Depression and preference for self-focusing stimuli after success and failure

Depressed individuals, who tend to have large perceived-self/ideal-self discrepancies, have been shown to be particularly high in private self-consciousness. On the bases of this finding and of several converging theoretical perspectives, we hypothesized that depressives, unlike nondepressives, do not find self-focus more aversive after failure than after success, and thus either (a) show no differential preference for self-focusing stimuli after success versus after failure (weak hypothesis), or (b) prefer self-focusing stimuli after failure over self-focusing stimuli after success (strong hypothesis). Depressed and nondepressed college students succeeded or failed on a supposed test of verbal intelligence, and then worked on two sets of puzzles, one in the presence and one in the absence of a self-focusing stimulus (mirror). Whereas nondepressed subjects liked the mirror-associated puzzle more after success than after failure, depressed subjects did not; depressed subjects tended to like the mirror-associated puzzle more after failure than after success. Nondepressed subjects also exhibited a self-serving pattern of attributions, viewing the test as less valid and luck as more responsible for their performance after failure than after success; depressed subjects showed no such differences. In consistency with their failure to use defensive strategies, depressed subjects showed a decrease in self-esteem after failure; nondepressed subjects showed no such change.     

Depression, self-focused attention, and expectancies for positive and negative future life events for self and others

In two studies, we examined depressed and nondepressed persons' judgments of the probability of future positive and negative life events occurring to themselves and to others. Study 1 demonstrated that depressed subjects were generally less optimistic than their nondepressed counterparts: Although nondepressed subjects rated positive events as more likely to happen to themselves than negative events, depressed subjects did not. In addition, relative to nondepressed subjects, depressed subjects rated positive events as less likely to occur to themselves and more likely to occur to others and negative events as more likely to occur to both self and others. Study 2 investigated the role that differential levels of self-focused attention might play in mediating these differences. On the basis of prior findings that depressed persons generally engage in higher levels of self-focus than nondepressed persons do and the notion that self-focus activates one's self-schema, we hypothesized that inducing depressed subjects to focus externally would attenuate their pessimistic tendencies. Data from Study 2 supported the hypothesis that high levels of self-focus partially mediate depressive pessimism: Whereas self-focused depressed subjects were more pessimistic than nondepressed subjects, externally focused depressed subjects were not. The role of attentional focus in maintaining these and other depressive pessimistic tendencies was discussed.     

Negative affect and ruminative self-focus during everyday goal pursuit

Models of self-regulation propose that negative affect is generated when progress towards goals is perceived to be inadequate. Similarly, ruminative thinking is hypothesised to be triggered by unattained goals (Martin & Tesser, 1996). We conducted an experience-sampling study in which participants recorded their negative affect, ruminative self-focus, and goal appraisals eight times daily for one week. Negative affect and ruminative self-focus were each associated with low levels of goal success and (with the exception of sadness) high levels of goal importance. As predicted, the combination of low goal success and high goal importance was associated with the highest levels of negative affect, and this interaction was marginally significant for ruminative self-focus. Decomposition of the ruminative self-focus measure revealed that the success by importance interaction was significantly associated with focus on problems but not focus on feelings. Findings did not differ for individuals reporting high versus low levels of depressive symptoms or trait rumination. These results suggest that self-regulatory models of goal pursuit provide a useful explanatory framework for the study of affect and ruminative thinking in everyday life.     

Attributional processing style differences in depressed and nondepressed individuals

A series of four studies used different measures to assess the amount of attributional processing following failure and success. It was found that, from an actor's point of view, relatively depressed students consistently differed from relatively nondepressed students in the amount of their attributional processing. The depressed individuals reported more attributions for both hypothetical and real failure, compared to the nondepressed individuals. They also reported fewer attributions for hypothetical success than the nondepressed individuals. In line with previous findings, depressed individuals took less personal credit for their successes and ascribed their failures more pronouncedly to their lack of ability. The findings reflect a depressive attributional processing style that encompasses individual differences, both in the content and in the amount of causal thinking following failure and success. Integration of this style into the attributional helplessness model of depression is suggested. The findings are compatible with a differential self-esteem view of depression and with aspects of Kuhl's functional helplessness model of depression. Implications for depression therapy are briefly discussed.Financial support for the studies was obtained from the University of Bielefeld (Grants 0Z 2760/2774). I wish to thank Karola Bettmer, Thomas Feld, and Stefan Wächter for their participation in the collection and the preparation of the data, as well as Friedrich Försterling, Jonathan Harrow, Wulf-Uwe Meyer, and two unknown reviewers for their helpful comments on earlier versions of this paper.     

