Interpretation and its "Metaphysical" Entanglements

Singularism is the view that for a given object of interpretation there must be one and only one admissible interpretation of it. And multiplism is the view that for a given object of interpretation there may be more than one admissible interpretation of it. My book, Rightness and Reasons , argued that singularism and multiplism are logically detachable from the ontological theories of realism and constructivism. This paper extends the range of ontologies to include constructive realism, whose versions include those of Joseph Margolis, Rom Harré, Paul Thom, and Hilary Putnam. They all disagree with both realism and constructivism. But their ontologies are also logically detachable from singularism and multiplism. Finally, the detachability of these ontologies from singularism and multiplism does not preclude wider "metaphysical" considerations (such as intentionality) in a ramified theory of interpretation.     

Exemplification Theory: Judging the Whole by Some of Its Parts

Exemplification is a ubiquitous phenomenon in communication. It permeates informative, educational and persuasive endeavors in both interpersonal exchanges and media presentations. Despite this, it has received little attention in communication research. Although its empirical exploration has begun and shown considerable promise, especially in the news context, a theoretical foundation has been missing. This essay attempts to remedy the neglect by conceptually scrutinizing the exemplification process. The relationship between exemplification and representation is given special attention, and exemplification strategies are extracted and their merits appraised. Exemplification is examined in different domains of communication, and the interface between direct and mediated experience is surveyed in conceptual terms. It is hoped that the analysis will foster a theoretical integration of the conceptually diverse and often eclectic research on exemplification effects.     

Emotion Education without Ontological Commitment?

Emotion education is enjoying new-found popularity. This paper explores the ‘cosy consensus’ that seems to have developed in education circles, according to which approaches to emotion education are immune from metaethical considerations such as contrasting rationalist and sentimentalist views about the moral ontology of emotions. I spell out five common assumptions of recent approaches to emotion education and explore their potential compatibility with four paradigmatic moral ontologies. I argue that three of these ontologies fail to harmonise with the common assumptions. Either those three must therefore be rejected or, if we want to retain one or more of them (for instance, Jesse Prinz’s recent rebranding of hard sentimentalism that I explore in detail), we need to revise our assumptions about the practice of emotion education in ways that are both radical and, I argue, ultimately unacceptable.     

Free Variation and the Intuition of Geometric Essences: Some Reflections on Phenomenology and Modern Geometry

Edmund Husserl has argued that we can intuit essences and, moreover, that it is possible to formulate a method for intuiting essences. Husserl calls this method ‘ideation’. In this paper I bring a fresh perspective to bear on these claims by illustrating them in connection with some examples from modern pure geometry. I follow Husserl in describing geometric essences as invariants through different types of free variations and I then link this to the mapping out of geometric invariants in modern mathematics. This view leads naturally to different types of spatial ontologies and it can be used to shed light on Husserl's general claim that there are different ontologies in the eidetic sciences that can be systematically related to one another. The paper is rounded out with a consideration of the role of ideation in the origins of modern geometry, and with a brief discussion of the use of ideation outside of pure geometry. What would be the study that would draw the soul away from the world of becoming to the world of being?… Geometry and arithmetic would be among the studies we are seeking … a philosopher must learn them because he must arise out of the region of generation and lay hold on essence or he can never become a true reckoner … they facilitate the conversion of the soul itself from the world of generation to essence and truth… they are knowledge of that which always is and not of something which at some time comes into being and passes away.     

Towards a Functional Approach to Modular Ontologies Using Institutions

We propose a functional view of ontologies that emphasises their role in determining answers to queries, irrespective of the formalism in which they are written. A notion of framework is introduced that captures the situation of a global language into which both an ontology language and a query language can be translated, in an abstract way. We then generalise existing notions of robustness from the literature, and relate these to interpolation properties that support modularisation of ontologies.     

Meaning and ontology

These are two related essays. The first, “Meaning,” defends the so‐called reference theory against current criticisms. Exemplification and the intentional tie are two subsistents. Subsistence is a mode of existence; mere possibility is another. That requires two distinctions; one among four uses of ‘possible'; one among three uses of ‘same’ in the phrase ‘the same fact'; which in turn permits an adequate account of false belief. The second essay, “Inclusion, Exemplification, and Inherence in G. E. Moore,” displays the impact of the fundamental ontological dialectic on the development of Moore's thought. His notion of nonnatural properties provides the early cue. His eventual failure to account for false belief is traced to his eventual nominalism.     

