Is it always fallacious to derive values from facts?

Since the time of David Hume, many philosophers have held that there is a logical Is/Ought gap. According to the doctrine of the Is/Ought gap, there are no valid (i.e., non-fallacious) arguments from purely factual premises about whatis the case to moral or normative conclusions about whatought to be. Occasionally, this doctrine has been challenged, but frequently it has been accepted without argumentation. Charles Pigden has recently argued for a logical Is/Ought gap on the grounds of the conservativeness of logic. I offer a counter-example which shows that Pigden's argument is unsound and that there need be no logical gap between Is-premises and an Ought-conclusion. My counter-example is an argument which is logically valid, has only Is-premises and an Ought-conclusion, and does not purport to violate the conservativeness of logic. Moreover, my argument does not rely, as other alleged counter-examples do, on controversial assumptions from Aristotelian biology about natures or ends, or about institutions such as promise-making.     

Wittgenstein's Temple: Or How Cool Is Philosophy?

How should we understand Wittgenstein's comment in 1929 that his ‘ideal’ was ‘a certain coolness’? Does it have the implication for the practice of philosophy that is suggested by the late Dewi Phillips? Wittgenstein's use of the metaphor of a temple in relation to the passions is curiously reminiscent in its structure of Rilke's first sonnet to Orpheus. In Zettel a similar preoccupation seems to be manifested in the long and unexpected passage that Wittgenstein copies out from Plato, a passage which is juxtaposed to the famous remark that the philosopher is the citizen of no community of ideas.     

Is gratitude an alternative to materialism?

Materialistic strivings have been implicated as a cause of unhappiness. Gratitude, on the other hand – both in its manifestations as a chronic affective trait and as a more temporary emotional experience – may be a cause of happiness. In the present paper we review the empirical research on the relationships among materialism, gratitude, and well-being. We present new correlational data on the gratitude–materialism relationship and propose that gratitude may have the potential to reduce materialistic strivings and consequently diminish the negative effects of materialistic strivings on psychological well-being. We conclude with some recommendations for future research on the relationships among gratitude, materialism, and well-being.     

Does an Appeal to the Common Good Justify Individual Sacrifices for Genomic Research?

In genomic research the ideal standard of free, informed, prior, and explicit consent is believed to restrict important research studies. For certain types of genomic research other forms of consent are therefore proposed which are ethically justified by an appeal to the common good. This notion is often used in a general sense and this forms a weak basis for the use of weaker forms of consent. Here we examine how the notion of the common good can be related to individual health, health care, and genomic research and we use this analysis to propose more precise criteria to justify forms of consent which diverge from the ideal standard.     

Is a Tenseless Language Possible?

Whether it takes the form of a translation or of giving truth-conditions, any putative reduction of tensed language to tenseless language will be undermined if it can be shown that there could be no genuinely tenseless language. A similar problem faced traditional phenomenalism: it was far from clear that there could be a 'language of sense-data'. Either the imagined language was no language at all, or it was dependent upon object-language, not the other way around. A parallel dilemma faces tenseless reductionism. In spelling out what a tenseless language would be like, one either ends up with something that no creature could have as a language, or with something that is parasitic upon tensed language - not the other way around.     

Is there an epistemic advantage to being oppressed?

Do the oppressed have an epistemic advantage when it comes to knowing about the systems that oppress them? If so, what explains this advantage? In this paper, I consider whether an epistemic advantage can be derived from the oppressed's contingent tendency to have more relevant experiences and motivation than the non-oppressed; or, alternatively, whether an advantage derives from the oppressed's very lived experience, thus being in principle unavailable to the non-oppressed. I then explore the potential role of knowledge-how for explaining an epistemic advantage. Ultimately, I conclude that the oppressed tend to have a contingent advantage, while rejecting that they have one in principle, except for when their phenomenological experience has an effect on the veracity of the claims they make. This has the important upshot that privileged people are not epistemically disadvantaged in principle and are thus often blameworthy for their ignorance about oppression.     

What Is It Like to Be an Alien?

This brief article is concerned with an aspect of Jonathan Glover's book, Alien Landscapes?. After reflecting a little on the book as a whole, the question that is taken up is, ‘Why might a book that seeks to help those without mental disorders understand what they are like “from the inside” be of interest to laymen and practitioners in the criminal law?’. One answer lies in part in the way that ‘what it is like from the inside’ might interact with judgements of criminal responsibility. Taking its cue from examples used by Glover the article considers, and puts pressure on, the ‘dual view’ he proposes: that when dealing with those with mental disorders we should treat them as responsible agents in the sense of not withholding from them Strawson's ‘reactive attitudes’, while nevertheless accepting that their personalities and behaviours are the results of large doses of ‘bad luck’.     

