进化逻辑:科学发展的动态模式

进化逻辑是在人工智能心理学派研究的推动下诞生的一种科学进步和发展的动态模式。计算机科学家和哲学家勃克斯 (Ａ .Ｗ .Ｂｕｒｋｓ )在这方面做出卓有成效的贡献。 1988年 ,勃克斯提出了一个进化逻辑系统。[1 ] 进化的逻辑由三个部分组成 :1.选择的逻辑或间接评价的逻辑 ;2 .通过反复竞争而进行的学习 ;3 .遗传发现的逻辑。在选择逻辑中 ,其基本原则是按照其产品 (或结论 )的性质进行选择 (或评价 )。例如 ,有两个生物 ,它们有不同的基因型。生活在相同环境中 ,每个生物都以单性生殖的方式繁殖 ,对同一环境资源进行生存竞争。这个过程一直…     

Scientific Counterpublics: In Defense of the Environmental Scientist as Public Intellectual

Global warming and climate change pose a significant threat to the livelihoods of future generations. Although there is a consensus among qualified climate scientists who believe that scientific evidence supports anthropogenic climate change (ACC) theories, this has not translated into public understanding or trust in these theories. In this essay, I trace policy debates in the United States during the 1970s and 1980s concerning the link between CFC pollution and ozone depletion. Based on a rich tradition of counterpublic scholarship and empirical success of ozone scientists, I argue that a rhetorical defense of global warming science in the form of counterpublic intellectualism may help environmental advocates overcome public disbelief in ACC theories.

     

论国防设计委员会

南京国民政府于“九一八”事变后设立的国防设计委员会,组织了一批国内著名的专家学者,针对日本的侵略威胁,重点在国防经济方面进行了一系列的前期准备工作。其工作的重点在于对中国的资源、工业制造、交通运输、财政经济等方面进行深入的调查和统计,并在此基础上,制定一系列建设及战时动员计划。虽然国防设计委员会还没有实际的权力,只是政府国防建设的一个咨询机构,但其为中国的抗战准备做出了贡献,为战时的国防工业建设,做了大量且必要的前期准备工作。     

幽默在语言应激中的防御功能

语言应激是现代人类生活中不可回避的问题,幽默则是一种积极成熟的心理防御机制.对语言应激及其消极影响、幽默在语言应激中的防御功能加以论述,并指出幽默修养在现代生活中重要意义.     

Peter Forrest,God without the Supernatural: A Defense of Scientific Theism.

International Journal for Philosophy of Religion -     

On the Historicity of Scientific Objects

The historical variation of scientific knowledge has lent itself to the development of historical epistemology, which attempts to historicize the origin and establishment of knowledge claims. The questions I address in this paper revolve around the historicity of the objects of those claims: How and why do new scientific objects appear? What exactly comes into being in such cases? Do scientific objects evolve over time and in what ways? I put forward and defend two theses: First, the ontology of science is so rich and variegated that there are no universally valid answers to these questions. Second, we need a pluralist account of scientific objects, a pluralist metaphysics that can do justice to their rich diversity and their various modes of being and becoming. I then focus on hidden objects, which are supposed to be part of the permanent furniture of the universe, and I discuss their birth and historicity: They emerge when various phenomena coalesce as manifestations of a single hidden cause and their representations change over time. Finally, I examine the conditions under which an evolving representation may still refer to the same object and I illustrate my argument drawing upon the early history of electrons.     

关于科学实在论的几点思考

本文从一个特选的角度来透视科学实在论和反实在论之间的争论。我认为,在争论物理学对象是否实在之前和之时,我们须问:物理学的实在性为何需要证明。这种需要分成两个层次,一是物理学内部的对象和假说是否实在,这要由物理学的发展去解决。二是物理学对象相对于日常对象是否实在。日常实在对象提供了实在概念的原型,但并不提供实在概念的定义,不能因为物理学对象不似日常而否定其实在性。然而,由于物理学对象只能由数学通达,所以,“实在”概念在物理学中已经发生了变化。     

On Classification of Scientific Revolutions

The question whether Kuhn's theory of scientific revolutions could be applied to mathematics caused many interesting problems to arise. The aim of this paper is to discuss whether there are different kinds of scientific revolution, and if so, how many. The basic idea of the paper is to discriminate between the formal and the social aspects of the development of science and to compare them. The paper has four parts. In the first introductory part we discuss some of the questions which arose during the debate of the historians of mathematics. In the second part, we introduce the concept of the epistemic framework of a theory. We propose to discriminate three parts of this framework, from which the one called formal frame will be of considerable importance for our approach, as its development is conservative and gradual. In the third part of the paper we define the concept of epistemic rupture as a discontinuity in the formal frame. The conservative and gradual nature of the changes of the formal frame open the possibility to compare different epistemic ruptures. We try to show that there are four different kinds of epistemic rupture, which we call idealisation, re-presentation, objectivisation and re-formulation. In the last part of the paper we derive from the classification of the epistemic ruptures a classification of scientific revolutions. As only the first three kinds of rupture are revolutionary (the re-formulations are rather cumulative), we obtain three kinds of scientific revolution: idealisation, re-presentation, and objectivisation. We discuss the relation of our classification of scientific revolutions to the views of Kuhn, Lakatos, Crowe, and Dauben. This revised version was published online in August 2006 with corrections to the Cover Date.     

