Children's comprehension of presupposed information: Logical and pragmatic inferences to speaker belief

This study explored the ability of young children (5 and 8 years old) to make presuppositional inferences to a speaker's belief in uttering a sentence. Presuppositional information is the information a speaker believes to be common between himself and the hearer. The information is cued by a speaker either logically, by the use of specific lexical items, or pragmatically, by the use of an utterance in violation of conventional rules of conversation. Comprehension of the information may require a reading of the context of utterance. Kindergarten and thirdgrade children and adults were read paragraphs containing both logical and pragmatic presuppositional information, as well as a sentence that could be treated in a logical or a pragmatic manner depending on the context of utterance. The results showed that both groups of children and the adults could make presuppositional inferences to a speaker's belief, and that the responses of the children and adults were context sensitive.     

Presupposition and Accommodation: Understanding the Stalnakerian Picture

This paper offers a critical analysis ofStalnaker's work on presupposition (Stalnaker1973, 1974, 1979, 1999, 2002). The paperexamines two definitions of speakerpresupposition offered by Stalnaker – the familiar common ground view, and the earlier,less familiar, dispositional account – and howStalnaker relates this notion to the linguisticphenomenon of presupposition. Special attentionis paid to Stalnaker's view of accommodation. Iargue that given Stalnakers views,accommodation is not rightly seen as driven bythe presuppositional requirements ofutterances, but only by the interests ofspeakers in eliminating perceived differencesamong presuppositions. I also consider therevisions which are needed either to thedefinition of speaker presupposition or to thedefinition of sentence presupposition in lightof the possibility of informativepresupposition. In the concluding section, Idiscuss the ways in which some recent accountsof context and speaker presupposition departfrom their Stalnakerian foundations.     

When children are more logical than adults: experimental investigations of scalar implicature

A conversational implicature is an inference that consists of attributing to a speaker an implicit meaning that goes beyond the explicit linguistic meaning of an utterance. This paper experimentally investigates scalar implicature, a paradigmatic case of implicature in which a speaker's use of a term like Some indicates that the speaker had reasons not to use a more informative term from the same scale, e.g. All; thus, Some implicates Not all. Pragmatic theorists like Grice would predict that a pragmatic interpretation is determined only after its explicit, logical meaning is incorporated (e.g. where Some means at least one). The present work aims to developmentally examine this prediction by showing how younger, albeit competent, reasoners initially treat a relatively weak term logically before becoming aware of its pragmatic potential. Three experiments are presented. Experiment 1 presents a modal reasoning scenario offering an exhaustive set of conclusions; critical among these is participants' evaluation of a statement expressing Might be x when the context indicates that the stronger Must be x is true. The conversationally-infelicitous Might be x can be understood logically (e.g. as compatible with Must) or pragmatically (as exclusive to Must). Results from 5-, 7-, and 9-year-olds as well as adults revealed that (a) 7-year-olds are the youngest to demonstrate modal competence overall and that (b) 7- and 9-year-olds treat the infelicitous Might logically significantly more often than adults do. Experiment 2 showed how training with the modal task can suspend the implicatures for adults. Experiment 3 provides converging evidence of the developmental pragmatic effect with the French existential quantifier Certains (Some). While linguistically-sophisticated children (8- and 10-year-olds olds) typically treat Certains as compatible with Tous (All), adults are equivocal. These results, which are consistent with unanticipated findings in classic developmental papers, reveal a consistent ordering in which representations of weak scalar terms tend to be treated logically by young competent participants and more pragmatically by older ones. This work is also relevant to the treatment of scalar implicatures in the reasoning literature.     

The influence of clause order,congruency, and probability on the processing of conditionals

Conditional information can be equally asserted in the forms if p, then q (e.g., “if I am ill, I will miss work tomorrow”) and q, if p (e.g., “I will miss work tomorrow, if I am ill”). While this type of clause order manipulation has previously been found to have no influence on the ultimate conclusions participants draw from conditional rules, we used self-paced reading to examine how it affects the real time incremental processing of everyday conditional statements. Experiment 1 revealed that clause order interacts with presuppositional congruency as readers hypothetically represent counterfactual statements. When if p, then q counterfactuals contained a presupposition that was incongruent with prior context, these statements took longer to read than when the presupposition was congruent, but for q, if p conditionals there was no such congruency effect. Experiment 2 revealed that reading times were influenced by the subjective probability of an indicative conditional regardless of clause order, with a penalty observed for low-probability statements relative to high-probability statements in both conditional clause orders. These data reveal a dissociation whereby clause order mediates the effect of suppositional congruency on reading times, but does not mediate the effect of subjective probability.     

