MORALITY AND THE LAW: BOWERS AND THE RIGHT TO PRIVACY

This article examines the right of privacy with emphasis on the Supreme Court’s ruling in the case of Bowers v. Hardwick, as this case illustrates issues that arise in the context of government interference with citizen’s actions and with the broader context of morality and the law. I argue specifically that the Supreme Court erred in its ruling on the Bowers case by failing to recognize that the moral value of autonomy in this case outweighs the right of a state to establish statutes based on the perceived moral attitudes of its constituencies. I argue generally that moral principles can inform decisions about the ordering of the right of privacy and the moral claims that aim to limit the right.     

BALANCING THE RIGHT TO HABILITATION WITH THE RIGHT TO PERSONAL LIBERTIES: THE RIGHTS OF PEOPLE WITH DEVELOPMENTAL DISABILITIES TO EAT TOO MANY DOUGHNUTS AND TAKE A NAP

In the pursuit of efficient habilitation, many service providers exercise a great deal of control over the lives of clients with developmental disabilities. For example, service providers often choose the client's habilitative goals, determine the daily schedule, and regulate access to preferred activities. This paper examines the advantages and disadvantages of allowing clients to exercise personal liberties, such as the right to choose and refuse daily activities. On one hand, poor choices on the part of the client could hinder habilitation. On the other hand, moral and legal issues arise when the client's right to choice is abridged. Recommendations are offered to protect both the right to habilitation and the freedom to choose.     

THE NEUTRALITY OF RIGHTNESS AND THE INDEXICALITY OF GOODNESS: BEYOND OBJECTIVITY AND BACK AGAIN

My purpose in the present paper is two‐fold: to provide a theoretical framework for understanding the difference between rightness and virtue; and to systematically account for the role of objective rightness in an individual person's decision making. I argue that a decision to do something virtuous differs from a decision to do what's right not simply, as is often supposed, in being motivated differently but, rather, in being taken from a different point of view. My argument to that effect is the following. The ‘objectively right’ course of action must be right, ‘neutrally’ speaking, that is right for each of the participants in a given situation: if it is right for you to do A, then it cannot, at the same time, be right for me to prevent you from doing A. But the latter is precisely how things work with virtuous action: for instance, it may be virtuous of you to assume responsibility for my blunder, but it isn't virtuous of me to let you do so. I maintain, on this basis, that, while objectivity does have normative force in moral decision‐making, the objective viewpoint is not, typically, the viewpoint from which decisions to act virtuously are taken. I then offer an account of objectivity's constraining power.     

BUCK-PASSING AND THE RIGHT KIND OF REASONS

The 'buck-passing' account equates the value of an object with the existence of reasons to favour it. As we argued in an earlier paper, this analysis faces the 'wrong kind of reasons' problem: there may be reasons for pro-attitudes towards worthless objects, in particular if it is the pro-attitudes, rather than their objects, that are valuable. Jonas Olson has recently suggested how to resolve this difficulty: a reason to favour an object is of the right kind only if its formulation does not involve any reference to the attitudes for which it provides a reason. We argue that despite its merits, Olson's solution is unsatisfactory. We go on to suggest that the buck-passing account might be acceptable even if the problem in question turns out to be insoluble.     

RAWLS AND THE STATUS OF POLITICAL LIBERTY

Abstract:  In his late work, Rawls makes strong claims about the status of political liberty. These claims, if accepted, would have significant implications for the content of "justice as fairness." I discuss the nature of these claims, clarifying Rawls's fair value guarantee of the political liberties and critically discussing the arguments that he and others have given for assigning special importance to the political liberties. I conclude that justice as fairness, properly understood, is not a deeply democratic conception of justice.