Beware of mereologists bearing gifts: prolegomena to a medical metaphysics

This essay considers implications of formal mereologies and ontologies for medical metaphysics. Edward Fried’s extensional mereological account of the human body is taken as representative of a prominent strand in analytic metaphysics that has close affinities with medical positivism. I show why such accounts fail. First, I consider how Fried attempts to make sense of the medical case of Barney Clark, the first recipient of an artificial heart, and show that his analytic metaphysical categories do not have the right kind of fit with the case. A proper medical metaphysic should involve a richer two way dialogue with medicine, and it should not just “apply” formal accounts worked out in other settings. Second, I argue that any effort to account for real wholes with extensional mereological sums requires all sorts of ad hoc, supplementary mechanisms that do the real work, and the full repertoire of these mechanisms involves inconsistencies and semantic shifts. Finally, I consider an alternative strand of work on non-extensional whole/part relations that is closer to medicine and that can deepen reflection on some core problems in bioethics, for example, associated with the determination of death when an organism ceases to function as a whole. In addition to the utility such formal ontologies have for addressing traditional problems such as the determination of death, philosophers of medicine should appreciate the increasingly influential role such formal tools are playing in the development of data system ontologies. Assumptions integral to these ontologies have far reaching implications for the way future research and practice in medicine will be conducted, and much greater critical reflection is needed on the full range of issues associated with the development and use of such medical ontologies.     

Ontologies and Construals in Lexical Semantics

The purpose of this paper is to propose a framework of lexical meaning, broadly along the lines of Cognitive Semantics (Langacker 1987a). Within the proposed model, all aspects of meaning are to be explained in terms of properties of ontologies in conceptual space, i.e. properties of content ontologies and schematic ontologies and construals which are imposed on the conceptual structures on the occasion of use. It is through the operations of construals on ontological structures that different readings of lexical expressions arise. Lexical meanings are dynamic and sensitive to contextual demands, rather than fixed and stable. In a dynamic, usage-based model like this, polysemy and multiple readings emerge as a natural consequence of the human ability to think flexibly. Another more specific purpose of this paper is to draw attention to the usefulness of ontologies in linguistic research in general and semantic modelling in particular.     

Explaining the Past in the Geosciences

Abductive reasoning is central to reconstructing the past in the geosciences. This paper outlines the nature of the abductive method and restates it in Bayesian terms. Evidence plays a key role in this working method and, in particular, traces of the past are important in this explanatory framework. Traces, whether singularly or as groups, are interpreted within the context of the event for which they have evidential claims. Traces are not considered as independent entities but rather as inter-related pieces of information concerning the likelihood of specific events. Exemplification of the use of such traces is provided by dissecting an example of their use in the environmental reconstruction of mountain climate.     

Ontological Categories in GOL

General Ontological Language (GOL) is a formal framework for representing and building ontologies. The purpose of GOL is to provide a system of top-level ontologies which can be used as a basis for building domain-specific ontologies. The present paper gives an overview about the basic categories of the GOL-ontology. GOL is part of the work of the research group Ontologies in Medicine (Onto-Med) at the University of Leipzig which is based on the collaborative work of the Institute of Medical Informatics (IMISE) and the Institute for Computer Science (IfI). It represents work in progress toward a proposal for an integrated family of top-level ontologies and will be applied to several fields of medicine, in particular to the field of Clinical Trials.     

V—Vagueness, Realism, Language and Thought

The problem of vagueness and the sorites paradox arise because we try to treat natural language as if it were a unitary formal system. In fact, natural language contains a large variety of representational ontologies that serve different purposes and which cannot be united formally, but which can intuitively be taken as ways of seeing a common basic ontology. Using this framework, we can save classical logic from vagueness and avoid the sorites.     

Performance-enhancing drugs in sport: a different form of drug abuse

The use and abuse of drugs in American society is recognized as a major issue among those who study youth. This paper addresses an often overlooked area of drug abuse: performance-enhancing drugs in sport. The reasons these vocational drugs are used by athletes are different from those of the recreational drug user. This paper examines the seriousness and prevalence of performance-enhancing drugs and presents the results of a series of interviews with steroid users to determine their attitudes. These attitudes and rationalizations suggest that an expanded view of drugs is required if performance-enhancing drug use is to be understood.     

