Thick,Thin, and Becoming a Virtuous Arguer

A virtue account is focused on the character of those who argue. It is frequently assumed, however, that virtues are not action guiding, since they describe how to be and so fail to give us specific actions to take in a sticky situation. In terms of argumentation, we might say that being a charitable arguer is virtuous, but knowing so provides no details about how to argue successfully. To close this gap, I develop a parallel with the thick-thin distinction from ethics and use Hursthouse’s notion of “v-rules”. I also draw heavily from the work in argumentation by Daniel Cohen to develop Wayne Brockriede’s notion of arguing lovingly. But “argue lovingly” has a delicious ambiguity. For Brockriede it describes how we engage with others arguers. It can also mean, however, a loving attachment to knowledge, understanding, and truth. Applying the thick-thin distinction to argumentation in general and loving argumentation in particular shows that a virtue theoretic approach to argumentation is valuable for two reasons: it can provide one articulation of what it means to be a virtuous arguer and provide some insights into how to become one.     

The Virtuous Fall

The medieval Church's concern with moral reform contributed to the emergence of a genre of literature in the thirteenth century dedicated to the vices and virtues. Inspired by monastic and scholastic traditions, treatises such as Laurent d'Orléans's Somme le roi encouraged the avoidance of sin and provided the faithful with a moral taxonomy that ultimately ensured their access to heaven. Marguerite Porete's Mirror of Simple Souls and Meister Eckhart's Discourses of Instruction challenge this virtue‐centered approach to salvation. Relying on their shared claim that the fall of the just man is in fact a virtue, this essay argues that their moral theology is grounded not on the a posteriori act of penance needed for salvation, but on the a priori consent of the will. This alternative view of moral life finds support in previous strands of the Christian tradition, and in particular in Peter Abelard's theory of intentionalism.     

One Personality, Multiple Selves: Integrating Personality and Social Roles

ABSTRACT How do people maintain multiple, role-specific self-conceptions as well as a consistent sense of self? In a sample of middle-aged women, we examined three issues: (a) the ways in which people view themselves as both different and similar across social roles (e.g., parent, friend, worker), (b) how role-specific self-conceptions and general self-conceptions are related, and (c) the merits of predicting role-specific criteria from role-specific and general self-conceptions. Results showed that subjects' self-conceptions were specific to role contexts, yet highly correlated across those same role contexts. In addition, role-specific self-conceptions were more similar to the general self-concept for roles with which the individual was more satisfied. Finally, as predicted from the bandwidth-fidelity trade-off, ratings of the general self correlated moderately with outcomes across all role domains, whereas ratings of role-specific self-conceptions correlated strongly with outcomes for the same role, but not in other roles.     

The Virtuous Tortoise

There is no philosophically interesting distinction to be made between inference‐rules and premises. That there is such a distinction is often held to follow from the possibility of infinite regress illustrated by Carroll's story of Achilles and the tortoise. I will argue that this is wrong on three separate grounds. Consequently, Carroll's fable provides no motivation to abandon the traditional logical separation of arguments into their premises and conclusions. There is no proposition that must be taken to be a rule and must not be taken as a premise.     

Virtuous Play: The Ethics,Pleasures, and Burdens of Brain Training

Through normative appeals of cognitive enhancement, the brain has become a site of both promise and peril. Displaying oneself as ethically sound may now include showing requisite care for cognitive capacities. Moreover, enhancing our cognitive reserves is framed as aspirational means of averting neurodegenerative disease and neoliberal precarity. Such demanding labours of self-care warrant close scrutiny. Promissory discourses proclaim our ‘neuroplasticity’, encouraging subjects to work on endlessly improvable functional capacities that hold labour market value. Yet a ‘fun morality’ is equally prevalent in today’s experiential economies. Neuro-enhancement is thus sold not as an ascetic chore, but an ecstatic potential. Hope, fear, pleasure, and ethical conduct are, therefore, all closely entwined in the ‘virtuous play’ of ‘brain training’, where commercial entities use digital platforms for game-based tasks designed to enhance cognitive abilities. These services are typically promoted through appeals to our dutiful biocitizenship. This type of virtuous play is increasingly the means by which subjects produce themselves as simultaneously pleasure-seeking, productive, and resoundingly ‘well’. However, this understanding of virtuosity is often narrowly derived—reduced to ‘active ageing’, corporate-style ‘neurohacking’, and ‘brain profiles’—that threaten to foreclose other ways of imagining well-being. In failing to recognize the neoliberal underpinnings of virtuous play we entrench burdensome attachments to emerging modes of personal enhancement. Against these seductive appeals of combining pleasure with self-improvement, we must cultivate a critical reflexivity regarding exactly how ‘enhancement’ is conceived, opening room for lines of possibility outside of currently dominant frameworks.     