Depression and pessimism for the future: biased use of statistically relevant information in predictions for self versus others

The cognitive theories of depression emphasize the role of pessimism about the future in the etiology and maintenance of depression. The present research was designed for two reasons: to provide a clear demonstration that depressed individuals' predictions of the likelihood of future outcomes are more pessimistic than those of nondepressed individuals given identical information with which to make forecasts and identical conditions for forecasting, and to test two additional hypotheses regarding possible mechanisms underlying depressives' relative pessimism in forecasting: a social-comparison and a differential attributional-style hypothesis. We used a modification of the cue-use paradigm developed by Ajzen (1977, Experiment 1) and examined depressed and nondepressed people's predictions of the likelihood of future positive and negative outcomes for themselves and for others. The results provided strong support for pessimism on the part of depressed individuals relative to nondepressed individuals in forecasts for both self and others. In addition, whereas nondepressives exhibited a self-enhancing bias in which they overestimated their probability of success and underestimated their probability of failure relative to that of similar others, depressives did not succumb to either positive or negative social comparison biases in prediction. Finally, in line with the attributional-style hypothesis, depressed-nondepressed differences in subjects' cue-use patterns were obtained, especially in forecasts for self. The findings are discussed with respect to the mechanisms underlying predictive optimism and pessimism and the possible functions and implications of these predictive biases.     

Pessimistic self-preoccupation, performance deficits, and depression

Three studies are presented testing a model of the cognitive performance deficits shown in depression. The model proposes that such deficits occur as an interaction of expectancy and focus of attention variables, that is, in the presence of both low expectancy of success and high self-focus. Study 1 was a pilot study which documented that depressed undergraduates evidence poorer anagram performance, greater self-focus, and lower pretask expectancies than do nondepressed subjects. Study 2 showed that nondepressed undergraduates evidence performance deficits only when both expectancy is lowered and self-focus is increased. Study 3 suggested that depressed undergraduates' performance deficits are overcome either by lowering self-focus or by raising expectancy. Discussed are discrepancies between self-report and performance data, the relevance of these studies to the test anxiety literature, the need to integrate literature concerning the effects of depression, anxiety, and self-esteem on performance, and how the interactive roles of positive expectancy and focus of attention may be related to effective coping in a variety of situations.     

Effects of analytical and experiential self-focus on stress-induced cognitive reactivity in eating disorder psychopathology

Previous research suggests distinct modes of self-focus, each with distinct functional properties: Analytical self-focus appears maladaptive, with experiential self-focus having more adaptive effects on indices of cognitive-affective functioning (e.g., Watkins, Moberly, & Moulds, 2008). The authors applied this framework to eating disorder (ED) psychopathology and manipulated the mode of self-focus prior to exposure to a stressor (imagining eating a large meal; Shafran, Teachman, Kerry, & Rachman, 1999). Study 1 showed that students high in ED psychopathology reported lower post-stressor feelings of weight or shape change and less subsequent attempts to neutralise (e.g., imagining exercising) after experiential relative to analytical self-focus. Study 2 found that partially weight restored patients with anorexia nervosa had lower post-stressor estimates of their own weight and reported lower urge to cancel stressor effects following experiential compared to analytical self-focus. Experiential self-focus was also followed by less neutralisation than analytical self-focus. Results suggest that the mode of self-focus affects cognitive reactivity following a stressor in individuals with ED psychopathology. Examining the mode within which individuals with ED psychopathology focus on self and body may raise important implications for understanding of psychopathology and open new possibilities for augmenting current treatments.     

Does affect induce self-focused attention?