亚里士多德和墨家的逻辑和语言概念

亚里士多德逻辑和墨家逻辑是基于非常不同的本体论思想的。这可以从比较亚里士多德的＂类＂（genus）概念和墨家的＂类＂概念得到解释。传统的翻译把中文词＂同＂和＂异＂分别解释为＂相似＂和＂不同＂,以掩饰这两个概念的不同。据此,亚里士多德逻辑的理论意图是完全不同于具有实际意图的、作为论证指导的墨家逻辑。     

Not my will but thine be done: Church versus magic in contemporary Russia

In contemporary Russia, the Orthodox Church has started to assume its traditional but long‐lost role as a guardian of morality and a source of coherent ontological foundations. At the same time, magic and alternative healing have become pervasive and conspicuously public phenomena, thriving on the new institutions of the market and the free media. The article examines the nature of ideological offensive deployed by the Russian Church against magic and healing. It suggests that the controversy between Church and magic reflects conflicting ontologies of self and incompatible constructions of agency inherent in these respective cultural fields. It argues that magic and healing are built on the Western models of agency as empowerment of an autonomous individualistic self, and explores contrasting models of agency offered by the Orthodox Christianity. In the light of this argument, seemingly premodern practices of healing and magic appear as phenomena deeply embedded in globalised modernity.     

Feminist Philosophy of Disability: A Genealogical Intervention

This article is a feminist intervention into the ways that disability is researched and represented in philosophy at present. Nevertheless, some of the claims that I make over the course of the article are also pertinent to the marginalization in philosophy of other areas of inquiry, including philosophy of race, feminist philosophy more broadly, indigenous philosophies, and LGBTQI philosophy. Although the discipline of philosophy largely continues to operate under the guise of neutrality, rationality, and objectivity, the institutionalized structure of the discipline implicitly and explicitly promotes certain ontologies, epistemologies, and methodologies as bona fide philosophy, while casting the ontologies, epistemologies, and methodologies of marginalized philosophies as mere simulacra of allegedly fundamental ways of knowing and doing philosophy and thus rendering these marginalized philosophies more or less expendable. This article is designed to show that legitimized philosophical discourses are vital mechanisms in the problematization of disability.     

The ethics of creative accounting

Creative accounting, which generally involves the preparation of financial statements with the intention of misleading readers of those statements, is prima facie a form oflying, as defined by Bok.¹ This paper starts by defining and illustrating creative accounting. It examines and rejects the arguments for considering creative accounting, in spite of its deceptive intent, as not being a form of lying. It then examines the ethical issues raised by creative accounting, in the light of the literature on the ethics of lying. This literature includes the evaluation of various excuses and justifications for lying, and these are examined here in relation to creative accounting. It is concluded that even in circumstances in which creative accounting would arguably serve a worthy purpose, that purpose would be at least as well served by honest communication.     

The Right Stuff

This paper argues for including stuff in one's ontology. The distinction between things and stuff is first clarified, and then three different ontologies of the physical universe are spelled out: a pure thing ontology, a pure stuff ontology, and a mixed ontology of both things and stuff. (The paper defends the latter.) Eleven different reasons for including stuff (in addition to things) in one's ontology are given (seven of which the author endorses and four of which would be sensible reasons for philosophers with certain metaphysical positions that the author does not happen to hold). Then five objections to positing stuff are considered and rejected.     

Argumentational Integrity: A Training Program for Dealing with Unfair Argumentative Contributions

In this article we present a training program based on the empirical research conducted in the project 'argumentational integrity'. After a brief sketch of the problem dimensions concerning unfair argumentation we give an overview of the training concept and the underlying empirical research. Exemplification of the instructional design is given for the second and the fifth training dimension (standards of argumentational integrity and reactions to unfair contributions). Finally we indicate how the training is to be evaluated and present initial results demonstrating that in comparison with an untrained control group participants in the training significantly improve their skills in identifying and naming argumentative rule violations.     

Settler Colonialism,Decolonization, and Climate Change

The article proposes that climate change makes enduring colonial injustices and structures visible. It focuses on the imposition and dominance of colonial concepts of land and self-determination on Indigenous peoples in settler states. It argues that if the dominance of these colonial frameworks remains unaddressed, the progressing climate change will worsen other colonial injustices, too. Specifically, Indigenous self-determination capabilities will be increasingly undermined, and Indigenous peoples will experience the loss of what they understand as relevant land from within their own ontologies of land. The article holds that even if settler states strive to repair colonial injustices, these efforts will be unsuccessful if climate change occurs and decolonization is pursued within the framework of a settler colonial ontology of land. Therefore, the article suggests, decolonization of the ontologies of land and concepts of self-determination is a precondition for a just response to climate change.