Four‐year‐olds incorporate speaker knowledge into pragmatic inferences

Human communication relies on the ability to take into account the speaker's mental state to infer the intended meaning of an utterance in context. For example, a sentence such as ‘Some of the animals are safe to pet’ can be interpreted as giving rise to the inference ‘Some and not all animals are safe to pet’ when uttered by an expert. The same inference, known as a scalar implicature, does not arise when the sentence is spoken by someone with partial knowledge. Adults have been shown to derive scalar implicatures in accordance with the speaker's knowledge state, but in young children this ability is debated. Here, we revisit this question using a simple visual world paradigm. We find that both 4‐ and 5‐year‐olds successfully incorporate speaker knowledge into the derivation of scalar inferences. However, this ability does not generalize immediately to non‐linguistic communicative contexts. These findings have important implications for the development of pragmatic abilities.     

Implicatures et développement

We summarize our work on pragmatic inference-making in children, while generally focusing on scalar implicatures. Such inferences arise when a relatively weak term implies the rejection of a stronger one. For example, some is often understood to mean not all. While adults readily draw such implicatures, children tend to rely on the terms’ minimal, lexically encoded meanings (with which some is compatible with all). Given that children’s treatments coincide with logical ones, children end up appearing more logical than adults on standard reasoning tasks. We describe this effect in detail while showing that (a) even young children can be encouraged to carry out implicatures and, that; (b) evidence of non-pragmatic behavior is best explained as due to unavailable effort.     

Are generalised scalar implicatures generated by default? An on-line investigation into the role of context in generating pragmatic inferences

Recent research in semantics and pragmatics has revived the debate about whether there are two cognitively distinct categories of conversational implicatures: generalised and particularised. Generalised conversational implicatures are so-called because they seem to arise more or less independently of contextual support. Particularised implicatures are more context-bound. The Default view is that generalised implicatures are default inferences and that their computation is relatively autonomous--being computed by some default mechanism and only being open to cancellation at a second stage when contextual assumptions are taken into consideration (i.a.). It is at that second stage where contextual assumptions are considered that particularised implications are computed. By contrast, Context-Driven theorists claim that both generalised and particularised implicatures are generated by the same process and only where there is contextual support (Chierchia, 2004; Horn, 1984; Levinson, 2000 i.a.). In this paper, we present three on-line studies of the prototypical cases of generalised implicatures: the scalar implicatures 'some of the Fs' > 'not all the Fs' and 'X or Y' > 'either X or Y but not both'. These studies were designed to test the context-dependence and autonomy of the implicatures. Our results suggest that these scalar implicatures are dependent on the conversational context and that they show none of the autonomy predicted by the Default view. We conclude with a discussion of the degree to which such implicatures are purely context-driven and whether an interactionist default position may also be plausible.     

Local pragmatics: reply to Mandy Simons

In response to Mandy Simons’ defence of a classical Gricean approach to pragmatic enrichment in terms of conversational implicature, I emphasize the following contrast. Conversational implicatures are generated by a global inference which uses as a premise the fact that the speaker has said that p, but only the triggering inference is global in cases of pragmatic enrichment. What generates the correct interpretation is a process of reconstrual, which locally maps the literal meaning of a constituent to a modulated meaning and composes that meaning with that of the other constituents. That process is constrained by Gricean considerations (in the broad sense) but that is true of all pragmatic aspects of interpretation, whether pre-propositional or post-propositional. Just as indexical resolution, though pragmatic and constrained by Gricean considerations, does not fit the two-stage model through which Grice accounts for conversational implicatures, so pragmatic modulation can’t be accounted for in terms of that model despite the fact that, like conversational implicatures and unlike indexical resolution, modulation is pragmatically rather than semantically triggered.     

