Feelings in Moral Conflict and the Hazards of Emotional Intelligence

From some perspectives, it seems obvious that emotions and feelings must be both reasonable and morally significant: from others, it may seem as obvious that they cannot be. This paper seeks to advance discussion of ethical implications of the currently contested issue of the relationship of reason to feeling and emotion via reflection upon various examples of affectively charged moral dilemma. This discussion also proceeds by way of critical consideration of recent empirical enquiry into these issues in the literature of so-called emotional intelligence. In this regard, despite ambiguities in their accounts of the relationship of reason to emotion, advocates of emotional intelligence generally incline to therapeutic conceptions of emotional health which are not inconsistent with currently fashionable cognitivist accounts of feeling and emotion. All the same, it is arguable that therapeutic or other strategies which overplay the possibility of cognitive or other resolution of emotional conflict are prey to certain difficulties. First, they underemphasise those passive but identity-constitutive aspects of affect which are not obviously rationally accountable. Secondly, they insufficiently recognise the extent to which emotional conflicts can be significantly implicated in moral diversity. In view of either or both of these points, they may fail to appreciate the moral inappropriateness of attempts to resolve certain forms of emotional conflict or tension.     

Signs of Value: Reid on the Evidential Role of Feelings in Moral Judgement

The Quietist affair at the end of the seventeenth century has much to teach us about theories of the will in the period. Although Bossuet and Fénelon are the names most famously associated with the debate over the Quietist conception of pure love, Malebranche and his erstwhile disciple Lamy were the ones who debated the deep philosophical issues involved. This paper sets the historical context of the debate, discusses the positions as well as the arguments for and against them, and opens up investigation of important material that is all but ignored in the English literature and only incompletely addressed in the French.     

On the Poverty of Scientism, or: The Ineluctable Roughness of Rationality

If there is one rationality there must be a plurality of them. This conclusion follows, I argue, partly from the extreme and ineradicable vagueness of the fundamental concepts that every would-be rational explanation must presuppose. Logicistic/scientistic assaults on this vagueness are doomed to fail partly because they are unable to acknowledge the imaginative dimension of rational thought. Being limited to the play of "outward appearances," scientific investigations are also dependent on "inward imaginings" on their speculative side. The upshot is that schools of philosophy should be characterized by the kind of imaginary they adopt rather than by their logics. In which case, every attempt to get and tell something right about the world is bound to incorporate mythopoeic elements in its explanations.     

Emotional Feelings

Abstract

There is a fear of death that persistently eludes adequate explanation from contemporary philosophers of death. The reason for this is their focus on mortal harm issues, such as why death is bad for the person who dies. Claims regarding the fear of death are assumed to be contingent on the resolution of questions about the badness of death. In practice, however, consensus on some mortal harm issues has not resulted in comparable clarity on mortal fear. I contend we cannot do justice to fear of death unless we detach it from theories about the badness of death, including the overwhelmingly popular deprivation theory. The case for this involves disambiguation of certain aspects of mortal harm, a broad conception of what is involved in accounting for an emotion, and close attention to the nature of the fear in question. The source of fear of death is our departure from a context in which self-directed emotions have coherent application; our attitudes become ‘unmoored’, in Samuel Scheffler’s phrase. While this does not result in a fear that is sui generis, it does demand that we remove the object of fear from the realm of well-being in order to make sense of it.     

Group Wrongs and Guilt Feelings

Can it ever be appropriate to feel guilt just because one's group has acted badly? Some say no, citing supposed features of guilt feelings as such. If one understands group action according to my plural subject account of groups, however, one can argue for the appropriateness of feeling guilt just because one's group has acted badly - a feeling that often occurs. In so arguing I sketch the plural subject account of groups, group intentions and group actions: for a group to intend (in the relevant sense) is for its members to be jointly committed to intend that such-and-such as a body. Individual group members need not be directly involved in the formation of the intention in order to participate in such a joint commitment. The core concept of joint commitment is in an important way holistic, not being reducible to a set of personal commitments over which each party holds sway. Parties to a group intention so understood can reasonably see the resulting action as "ours" as opposed to "theirs" and thus appropriately respond to the action's badness with a feeling of guilt, even when they themselves are morally innocent in the matter. I label the feeling in question a feeling of "membership guilt." A number of standard philosophical claims about the nature of guilt feelings are thrown into question by my argument.     

Feelings in Literature

In this article it is argued that feelings are all important to the function of literature. In contradiction to music that is concerned with the inwardness of humankind, literature has, because of language, the capacity to create fictional worlds that in many respects are similar to and related to the life world within which we live. One of the most important reasons for our emotional engagement in literature is our empathy with others and our constant imagining and hypothesizing on possible developments in our interactions with them. Hence, we understand and engage ourselves in fictional worlds. It is further claimed and exemplified, how poetic texts are very good at rhetorically engage and manipulate our feelings. Finally, with reference to the important work of Ellen Dissanayake, it is pointed out that the first kind of communication in which we engage, that between mother and infant, is a kind of speech that positively engages the infant in a dialogue with the mother by means of poetic devices.     

Feelings,Imagination and Self-Understanding

Starting from some considerations about the text ‘Feelings in Literature’ by Johansen (2010), this article discusses the topic of emotions from the standpoint of moral psychology, namely the relationship between emotions and the conduct of our moral life. From this assumption, we will argue that literature, as an exercise of imagination, helps us understand and evaluate our own emotions, what is essential for establishing our uniqueness, distinguishing ourselves from others. In literature we can learn about emotions and we can understand our own feelings. Literature plays an important role in cultural experience, triggering emotional responses.     

