Feeling like a good psychotherapist — Or a bad one: Critical incidents in psychotherapists' experiences

What makes a therapist feel competent or incompetent in a session, a concept related to the good — or bad — hour, is an implication of what the therapist believes is good therapy and therefore is trying to do — or believes is bad and therefore tries to avoid doing. In an attempt to infer covert processes in therapists, twenty-seven psychoanalytically-oriented psychotherapists furnished written accounts of sessions when they had felt like good — or bad — therapists. Accounts were analysed and interpreted to uncover the varieties of good and bad experiences and their grounds. Resistance and countertransference were found to be critical phenomena. When the therapist was able to cope with such complications, good feelings were generated, and when he was unable, bad ones — provided he became aware of this inability. If not, the therapist acted out patient-specific or unspecific countertransference feelings in ways that made him feel like a good therapist.     

Minima sensibilia: Against the dynamic snapshot model of temporal experience

In our wakeful conscious lives, the experience of time and dynamic temporal phenomena—such as continuous motion and change—appears to be ubiquitous. How is it that temporality is woven into our conscious experience? Is it through perceptual experience presenting a series of instantaneous states of the world, which combine together—in a sense which would need to be specified—to give us experience of dynamic temporal phenomena? In this paper, I argue that this is not the case. Several authors have recently proposed dynamic snapshot models of temporal experience—such as Prosser and Arstila, building upon Le Poidevin—according to which, perceptual experience has no temporal content of a non‐zero extent. I argue that there is an absence of motivation for such a view; I develop and defend the claim that perceptual experience minimally presents something of some non‐zero temporal extent as such.     

Logical recoding of S-R rules can reverse the effects of spatial S-R correspondence

Two experiments investigated competing explanations for the reversal of spatial stimulus—response (S—R) correspondence effects (i.e., Simon effects) with an incompatible S—R mapping on the relevant, nonspatial dimension. Competing explanations were based on generalized S—R rules (logical-recoding account) or referred to display—control arrangement correspondence or to S—S congruity. In Experiment 1, compatible responses to finger—name stimuli presented at left/right locations produced normal Simon effects, whereas incompatible responses to finger—name stimuli produced an inverted Simon effect. This finding supports the logical-recoding account. In Experiment 2, spatial S—R correspondence and color S—R correspondence were varied independently, and main effects of these variables were observed. The lack of an interaction between these variables, however, disconfirms a prediction of the display—control arrangement correspondence account. Together, the results provide converging evidence for the logical-recoding account. This account claims that participants derive generalized response selection rules (e.g., the identity or reversal rule) from specific S—R rules and inadvertently apply the generalized rules to the irrelevant (spatial) S—R dimension when selecting their response.     

Techniques for Assisting Life-Stage Vocational Development

Since vocational development processes are not synonymous with psycho-pathology, the techniques for assisting vocational development must be conceptualized as distinct from psychotherapy. Two levels of assistance are suggested: facilitation (promoting normal development) and remediation (actively removing serious blocks to development). Utilizing the author's earlier formulation of five vocational development life stages, four transitions exist: (a) social amniotic to self-differentiation; (b) self-differentiation to competence; (c) competence to independence; and (d) independence to commitment. Procedures required for making these transitions involve, respectively: (a) determining the program; (b) information in-put; (c) information processing; and (d) information utilization. Techniques for assisting these procedures involve, respectively: (a) facilitation—life style analysis, remediation—environmental manipulation and psychotherapy; (b) facilitation—guidance, remediation—skill training; (c) for content—client-centered approach, for process—training in decision-making; and (d) for intrapsychic difficulties—existential approaches, for situational difficulties—job matching. For c and d, facilitation and remediation differ in degree, not in kind.     

What causes the word gap? Financial concerns may systematically suppress child-directed speech

Parents with fewer educational and economic resources (low socioeconomic-status, SES) tend to speak less to their children, with consequences for children's later life outcomes. Despite this well-established and highly popularized link, less research addresses why the SES “word gap” exists. Moreover, while research has assessed individual-level contributors to the word gap—like differences in parenting knowledge—we know little about how structural constraints that vary according to SES might affect caregivers’ speech. In two pre-registered studies, we test whether experiencing financial scarcity can suppress caregivers’ speech to their children. Study 1 suggests that higher-SES caregivers who are prompted to reflect on scarcity—particularly those who reflect on financial scarcity—speak less to their 3-year-olds in a subsequent play session, relative to a control group. Study 2 suggests that mid- to higher-SES caregivers engage in fewer back-and-forth exchanges with their children at the end of the month—when they are more likely to be experiencing financial hardship—than the rest of the month. These studies provide preliminary evidence that—above and beyond caregivers’ individual characteristics—structural constraints may affect how much parents speak to their children.     

Why are therapists indifferent to research?

In counselling and psychotherapy there is a serious research—practice gap. Why should research on the therapeutic process have such little impact? Five related factors are considered: (i) epistemology—reliance on experiential/personal knowledge; (ii) preciousness—reliance on nonaxiomatic truths; (iii) lack of theoretical rigour—looseness with which constructs are construed; (iv) non-Popperian logic—tendency to work within a theory and defend it; and (v) personalisation of theory—evaluation seen as criticism. The result is a proliferation of therapies rather than a refinement of therapy.     

