The Contingent A Priori and Implicit Knowledge

By introducing a name 'one meter' and stipulating that it refers to the length of stick S, the stipulator appears to be in a position to gain immediate (and arguably a priori ) knowledge of a mind- and language-independent fact—the fact that the length of stick S is one meter. It appears that other users of the name can gain this knowledge only through empirical enquiry. I argue that this presents a paradox. After clarifying the nature of the paradox, I offer a solution by arguing that, contrary to appearances, other users of 'one meter' implicitly knew that the length of stick S is one meter before learning the name, as did the stipulator prior to introducing the name. There is some distinct knowledge that other users of the name can only gain empirically, but the stipulator cannot gain this knowledge without empirical enquiry either.     

Kann Es Ein Argument Für Den Skeptizismus Geben? Das Epistemische Problem Der Irrtumsmöglichkeit

Summary  Is there any argument for scepticism? The epistemic problem of the possibility of error. Arguments for scepticism rest on the assumption that knowledge claims are fallible. For this reason the concept of knowledge appears to be questionable. Since it is necessary to distinguish doubts from possible doubts, the arguments for scepticism appear to be unconvincing. If we take it into account that we know something that is immune to doubt, we should draw the conclusion that, contrary to scepticism, knowledge claims have to be compatible with being fallible. Thus any knowledge claim is capable of being doubted.     

‘Knowledge’ as a natural kind term

Naturalists who conceive of knowledge as a natural kind are led to treat ‘knowledge’ as a natural kind term. ‘Knowledge,’ then, must behave semantically in the ways that seem to support a direct reference theory for other natural kind terms. A direct reference theory for ‘knowledge,’ however, appears to leave open too many possibilities about the identity of knowledge. Intuitively, states of belief count as knowledge only if they meet epistemic criteria, not merely if they bear a causal/historical relation to the term. I will develop this objection and show that it is grounded in modal considerations central to Kripke’s work on reference. I will also argue that a more plausible externalist semantics for natural kind terms disarms the objection.     

Metacognition,Metalanguage and Metapragmatics

In this article, the author briefly reports John Flavell's analysis of metacognition. By attempting to integrate metalinguistic activities into this analysis, the author brings to light several interesting characteristics of the field of metalinguistics and its current state of research. Firstly, it appears that, unlike other meta-abilities, the metalinguistic abilities are defined in terms of their objects. On this basis, metalinguistic activities are at least partially independent of other metacognitive activities. Secondly, it appears that the position of metapragmatics in relation to metalinguistics is in need of greater clarification. In particular, it seems necessary to draw a distinction between metapragmatic knowledge and metapragmatic experience. The fact that this distinction is not usually made contributes to the heterogeneity of this field of study and gives rise to fruitless controversy. Finally, the analysis reveals that the manipulation of writing mobilises aspects of metalinguistic knowledge which are not mobilised spontaneously through speech. The study of where this knowledge is positioned and of the cognitive burden its manipulation represents at various levels of reading and writing ability has yet to be developed.     

Semantic representations of word meanings by the cerebral hemispheres

Two priming experiments investigated kind and strength of semantic knowledge underlying known, frontier, and unknown low frequency words. Results from Experiment 1 suggest that known words reflect categorical knowledge, but frontier and unknown words reflect thematic knowledge. Thematic knowledge for frontier words appears to be stronger than that for unknown words. Experiment 2 entailed visual half-field presentation of targets. All facilitory effects were restricted to the lvf/RH, and inhibitory effects to the rvf/LH. Experiment 1 findings were mirrored by the RH. Thematic knowledge appears to precede categorical knowledge for the RH, but the opposite may be true of the LH. Results are also discussed in terms of the RH role in meaning acquisition and metacontrol.     

Radical Epistemic Self-Sufficiency on Reed’s Long Road to Skepticism

Baron Reed has developed a new argument for skepticism: (1) contemporary epistemologists are all committed to two theses, fallibilism and attributabilism; unfortunately, (2) these two theses about knowledge are incompatible; therefore, (3) knowledge as conceived by contemporary epistemologists is impossible. In this brief paper I suggest that Reed's argument appears to rest on an understanding of attributabilism that is so strong (call it maximal attributabilism) that it's doubtful that many contemporary epistemologists actually embrace it. Nor does Reed offer any direct argument for the truth of maximal attributabilism. Therefore, we need not be persuaded by Reed's new argument for skepticism.     

