B.F. Skinner:

Skinner's non-intuitive discovery in the 1930s that response probability can be a function of not only temporal contiguity but also past consequences sparked fifty years of reaction ranging from high praise to scathing criticism and misunderstanding. Failures to distinguish between the work of Skinner and Pavlov and Watson account for some of the misunderstandings. Other criticisms stem from basic value differences. Whereas Skinner's scientific interest is in behavior per se, other psychologist are curious about inner processes. While Skinners' truth criterion is pragmatic, other psychologists hold correspondence theories of truth. Whereas Skinner is convinced that hypothetical constructs hinder scientific discovery, other psychologists are equally certain that they are essential. Skinner's eschewal of hypothetical constructs, however, has not prevented him form addressing complex behavior, as is widely believed. To the contrary, Skinner has formulated enough unexplored theories on the origin and maintenance of verbal behavior, concept development, problem solving, and creativity to keep theoreticians and empiricists occupied for decades.     

Some early similarities and later differences between Bertrand Russell and B. F. Skinner

B. F. Skinner credited Bertrand Russell with converting him to behaviorism and with writing one of the books that most influenced him. Particularly in Skinner's early work, there are similarities between Skinner and Russell that extend across mathematics, determinism, positivism, verbal behavior, future communities, evolution, and pragmatism. Later, Skinner's views changed, and he parted company with Russell in most of these areas. Perhaps the most dramatic and fundamental departure came when Skinner embraced pragmatism, which Russell said he "hated." However, there was a time during which Russell wrote favorably of pragmatism as a view for science. Although the similarities between Skinner and Russell may have resulted from common cultural influences, Russell appears to deserve credit for leading Skinner into the stimulus-response behaviorism of two-term necessities; he may also deserve some credit for helping to lead him out of it and into the selectionist behaviorism of three-term contingencies.     

Symposium: Recollections of B. F. Skinner

This symposium was presented at the Annual Meeting of the Pavlovian Society, Lord Baltimore Hotel, Baltimore, Maryland, September 27, 1991.     

B. F. Skinner, organism.

B. F. Skinner illustrated the power of behavior analysis by turning it upon his own behavior. This article considers parallels in the life and work of Charles Darwin and places Skinner's views on life and death in the context of his selectionist paradigm for psychology. The term organism plays a special role, and the account shows why B. F. Skinner might have regarded it as an appropriate title.     

The ultimate challenge: prove B. F. Skinner wrong

For much of his career, B. F. Skinner displayed the optimism that is often attributed to behaviorists. With time, however, he became less and less sanguine about the power of behavior science to solve the major problems facing humanity. Near the end of his life he concluded that a fair consideration of principles revealed by the scientific analysis of behavior leads to pessimism about our species. In this article I discuss the case for Skinner's pessimism and suggest that the ultimate challenge for behavior analysts today is to prove Skinner wrong.     

B.F. Skinner and the auditory inkblot: The rise and fall of the verbal summator as a projective technique

Behaviorist B.F. Skinner is not typically associated with the fields of personality assessment or projective testing. However, early in his career Skinner developed an instrument he named the verbal summator, which, at one point, he referred to as a device for "snaring out complexes," much like an auditory analogue of the Rorschach inkblots. Skinner's interest in the projective potential of his technique was relatively short lived, but whereas he used the verbal summator to generate experimental data for his theory of verbal behavior, several other clinicians and researchers exploited this potential and adapted the verbal summator technique for both research and applied purposes. The idea of an auditory inkblot struck many as a useful innovation, and the verbal summator spawned the tautophone test, the auditory apperception test, and the Azzageddi test, among others. This article traces the origin, development, and eventual demise of the verbal summator as an auditory projective technique.     

A daughter's retrospective of B. F. Skinner

This paper describes characteristic behaviors of my father, B. F. Skinner, using family documents and my own recollections. Early contingencies in his upbringing strengthened his love of building things and his independence in discovering how the world works. Those skills, combined with a lack of supervision in graduate school, set the stage for his discovery of the operant. He did not stop with laboratory research. He extended his discovery of how consequences select behavior into education and the design of cultural practices. As well as solving society's problems, my father was always concerned with improving his own behavior. Some of the contingencies he set up to maximize his own productivity are described.     

Precision teaching's unique legacy from B. F. Skinner

Precision Teaching's unique legacy from B. F. Skinner was the monitoring system of rate of response and the cumulative response recorder. This legacy is unique because the other instructional systems derived from Skinner's work do not use his monitoring method exclusively. Rate of response, cumulative recording and their extension to Precision Teaching's standard celeration charting are briefly described. In addition, Precision Teaching's nature, history, costs, distribution, inductive data-base, and academic base are briefly described. Skinner's legacy to education was a sound behavioral scientific base and his unique legacy to Precision Teaching was self-monitoring for real time decision making by learners and teachers.     

The Limits of Experience and Explanation: F. A. Lange and Ernst Mach on Things in Themselves

In the middle of the nineteenth century, advances in experimental psychology and the physiology of the sense organs inspired so-called ‘Back to Kant’ Neo-Kantians to articulate robustly psychologistic visions of Kantian epistemology. But their accounts of the thing in itself were fraught with deep tension: they wanted to conceive of things in themselves as the causes of our sensations, while their own accounts of causal inference ruled that claim out. This paper diagnoses the source of that problem in views of one Neo-Kantan, F. A. Lange, and argues that it is solved only by Ernst Mach. No less than Lange and other Neo-Kantians, Mach was inspired to develop a psychologistic account of the foundations of knowledge, but his account also includes a coherent denial of things in themselves’ existence. Finally, this paper uses this account of Lange and Mach on things in themselves to illuminate Mach's relation to a certain strain of the Neo-Kantian philosophy of his own time: his views constitute a more fully coherent version of the psychologistic theory of knowledge Back to Kant figures tried to articulate.     

B. F. Skinner: The Writer and His Definition of Verbal Behavior

Skinner's definition of verbal behavior, with its brief and refined versions, has recently become a point of controversy among behavior analysts. Some of the arguments presented in this controversy might be based on a misreading of Skinner's (1957a) writings. An examination of Skinner's correspondence with editors of scientific journals shows his sophisticated mastery of English and his knowledge of contemporary approaches of linguistics, and might help to settle the meaning of the passages involved in the controversy. A more precise definition of verbal behavior, deduced from Skinner's distinction between verbal and nonverbal operants, is suggested, and a possible reason why Skinner did not define verbal behavior in the terms proposed by this alternative definition is discussed. The alternative definition is more compatible with a functional approach to behavior and highlights what is specific to verbal behavior by pointing to the conventions of the verbal community. Some possible consequences of adopting this alternative definition are described.