Identifying and explaining apparent universal sex differences in cognition and behavior

With growing recognition that there are universal sex differences in cognition and behavior, four theories have been proposed to account for these differences: the founder effect theory, the social structuralist theory, the evolutionary theory, and the evolutionary neuroandrogenic (ENA) theory. The latter of these theories is described in considerable detail as offering an explanation for most of 65 recently identified apparent universal sex differences (AUSDs) in cognition and behavior. Regarding “ultimate causes” (why), ENA theory asserts that (a) evolutionary-genetic factors incline females to bias their mate choices toward males who are loyal and competent provisioners of resources and (b) males are merely a genetic variant on the female sex selected for responding to female mating biases. In terms of “proximate causes” (how), the theory maintains that high exposure to androgens has evolved to alter the male brain functioning in two specific ways relative to most female brains: (a) suboptimal arousal and (b) a rightward shift in neocortical functioning. These two functional patterns are described and hypothesized to incline males and females to learn differently in many respects. The most fundamental differences involve males learning ways of either complying with or circumventing female mate preferences. Numerous universal sex differences in cognition and behavior are hypothesized to result from these evolved neurohormonal factors, including most of the 65 AUSDs herein summarized in seven categorical tables.     

Armchair methodology and epistemological naturalism

In traditional armchair methodology, philosophers attempt to challenge a thesis of the form ‘F iff G’ or ‘F only if G’ by describing a scenario that elicits the intuition that what has been described is an F that isn’t G. If they succeed, then the judgment that there is, or could be, an F that is not G counts as good prima facie evidence against the target thesis. Moreover, if these intuitions remain compelling after further (good faith) reflection, then traditional armchair methodology takes the judgment to be serious (though not infallible) evidence against the target thesis—call it secunda facie evidence—that should not be discounted as long as those intuitions retain their force. Some philosophers, however, suggest that this methodology is incompatible with epistemological naturalism, the view that philosophical inquiry should be sensitive to empirical observations, and argue that traditional armchair methodology must deemphasize the role of intuitions in philosophical inquiry. In my view, however, this would be a mistake: as I will argue, the most effective way to promote philosophical progress is to treat intuitions as having the (prima and secunda) evidential status I’ve described. But I will also argue that philosophical inquiry can produce a theory that is sensitive to empirical observations and the growth of empirical knowledge, even if it gives intuitions the prima- and secunda-facie evidential status that traditional armchair methodology demands—and thus that traditional armchair methodology, if properly practiced, need not be abandoned by naturalists, or even (except for a few exceptions) be much revised.     

Two Accounts of Moral Objectivity: from Attitude-Independence to Standpoint-Invariance

How should we understand the notion of moral objectivity? Metaethical positions that vindicate morality’s objective appearance are often associated with moral realism. On a realist construal, moral objectivity is understood in terms of mind-, stance-, or attitude-independence. But realism is not the only game in town for moral objectivists. On an antirealist construal, morality’s objective features are understood in virtue of our attitudes. In this paper I aim to develop this antirealist construal of moral objectivity in further detail, and to make its metaphysical commitments explicit. I do so by building on Sharon Street’s version of “Humean Constructivism”. Instead of the realist notion of attitude-independence, the antirealist account of moral objectivity that I articulate centres on the notion of standpoint-invariance. While constructivists have been criticized for compromising on the issue of moral objectivity, I make a preliminary case for the thesis that, armed with the notion of standpoint-invariance, constructivists have resources to vindicate an account of objectivity with just the right strength, given the commitments of ordinary moral thought and practice. In support of this thesis I highlight recent experimental findings about folk moral objectivism. Empirical observations about the nature of moral discourse have traditionally been taken to give prima facie support to moral realism. I argue, by contrast, that from what we can tell from our current experimental understanding, antirealists can capture the commitments of ordinary discourse at least as well as realists can.     