Learning the unlearnable: the role of missing evidence

Syntactic knowledge is widely held to be partially innate, rather than learned. In a classic example, it is sometimes argued that children know the proper use of anaphoric one, although that knowledge could not have been learned from experience. Lidz et al. [Lidz, J., Waxman, S., & Freedman, J. (2003). What infants know about syntax but couldn't have learned: Experimental evidence for syntactic structure at 18 months. Cognition, 89, B65-B73.] pursue this argument, and present corpus and experimental evidence that appears to support it; they conclude that specific aspects of this knowledge must be innate. We demonstrate, contra Lidz et al., that this knowledge may in fact be acquired from the input, through a simple Bayesian learning procedure. The learning procedure succeeds because it is sensitive to the absence of particular input patterns--an aspect of learning that is apparently overlooked by Lidz et al. More generally, we suggest that a prominent form of the "argument from poverty of the stimulus" suffers from the same oversight, and is as a result logically unsound.     

How Do We Acquire Moral Knowledge? Is Knowing Our Duty Ever Passive? – Two Questions for Martin Sticker

Martin Sticker's discussion of the common moral agent contains much that I find insightful, true and significant. As a response to his paper, I focus on two important issues that nevertheless separate us: (1) Sticker claims that knowing our duty can be mere passive awareness and that it indeed is passive as awareness of the special status of humanity. I deny that knowing our duty is ever passive. (2) He further claims that the common universalization test is the paradigmatic way active agents acquire moral knowledge. I argue that Sticker appears to construe universalization as a formal test that presupposes no moral knowledge and that so construed the test cannot serve for acquiring moral knowledge.     

Epistemology and School Counseling

Because a counselor's interactions with his clients should be an out-growth of his philosophical commitments, he must grapple with certain epistemological questions: (a) Can human beings know the extramental world or merely their own ideas? (b) Is human knowledge a valid representation of the extramental world? (c) Can human beings reach agreement about the nature of extramental realities? The counselor can assume two possible stances. First, there is the “realist” position which states that there is an extramental world, we can achieve valid knowledge of it, and the knowledge of various observers can agree. Second is the “phenomenalist” position: There is an extramental world, but no one can achieve valid knowledge of it, nor can various observers easily agree regarding its nature. The realist counselor should help his client perceive his problem situation as it “really” is and as it appears to others. The phenomenalist counselor cannot do this instead, he can only try to enter the client's subjectivity and to help him deepen and enrich his unique perception of the problem situation.     

Cartesian Method and the Aristotelian-Scholastic Method

In book one of the Consolation of Philosophy, Boethius is portrayed as a man who suffers because he forgot philosophy. Scholars have underestimated the significance of this portrayal and considered it a literary device the goal of which is simply to introduce the discussion that follows. In this paper, I show that this view is mistaken since it overlooks that this portrayal of Boethius is the key for the understanding of the whole text. The philosophical therapy that constitutes the core of the ‘Consolation’ can in fact be properly evaluated only if we recognize the condition it is designed to cure. Through the portrayal of Boethius's forgetfulness, the ‘Consolation’ illustrates that it is the very nature of philosophical knowledge that makes it susceptible to being forgotten. Philosophical knowledge can (i) turn into misology, when it appears unable to solve certain problems, and (ii) be overrun by strong emotions. The therapy offered in the ‘Consolation’ is designed to make Boethius aware of the ‘fragility’ of philosophical knowledge and show him how to ‘strengthen’ it. He is taught how to more fully embody philosophy's precepts and that philosophy's inability to solve certain problems reveals not its failures but its limits.     

Hindsight bias: how knowledge and heuristics affect our reconstruction of the past

Once people know the outcome of an event, they tend to overestimate what could have been anticipated in foresight. Although typically considered to be a robust phenomenon, this hindsight bias is subject to moderating circumstances. In their meta-analysis, Christensen-Szalanski and Willham (1991) observed that the more experience people have with the task under consideration, the smaller is the resulting hindsight bias. This observation is one benchmark against which the explanatory power of process models of hindsight bias can be measured. Therefore, we used it to put the recently proposed RAFT model (Hoffrage, Hertwig, & Gigerenzer, 2000) to another test. Our findings were consistent with the "expertise effect." Specifically, we observed-using computer simulations of the RAFT model-that the more comprehensive people's knowledge is in foresight, the smaller is their hindsight bias. In addition, we made two counterintuitive observations: First, the relation between foresight knowledge and hindsight bias appears to be independent of how knowledge is processed. Second, even if foresight knowledge is false, it can reduce hindsight bias. We conclude with a discussion of the functional value of hindsight bias.     

