安于现状偏差的心理机制、影响因素及应用启示

安于现状偏差是指个体在决策时,倾向于不作为、维持当前或者以前的决策的一种现象。安于现状偏差包括内源的安于现状偏差与外源的安于现状偏差。目前研究者对这一现象的解释主要有两种:损失规避与后悔理论。安于现状偏差的影响因素主要包括备择项的数目、决策者的情绪以及认知与动机特征等。安于现状偏差有利于认识日常决策行为,而且在销售、管理与公共政策等实践领域有着重要的研究价值。未来的研究则需要从安于现状偏差与其他决策现象之间的关系,安于现状偏差的产生根源及其应用研究的拓展等方面来进一步探讨。     

Escalation of Commitment: The Effect of Number and Attractiveness of Available Investment Alternatives

Purpose  

The purpose of this study was to examine the hypothesis that decision difficulty increases the likelihood of commitment to a failing project (escalation). The hypothesis was based on findings regarding status quo bias. Three aspects of decision difficulty were tested: equivalence of options, option set size and attractiveness structure of the alternatives.     

Multiple Reference Points,Framing, and the Status Quo Bias in Health Care Financing Decisions

Reference effects help account for several behavioral biases, including framing, status quo, and omission effects. Despite the importance of reference effects, little is understood about how decision makers adopt a referent. This study investigates the roles of status quo and framing conditions in the selection of reference alternatives. Full-time employees made health care financing decisions within a problem context containing multiple reference candidates. Results from this work demonstrate that the status quo bias can operate at multiple levels and that the status quo bias does interact with framing. In addition, these results demonstrate that subjects manifest the status quo bias within the domain of health care financing decisions.     

Inaction inertia

Inaction inertia occurs when bypassing an initial action opportunity has the effect of decreasing the likelihood that subsequent similar action opportunities will be taken. This overview of the inaction inertia literature demonstrates the impact of inaction inertia on decision making. Based on research on the causes of inaction inertia, we show that it is a multi-determined phenomenon, explained by both valuation and regret considerations. Moreover, we demonstrate how a sour grapes explanation of inaction inertia might integrate these two accounts. Furthermore, we explain when inaction inertia is most likely to occur and how it can be prevented. We conclude that the inaction inertia literature does not only add to our understanding of this intriguing phenomenon, but also contributes to related social psychological phenomena, such as the sunk cost effect, sequential decision making, decision avoidance (e.g., choice deferral, status quo bias, decisional conflict), and procrastination.     

To change or not to change: A matter of decision maker’s role

The status quo effect derived from loss aversion is common in decision making. However, we propose that advisors (vs. personal decision makers) are less susceptible to such an effect because they are less loss-averse. The difference in loss aversion between personal decision makers and advisors is reflected in both the query order and content. Compared to advisors, personal decision makers produce more queries favoring the status quo, at an earlier time, than those favoring the new option. As hypothesized, the status quo effect was observed among personal decision makers, but not among advisors (Studies 1 and 2). Query order and content were found to mediate the impact of decision maker’s role on the status quo effect (Study 2). When personal decision makers and advisors made queries in the same order (Study 3) or of the same content (Studies 4a and 4b), the difference between self–other decision making disappeared.     

守范?失范?——作为参照点的社会规范对决策行为的影响

作为参照点的社会规范指个体为实现群体目标保持活动一致性所建立起来的、视为决策与判断标准的规范。社会规范研究经历了从完全理性到有限理性的转变过程。其对决策行为影响的解释机制包括预期理论、后悔理论、"齐当别"抉择模型、程数说和三参照点理论等,能较好解释避税、见死不救与医患冲突等现象。今后研究注意结合社会认知角度,实现研究思想与范式的转变,侧重探索多重参照点、群体决策机制,丰富跨文化研究等,为转型期的守范与失范行为提供科学的解释。     

Enlarging the Societal Pie Through Wise Legislation

ABSTRACT— We offer a psychological perspective to explain the failure of governments to create near-Pareto improvements. Our tools for analyzing these failures reflect the difficulties people have trading small losses for large gains: the fixed-pie approach to negotiations, the omission bias and status quo bias, parochialism and dysfunctional competition, and the neglect of secondary effects. We examine the role of human judgment in the failure to find wise trade-offs by discussing diverse applications of citizen and government decision making, including AIDS treatment, organ-donation systems, endangered-species protection, subsidies, and free trade. Our overall goal is to offer a psychological approach for understanding suboptimality in government decision making.     

Reference Points and Omission Bias

Subjects were asked to evaluate the choice of options leading to known outcomes, or to say how they would feel about a chance outcome, in hypothetical decisions. We independently manipulated the value of the status quo and the assignment of the better or worse outcome to an act or an omission. Acts leading to the worse outcome were always considered worse than omissions leading to the worse outcome. This act-omission difference was reduced or reversed for the better outcome. Most experiments showed an overall bias toward omissions (combining better and worse). Little evidence was found for greater omission bias for losses relative to the status quo than for gains. A bias toward maintaining the status quo itself was found, however, independently of omission bias. Most of the results can be explained by norm theory and by loss aversion, but other possible accounts are inconsistent with the results.     