What Is It to Make Clear the Working of Our Language?1

In The Logical Basis of Metaphysics, Dummett articulates and develops his “fundamental assumption” that the introduction rules for a logical constant determine its meaning. According to Dummett, logical laws in harmony with the introduction rules are justified, while logical laws not in harmony with the introduction rules are unjustified. This powerful picture enables Dummett to criticise certain aspects of our linguistic practice, such as the Law of Excluded Middle and the metaphysics of realism he believes it embodies, as not remaining responsible to the meanings of the logical constants. Against Dummett's fundamental assumption, I bring to bear what in the Tractatus Wittgenstein describes as his “fundamental thought” that the logical constants do not represent. Properly understood, Wittgenstein's point is that since the logical constants may be eliminated from the propositional signs of a fully precise logical notation, the constants do not express meanings to which our use of expressions containing the constants is responsible. I then apply Wittgenstein's fundamental thought to Dummett's proof‐theoretic notation to show that far from determining the meanings of the logical constants, the introduction rules merely allow the constants to be edited from certain inferences, leaving Dummett with no semantic kernel with which to criticise other sentences or inferences featuring the constants. Thus, his picture of what it is to make clear the working of our language collapses.     

Is rowe committed to an expanded version of theism?

I argue in this paper two theses. First, I argue that the internal consistency of the argument from evil demands that it take into account some form of EST. Thus, there is no ground for the atheist to chide the theist when the theist appeals to an expanded version of theism. Second, I show that it isprima facie probable that RST does in fact ential EST. I show this by capitalizing on the distinction between what is contained in a concept and what is entailed by a concept. What a term or concept means is different from what it may entail. What a concept or term entails is conceptually more robust than what it simply means. I call this the “containment objection” and if is true, then the restricted conjunction rule cannot apply since a version of theism sufficient to deflate the evidential argument would not be logically independent from RST,pace Rowe.     

Do Populist Leaders Mimic the Language of Ordinary Citizens? Evidence From India

Minimal understandings of populism focus on measuring explicit stances of antielitism and people centrism. What remains poorly understood is the way less overt forms of populist rhetoric enable leaders to emulate the language of common citizens to achieve electoral success. This article suggests that the study of the populist discourse also requires taking into account their implicit occurrences, that is, those conveying connect, closeness, commonness, and similarity with ordinary people. Expressed through performances of “layman likeness,” they enable populist politicians to dissociate from traditional ruling elites while enabling people leaders' identifications. Using a novel 261-million-word dataset of Indian political discourses—including the speeches of 11 Prime Ministers—to proxy such identifications, we argue that populist leaders rely on a mimesis of the common people. Three core mimetic speech items are quantified: intimacy, disintermediation, and simplicity. We use a replicable corpus-contextual multiword collocation technique to populate lexicons of pretested psychometric profiles as well as a threefold validation method. The analysis finds that current Prime Minister Narendra Modi communicates mimetic identification around his persona, indexing the linguistic markers of his stylistic, ideological, and institutional populist politics. We indicate that our context-aware method could also be of use to study the cross-regional variability of mimetic populism.     

Is an epigenetic switch the key to persistent extinction?

Many studies of learning have demonstrated that conditioned behavior can be eliminated when previously established relations between stimuli are severed. This extinction process has been extremely important for the development of learning theories and, more recently, for delineating the neurobiological mechanisms that underlie memory. A key finding from behavioral studies of extinction is that extinction eliminates behavior without eliminating the original memory; extinguished behavior often returns with time or with a return to the context in which the original learning occurred. This persistence of the original memory after extinction creates a challenge for clinical applications that use extinction as part of a treatment intervention. Consequently, a goal of recent neurobiological research on extinction is to identify potential pharmacological targets that may result in persistent extinction. Drugs that promote epigenetic changes are particularly promising because they can result in a long-term molecular signal that, combined with the appropriate behavioral treatment, can cause persistent changes in behavior induced by extinction. We will review evidence demonstrating extinction enhancements by drugs that target epigenetic mechanisms and will describe some of the challenges that epigenetic approaches face in promoting persistent suppression of memories.     

Is Human Behavior Autocorrelated? An Empirical Analysis

The current review and analysis investigated the presence of serial dependency (or autocorrelation) in single-subject applied behavior-analytic research. While well researched, few studies have controlled for the number of data points that appeared in the time-series and, thus, the negative bias of the r coefficient, and the power to detect true serial dependency effects. Therefore, all baseline graphs that appeared in the Journal of Applied Behavior Analysis (JABA) between 1968 and 1993 that provided more than 30 data points were examined for the presence of serial dependency (N = 103). Results indicated that 12% of the baseline graphs provided a significant lag-1 autocorrelation, and over 83% of them had coefficient values less than or equal to (±.25). The distribution of the lag-1 autocorrelation coefficients had a mean of .10. Subsequent distributions of partial autocorrelations at lags two through seven had smaller means indicating that as the distance between observations increases (i.e., the lag), serial dependency decreased. Although serial dependency did not appear to be a common property of the single-subject behavioral experiments, it is recommended that, whenever statistical analyses are contemplated, its presence should always be examined. Alternatives for coping with the presence of significant levels of serial dependency were discussed in terms of: (a) using alternative statistical procedures (e.g., ARIMA models, randomization tests, the Shewhart quality-control charts); (b) correcting statistics of traditional parametric procedures (e.g., t, F); or (c) using the autocorrelation coefficient as an indicator and estimate of reliable intervention effects.     