Self‐Knowledge Failures and First Person Authority1

Davidson and Burge have claimed that the conditions under which self‐knowledge is possessed are such that externalism poses no obstacle to their being met by ordinary speakers and thinkers. On their accounts, no such person could fail to possess self‐knowledge. But we do from time to time attribute to each other such failures; so we should prefer to their accounts an account that preserves first person authority while allowing us to make sense of what appear to be true attributions of such failures. While the core idea behind Davidson's and Burge's accounts appears ioadequate to this task, I argue that it can be deployed in such a way as to deliver the desired result. What makes this possible is that two attitude‐types can differ as follows: the self‐knowledge required for an utterance to be a Oing that p is different from the self‐knowledge required for it to be a Ψfing that p.     

SOCIOLOGISM IN PHILOSOPHY OF SCIENCE*

In a nutshell, the present essay claims this: First, the classical problem of knowledge has recently shifted from, How do I know? to, How do we know?–from psychology to sociology. As a phenomenological matter this is a great improvement, as a solution to the problem of rationality it is erroneous and immoral. The problem, (Why) should I act, believe, etc., this or that? is answered: You should do so on the authority of your reason. But change the problem of rationality in accord with the change in the problem of knowledge, and ask, (Why) should we–rather than I–act or believe as we do? and the answer is clear: We should act and believe as we do, because our society is as it is, and should be as it is. This is clearly the same as, we should because we should. Not very enlightening. Sociologism appears as the authoritarian solution to the problem of rationality in works of Polanyi and Kuhn; a variant of it appears as a liberal theory in the studies of Popper and his former students who, however, do not offer any positive theory of what to believe or do; rather, they offer a negative theory of what to reject. They view this as a better solution to the problem of rationality, if not even a better formulation of it (not what and why should I/we etc., but what and why should I/we not etc.).     

Lyotard’s performance

Starting with Lyotard’s characterisation of postmodernity as incredulity, this is related to another of his key concepts—that of ‘performativity’. Lyotard appears to deploy performativity to characterise those technologies that bring about the optimisation of efficient performance. However, there is another sense of performativity where it is linked to performance. Performance conditions the possibility of any and all performatives, or to put it another way, as performance is itself enabled by performativity, so too performativity is realised through its performance. Both senses of performativity and the linkage between them are clearly manifested in the space of knowledge production that is the contemporary university. This linkage is itself a feature of the semiotic process within which contemporary knowledge and knowledge production is located and which Lyotard himself recognised, albeit implicitly. The implication of this therefore is that Lyotard himself performs his text and in so doing both manifests and contributes to realising both senses of performativity.     

Reaping the Right Fruits: Luther's Meditation on the 'Earnest Mirror, Christ'

Abstract:  To meditate aright, for Luther, is not to arouse in us an emotive piety for the crucified, but to be acquainted with the knowledge of our sinnerhood, and be devastated by it. Thus there is no natural knowledge of sin. The knowledge of sin flows directly from Christ, whom he called 'the earnest mirror'. This mirror causes sin to surface in our conscience so that it might cause it to disappear from it. This is made possible in Christ's atoning efficacy, where Christ, after exposing our sins, appears to us as our sin-bearer, the one who suffers our sins but suffers them into defeat in his cross and resurrection, if only we believe. The mirror then leads us beyond Christ's heart to the friendly heart of God, the one and same heart, which from eternity beats with such earnest love for us. Thus to grasp God aright, as the mirror reveals, is to grasp him not in his power and majesty, which might be terrifying, but in his opposites, that is, in his weakness and humility. God's way of being 'most himself' is by being for us ( pro nobis ), bearing and suffering the judgement of sin, and eventually dying on the cross. Then our faith and salvation stand immovably certain.     

