispenses with them, as contenders for this theoretical basis. Kantianism and utilitarianism are likewise rejected as "a universally acceptable grounding for ethics." In their place, Loewy proposes that "a deeper and more universal grounding can be found in the capacity of sentient beings to suffer." It is on this capacity to suffer that he builds his hierarchies of moral value, including primary, secondary, and symbolic worth. This theory of suffering should be welcomed. It promises to expand our awareness of clinical experience, and moral life generally, away from autonomy, utility, or virtue orientations toward attention to suffering and our response to it. Such a theory can give us a revitalized language to probe the issues of medical ethics. This should lead us to a careful reading of Loewy's larger work on which this article is based. Yet my enthusiasm is tempered by Loewy's noncritical acceptance of a peculiar, yet pervasive, understanding of the role and use of theory in ethics....     

Avowals and First-Person Privilege

When people avow their present feelings, sensations, thoughts, etc., they enjoy what may be called "first-person privilege." If I now said: "I have a headache," or "I'm thinking about Venice," I would be taken at my word: I would normally not be challenged. According to one prominent approach, this privilege is due to a special epistemic access we have to our own present states of mind. On an alternative, deflationary approach the privilege merely reflects a socio-linguistic convention governing avowals. We reject both approaches. On our proposed account, a full explanation of the privilege must recognize avowals as expressive performances, which can be taken to reveal directly the subject's present mental condition. We are able to improve on special access accounts and deflationary accounts, as well as familiar expressive accounts, by explaining both the asymmetries and the continuities between avowals and other pronouncements, and by locating a genuine though non-epistemic source for first-person privilege.     

Are we ready for sexual reorientation therapy in the U.S. military? A response to David W. Lutz.

In his paper "The Catholic Church, the American Military, and Homosexual Reorientation Therapy," David W. Lutz ultimately concludes that it is "appropriate, and highly ethical" for the American military to offer reorientation therapy to help homosexuals overcome "the vice of sodomy." The major thrust of his paper, however, is to call for abandonment of the "Don't Ask/Don't Tell" policy currently in place in the military. Lutz's paper covers much ground, and this review begins by examining whether such a wide view is necessary for the ultimate conclusions. It goes on to ask whether Lutz has omitted to mention important considerations bearing on this issue, and whether Lutz's call for the introduction of reorientation therapy is a serious call or a symbolic response to homosexual activities. Lutz fails to address essential issues such as the actual experiences of other nations having homosexuals in the military, and issues regarding what constitutes "reorientation therapy," the latter leading to questions about how such a therapy would actually be implemented.     

Jewish Ethical Themes That Should Inform the National Healthcare Discussion: A Prolegomenon

Despite the passage of H.R. 3590 in the 111th Congress, the national healthcare debate in the United States continues, with repeal or modification of the Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act under ongoing consideration. Reference is often made to morality or ethics, but typically in general terms only. This paper elucidates themes from one system of moral theology, namely Jewish healthcare ethics, that would valuably inform this debate. Themes include "covenant," "holiness," "justice," "mercy," "for the sake of peace," "to save a life," "peoplehood," "repair of the world," "repentance," and "jubilee." Policy-related, economic, political, and moral challenges to acting on these principles are discussed.     

Privacy as a value and as a right

Conclusions Knowledge of others, then, has value; so does immunity from being known. The ability to extend one's knowledge has value; so does the ability to limit other's knowledge of oneself. I have claimed that no interest can count as a right unless it clearly outweighs opposing interests whose presence is logically entailed. I see no way to establish that my interest in not being known, simply as such, outweighs your desire to know about me. I acknowledge the intuitive attractiveness of such a position; but my earlier discussion concluded that the value of privacy is ease, and the value of knowledge is understanding - and it's not obvious that either outweighs the other. Nor is it obvious that the freedom and autonomy which result from the power to limit what others know is more significant than the freedom and autonomy which result from the power to extend one's knowledge. I believe the intuitive attractiveness of the belief that privacy values outweigh knowledge values lies in the entirely correct belief that a society without any privacy would be unpleasant. But a society without mutual knowledge would be impossible.I conclude therefore that there is no right to privacy nor to control over it. Nevertheless, each of these things is a good, and a good made possible (given the presence of other people) by social structures. A desirable society will provide both privacy and control over privacy to some extent. Nothing in my analysis helps determine what the proper extent is, nor what areas of life particularly deserve protection. Those who would argue that privacy and control over it are entailed by respect for persons should, I think, choose instead some particular areas central to being a person, to counting as a person, and then show how one is less likely to exercise one's capacities there fully without privacy or without control over it. Although Gerstein's attempt fails because he inaccurately defines intimacy as a kind of absorption and incorrectly opposes absorption with publicity, I think it is the kind of attempt which must be made. Furthermore, he has probably chosen the right area of life - if anything has a special claim to privacy it is probably the union between people who care for one another. The value of being together alone may be more significant than the value of being alone, if only because words and actions are public while thoughts are not. But I will not try to develop that argument here.In any case both privacy and control over it are social goods; on egalitarian grounds they should, ceteris paribus, be equally available to everyone. This helps explain the dehumanizing effect of institutions which provide no privacy at all- prisons and some mental institutions. It is not so much that the inmates are totally known; it is rather that those who know them are not so fully known by them; further, that the staff has a great deal of control over what they disclose of themselves, and the inmates very little. The asymmetry of knowledge in those institutions is one aspect of the asymmetry of power; the completely powerless are likely to feel dehumanized.My analysis also helps account for the wrongness of covert observation. It is not simply that the observer violates the wishes of the observed, for the question is whose wishes trump. The observer is violating the justified expectations of the observed: expectations supported by weighty social conventions. These have more moral weight than simple desires do. The peeping torn is violating a convention which structures the distribution of knowledge, a convention from which he benefits. Without it his own activities might well be impossible. He might be more easily caught; or his victim, less trusting, might choose houses without windows. More deeply, the thrill of what he is doing depends on the existence of the convention. Even morally permissible excitement - the suggestiveness of some clothing- would disappear without conventions about nudity. Presumably, too, there are elements of his own personal life for which he values his privacy. He is on grounds of justice obligated to observe the rule which makes his benefits possible.(Some claims to privacy result from personal predilections, rather than from convention. Parent describes a person who is extremely sensitive about being short, for instance, and does not want his exact height to be common knowledge. The grounds for these claims are obviously different from those I've been discussing. The grounds are the moral obligation not to cause needless pain, or, if the information was given in confidence, to keep one's promises.)Although there is no right to privacy or to control over it as such, there is a right to equality of consideration and to a just distribution of benefits and burdens. To put it another way: there is no natural human right to privacy or to control over it; but a good society will provide some of each, and justice requires that the rules of a good society be observed.