The quail, Coturnix coturnix, as a laboratory animal

The quail, Coturnix coturnix, is small, gentle, hardy, adaptable, easy to house, and economical to maintain. Wetherbee and Jacobs (1960) call it the “Drosophila of the avian laboratory,” and yet this charming bird is virtually unknown to the psychological laboratory. Our preliminary investigations show that the pecking operant is readily conditioned and that little or no deprivation is necessary to maintain behavior with food as a reinforcer. Visual and temporal discriminations were very quickly made. Our observations suggest that the social behavior of these birds might be a fruitful area for psychological study. On the basis of our somewhat limited observations, we believe that C. coturnix should prove a useful experimental animal for comparative studies, for basic research in learning, motivation, and perhaps social behavior, and for teaching the analysis of behavior in demonstrations and laboratory courses.     

How objectivity undermines the study of personhood: Toward an intersubjective epistemology for psychological science

As a science, psychology embraces the value of objectivity. An objective observation is one that is (a) based upon publically observable phenomena (i.e., overt behavior); (b) unbiased, in the sense that it records only what was observed, without either adding or taking away from the observation, and (c) an accurate representation of the world as it truly is. To understand the person, however, it is necessary to come to grips with seemingly elusive concepts such as agency, symbolism, experience, meaning, inter-subjectivity, and morality. Such concepts make reference to phenomena that are not observable in way that one can observe objects in the physical world of space and time. In this paper, I examine how psychology's commitment to objectivity obscures our ability to understand persons. A remnant of the Cartesian distinction between a mind and body, the principle of objectivity forces psychologists to seek “objective” indicators of “subjective” processes. Following Wittgenstein and recent research on the mirror resonance system, I argue that psychological knowledge arises neither from within (subjectively) nor from without (objectively), but instead from between (intersubjectively). To understand what it means to be a person, we must abandon the false distinction between objectivity and subjectivity, and embrace an epistemology based on intersubjectivity.     

A model clarifying the role of mediators in the variability of mood states over time in people who stutter

PurposeElevated negative mood states such as social anxiety and depressive mood have been found in adults who stutter. Research is needed to assist in the development of a model that clarifies how factors like self-efficacy and social support contribute to the variability of negative mood states over time.MethodParticipants included 200 adults who stutter. A longitudinal design was employed to assess change in mood states over a period of five months. Hierarchical directed regression (path analysis) was used to determine contributory relationships between change in mood states and self-efficacy, social support, socio-demographic and stuttering disorder variables. Participants completed a comprehensive assessment regimen, including validated measures of mood states, perceived control (self-efficacy) and social support.ResultsResults confirmed that self-efficacy performs a protective role in the change in mood states like anxiety and depressive mood. That is, self-efficacy cushioned the impact of negative mood states. Social support was only found to contribute a limited protective influence. Socio-demographic variables had little direct impact on mood states, while perceived severity of stuttering also failed to contribute directly to mood at any time point.ConclusionsMood was found to be influenced by factors that are arguably important for a person to cope and adjust adaptively to the adversity associated with fluency disorder. A model that explains how mood states are influenced over time is described. Implications of these results for managing adults who stutter with elevated negative mood states like social anxiety are discussed.Educational Objectives: The reader will be able to describe: (a) the method involved in hierarchical (directed) regression used in path analysis; (b) the variability of mood states over a period of five months; (c) the nature of the mediator relationship between factors like self-efficacy and social support and mood states like anxiety, and (d) the contribution to mood states of socio-demographic factors like age and education and stuttering disorder variables like stuttering frequency and perceived severity.     

Gandalf’s solution to the Newcomb problem

This article proposes a new theory of rational decision, distinct from both causal decision theory (CDT) and evidential decision theory (EDT). First, some intuitive counterexamples to CDT and EDT are presented. Then the motivation for the new theory is given: the correct theory of rational decision will resemble CDT in that it will not be sensitive to any comparisons of absolute levels of value across different states of nature, but only to comparisons of the differences in value between the available options within states of nature; however, the correct theory will also resemble EDT in that it will rely on conditional probabilities (not unconditional probabilities). The new theory gives a prominent role to the notion of a “benchmark” for each state of nature, by comparison with which the value of the available options in that state of nature are measured, and so it has been called the Benchmark Theory (BT). It is argued that BT gives the right verdict on the cases that seem to be counterexamples to CDT and EDT. Finally, some objections to BT are considered and answered.     

