共查询到20条相似文献,搜索用时 15 毫秒
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GEORGE SCHEDLER 《Heythrop Journal》1979,20(1):25-43
Social justice (which includes retributive and distributive justice) is most clearly satisfied by a system of Divine rewards and punishments: an omnipotent, omniscient, perfectly just Being could determine in each case how much effort was made and effect the appropriate distribution of rewards and punishments. A correct understanding of social justice naturally leads us to suppose that there is an afterlife, a God, a free choice — though it is logically possible at least that social justice could be satisfied in some future (very advanced) human society. There will still be those who have their doubts about the correctness of any view according to which justice cannot be attained by fallible creatures who have an incomplete knowledge of one another's behaviour. But, surely, these doubts are not sufficient to discredit my view. There is no a priori reason for rejecting such a view. There is nothing about our use of the term ‘justice’ and its cognates which implies that such a view is mistaken. (Otherwise the statement “There is no justice in this world’ would be meaningless.) To the contrary, there are widely held religious views, Christian as well as non-Christian, which take this view quite seriously. If there is no a priori reason for rejecting this view, then there must be some independent reason for rejecting it. In other words, we need some independent reasons for believing that social justice can be attained by fallible creatures with limited knowledge. The mere fact that we might feel uncomfortable with my theory is not reason enough to reject it. Finally, those who do experience this discomfort might ask themselves whether such discomfort stems from their moral experience or whether they are simply intent on finding justice in imperfect human institutions. 相似文献
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S.A. Lloyd 《Pacific Philosophical Quarterly》1994,75(3-4):353-371
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ZENON SZABLOWINSKI 《Heythrop Journal》2008,49(3):405-422
The notion of justice is broad and complex. When we pursue justice too harshly after a conflict, we create new injustice and more victims; when we do not, the offenders usually keep hurting others and the violence is prolonged. As a matter of fact, only a few perpetrators can be punished. On the other hand, does punishment of the offender alone heal the victim or restore peace and harmony in society? Moreover, when the victim forgives, should the society still punish the offender? What role do truth recovery, state tribute (paid to the victims) and monetary compensation play in finding the balance between punitive justice and restorative justice? This paper takes up these issues of justice and, while discussing certain aspects of the relationship between punitive justice and restorative justice in some processes of social (national) reconciliation, tries to present some answers. 相似文献
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JEAN-PHILIPPE DERANTY 《The Philosophical forum》2005,36(3):307-331
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AARON JAMES 《Pacific Philosophical Quarterly》2005,86(1):25-49
Abstract: The paper suggests that the state is subject to assessment according to principles of social justice because state institutions or practices exercise forms of power over which no particular person has control. This rationale for assessment of social justice equally applies to legally optional or informal social practices. But it does not apply to individual conduct. Indeed, it follows that principles of social justice cannot provide a basis for the assessment and guidance of individual choice. The paper develops this practice‐based conception of the subject of justice by rejoining G. A. Cohen's influential critique of Rawls’ focus on the “basic structure” of society. 相似文献
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Kelly's Commonality and Sociality corollaries deal with shared meanings. In this article, the authors revisit Kelly's early work on superpatterns to demonstrate the relationship between superpatterns and the concept of corporate construing (Balnaves & Caputi, 1993) as a way of extending the Commonality and Sociality corollaries. The authors argue that corporate construing is joint action. Constructs in such an action originate from corporate, not personal, agents. Corporate agency entails anticipation in joint action of the mode of representation of everyone else (sensus communis), justification of the joint action (reasons as good reasons), recognition that a personal action is corporate (the same) within a style of reasoning (a system of specialized techniques or corporate constructs). It is not the individual patterns of personal constructs, or an individual's interpretations of his or her own actions, that is relevant in an explanation of personal actions. It is an understanding of the genre, the overall template, the superpattern. 相似文献
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