Despite growing evidence that depression is linked with self-focused attention, little is known about how depressed individuals become self-focused or, more generally, about what arouses self-focus in everyday life. Two experiments examined the hypothesis that affect itself induces self-focused attention. In Experiment 1, moods were manipulated with an imagination mood-induction procedure. Sad-induction Ss became higher in self-focus than did neutral-induction Ss. Experiment 2 replicated this effect for sad moods by means of a musical mood-induction procedure and different measures of self-focus. However, Experiment 2 failed to support the hypothesis that happy moods induce self-focus. The results have implications for mood-induction research, self-focused attention, and recent models of depression.     

Depression,self-focus,and social interaction

The accuracy of depressed and nondepressed subjects' perceptions of their own and a social interactional partner's performance was investigated. Twenty depressed and twenty nondepressed college students participated in dyadic interactions and then rated their own and their partner's social behavior. The interactions were also rated by objective coders. Depressed subjects were differentiated from nondepressed subjects on several measures by both the coders and the subjects. Depressed subjects' self-ratings were correlated with the coders' ratings more often than were the nondepressives' ratings, suggesting depressives provided more accurate self-observations. Contrary to prediction, depressives were also more accurate in judging their partner's behavior. Depressives experienced heightened levels of self-focused attention, but this attentional focus did not mediate the relationship between depression level and self-accuracy. Finally, an analysis of the verbal statements suggests that performance differences between depressives and nondepressives may be a function of the quantity, rather than the quality, of the verbal production.     

Depression and interpersonal attraction: the role of perceived similarity

We hypothesized that depressed individuals are generally viewed as dissimilar and that this perceived dissimilarity contributes to negative reactions to the depressed. In addition, we hypothesized that if perceived similarity affects liking of depressed individuals, then nondepressed subjects should prefer nondepressed targets, but depressed subjects should not share this preference. To test these hypotheses, depressed and nondepressed subjects received information about two targets, both either depressed or nondepressed, one attitudinally dissimilar and one attitudinally similar. They were then asked to fill out an attraction measure and an interest in meeting measure for each target. The results clearly supported the primary hypotheses, demonstrating that nondepressed subjects preferred nondepressed targets and perceived them as more similar than depressed targets, and that this preference for nondepressed targets is not shared by depressed subjects. Tests of supplementary hypotheses also confirmed that depressed subjects perceive their best friends as being more depressed and more dissimilar than do nondepressed subjects. The implications of these findings for the social world of the depressed were discussed.     

Adaptive and maladaptive ruminative self-focus during emotional processing

Ruminative self-focus on mood, problems and other aspects of self-experience can have both mal adaptive consequences, perpetuating depression, and, adaptive consequences, promoting recovery from upsetting events. Increasing evidence suggests that these contrasting effects may be explained by distinct varieties of ruminative self-focus, each with distinct functional properties. This study tested the prediction (Emotional processing, three modes of mind and the prevention of relapse in depression. Behav. Res. Therapy, 37 (1999) S53) that an experiential mode of self-focused attention would facilitate recovery from an upsetting event in comparison to a conceptual-evaluative mode of self-focused attention. To test these contrasting effects experimentally, 69 participants wrote about an induced failure experience in either a conceptual-evaluative condition (e.g. "Why did you feel this way?"), or an experiential condition ("How did you feel moment-by-moment?"). Consistent with the hypothesis, higher levels of trait disposition to ruminate were associated with relatively greater increases in negative mood 12 h after the failure in the conceptual-evaluative condition compared to the experiential condition. Furthermore, the conceptual-evaluative condition resulted in more intrusions about the failure than the experiential condition. These results support the differentiation of rumination into distinct modes of self-focused attention with distinct functional effects; a conceptual-evaluative mode that is maladaptive and an experiential mode that is adaptive.     

Emotional dimensions as determinants of self-focused attention

Negative emotions, and particularly sadness, have been found to induce self-focused attention among both depressed and normal individuals. However, positive emotion, such as happiness, is sometimes found to have a similar effect. The present study examines the effect of emotion on self-focus induction by looking separately at the emotional dimensions of valence and arousal. It postulates that arousal would be even more potent than valence in increasing self-focus, since it increases the salience of the self. Results of Experiment 1 showed that emotions that are both intense and negative, such as fear, induce the most self-focus, but pleasant relaxation also resulted in increased self-focusing. Experiment 2, using a similar design, replicated the arousal effect, and showed that fear and joy, the two most arousing emotions resulted in the most self-focus.     