论进化心理学的“心理机制”

“心理机制”是进化心理学的核心概念。对这一概念的理解直接影响着对整个进化心理学理论的理解。该文尝试从心理学其它相关学科的角度,对这一概念的性质进行充分的解读与分析,同时也指出进化心理学“心理机制”理论之明显误区,并在此基础上对进化心理学价值之所在给予充分的彰显。     

On the Psychology of the Uncertain Self and the Integration of the Worldview Defense Zoo

In this paper, I focus on two issues raised against the uncertainty management model that I proposed. The first issue has to do with the need for deeper insight into psychological processes instigated by uncertainty concerns, including the possibility of positive responses to uncertainty. The second issue revolves around the question to what extent uncertainty management is the core motive (vs. a core motive) of worldview defense and sense-making. By discussing these two issues, I hope to (a) make my view on uncertainty management processes clearer, (b) note explicitly that I was advocating a core motive of worldview defense (not the core motive), and (c) propose a research agenda for future research. I end the article with a plea for research studies that focus on moderators of worldview defense motives. These moderator studies may help to integrate the large variety of core motives proposed in the literature to underlie worldview defense strategies.     

试论西方伦理学的科学路径

由于文化的差异,西方伦理学在发展路径上表现出明显的科学化倾向:一方面,与中国伦理学认为通达道德境界的道路只能是修身养性不同,西方伦理学却主张科学的理性有助于达到道德的理想目标;另一方面,与中国伦理学甚至认为为道与为学在根本上是对抗的相反,西方伦理学却断言美德本身就是知识。     

On the Significance of William James to a Contemporary Doctrine of Evolutionary Psychology

Academic popularizers of the new field of evolutionary psychology make notable appeals to William James to bolster their doctrine. In particular, they cite James’ remark that humans have all the “impulses” animals do and many more besides to shore up their claim that people’s “instincts” account for their flexibility. This essay argues that these scholars misinterpret James on the instincts. Consciousness (which they find inscrutable) explains cognitive flexibility for James. The evolutionary psychologists’ appeal to James is, therefore, unwarranted and, given the conditions relevant to the public and professional audiences they address, also ineffective as a rhetorical tool for enlisting new recruits.

On the Thinking Brains and Tinkering with the Scientific Models

The paper aims to provide a detailed assessment of Tim Crane’s recent invocation of the notion of scientific models in the way of dealing with the issue of the brain’s representational states. In this paper, I assess Crane’s proposal under a charitable and a less charitable reading. I argue that Crane’s use of scientific models is at best (i.e. under a charitable reading) compatible with his expression of psychological realism. However, Crane’s use of model-based strategy by no means underlay, support, or strengthen his psychological realism. Rather, traditional reasons from the metaphysics of mind, acting quite separately from empirical scientific reasons, must be used to support this realism, and Crane has merely removed the threat posed to these metaphysical arguments by the existence of the so-called mereological fallacy in empirical neuroscience. Therefore, while he has saved the neuroscientific language from philosophical attack, he has perhaps even strengthened the divide between neuroscience and philosophy. I conclude the paper by outlining the sketch of a broadbrush scientifically informed strategy for defending psychological realism.     

Still Mythic After All Those Years: On Alston's Latest Defense of the Given

Wilfrid Sellars' conclusion in "Empiricism and the Philosophy of Mind" that "the Given" is a "Myth" quickly elicited philosophical opposition and remains contentious fifty years later. William Alston has challenged that conclusion on several occasions by attempting to devise an acceptable account of perception committed to the givenness of perceived objects. His most recent challenge advances a "Theory of Appearing" which posits irreducible non-conceptual relations, ostensibly overlooked by Sellars, e.g., of "looking red", between the subject and the object perceived, that can play a justificatory role vis-à-vis the corresponding beliefs, e.g., that the object is red. I argue that Alston undermines his positive plausibility arguments by first blurring and then ignoring crucial differences among various looks-concepts, and that his own putative "phenomenal" looks-concept demonstrably cannot play the justificatory role that he envisions for it. Both his critique of Sellars' arguments and his own alternative proposal thus fail on all fronts.     

人类自我意识的多重起源：兼论精神分裂症的进化论解释

将ＰｏｗｖｉｎｅｌｌｉａｎｄＣａｎｔ提出的栖处降服假说推广以生态位－亚生态位中的维数－参量之间的更一般的互相降服情景,提出了人类的自我意识的多重起源的假设及对精神分裂症作出了进化方面的解释,最后对意识起源之谜进行了探讨和推测：意识具有精炼信息的功能。