Hindsight bias: How knowledge and heuristics affect our reconstruction of the past

Once people know the outcome of an event, they tend to overestimate what could have been anticipated in foresight. Although typically considered to be a robust phenomenon, this hindsight bias is subject to moderating circumstances. In their meta-analysis, Christensen-Szalanski and Willham (1991) observed that the more experience people have with the task under consideration, the smaller is the resulting hindsight bias. This observation is one benchmark against which the explanatory power of process models of hindsight bias can be measured. Therefore, we used it to put the recently proposed RAFT model (Hoffrage, Hertwig, & Gigerenzer, 2000) to another test. Our findings were consistent with the "expertise effect." Specifically, we observed--using computer simulations of the RAFT model--that the more comprehensive people's knowledge is in foresight, the smaller is their hindsight bias. In addition, we made two counterintuitive observations: First, the relation between foresight knowledge and hindsight bias appears to be independent of how knowledge is processed. Second, even if foresight knowledge is false, it can reduce hindsight bias. We conclude with a discussion of the functional value of hindsight bias.     

Influence of Genetic Risk Information on Parental Role Identity in Adolescent Girls and Young Women from Families with Fragile X Syndrome

Using a multi-group cross-sectional design, we explored self-concept related to parental role salience and enactment in 53 young women (14 to 24 years) with knowledge they were either carriers, non-carriers, or could be a carrier of fragile X syndrome (FXS). Parental role salience included the participants’ desire “to be a mother” and the importance they placed on this role. Enactment focused on the participants’ views regarding ways to become a mother (reproductive options), parenting a child affected by FXS, and the development of partner relationships (marriage). Participants completed the FXS Adolescent Interview and the FX-Visual Analog Scale. Participants’ knowledge of their genetic risk status appears to have influenced both salience and enactment of the parental role, and the effect varied based on carrier status. For many, knowledge of genetic risk appears to have led to reappraisal, redefinition, and re-engagement with the goal of becoming a parent. This process was prominent in those who were carriers and less so in those who were at-risk, and it did not typically occur in those who were non-carriers. Findings offer valuable insight into the impact of genetic risk information on developing perceptions of the parental role and offer new directions for genetic counseling with adolescents and young women with a family history of FXS.     

‘The Mind as an Object of God's Knowledge’: Another Cartesian Temptation?

In this paper my aim is to consider the picture of God's immediate knowledge of the mind as this appears in Wittgenstein's work, where its soundness seems to be brought into question. My argument is that the response to this denial should take the form, not of an investigation of a theological position concerning God's knowledge (“can God look into the human mind?”), but of a negotiation of the difficulties affecting our use of this picture. A great part of the latter can be seen as difficulties in mastering the communicative relation between God and man which lies at the heart of the religious form of life, and which arises from the dislocation which familiar language‐games undergo within it.     

The knower,inside and out

Adherents of the epistemological position called internalism typically believe that the view they oppose, called externalism, is such a new and radical departure from the established way of seeing knowledge that its implications are uninteresting. Perhaps itis relatively novel, but the approach to knowledge with the greatest antiquity is the one that equates it withcertainty, and while this conception is amenable to the demands of the internalist, it is also a non-starter in the opinion of almost all contemporary epistemologists since obviously it directly implies that we know nothing about the world. Perhaps skepticism is correct, but there are conceptions of knowledge at least as plausible as the certainty equation that do not obviously land us there. It is its promise along these lines that makes the so-called traditional conception of knowledge initially interesting. But contrary to popular belief, the traditional conception cannot be claimed by internalists if it is to have any chance at all in avoiding skepticism; to avoid skepticism, I shall argue, it has to have an externalist element.Moreover, each of the departures from the traditional view that appears in the Gettier literature is externalist as well, or at least all of the ones of which I am aware. The only genuine forms of internalism are those held by philosophers who draw a fairly sharp line between knowledge and justified belief, ignore the former, then offer an internalist account of the latter. This approach is very common and very plausible. But it is not as useful as is often thought; in particular, I shall suggest, it must succumb to a form of skepticism.     

How we make discoveries

In trying to make discoveries, we are trying to uncover knowledge of HIDDEN realities. It appears impossible to uncover knowledge of hidden realities. How can we evaluate results? (How can we find out whether they are true or even good approximation when we cannot compare them to the hidden realities?) But we are often able to do things which appear impossible; it depends on whether we have chanced onto, or discovered, or invented, the relevant OPERATING PRINCIPLES. It appeared impossible to fly to the moon in one lifetime. We discovered the principle of the rocket. If we can discover the operating principle for making discoveries, we know how we make discoveries. In this paper, I show step by step how we can discover this operating principle.