Contingency judgments by depressed college students: sadder but not always wiser

We examined depressed and nondepressed college students' perceptions of control over outcomes in a task similar to the one introduced by Alloy and Abramson (1979, Experiment 2). In Experiment 1, when subjects completed a contingency learning task with no one else present, nondepressed subjects perceived themselves to have more control over frequently occurring response-independent outcomes than did depressed subjects, which replicated Alloy and Abramson's finding. When subjects completed the task in the presence of an observer, depressed students perceived themselves to have more control than did nondepressed students. In Experiment 2, the observer effects found in Experiment 1 were replicated, and we extended those results by showing that when response-independent outcomes occurred relatively infrequently, depressed and nondepressed subjects who completed the task in the presence of an observer did not reliably differ in their estimates of personal control. In Experiment 3, which included minor procedural variations from the other experiments, the pattern of results found in Experiments 1 and 2 was replicated under conditions in which observers were present while subjects received frequently occurring outcomes. Together, the results of the three experiments demonstrate that the consistently accurate personal control estimates of depressed subjects that have been found across a variety of situations break down when subjects complete a contingency learning task in the presence of an observer, and outcomes occur independently of response at a high frequency.     

Rumination, distraction, and mindful self-focus in depressed patients

Rumination has been proposed as a cognitive risk factor for the onset and maintenance of depression. In parallel, mindfulness interventions have shown to reduce the risk for recurrence of depressive episodes. This study aimed to investigate effects of short periods of induced rumination, distraction, and mindful self-focus on sad mood in depressed patients and to assess possible moderator effects of habitual variables on respective mood changes. Seventy-six depressed patients 3.5 years after discharge from inpatient treatment were subjected to negative mood induction and subsequently randomly assigned to a rumination, distraction, or mindful self-focus induction. Habitual aspects of rumination, distraction, and mindfulness were assessed by questionnaires. Compared to rumination, the induction of a mindful self-focus and of distraction showed clear beneficial effects on the course of negative mood. While habitual distraction predicted better mood outcomes across all conditions, patients high in habitual mindfulness tended to show stronger negative mood reduction specifically after the induction of a mindful self-focus. This study indicates that - similar to distraction - an experimentally induced mindful self-focus is able to reduce negative mood in depressed patients. Implications regarding possible subgroups of patients who might particularly benefit from mindfulness-based interventions are discussed.     

Interactions of depressed college students with their roommates: not necessarily negative

Coyne's (1976b) interactional theory of the social environment's role in maintaining depression suggests that depressed people create negative affect in others. This leads to a pattern of interactions between depressed individuals and others that is aversive to both parties and becomes a vicious circle. We examined interactions of 15 depressed and 15 nondepressed college students with their roommates. On questionnaires, roommates did indicate more rejection, dislike, and avoidance of the depressed students than of the nondepressed students, consistent with Coyne's theory, and depressed-student-roommate interactions were more personally involved (higher percentage of self-disclosure) and less positive than nondepressed-student-roommate interactions. The moods of both depressed students and their roommates were worse than those of controls before the interaction but, contrary to expectation, improved over the course of the interaction, whereas the moods of nondepressed students and their roommates did not change significantly. Implications of these results for Coyne's theory are discussed.     

Concreteness of thinking and self-focus

The present study used the experience sampling method to detect fluctuations in thinking, such as self-focus or concreteness in daily life, and to examine their relationship with depressive symptoms and concurrent negative affect. Thirty-one undergraduates recorded their negative affect, ruminative self-focus, and concreteness of thinking eight times a day for 1 week. Multilevel modeling showed that individuals with increasing levels of depression showed lower levels of concreteness in their daily thinking. Further analysis revealed a significant positive association between momentary ruminative self-focus and concurrent negative affect only with low concreteness of thinking. These results suggested that individuals with increasing levels of depression chronically process self-related information on an abstract level, which reflects a malfunction of their self-regulatory cycle and might serve to maintain or even exacerbate dysphoric moods.     

