Exemplification and Parthood

Consider the things that exist—the entities—and let us suppose they are mereologically structured, that is, some are parts of others. The project of ontology within the bounds of bare mereology use this structure to say which of these entities belong to various ontological kinds, such as properties and particulars. My purpose in this paper is to defend the most radical section of the project, the mereological theory of the exemplification of universals. Along the way I help myself to several hypotheses: the existence of merely possible worlds; that particulars have thisnesses; and that mereology is far from classical. Moreover, the way I characterize instantiation might be judged too complicated to be plausible. At the end of the paper, I reply to these objections based on complexity.     

Exemplification and Universal Realism

The relation between universal and particular is considered to be the Achilles’ heel of universal realism. However, modern universal realism with facts does not have the difficulties which traditional Platonic universal realism had. Its exemplification relation connecting particulars and universals in atomic facts is very different from Platonic participation. Bradley’s regress argument against the exemplification relation can be refuted in two different ways. Nevertheless, there are good reasons to avoid the assumption of an exemplification relation and thus to go without the Achilles’ heel altogether.     

Exemplification as Explanation

In this paper I critically investigate an unorthodox attempt to metaphysically explain in virtue of what there are states of affairs. This is a suggestion according to which states of affairs exist thanks to, rather than, as is the common view, in spite of, the infinite regress their metaphysical explanation seems to engender. I argue that, no matter in which form it is defended, or in which theoretical framework it is set, this suggestion cannot provide us with the explanation we crave.     

Exemplification, Then and Now

Exemplification can be found in ontologies from the ancient world, such as those of Plato and Aristotle, and more recent ontologies, in particular those that take what exists to be determined by the empiricist’s Principle of Acquaintance. This study examines some of the ways in which exemplification takes different forms in these different ontologies. Exemplification has also been criticized as an ontological category. This paper examines a number of these criticisms, to see the extent to which they are viable.     

Exemplification as molecular function

Since the publication of Universals and Scientific Realism (Armstrong 1978a, b) until Sketch for a Systematic Metaphysics (Armstrong 2010), via Universals: An Opinionated Introduction (Armstrong 1989), a World of States of Affairs (Armstrong 1997), and Truth and Truthmakers (Armstrong 2004), David Armstrong has developed one of the most influential theories of instantiation in contemporary analytic metaphysics (see, for example, Lewis, in Aust J Phil 61(4), 343–377, 1983; Baxter in Aust J Phil, 79, 449–464, 2001; Forrest, in Aust J Phil, 83, 213–228, 2006). Instantiation has been advocated by Armstrong to give a solution to what he has called the “pressing problem” of “the multiple location of property universals” (Armstrong, in Universals: An opinionated introduction. University Press, Cambridge, 1989, pp. 89–90). Here I argue that Armstrong’s theory of instantiation fails to solve the problem because it involves two kinds of instantiation to account for particulars “having” and “sharing” universals. As a viable alternative to Armstrong’s theory, I propose a theory of instantiation capable of accounting for both phenomena in a univocal way.     

A Correspondence Theory of Exemplification

What is exemplification? A proposition that attributes a property to an object is true if the object exemplifies the property. But according to the correspondence theory, a proposition is true if the corresponding fact exists. So if the correspondence theory is correct, an exemplification of a temporal property by an object is simply the concrete circumstance of the object’s having the property. But since not all properties are temporal, not all exemplifications are circumstances, and we need to recognise timeless as well as temporal facts. This distinction allows us to solve the problem of converse relations, and to give an account of the logically complex facts which deduction allows us to know.     

Qualities, Relations, and Property Exemplification

The question whether qualities are metaphysically more fundamental than or mere limiting cases of relations can be addressed in an applied symbolic logic. There exists a logical equivalence between qualitative and relational predications, in which qualities are represented as one-argument-place property predicates, and relations as more-than-one-argument-place predicates. An interpretation is first considered, according to which the logical equivalence of qualitative and relational predications logically permits us ontically to eliminate qualities in favor of relations, or relations in favor of qualities. If metaphysics is understood at least in part as an exercise in ontic economy, then we may be encouraged to adopt a property ontology of qualities without quality-irreducible relations, or relations without relation-irreducible qualities. If either strategy is followed, the choice of reducing qualities to relations or relations to qualities will need to be justified on extra-logical grounds. These might include a perceived greater intuitiveness, explanatory fecundity, compatibility with cognitive ontogeny or developmental psychology, expressive or explanatory elegance or cumbersomeness, and an open-ended list of philosophical motivations that could reasonably favor the ontic prioritization of qualities over relations or relations over qualities. Despite its intuitive appeal, the thesis that logical equivalence together with extra-logical preferences justifies unidirectional ontic reduction of relations to qualities or qualities to relations is rejected in light of the more defensible proposition that the logical equivalence of qualitative and relational predications actually supports the opposite conclusion, that both qualities and relations are logically indispensable to a complete ontology of properties. The logical equivalence of qualitative and relational predications, insofar as we continue to observe the distinction, makes it logically necessary ontically for both qualities and relations to exist whenever either one exists. That logically equivalent qualitative and relational predications have as their truth-makers the exemplification by objects of both qualities and relations as equi-foundational properties further suggests that there is no deeper logical distinction between qualities and relations, but only two convenient lexical-grammatical designations for property predications involving one- versus more-than-one-argument-place.     

Exemplification Effects of Multimedia Enhancements

This research addresses multimedia effects through the lens of exemplification, thereby providing insight into consequences of using multimedia to embellish news content. Specifically, the study examines whether the vivid display of multimedia enhancements could influence the way people perceive issues reported in the accompanying stories. A 3 × 2 × 2 mixed factorial experiment was conducted with exemplar valence and exemplar vividness presented via multimedia elements and time of response serving as factors. According to the results, the content of multimedia additions created a shift in issue perception. The more interesting finding was the interaction effect of valence and vividness in multimedia exemplification. Valence of highly vivid exemplars was more likely to bias issue perception than did valence of non-vivid exemplars. This effect occurred in the presence of identical, two-sided textual content across all conditions. Theoretical and practical implications of the findings are discussed.     