Social support from work and family domains as an antecedent or moderator of work-family conflicts?

On the basis of Conservation of Resources theory, we investigated how social support from supervisor, co-workers, life partner, and family members is associated with work-family conflicts in N = 107 working mothers. We used data from a cross-sectional questionnaire and a standardized diary to examine two possible forms of interplay: (a) Social support as an antecedent of work-family conflicts, and (b) moderating effects of social support on the relationship between domain-specific strain and work-family conflicts. Overall, results favored social support as an antecedent of work-family conflicts.     

A Brief Social Skills Intervention to Reduce Challenging Classroom Behavior

Social skills instruction has been recommended as a way of improving behavioral and social outcomes for students with emotional and behavioral disorders (EBD). A brief social skills intervention (Stop and Think (Knoff in The stop & think social skills program, Sopris West, Longmont, CO, 2001) was used to extend the current literature base for students with EBD. A multiple-baseline across classrooms design was used to examine negative social behavior of five participants attending a self-contained school setting for students with challenging behavior. The primary intervention components included: (a) teach, (b) model, (c) role play, and (d) performance feedback. Specific social skills addressed in intervention were listening, using nice talk, accepting consequences, ignoring others, and following directions. Participants were taught to use a 5-step process for each social skill: (1) stop and think, (2) identify good and bad choices, (3) identify steps to performing the good choice, (4) implement steps, and (5) reflect on the good choice you made. Results indicated students benefitted from 12 sessions of explicit social skills instruction as evidenced by decreases in negative social behavior. Social behavior improvements maintained during 2-week follow-up observations. Decreasing negative social behaviors is important in improving general social and behavioral outcomes as well as demonstrating growth toward being prepared to transition back to less restrictive environments. Limitations, recommendations for future research, and practice implications are discussed.     

Explaining enkratic asymmetries: knowledge-first style

There are two different kinds of enkratic principles for belief: evidential enkratic principles and normative enkratic principles. It’s frequently taken for granted that there’s not an important difference between them. But evidential enkratic principles are undermined by considerations that gain no traction at all against their normative counterparts. The idea that such an asymmetry exists between evidential and normative enkratic principles is surprising all on its own. It is also something that calls out for explanation. Similarly, the considerations that undermine evidential enkratic principles also undermine certain narrow-scope evidential principles. This too generates explanatory questions. I show how a knowledge-first view of rationality can easily address these (and further) explanatory questions. Thus we have one more reason to put knowledge first in epistemology.     

Group Treatment of Sexually Abused Adolescent Girls: A Review of Outcome Studies

Abstract

This paper considers factors that make children “at risk” for postdivorce maladjustment. The risk factors include (a) demographic variables of sex, age and socioeconomic status; (b) predivorce family functioning; (c) postdivorce relationship with the ex-spouse; (d) postdivorce parentchild interaction; and (e) social support systems. Treatment programs incorporating these factors are briefly described. Recommendations are provided for the clinician and researcher.     

A Note in Defence of Ratificationism

Andy Egan argues that neither evidential nor causal decision theory gives the intuitively right recommendation in the cases The Smoking Lesion, The Psychopath Button, and The Three-Option Smoking Lesion. Furthermore, Egan argues that we cannot avoid these problems by any kind of ratificationism. This paper develops a new version of ratificationism that gives the right recommendations. Thus, the new proposal has an advantage over evidential and casual decision theory and standard ratificationist evidential decision theory.     

Reciprocity of the relationship between role ambiguity and group cohesion in youth interdependent sport

Objectives

Based on the role episode model (Kahn, Wolfe, Quinn, Snoek, & Rosenthal, 1964), the purpose of this study was to examine the reciprocal relationship between role ambiguity (Beauchamp, Bray, Eys, & Carron, 2002) and group cohesion (Eys, Loughead, Bray, & Carron, 2009) in youth interdependent sport teams.