Is the Appeal of the Doctrine of Double Effect Illusory?

Scanlon (2008) has argued that his theory of permissibility (STP) has more explanatory power than the Doctrine of Double Effect (DDE). I believe this claim is wrong. Borrowing Michael Walzer’s method of inquiry, I will evaluate the explanatory virtue of these accounts by their understanding of actual moral intuitions originated in historical cases. Practically, I will evaluate these accounts as they explain cases of hostage crises. The main question in this context is: is it permissible that nation-states act with military force in order to liberate hostages, even if those actions put the lives of the hostages at risk? The first part of this paper has an operative reconstruction of the relevant theories. In the second section, two cases of hostage crises will be considered: the Moscow theater hostage crisis of 2002, and the Jaque Operation, which occurred in Colombia in 2008. Additionally, it will be shown that DDE explains these cases better than STP. Finally, this paper offers a critical analysis of Scanlon’s account of the explanatory power of both STP and DDE.     

What is an Empirical Analysis of Causation?

Philosophical accounts of causation have traditionally been framed as attempts to analyze the concept of a cause. In recent years, however, a number of philosophers have proposed instead that causation be empirically reduced to some relation uncovered by the natural sciences: e.g., a relation of energy transfer. This paper argues that the project of empirical analysis lacks a clearly defined methodology, leaving it uncertain how such views are to be evaluated. It proposes several possible accounts of empirical analysis and argues that the most promising approach would treat it as a contingent identity discovered by identifying the relation (or relations) that most nearly approximate the inferential role of causal concepts in a psychological theory of causal judgment.     

Is Contemporary Chinese Society Inhumane? What Mencius and Empirical Psychology Have to Say

This essay discusses the tragic news story of a Chinese toddler, Xiao Yueyue 小悅悅, in light of Mencius’ ethical philosophy and modern studies of moral psychology, which help in understanding the problem of passive bystanders that has long vexed the Chinese public. Mencius never said that every person would act to help when a child is in danger; he did not even say that people would feel sympathetic for every child in a real life dangerous situation. He simply asserted the existence of a fragile sprout of sympathy that demands constant cultivation and a proper environment to be grown into actual altruistic behavior. This essay also compares and contrasts Mencius’ theory to the works of Martin Hoffman and Daniel C. Batson and shows some of the ways modern empirical psychology supports Mencius’ understanding of sympathy and altruism.     

What Is an Antique?

Antiques are undoubtedly objects worthy of aesthetic appreciation, but do they have a distinctive aesthetic value in virtue of being antiques? In this article we give an account of what it is to be an antique that gives the thesis that they do have a distinctive aesthetic value a chance of being true and suggests what that distinctive value consists in. After introducing our topic in Section I, in Section II we develop and defend the Adjectival Thesis: the thesis that the concept of being an antique is an adjectival concept. This provides us with the means to formulate our definition, which we do in Section III. In Section IV we further explicate and defend our definition. In Section V we conclude by briefly saying where we think our definition could be improved, by making a few comments about the aesthetics of antiques and by stating an interesting consequence of our definition: that it is not analytic that antiques are old.     

What Is an Affordance?

What should and should not be considered an affordance is still an open issue. At the 2002 North American meeting of the International Society for Ecological Psychology, a symposium was held concerning this topic. The articles in this special issue are expanded versions of the papers presented at that symposium. To set the stage for those discussions, this article presents an analysis of the evolution of J. J. Gibson's thinking on this issue, from some of his earliest writings (i.e., J. J. Gibson & Crooks, 1938) through his most recent writings (i.e., J. J. Gibson, 1979/1986). It is hoped that this forum will stimulate thinking concerning this important ecological concept.     

Is God an Adaptation?

In this critical notice to Robert Wright’s The Evolution of God, we focus on the question of whether Wright’s God is one which can be said to be an adaptation in a well defined sense. Thus we evaluate the likelihood of different models of adaptive evolution of cultural ideas in their different levels of selection. Our result is an emphasis on the plurality of mechanisms that may lead to adaptation. By way of conclusion we assess epistemologically some of Wright’s more controversial claims concerning the directionality of evolution and moral progress.