On Distinguishing Epistemic from Pragmatic Action

We present data and argument to show that in Tetris—a real-time, interactive video game—certain cognitive and perceptual problems are more quickly, easily, and reliably solved by performing actions in the world than by performing computational actions in the head alone. We have found that some of the translations and rotations made by players of this video game are best understood as actions that use the world to improve cognition. These actions are not used to implement a plan, or to implement a reaction; they are used to change the world in order to simplify the problem-solving task. Thus, we distinguish pragmatic actions—actions performed to bring one physically closer to a goal—from epistemic actions—actions performed to uncover informatioan that is hidden or hard to compute mentally. To illustrate the need for epistemic actions, we first develop a standard information-processing model of Tetris cognition and show that it cannot explain performance data from human players of the game—even when we relax the assumption of fully sequential processing. Standard models disregard many actions taken by players because they appear unmotivated or superfluous. However, we show that such actions are actually far from superfluous; they play a valuable role in improving human performance. We argue that traditional accounts are limited because they regard action as having a single function: to change the world. By recognizing a second function of action—an epistemic function—we can explain many of the actions that a traditional model cannot. Although our argument is supported by numerous examples specifically from Tetris, we outline how the new category of epistemic action can be incorporated into theories of action more generally.     

It's not you,it's them: Social influences on trust propensity and trust dynamics

Scholars agree that trust primarily has two bases: trustworthiness—the extent to which a trustee is competent, honest, and has goodwill toward the trustor—and trust propensity—a stable trait reflecting the trustor's generalized belief that others can be trusted. Due to this trait characterization, the literature has largely reached a consensus that trust propensity is only an important base of trust in the earliest stage of a relationship—before information on trustworthiness has been gathered. Additionally, the trait conceptualization of trust propensity inhibits it from being modeled as an explanatory mechanism. Drawing on accessibility theory, a theory of trait activation, we argue that trust propensity has state‐like characteristics that are “activated” by the daily treatment an employee receives from coworkers. Our model highlights that the social context—predominantly ignored in prior trust research because of its lack of relevance to dyadic perceptions of trustworthiness—can have a substantial impact on dyadic trust. Across two multisource experience sampling methodology studies, we provide evidence that state trust propensity transmits the effects of citizenship and deviance received to trust in a focal coworker, whether that focal coworker is a source of that treatment or not. We also address how general levels of workplace unfairness—a between‐person construct—influence these dynamics. We discuss the theoretical and practical implications of these within‐person dynamics for fostering trust within organizations.     

Constructing a theory of the triple typology: Some (second) thoughts on nomothetic and idiographic approaches to personality

Our fundamental scientific task is to convert observations of particular persons behaving in particular ways in particular situations into assertions that certain kinds of persons will behave in certain kinds of ways in certain kinds of situations, that is, to construct triple typologies or equivalence classes—of persons, of behaviors, and of situations—and to fashion theories of personality that relate these equivalence classes to one another. It is argued that the different approaches to the study of personality are distinguished from one another not by whether they are idiographic or nomothetic but by the strategies they employ for constructing—or ignoring—each of these three types of equivalence classes. The likely attributes of a successful interactional theory of personality—one that would embrace the entire triple typology—are proposed and discussed.     

The Holy Spirit,Eco‐Justice,and an African Lutheran Response to Ecological Peril

In response to the environmental degradation that is taking place right now in much of Africa—and in light of a traditional African emphasis on interdependence—this article seeks to provide an African Lutheran “eco‐pneumatological” contribution to the ongoing conversation about eco‐justice. To do so, it draws on classic Lutheran understandings of creation and grace, even as it calls for a more expanded—and more deeply biblical—understanding of the Holy Spirit's presence and activity throughout all of creation.     

Behavior analysis and neuroscience: Complementary disciplines

Behavior analysis and neuroscience are disciplines in their own right but are united in that both are subfields of a common overarching field—biology. What most fundamentally unites these disciplines is a shared commitment to selectionism, the Darwinian mode of explanation. In selectionism, the order and complexity observed in nature are seen as the cumulative products of selection processes acting over time on a population of variants—favoring some and disfavoring others—with the affected variants contributing to the population on which future selections operate. In the case of behavior analysis, the central selection process is selection by reinforcement; in neuroscience it is natural selection. The two selection processes are inter‐related in that selection by reinforcement is itself the product of natural selection. The present paper illustrates the complementary nature of behavior analysis and neuroscience through considering their joint contributions to three central problem areas: reinforcement—including conditioned reinforcement, stimulus control—including equivalence classes, and memory—including reminding and remembering.     

Masculinity and farming-related accidents

Survey data collected from 450 male farmers in Canada revealed that three variables — conservative farming, willingness to risk life and limb to make a profit, and safe equipment operation — directly predicted the rate of serious farming-related accidents. Three dimensions of masculinity — suppression of emotions, “men in charge,” and recklessness — had strong indirect effects. Masculine recklessness tended to increase profit-oriented personal risk taking and to decrease the safe operation of farm equipment. Suppression of emotions also increased risk taking.     

