PERSONS AND RELICS

We describe a number of puzzling phenomena and use them as evidence for a hypothesis about why bodily continuity matters for personal identity. The phenomena all belong to a particular kind of symbolisation: each of them illustrates how an entity (object or person) sometimes acquires symbolic significance in virtue of a material link with the symbolised entity. Relics are the most obvious example of what happens here: they are cherished, desired or respected, not because of their intrinsic features, but because of their material link with some significant individual person. Crucial for the hypothesis we wish to defend, is the fact that a human being can in some cases and for some others function as a relic of what she used to be; in these cases a human individual has a specific significance in virtue of a material link (bodily continuity) with her own past. We argue that this phenomenon can be extended and that the importance of bodily continuity for personal identity is constituted by the kind of symbolisation upon which the existence of relics is based. 1     

PERSONS AND THE EXTENDED-MIND THESIS

The extended-mind thesis (EM) is the claim that mentality need not be situated just in the brain, or even within the boundaries of the skin. Some versions take "extended selves" be to relatively transitory couplings of biological organisms and external resources. First, I show how EM can be seen as an extension of traditional views of mind. Then, after voicing a couple of qualms about EM, I reject EM in favor of a more modest hypothesis that recognizes enduring subjects of experience and agents with integrated bodies. Nonetheless, my modest hypothesis allows subpersonal states to have nonbiological parts that play essential roles in cognitive processing. I present empirical warrant for this modest hypothesis and show how it leaves room for science and religion to coexist.     

MACHINES, BRAINS, AND PERSONS

Abstract. This paper explores the suggestion that our conscious experience is embodied in, rather than interactive with, our brain activity, and that the distinctive brain correlate of conscious experience lies at the level of global functional organization. To speak of either brains or computers as thinking is categorically inept, but whether stochastic mechanisms using internal experimentation rather than rule-following to determine behavior could embody conscious agency is argued to be an open question, even in light of the Christian doctrine of man. Mechanistic brain science does nothing to discredit Christian experience in dialogue with God or the Christian hope of eternal life.     

ITEMS AND PERSONS: FORMAL DUALS AND PSYCHOLOGICAL DIFFERENCES

A matrix of the responses of persons (rows) to items (columns) can be analyzed for persons as the dual of the usual analyses for items. In personality tests, the stability of items varies with mean distance between the item and the points for persons, and the dual holds for persons. For items, the item- test correlation varies somewhat with stability and with the frequency of appropriate response processes (i.e., Ss answering the item as E intended them to), but stability and appropriateness are not correlated. For persons, the per- son-group correlation is independent of stability and appropriateness, these latter variables being correlated. Thus the pattern of relationships among item indices is different from that for the dual indices for people. Persons being complex, they approach personality test items in diverse ways about which little is known today.     

INTELLECTUAL VIRTUE AND THE JUSTIFICATION OF PERSONS

In this paper, I develop a model of personal justification that is rooted in the intellectual virtues and the concept of epistemic praise. In particular, I show how a character‐based understanding of the virtues gives rise to an important emphasis on agents and how this provides the resources for dealing with several problems in epistemology.     

GENERALIZATION AND TRANSFER BETWEEN COMPREHENSION AND PRODUCTION: A COMPARISON OF RETARDED AND NONRETARDED PERSONS

The study compared the acquisition, generalization, transfer, and maintenance of language comprehension and production responses by persons at two IQ levels: mentally retarded (N = 10) and nonretarded (N = 10). The two levels of the IQ Level factor were combined factorially with two levels of a Training Condition factor: Comprehension-Production and Production Only. Participants in the former groups were trained sequentially to (a) comprehend coin labels by pointing, and then (b) produce verbally the correct coin label. Participants in the Production Only groups were trained on the latter response only. A three-factor mixed design with one repeated measure plus a multiple baseline across coin responses was employed. Results indicated that both mentally retarded and nonretarded subjects attained a high level of acquisition and maintained their performance on 1- and 4-week follow-up tests. No difference occurred between mentally retarded and nonretarded participants in magnitude of acquisition, but the mentally retarded groups took approximately three times as many trials to complete training. Data also suggested, contrary to past research, that generalization from comprehension to production was bidirectional, with no difference in magnitude between mentally retarded and nonretarded subjects. Transfer from comprehension to production occurred in both nonretarded and retarded subjects; comprehension training facilitated a savings of trials in production training. These results show that language differences between retarded and nonretarded persons are quantitative rather than qualitative as some past research may have suggested.