Doctoral dissertations in pastoral psychology September 1, 1968 to August 31, 1969

Pastoral Psychology -     

Doctoral dissertations in pastoral psychology June 1, 1963 to May 31, 1964

Pastoral Psychology -     

Doctoral dissertations in pastoral psychology June, 1961 to June, 1962

Pastoral Psychology -     

Doctoral dissertations in the Nordic countries 2003

The purpose of this article is to discuss how the possibility of being fallible fits together with religious convictions and practices. By fallibilism, it is usually meant that all our beliefs are only fallibly justified, at best. This entails that even for our best-argued beliefs, it remains possible that they can be rationally doubted. Recently, this idea has found its way to theological deliberation as well. The upside of the idea is that it enables one to dodge the charges of absolutism or immutability. The downside is that it seems to make religious belief only tentative, and unable to motivate action. In the following, I will shortly present some recent fallibilist proposals of Christian identity, and then reflect on the possibility of holding religious beliefs fallibly against the background of the demand of certitude and action. Finally, I will propose a model of Christian fallibility, based on virtue epistemology, which avoids some of the problems inherent in current models.     

Books Received from August 1, 2009 to July 31, 2010

This study aimed to explore the recognition of emotional and non-emotional biological movements in children with severe and profound deafness. Twenty-four deaf children, together with 24 control children matched on mental age and 24 control children matched on chronological age, were asked to identify a person's actions, subjective states, emotions, and objects conveyed by moving point-light displays. Results showed that when observing point-light displays, deaf children showed impairments across all conditions (emotions, actions, and moving objects) compared with their chronological age-matched controls but showed no differences across subjective states. The results are supportive that deaf children present developmental delays in their biological motion apart from the ones relative to their own mental state, and this may be interpreted in relation to the expertise they have acquired in decoding action toward themselves. The findings are discussed in relation to deaf children viewing motion stimuli very differently to hearing children.