Construct accessibility and depression: an examination of cognitive and affective factors

Two studies in which the parameters of construct accessibility in depression were examined are reported. In Experiment 1, depressed and nondepressed subjects were required to name the colors of tachistiscopically presented depressed-content, neutral-content, and manic-content words. Because of the predicted accessibility and interference effects of the depressed-content words, the depressed subjects were expected to demonstrate longer response latencies to these words than to the non-depressed-content words. This response pattern was found for the depressed subjects; the nondepressed subjects did not demonstrate differential response latencies. In Experiment 2, a mood-induction paradigm was used to investigate whether the interference effects obtained in Experiment 1 were due to temporary mood differences between the depressed and nondepressed subjects, or were a function of more stable depression-associated patterns of information processing. Although predicted group differences were obtained on a mood adjective checklist, no effects were found for task performance. These results suggest that transient mood is not a sufficient explanation for the results obtained in Experiment 1. The implications of the present findings for the understanding of both construct accessibility and depression are discussed, and directions for future research are suggested.     

Distinct modes of ruminative self-focus: impact of abstract versus concrete rumination on problem solving in depression

One account for the negative effects of rumination on social problem solving (SPS) is the symptom-focus hypothesis, which proposes that focus on symptoms amplifies the vicious cycle between depressed mood and negative cognition. The authors tested a contrasting account, the reduced concreteness hypothesis, which postulates that the abstract thinking typical of rumination impairs SPS. In 40 depressed patients and 40 never-depressed controls, SPS was assessed before and after versions of symptom-focused rumination known to differentially induce abstract versus concrete self-focus (E. Watkins & J. D. Teasdale, 2001). As predicted by reduced concreteness theory, relative to abstract self-focus, concrete self-focus improved SPS in depressed patients, suggesting that the particular mode of symptom-focus, rather than symptom-focus per se, determines the effects of rumination on problem solving.     

Behavioral activation and inhibition systems and the severity and course of depression

Theorists have proposed that depression is associated with abnormalities in the behavioral activation (BAS) and behavioral inhibition (BIS) systems. In particular, depressed individuals are hypothesized to exhibit deficient BAS and overactive BIS functioning. Self-reported levels of BAS and BIS were examined in 62 depressed participants and 27 nondepressed controls. Clinical functioning was assessed at intake and at 8-month follow-up. Relative to nondepressed controls, depressed participants reported lower BAS levels and higher BIS levels. Within the depressed group, lower BAS levels were associated with greater concurrent depression severity and predicted worse 8-month outcome. Levels of both BIS and BAS showed considerable stability over time and clinical state. Overall, results suggest that BAS dysregulation exacerbates the presentation and course of depressive illness.     

Depressed and nondepressed content self-reference in mild depressives

The present research investigated the extent to which mild depressives and normals differed in their self-referent processing of personal information. In Experiment 1, these subjects made two types of ratings on depressed (e.g., bleak, dismal) and nondepressed (e.g., loyal, organized) content personal adjectives. Half of the adjectives in each content category were rated for a semantic attribute (Does this word have a specific meaning or relate to a specific situation?), whereas half were rated for degree of self-reference (Does this word describe you?). These ratings were followed immediately by an incidental recall task, in which subjects recalled as many of the adjectives as possible. Consistent with predictions generated from a content-specific self-schema model, normals displayed superior recall for self-referenced nondepressed content adjectives, when compared to recall for self-referenced depressed content adjectives and recall for semantic ratings (both depressed and nondepressed content). In contrast, mild depressives exhibited enhanced self-referent recall for both types of content, when compared to their recall for semantic adjectives. This finding suggested that mild depressives utilize a self-schema which incorporates both depressed and nondepressed content. Experiment 2 explored this suggestion further by substituting an other-referent rating task (Does this word describe Pierre Trudeau?) for the semantic judgment used in Experiment 1. Again, consistent with a content-specific self-schema model, normals displayed superior recall only for self-referenced nondepressed adjectives. Mild depressives, however, showed enhanced self-referent recall, relative to other-referent recall, only for depressed content adjectives. For nondepressed content, mild depressives did not distinguish between the self- and other-referent conditions. This finding hinted that the nondepressed component of the mild depressives self-schema may operate at a somewhat reduced effectiveness, but only when required to differentiate between self and others.