Moderating Loss Aversion: Loss Aversion Has Moderators,But Reports of its Death are Greatly Exaggerated

Loss aversion, the principle that losses impact decision making more than equivalent gains, is a fundamental idea in consumer behavior and decision making, though its existence has recently been called into question. Across five unique samples (N_total = 17,720), we tested several moderators of loss aversion, which supported a preference construction account. Across studies, more domain knowledge and experience were associated with lower loss aversion, though people of all knowledge and experience levels were loss averse. Among car buyers, those who knew more about a particular car attribute (e.g., fuel economy) were less loss averse for that attribute but not other attributes (e.g., comfort), consistent with the idea that people with less attribute knowledge are more likely to construct preferences, thereby increasing loss aversion. Additionally, older consumers were more loss averse across different loss aversion measures and studies. We discuss implications for several accounts of loss aversion, including accounts rooted in status quo bias, emotion, or ownership. In addition to discovering loss aversion moderators, we cast doubt on recent claims that loss aversion is a fallacy or is fully explained by status quo bias, risk aversion, or the educated laboratory samples often used to study loss aversion.     

Nozick's experience machine is dead,long live the experience machine!

Robert Nozick's experience machine thought experiment (Nozick's scenario) is widely used as the basis for a “knockdown” argument against all internalist mental state theories of well-being. Recently, however, it has been convincingly argued that Nozick's scenario should not be used in this way because it elicits judgments marred by status quo bias and other irrelevant factors. These arguments all include alternate experience machine thought experiments, but these scenarios also elicit judgments marred by status quo bias and other irrelevant factors. In this paper, several experiments are conducted in order to create and test a relatively bias-free experience machine scenario. It is argued that if an experience machine thought experiment is used to evaluate internalist mental state theories of well-being, then this relatively bias-free scenario should be used over any of the existing scenarios. Unlike the existing experience machine scenarios, when this new scenario is used to assess internalist mental state theories of well-being, it does not provide strong evidence to refute or endorse them.     

Is the conflict model of decision making applicable to the decision to be screened for cervical cancer? A field study

The present study examined aspects of the conflict model of decision making (Janis and Mann, 1977) in the context of attending for a screening test for cervical cancer. In addition, the ability of decision coping styles as measured by Mann's (1982) Decision Making Questionnaire II (DMQ II) to predict screening status was examined. Three hundred and two women answered a questionnaire operationalizing the constructs in the conflict model about their beliefs and knowledge of cervical cancer and the Pap smear test. Four screening categories were identified: never screened, not screened in the last two years (overdue), screened in last two years and initiated the test, and screened in last two years and recruited to have the test. Differences in the decision processes of these groups were examined. Women who were overdue for their Pap test showed greater decisional conflict and were more likely to adopt a defensive avoidance coping pattern than those who had been screened in the last two years. Regression analyses exploring predictors of decisional stress and defensive avoidance for each group, except the never screen, showed that the model's suggested pathways were evidenced among the Overdue Group. Results failed to find any association between coping styles as measured by the DMQ II and screening status. Implications of these findings are discussed.     

Constraints on decision making: Implications from genetics, personality, and addiction

An influential neurocomputational theory of the biological mechanisms of decision making, the “basal ganglia go/no-go model,” holds that individual variability in decision making is determined by differences in the makeup of a striatal system for approach and avoidance learning. The model has been tested empirically with the probabilistic selection task (PST), which determines whether individuals learn better from positive or negative feedback. In accordance with the model, in the present study we examined whether an individual’s ability to learn from positive and negative reinforcement can be predicted by genetic factors related to the midbrain dopamine system. We also asked whether psychiatric and personality factors related to substance dependence and dopamine affect PST performance. Although we found characteristics that predicted individual differences in approach versus avoidance learning, these observations were qualified by additional findings that appear inconsistent with the predictions of the go/no-go model. These results highlight a need for future research to validate the PST as a measure of basal ganglia reward learning.     

动态系统累积变量判断中的关联启发式

关联启发式是指在累积变量判断中, 将存量与流量建立正相关关系, 认为存量变化特征与流量变化特征具有相似性而导致判断偏差的思维模式。在多特征交互及简单动态系统任务判断中, 关联启发式偏差以不同形式的S-F错误表现出来。作为一种内生性的、顽固的思维模式, 对于关联启发式的心理机制提出了客体偏差、特征替代、不充分调整等多种观点解释。影响关联启发式的个体因素和情境因素的研究结果不尽一致。由于关联启发式偏差直接影响人对复杂系统的可持续性决策和行动, 减少偏差策略的研究也已实现起步。本文系统总结和分析了关联启发式研究的发展脉络, 针对澄清关联启发式的发生机制、系统考察关联启发式的影响因素及其相互作用、丰富和深化关联启发式的研究范式、开发减少关联启发式的有效途径等方面, 提出了深化研究的方向和思路。     

Employment as a Poverty Trap

Using an experiment conducted with 384 young Israelis, the authors find that if young people are actually working as unskilled workers, the status quo bias increases the premium that they require for giving up their jobs and seeking more education. This excess premium may make some individuals choose to remain employed as unskilled workers rather than pursue higher education. Such a decision may trap them in a life of poverty. The authors maintain that their results prompt a reexamination of the widely held belief that early employment is an advantage for young people.     