Collective Guilt and Collective Guilt Feelings

Can collectives feel guilt with respect to what they have done? It hasbeen claimed that they cannot. Yet in everyday discourse collectives areoften held to feel guilt, criticized because they do not, and so on.Among other things, this paper considers what such so-called collectiveguilt feelings amount to. If collective guilt feelings are sometimesappropriate, it must be the case that collectives can indeed beguilty. The paper begins with an account of what it is for a collectiveto intend to do something and to act in light of that intention.According to this account, and in senses that are explained, there is acollective that intends to do something if and only if the members of agiven population are jointly committed to intend as a body to do thatthing. A related account of collective belief is also presented. It isthen argued that, depending on the circumstances, a group's action canbe free as opposed to coerced, and that the idea that a collective assuch can be guilty of performing a wrongful act makes sense. The ideathat a group might feel guilt may be rejected because it is assumed thatto feel guilt is to experience a ``pang'' or ``twinge'' of guilt –nothing more and nothing less. Presumably, though, there must becognitions and perhaps behavior involved. In addition, the primacy, eventhe necessity, of ``feeling-sensations'' to feeling guilt in theindividual case has been questioned. Without the presumption that it isalready clear what feeling guilt amounts to, three proposals as to thenature of collective guilt feelings are considered. A ``feeling ofpersonal guilt'' is defined as a feeling of guilt over one's own action.It is argued that it is implausible to construe collective guiltfeelings in terms of members' feelings of personal guilt. ``Membershipguilt feelings'' involve a group member's feeling of guilt over what hisor her group has done. It is argued that such feelings are intelligibleif the member is party to the joint commitment that lies at the base ofthe relevant collective intention and action. However, an account ofcollective guilt in terms of membership guilt feelings is found wanting.Finally, a ``plural subject'' account of collective guilt feelings isarticulated, such that they involve a joint commitment to feel guilt asa body. The parties to a joint commitment of the kind in question may asa result find themselves experiencing ``pangs'' of the kind associatedwith personal and membership guilt feelings. Since these pangs, byhypothesis, arise as a result of the joint commitment to feel guilt as abody, they might be thought of as providing a kind of phenomenology forcollective guilt. Be that as it may, it is argued the plural subjectaccount has much to be said for it.     

Feelings of dread and intertemporal choice

It frequently has been observed that people discount future rewards relative to present rewards. However, the literature on intertemporal choices involving emotional upsets and losses is fraught with inconsistencies, with some studies finding similar discounting of gains and losses, and others reporting that participants elect to undergo negative experiences sooner rather than later. To help resolve these contradictions, time preferences for different types of aversive experiences (social rejection, embarrassment, pain, monetary and property loss) were examined in five studies. Most participants preferred to postpone monetary and property losses, but intertemporal choices for other unpleasant experiences showed highly variable responses, with some participants deferring them as long as possible, and many electing to experience them immediately. Time preferences for these negative experiences were correlated, but were independent of time preference for rewards. It is argued (following Loewenstein, 1987 ) that anticipation of dread plays a key role in many people's choices about timing of aversive experiences. This interpretation was supported by choices about when to learn of a very unpleasant event whose timing was fixed (Study 3), and by a novel preference reversal (Study 4). Study 5 examined how actual and hypothetical experiences of dread unfolded over time; the results were consistent with a dread‐based interpretation of choices in the preceding studies. Copyright © 2010 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.     

Social Interactions and Feelings of Inferiority

A daily event-recording method, referred to as the Daily Interaction Record in Organizations (DIRO) was employed for assessing the influence of three types of social interaction on negative affect at work. For this purpose, 38 correctional officers (COs) completed forms, for a l-week period, that described their social interactions and stressful events at work. Moreover, the forms measured the negative feelings of COs both at the beginning and at the end of the workday. The results showed that each type of social interaction had a different effect on negative affect at the end of the day. Instrumental support showed an adverse effect on negative affect because this type of support appeared to induce feelings of inferiority, which in turn led to negative affect. Rewarding companionship appeared to have a positive effect, whereas intimate support showed no effect at all on negative affect. It is concluded that a micro-analytic approach offers interesting possibilities for fine-grained analyses of daily occurring social interactions and psychological mechanisms involved in social support as related to negative affect.     

道德德性:人类学以及实践认知的维度

伦理学涉及行为中的人.伦理学是关于善(Guten)的学说.作为自由的、有理性的存在者,我们能够在其中发现幸福.然而,"幸福"并不是简单的,主观上的满足,而是根据理性的尺度实现了理想.因此,伦理学涉及到对"主观真实性"的条件的分析.一种美德伦理学断言:这些条件首先在于拥有德行.根据传统的理解,道德德性是人类人格的表达,因此,在真理和理性中视为好的东西,在主观上也作为好的呈现出来:即道德德性对于行为主体的理性来说是情感上的需要.道德德性针对行为主体对善的情感需求来提高实践理性,特别是在能力方面,也包括认识道德上正确的事情并且有效地实践.因此,道德德性就存在两方面的任务,即人类学和认知实践的二重任务,而没有借此定义道德义务,或过多地对道德原则、规则或规范进行理性地讨论.