Exemplification: The self-presentation of moral character

How do people come to terms with moral self-presentations and disconfirming behaviors? Subjects were exposed to the self-presentation of either an exemplifier (presenting himself as morally virtuous) or a pragmatist (presenting himself as morally adaptable) and then learned whether the self-presenter had or had not cheated for self-serving reasons in an earlier experiment Subjects clearly distinguished between exploitativeness and hypocrisy in their attributions, and considered a cheating exemplifier more hypocritical and self-deluding, but less exploitative and devious than a cheating pragmatist A second experiment manipulated subjects' involvement with the cheating of an exemplifier and a pragmatist by making half of the subjects its victims As in Experiment 1, uninvolved subjects considered the cheating exemplifier more hypocritical and less exploitative than a cheating pragmatist, however, involved subjects (victims) considered a cheating exemplifier more hypocritical but no less exploitative than a cheating pragmatist The results are discussed in terms of strategic self-presentation and the attribution of moral character     

Exemplification and Constituent Realism: A Clarification and Modest Defense

In this article I present and (modestly) defend a hybrid position which we may call a Platonist constituent ontology. More specifically, I present a version of exemplification which entails (1) a certain form of Platonism, (2) a constituent ontology of ordinary objects, (3) a view of exemplification as a “tiedto” nexus, and (4) a view of properties as abstract objects that are non-spatially “in” ordinary objects. I clarify two sets of preliminary issues, present my hybrid analysis of exemplification, raise and seek to undercut an argument against my constituent realism, and surface some of the costs and benefits relevant to assessing the relative merits of relational versus constituent realism.     

Towards a More Plausible Exemplification Theory of Events

Among the most well-known accounts of events is Jaegwon Kim’s exemplification theory, which identifies each event with a property exemplification (often modeled as an “ordered triple” of an entity, property type, and time). Two of the most influential rival event theorists (Lawrence Lombard and Jonathan Bennett) have urged rejecting exemplificationism on the basis of the charge that it ultimately conflates events with facts [Lombard (1986): Events: A Metaphysical Study. Routledge & Kegan Paul; Bennett (1988):Events and their Names. Hackett Publishing Company]. In response, I offer a detailed examination of Lombard and Bennett’s arguments that exemplificationism undermines the event/fact distinction. I then develop and defend a modified version of Kim’s account that overcomes this objection, and so constitutes a more plausible exemplification theory of events.     

The moral of the story: Exemplification and the literary work

So in literature we have two (perhaps identical) syntactically articulate vocabularies, the terms of each taking the terms of the other as referents, with both of the resultant systems — the one a system of denotation, the other of exemplification — being syntactically articulate and semantically dense. Thus, even though a literary work is articulate and may exemplify or express what is articulate, endless search is always required here as in other arts to determine precisely what is exemplified or expressed.A version of this paper was read at the annual meeting of the American Philosophical Association, Eastern Division, December 1978.     

《序卦》晚于《说卦》的一个例证

自司马迁于《史记·孔子世家》认定：“孔子晚而喜《易》,序《彖》、《系》、《象》、《说卦》、《文言》。”扬子云、刘歆、班孟坚诸儒,皆以为《易传》十篇乃孔子所作,并无异论。直到北宋欧阳修方提出怀疑,以为《系辞》以下等传非孔子所作。至清代崔东璧在此基础上又详加考证,进而怀疑《彖》、《象》为孔子著作。近代以来,虽然仍有不同意见,但学术界大多数认为,“十翼”非孔子所作,也非出于一时一人之手,乃战国以来陆续形成的解《易》作品。     

Generating Nonnormal Multivariate Data Using Copulas: Applications to SEM

This article develops a procedure based on copulas to simulate multivariate nonnormal data that satisfy a prespecified variance-covariance matrix. The covariance matrix used can comply with a specific moment structure form (e.g., a factor analysis or a general structural equation model). Thus, the method is particularly useful for Monte Carlo evaluation of structural equation models within the context of nonnormal data. The new procedure for nonnormal data simulation is theoretically described and also implemented in the widely used R environment. The quality of the method is assessed by Monte Carlo simulations. A 1-sample test on the observed covariance matrix based on the copula methodology is proposed. This new test for evaluating the quality of a simulation is defined through a particular structural model specification and is robust against normality violations.     

Exemplification Theory: Judging the Whole by Some of Its Parts

Exemplification is a ubiquitous phenomenon in communication. It permeates informative, educational and persuasive endeavors in both interpersonal exchanges and media presentations. Despite this, it has received little attention in communication research. Although its empirical exploration has begun and shown considerable promise, especially in the news context, a theoretical foundation has been missing. This essay attempts to remedy the neglect by conceptually scrutinizing the exemplification process. The relationship between exemplification and representation is given special attention, and exemplification strategies are extracted and their merits appraised. Exemplification is examined in different domains of communication, and the interface between direct and mediated experience is surveyed in conceptual terms. It is hoped that the analysis will foster a theoretical integration of the conceptually diverse and often eclectic research on exemplification effects.     

医学院校自然辩证法教学中的例证探析

目前在《自然辩证法》的教学中还存在一些问题,如教材老化、师资力量不足,学生人文素质背景较薄弱等,为了切实使理论和实践相结合,使学生认识到该课程的重要性而学有所用,以医学院校为例,论述了如何将有关医学实例结合到《自然辩证法》的教学过程中去,以切实有效地提高这门课的教学效果。