Bias in Favor of the Status Quo

People favor the existing and longstanding states of the world. Rational explanations for status quo maintenance are complemented by a number of non‐rational mechanisms; loss aversion, regret avoidance, repeated exposure, and rationalization create a preference for existing states. We show that the status quo also benefits from a simple assumption of goodness due to mere existence and longevity; people treat existence as a prima facie case for goodness, aesthetic and ethical Longevity increases this preference. These biases operate heuristically, forming barriers to cognitive and social change.     

Accountability amplifies the status quo effect when change creates victims

This study assesses the impact of accountability, the status quo, and anticipated costs and benefits on judgement of the acceptability of a drug in the US pharmaceuticals market. Several effects are documented: (1) subjects were more accepting of a drug, the lower the anticipated risks of side effects and the greater the anticipated benefits; (2) subjects were especially unwilling to accept risk when the drug was not yet on the market and when they felt accountable for their decisions; (3) accountable subjects confronted by an off-the-market drug that posed moderate or high risk were also especially likely to procrastinate, to buckpass, and to think in integratively complex ways about the problem, notwithstanding the fact that many more lives would be saved than lost. We explain these results by positing that perceptual-cognitive processes (loss aversion) and political processes (blame avoidance) mutually reinforce each other when decision makers are accountable for choices that raise the possibility of changing the status quo in ways that impose losses on identifiable constituencies. We conclude by commenting on the complex normative issues that arise in labelling response tendencies as biases. Choices that look irrational within one ethical or political framework sometimes appear quite reasonable with another.     

“You're overreacting!”: The ambiguity of Asian American microaggressions delegitimizes collective action

Asian Americans are lauded as the model minority who are intelligent and industrious. Simultaneously, they are deemed as perpetual foreigners. The current research examines how racial microaggressions expressed by a White American source toward an Asian American target affect perceptions of the perpetrator and target. White Americans and Asian Americans read about an interaction between two college students, where the racial microaggression made was either an ambiguous expression of the model minority myth (MMM; all studies), an ambiguous perpetual foreigner stereotype (all studies), an unambiguous MMM (all studies), or no racial bias (Studies 2 and 3). Findings indicate that both Whites and Asian Americans respond differently—when exposed to the aforementioned conditions—regarding perceived racism of the White perpetrator and appropriateness of response by the Asian American target; however, they respond similarly regarding perceived legitimacy of collective action by the target. Nevertheless, Whites and Asian Americans deemed the ambiguous microaggression against the target as a model minority not racist relative to unambiguous MMM. Our findings show that ambiguous forms of bias toward Asian Americans go “under the radar” of both Whites and Asian Americans as being racist and contribute to the maintenance of the racial status quo.     

决策评估中的结果偏差

结果偏差又称结果效应,它是发生在决策评估中的一种偏差式判断,即当决策结果与决策质量不存在实质性联系时,评估者仍根据结果信息评估决策质量.针对这一判断谬误的产生根源,研究者们提出了认知解释和申辩模型.结果偏差的影响因素主要包括动机、情境因素和评估手段等.基于先前研究存在的问题和不足,今后的研究应着眼于改进研究手段,理清与其他现象的关系并提出有效的应对策略.     

Variability of attention bias in socially anxious adolescents: differences in fixation duration toward adult and adolescent face stimuli

Prior research on attention bias in anxious youth, often utilising a visual dot probe task, has yielded inconsistent findings, which may be due to how bias is assessed and/or variability in the phenomenon. The present study utilises eye gaze tracking to assess attention bias in socially anxious adolescents, and explores several methodological and within-subject factors that may contribute to variability in attention bias. Attention bias to threat was measured in forty-two treatment-seeking adolescents (age 12–16 years) diagnosed with Social Anxiety Disorder. Bias scores toward emotional stimuli (vigilant attention) and bias scores away from emotional stimuli (avoidant attention) were explored. Bias scores changed between vigilance and avoidance within individuals and over the course of stimulus presentation. These differences were not associated with participant characteristics nor with self-reported social anxiety symptoms. However, clinician rated severity of social anxiety, explained a significant proportion of variance in the bias scores for adult, but not the adolescent, stimuli. Variability in attention bias among socially anxious adolescents is common and varies as a function of stimulus duration and type. Results may inform stimulus selection for future research.