Presupposition Projection and Conditionalization

I explain what exactly constrains presupposition projection in compound sentences and argue that the presuppositions that do not project are conditionalized, giving rise to inferable conditional presuppositions. I combine elements of (Gazdar in Pragmatics: implicature, presupposition, and logical form. Academic Press, New York 1979) and (van der Sandt in Context and presupposition. Croom Helm, London 1988) which, together with an additional, independently motivated assumption, make it possible to construct an analysis that makes correct predictions. The core of my proposal is as follows: When a speaker felicitously utters a compound sentence whose constituent clauses (considered in isolation) require presuppositions, the hearer will infer that the speaker presupposes those propositions, unless the sentence contains some element that makes the hearer realize that, if the speaker actually presupposed them, she would be either uninformative or inconsistent in her beliefs. In these cases, the propositions that would have been presupposed, had the clauses been uttered in isolation, will not be presupposed, i.e. the clausal presuppositions will not project.     

Accommodating Presuppositions Is Inappropriate in Implausible Contexts

According to one view of linguistic information (Karttunen, 1974; Stalnaker, 1974), a speaker can convey contextually new information in one of two ways: (a) by asserting the content as new information; or (b) by presupposing the content as given information which would then have to be accommodated. This distinction predicts that it is conversationally more appropriate to assert implausible information rather than presuppose it (e.g., von Fintel, 2008; Heim, 1992; Stalnaker, 2002). A second view rejects the assumption that presuppositions are accommodated; instead, presuppositions are assimilated into asserted content and both are correspondingly open to challenge (e.g., Gazdar, 1979; van der Sandt, 1992). Under this view, we should not expect to find a difference in conversational appropriateness between asserting implausible information and presupposing it. To distinguish between these two views of linguistic information, we performed two self‐paced reading experiments with an on‐line stops‐making‐sense judgment. The results of the two experiments—using the presupposition triggers the and too—show that accommodation is inappropriate (makes less sense) relative to non‐presuppositional controls when the presupposed information is implausible but not when it is plausible. These results provide support for the first view of linguistic information: the contrast in implausible contexts can only be explained if there is a presupposition‐assertion distinction and accommodation is a mechanism dedicated to reasoning about presuppositions.     

Using Triggers Without Projecting Presuppositions

Presuppositions are capable of projecting from under the scope of operators such as negation, but do not obligatorily do so. This creates a potential difficulty for the hearer of presupposition-bearing utterances, especially given the fact that speaker can use presupposition to convey entirely new information. In this paper, I discuss the potential role of context in resolving this tension, and in particular, I argue that the inferences that are drawn about the current discourse purpose may be materially relevant to the interpretation of potential presuppositions. I also consider some of the implications of this for recent experimental work on presupposition and projection.     

Understanding Frege’s notion of presupposition

Why did Frege offer only proper names as examples of presupposition triggers? Some scholars claim that Frege simply did not care about the full range of presuppositional phenomena. This paper argues, in contrast, that he had good reasons for employing an extremely narrow notion of ‘Voraussetzung’. On Frege’s view, many devices that are now construed as presupposition triggers either express several thoughts at once or merely ‘illuminate’ a thought in a particular way. Fregean presuppositions, in contrast, are essentially tied to names.

     

Indicatives,Subjunctives, and the Falsity of the Antecedent

It is widely held that there are important differences between indicative conditionals (e.g., “If the authors are linguists, they have written a linguistics paper”) and subjunctive conditionals (e.g., “If the authors had been linguists, they would have written a linguistics paper”). A central difference is that indicatives and subjunctives convey different stances toward the truth of their antecedents. Indicatives (often) convey neutrality: for example, about whether the authors in question are linguists. Subjunctives (often) convey the falsity of the antecedent: for example, that the authors in question are not linguists. This paper tests prominent accounts of how these different stances are conveyed: whether by presupposition or conversational implicature. Experiment 1 tests the presupposition account by investigating whether the stances project—remain constant—when embedded under operators like negations, possibility modals, and interrogatives, a key characteristic of presuppositions. Experiment 2 tests the conversational-implicature account by investigating whether the stances can be cancelled without producing a contradiction, a key characteristic of implicatures. The results provide evidence that both stances—neutrality about the antecedent in indicatives and the falsity of the antecedent in subjunctives—are conveyed by conversational implicatures.     