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BOHM AND WHITEHEAD ON WHOLENESS, FREEDOM, CAUSALITY, AND TIME

Abstract. David Bohm's developing postmodern thought (combining precision and wholeness) is seen to contain two tendencies. One is a vision of "underlying wholeness," in which all causation is vertical, and the implicate-explicate relation is ubiquitous. This provides a possible solution to certain problems, but creates many others involving freedom, causation, and time. Second, many of Bohm's statements suggest that his deepest intuitions could be formulated without those problems in terms of the distinctions developed in Alfred North Whitehead's philosophy of "prehensive wholeness," in which the ubiquity of creativity would require a more restricted use of the implicate-explicate relation.     

Abandonment, Religion, and Male Melancholia: A Psychoanalytic Study of Archpriest Avvakum's Religious Autobiography

The present study is a psychoanalytic reading of Archpriest Avvakum's autobiography and takes its cue from some observations made by Russian and Ukrainian historian Edward Keenan, who offered a tentative diagnosis of manic-depression to describe Avvakum's personality. In my view, Donald Capps's analysis of religious male melancholia supports Keenan's observations, and I argue that Avvakum carried his childhood experiences and conflicts over into his later religious life. His religious life manifested a series of transferences and displacements, with Mary the Mother of God, God the Father, and the Church functioning as his loving or positive relationships with his family; and Patriarch Nikon and his followers embodying everything he feared and resented about his own childhood—change and abandonment.     

In Memoriam: Mordecai Kaffman, M.D. (1917–2005)

A word of warning: the following ideas will be presented in plain everyday language, avoiding any type of professional lexicon. It may be that this down-to-earth form of presentation will disappoint some of my potential readers who are accustomed to peruse material presented in sophisticated meta-systemic language. All I can do is plead guilty, and in self-defense put forward two arguments. First, that I cannot escape the universal truth, "the style is the man," and second, that the simple ideas which I am to present here are all, without exception, the result of concrete clinical experience, with no admixture of theoretical armchair speculation.     

The virgil role

The referral of a patient for subspecialty consultation and examination is but one facet of the primary care physician's involvement with his patient. Using examples from my practice, I argue that the term "gatekeeper" is an inadequate term for describing what the primary care physician does, or should do, for his patient. "Virgil Role" is offered as an alternative expression based on a proposed parallel between Dante's passage through the Inferno accompanied by his mentor-guide, Virgil, and a sick person's journey through his personal Hell of illness and the labyrinthine medical care system, guided by his physician.     

Descartes's Regulae, mathematics, and modern psychology: "the Noblest example of all" in Light of Turing's (1936) On computable Numbers

There are surprisingly strong connections between the philosophy of mind and the philosophy of mathematics. One particular important example can be seen in the Regulae (1628) of Descartes. In "the noblest example of all," he used his new abstract understanding of numbers to demonstrate how the brain can be considered as a symbol machine and how the intellect's algebraic reasoning can be mirrored as operations on this machine. Even though his attempt failed, it is illuminating to explore it because Descartes launched 2 traditions--mechanistic philosophy of mind and abstract mathematics--that would diverge until A. Turing (1936) approached symbolic reasoning in a similar "symbol machine-existence proof" way. Descrates's and Turing's thought experiments, which mark the beginning of modern psychology and cognitive science, respectively, indicate how important the development of mathematics has been for the constitution of the science of mind.     

Stem cell research: a target article collection: Part II--what's in a name: embryos,clones, and stem cells

In 2001, the U.S. House of Representatives passed the "Human Cloning Prohibition Act" and President Bush announced his decision to allow only limited research on existing stem cell lines but not on "embryos." In contrast, the U.K. has explicitly authorized "therapeutic cloning." Much more will be said about bioethical, legal, and social implications, but subtleties of the science and careful definitions of terms have received much less consideration. Legislators and reporters struggle to discuss "cloning," "pluripotency," "stem cells," and "embryos," and whether "adult" are preferable to "embryonic" stem cells as research subjects. They profess to abhor "copying humans" or "killing embryos." Do they know what they are talking about? Do we? This paper explores the historical, philosophical, and scientific contexts that inform this heated discussion.