Design

Longitudinal research with self-reported questionnaires.

Methods

Participants (N = 162; 12-18 years of age; M = 15.00 years) took part in two testing sessions (midseason vs. late-season) designed to gather information on individual perceptions of role ambiguity and group cohesion.

Results

After statistically controlling for status, gender, and team membership, results demonstrated that perceptions of social cohesion at midseason positively predicted variations in perceptions of scope of responsibilities and role behaviors in defense between mid- and end of season.

Conclusions

The need to belong (fundamental human motivation) and the unbalanced gender composition of the sample could explain the salience of social cohesion in the cohesion-role ambiguity relationship within youth interdependent sport teams. Results underlined that a part of role construction within youth teams is based on the peer social relationships developed between teammates. Implications are identified for youth practice. Limitations and future directions are addressed.     

Objectivity,diversity, democracy: locating social theory in <Emphasis Type="Italic">Objectivity and Diversity</Emphasis>

Reprising and revising a question from Longino regarding an earlier phase of standpoint theory, I raise some issues regarding the place of a substantive normative social theory in the strong objectivity project in Harding’s recent book, Objectivity and Diversity. I offer reasons to think the issue needs to be reframed in the co-constructionist and pluralist setting of the new book but that interesting issues continue to arise in thinking about the philosophical resources feminist philosophies of science can or might rely on.     

General Versus Specific Victim Blaming

Abstract

The authors investigated (a) whether victim blaming is a general variable in a person's make-up or (b) whether the extent of blaming depends on the kind of victim considered. The authors evaluated scales for blaming (a) victims in general, (b) society in general, (c) a specific kind of victim (i.e., AIDS), and (d) the society in which AIDS victims live. The general and specific scales had favorable psychometric properties, including reliability. General and specific victim blaming were significantly and positively correlated, whereas victim blaming and society blaming were not significantly correlated. Multiple regression analyses provided evidence of construct validity for the scales. All blaming variables were significantly related in the hypothesized directions to social distance, social responsibility, and discrimination (regarding persons with AIDS). The general and specific scales made significant and unique contributions. Implications for attribution theory and research are specified.     

Self and modernity on trial: A reply to cergen's saturated self

Abstract

In The Saturated Self: Dilemmas of Identity in Contemporary Life, Kenneth Gergen (1991) suggests that the rising uncertainty ushered in by the postmodern age has resulted in the collapse of traditional conceptions of self, truth, and social life. Although we agree that meaning is a product of social construction, we believe that Gergen has overextended his case. We argue that there is a need to maintain a notion of personal agency in constructionist models of human functioning and that an epigenetic-systems model of development (Gottlieb, 1991a, 1991b) provides a useful framework for doing so. We also suggest that even though social frameworks structure people's observations, data from their worlds nevertheless constrain theory making and foster scientific progress. Finally, we question whether postmodernism has provided a convincing strategy for dealing with the conflicts that arise from competing value systems.     

Can Science Be Objective? Longino's Science as Social Knowledge

In Science as Social Knowledge, Helen Longino offers a contextual analysis of evidential relevance. She claims that this “contextual empiricism” reconciles the objectivity of science with the claim that science is socially constructed. I argue that while her account does offer key insights into the role that values play in science, her claim that science is nonetheless objective is problematic.     

Comparisons in research and reasoning: Toward an integrative theory of social induction

Strong scientific theories give coherence to a body of research findings, make precise predictions about key phenomena, and guide the search for new discoveries. In social psychology, some contemporary theories fall short of this ideal. Mini-theories are prevalent (cf. Van Lange, Higgins, & Kruglanski, 2011), many predictions are merely directional (like this one!) and theorizing post-hoc. Guided by experimental reasoning, many researchers emphasize—and reify—empirical differences. Taking the experimental method as an epistemological gold standard, they regard comparative thinking as a criterion of rational thinking. Using examples from social judgment and decision making, we show how comparative reasoning can constrain theoretical development and bias assessments of human rationality. To encourage movement toward stronger theory, we describe a model of inductive reasoning in social contexts.