Phenomenal Contrast Arguments for Cognitive Phenomenology

According to proponents of irreducible cognitive phenomenology some cognitive states put one in phenomenal states for which no wholly sensory states suffice. One of the main approaches to defending the view that there is irreducible cognitive phenomenology is to give a phenomenal contrast argument. In this paper I distinguish three kinds of phenomenal contrast argument: what I call pure—represented by Strawson's Jack/Jacques argument—hypothetical—represented by Kriegel's Zoe argument—and glossed—first developed here. I argue that pure and hypothetical phenomenal contrast arguments face significant difficulties, but that there is a sound glossed phenomenal contrast argument for irreducible cognitive phenomenology.     

The role of legal stigmatization in the enhancement of treatment goals for problem drinkers

Traditionally, labeling theory has neglected the active capacity of labeled individuals: the capacity to respond in several different ways to a stigmatizing label. Several writers have dealt with this issue, yet there is little data dealing with alternative responses to a stigmatizing label. This research tests the hypothesis that stigmatizing labels (in the form of legal intervention) can result in conventionalizing the problem drinker's behavior, and further tests two conditions deemed necessary before the hypothesis will be valid. The overall proposition—that stigmatizing labels can result in conventionalizing behavior—was supported by this research. The first condition—that the change agent responsible for the promotion of behavior change must be an ex‐practitioner of the relevant deviance and an identifiable role model for the client—was also supported. Finally, the second condition—that membership in the behavior‐changing group must be voluntary—was invalidated.     

Kant on the Ontological Argument

The article examines Kant's various criticisms of the broadly Cartesian ontological argument as they are developed in the Critique of Pure Reason. It is argued that each of these criticisms is effective against its intended target, and that these targets include—in addition to Descartes himself—Leibniz, Wolff, and Baumgarten. It is argued that Kant's most famous criticism—the charge that being is not a real predicate—is directed exclusively against Leibniz. Kant's argument for this thesis—the argument proceeding from his example of a hundred thalers—although it may seem to beg the question, in fact succeeds against Leibniz. It does so because the charge of begging the question can be rebutted if one makes certain Leibnizian assumptions.     

Teleological Essentialism: Generalized

Natural/social kind essentialism is the view that natural kind categories, both living and non-living natural kinds, as well as social kinds (e.g., race, gender), are essentialized. On this view, artifactual kinds are not essentialized. Our view—teleological essentialism—is that a broad range of categories are essentialized in terms of teleology, including artifacts. Utilizing the same kinds of experiments typically used to provide evidence of essentialist thinking—involving superficial change (study 1), transformation of insides (study 2), and inferences about offspring (study 3)—we find support for the view that a broad range of categories—living natural kinds, non-living natural kinds, and artifactual kinds—are essentialized in terms of teleology. Study 4 tests a unique prediction of teleological essentialism and also provides evidence that people make inferences about purposes which in turn guide categorization judgments.     

Making Meaning: The Constructive-Developmental Approach to Persons and Practice

The constructive (in the sense of construing) and developmental (but throughout the lifespan) framework, whose conceptual roots lie in the work of Piaget, outlines the holistic personality process of systems of making meaning, systems that organize human thought, feeling, and action. In this article Kegan discusses and then applies the model—to a worker in a CETA program and to a psychiatric ward patient—elucidating the perspectives—on mental health and employability—it can open for practitioners.     

Philosophy,Logic, Science,History

Analytic philosophy is sometimes said to have particularly close connections to logic and to science, and no particularly interesting or close relation to its own history. It is argued here that although the connections to logic and science have been important in the development of analytic philosophy, these connections do not come close to characterizing the nature of analytic philosophy, either as a body of doctrines or as a philosophical method. We will do better to understand analytic philosophy—and its relationship to continental philosophy—if we see it as a historically constructed collection of texts, which define its key problems and concerns. It is true, however, that analytic philosophy has paid little attention to the history of the subject. This is both its strength—since it allows for a distinctive kind of creativity—and its weakness—since ignoring history can encourage a philosophical variety of “normal science.”     

Ex‐offender Restrictions

Individuals convicted of crimes are often subject to numerous restrictions — on housing, employment, the vote, public assistance, and other goods — well after they have completed their sentences, and in some cases permanently. The question of whether — and if so, when — ex‐offender restrictions are morally permissible has received surprisingly little philosophical scrutiny. This article first examines the significance of completing punishment, of paying one's debt to society, and contends that when offenders' debts are paid, they should be restored to full standing as citizens. Thus all ex‐offender restrictions are presumptively unjustified. Nonconsequentialist defences of these restrictions are ultimately unsuccessful in defeating the presumption against them. In a limited range of cases, consequentialist considerations — namely, of risk reduction — may be sufficient to override the presumptive case against these restrictions. The article concludes by suggesting a number of criteria for assessing whether particular restrictive measures are permissible on grounds of risk reduction.