论生态经济学的伦理基础

生态经济学主张经济发展的现实基础是人的感性生存;经济发展的动力机制是人类文明的可持续性;经济发展的价值目的是人的全面发展.     

Birth of A Person: One Woman's Reflections on Survival and Growth

Through her words written in a daily log, a woman examines her life and goals, her relationship with her husband, and the influence in her life of an assertion-training course.     

面孔认知的四个层面及FFA在其中的作用

面孔具有明显不同于其他刺激物的特点,面孔认知的目的也因此与其他物体认知的目的大相径庭。依据面孔认知的目的,本文将面孔认知划分为四个层面：将面孔区别于一般物体的第一层面,对面孔物理属性进行识别的第二层面,对面孔的生物属性进行识别的第三层面和对面孔的社会属性进行识别的第四层面。FFA是面孔加工的一个重要脑区,通过论述它对面孔认知各层面的作用,FFA在面孔加工中的作用被进一步明确。     

一起四级医疗事故引发的几点思考

目前,规范护士执业范围的法律、法规存在着盲区。作者通过对一起四级医疗事故的护理责任及护士执业范围的合法性进行分析探讨,认为应当尽快出台与《护士条例》配套的实施细则,以明确规范护士的执业范围及合法性,保障护士执业的安全。     

The Jazz Solo as Virtuous Act

This article presents a new aesthetic of the improvised jazz solo, an aesthetic grounded in the premise that a solo is an act indivisible from the actor (the soloist) and the context. The solo's context includes the local and large‐scale conventions of jazz performance as well as the soloist's other work. The theme on which a solo is based serves not as a “work,” but as part of the solo's stylistic context. Knowledge of this context inheres directly into proper apprehension of the musical surface; it does not constitute a separate plane of appreciation. I begin by examining the improvisational error. This examination supports the position that the solo is an act, not a work. From this position, I detail a new aesthetic of the improvised solo, grounded in the soloist's virtues. In a successful solo, the soloist's actions display a balance of two aesthetic “virtues”: compositional skill and a commitment to the spirit of improvisation. Compositional skill manifests in a solo as coherence. The improvisational spirit manifests as courage, spontaneity, and related qualities. These virtues often come into conflict; each soloist negotiates this conflict differently.     

Virtuous Arguers: Responsible and Reliable

Virtuous arguers are expected to manifest virtues such as intellectual humility and open-mindedness, but from such traits the quality of arguments does not immediately follow. However, it also seems implausible that a virtuous arguer can systematically put forward bad arguments. How could virtue argumentation theory combine both insights? The solution, I argue, lies in an analogy with virtue epistemology: considering both responsibilist and reliabilist virtues gives us a fuller picture of the virtuous arguer.     

Four Roles of Ethical Theory in Clinical Ethics Consultation

When clinical ethics committee members discuss a complex ethical dilemma, what use do they have for normative ethical theories? Members without training in ethical theory may still contribute to a pointed and nuanced analysis. Nonetheless, the knowledge and use of ethical theories can play four important roles: aiding in the initial awareness and identification of the moral challenges, assisting in the analysis and argumentation, contributing to a sound process and dialogue, and inspiring an attitude of reflexivity. These four roles of ethical theory in clinical ethics consultation are described and their significance highlighted, while an example case is used as an illustration throughout.     

Virtuous motives,moral luck,and assisted death

Abstract

In this paper I outline a motive-based virtue account of right action, according to which an action is right if it expresses or exhibits virtuous motive, and which defines virtue in terms of human flourishing. I indicate how this account allows us to deal with the problem of consequential luck. By applying this account to the question of whether it is ever morally right or acceptable to assist in someone’s death, I demonstrate how it also allows us to deal with the problem of circumstantial luck, which arises when an agent finds himself in a situation where he is forced to choose between two reprehensible acts.