汉语语用标记语与规约含义

本文剖析现代汉语中的语用标记语和规约含义之间的关系。格赖斯认为语用标记语的意义就是其所在话语的规约含义,本文指出语用标记语本身的意义不等于其所在话语的规约含义,因为语用标记语的意义不受语境影响,具有静态的语义特征,规约含义则是语用标记语和它所依附句子以及其使用场合相互作用而产生的,具有动态的语用特征。也就是说,同一语用标记语在不同的语境中会产生不同的规约含义。本文详细分析了各类语用标记语在具体语境中触发的规约含义。这种以说话人为中心分析语用标记语的方法摒弃了以听话人为中心或以篇章为中心的分析传统,不仅符合格赖斯意义理论基本哲学精神,而且符合自然语言的意义是对某一认知主体而言的基本语言哲学立场。     

Presuppositional completeness

Some notions of the logic of questions (presupposition of a question, validation, entailment) are used for defining certain kinds of completeness of elementary theories. Presuppositional completeness, closely related to -completeness ([3], [6]), is shown to be fulfilled by strong elementary theories like Peano arithmetic.     

Utterance at a distance

In this paper I defend Kaplan’s claim that the sentence “I am here now” is logically true. A number of counter-examples to the claim have been proposed, including occurrences of the sentence in answerphone messages, written notes left for later decoding, etc. These counter-examples are only convincing if they can be shown to be cases where the correct context with respect to which the utterance should be evaluated is the context in which it is decoded rather than encoded. I argue that this is not the case, and draw on the distinction between force and content to suggest an alternative account of how information is communicated in these cases that is consistent with Kaplan’s semantic theory.

Multivalent Semantics for Vagueness and Presupposition

Both the phenomenon of presupposition and that of vagueness have motivated the use of one form or another of trivalent logic, in which a declarative sentence can not only receive the standard values true (1) and false (0), but also a third, non-standard truth-value which is usually understood as ‘undefined’ (#). The goal of this paper is to propose a multivalent framework which can deal simultaneously with presupposition and vagueness, and, more specifically, capture their projection properties as well as their different roles in language. Now, there is a prima facie simple way of doing this, which simply consists in assimilating the two phenomena, and using an appropriate type of trivalent logic. On this view, we just need a compositional system that deals with the ‘undefined’ truth-value, and does not care about whether the source of undefinedness is ‘presuppositional’ or related to vagueness. I will argue that such a simple solution cannot succeed, and point out a number of desiderata that any successful approach must meet. I will then present and discuss two seven-valued semantics, inspired, respectively, by the Strong Kleene semantics and by supervaluationism, which meet these desiderata.     

Zero tolerance for pragmatics

The proposition expressed by a sentence is relative to a context. But what determines the content of the context? Many theorists would include among these determinants aspects of the speaker’s intention in speaking. My thesis is that, on the contrary, the determinants of the context never include the speaker’s intention. My argument for this thesis turns on a consideration of the role that the concept of proposition expressed in context is supposed to play in a theory of linguistic communication. To illustrate an alternative approach, I present an original theory of the reference of demonstratives according to which the referent of a demonstrative is the object that adequately and best satisfies certain accessibility criteria. Although I call my thesis zero tolerance for pragmatics, it is not an expression of intolerance for everything that might be called “pragmatics.”     

‘I’

It has traditionally been maintained that every token of ‘I’ refers to its utterer. However, certain uses of indexicals conflict with this claim, and its counterparts with respect to ‘here’ and ‘now’, suggesting that the traditional account of indexical reference should be abandoned. In this paper, I examine some proposed alternatives and the difficulties they face, before offering a new account of indexical reference. I endorse Kaplan’s view that the reference of an indexical is determined on any occasion it is used by applying its character to a particular context, arguing that the problem cases show that this is not always the context of utterance. The task facing the semantic theorist is thus to explain what fixes the reference-determining context. I consider and reject both Predelli’s suggestion that the reference-determining context is the one intended by the utterer, and Corazza et al.’s proposal that the relevant context is fixed by conventions delivered by the utterance setting. The discussion of these two accounts reveals that an adequate theory of indexical reference should allow the speaker to use indexicals in novel ways, whilst holding that what a speaker can refer to with an indexical utterance is constrained by what an audience can understand. I develop an account based around these two requirements.