Richard Rorty's realism

An examination of late Rorty shows that he does not abandon belief in an external world about which we can, and indeed must, acquire knowledge. His disapproval of the correspondence theory of truth does not involve the idea that anything other than local weather, for example, could falsify remarks about local weather. It is just that once we get done looking out the window or, if we are outside, feeling the right kind of drops make contact with our skin, there is nothing else we can do, nothing better, to make ourselves more certain, more cognitively secure. One can see this in the detailed work that enables scientific progress. Science improves itself by doing more of the same. G. E. Moore's famous open question stays open only as a reminder that our fallibility never disappears and that our cognitive security is never better than pro tem. Rorty, as a faithful pragmatist and undogmatic meliorist, thinks this is perfectly O.K.     

The value of philosophy: A Canguilhemian perspective

This paper represents a philosophical reflection on the nature and value of philosophy itself. Georges Canguilhem somewhat scandalously argued that the fundamental value of philosophy does not lie in truth. He suggests that truth is a typical value of science because truth is what science says and what is said scientifically. Why would a philosopher depreciate his own discipline? And does he really do so? Or is there a different motivation: to help philosophy to become a much more self-confident voice? And if truth is no longer a value of philosophy, what value fits it better? The article follows Canguilhem in his conception of truth, science, and philosophy. It is against the background of these considerations that the specific revised anthropology of the scientist or philosopher is formed. The main question is what this means for current philosophy and why it could be inspiring for philosophers today.     

Doing African political philosophy from a universalist perspective

There has been a strong impetus to set the definitional parameters of study in African political philosophy and theory. Many scholars advance the idea of a discipline intended to provide lessons that stem from “original” African moral, ideological, and political traditions. Often, these traditions and their ideas are presented as holding categorical moral substance in so far as they are seen to be specific to a culturally essentialist understanding of “Africa.” In turn, an influential part of the literature estimates the normative value of the intellectual ideas and arguments afforded by a varied historical, socio-cultural and economic African geography by the degree to which, in being tethered to a seemingly homogenous, “culturally African” influence, these ideas can be opposed to a “Western” equivalent. In this article, I argue that the effects on the discipline of attending to, and being defined by, this cultural essentialism are at best unclear, at worst detrimental. I aim to contribute to the side of those who advocate a universalist perspective to the study of African political philosophy and thought, and who argue for jettisoning an unhelpful dichotomy between “West” and “African,” in favour of a methodological, conceptual and historical specificity that allows the discipline to be truly useful to itself and to others.     

Pragmatism, Science, And Society: A Review Of Richard Rorty's Objectivity, Relativism, and Truth: Philosophical Papers, Volume 1

Richard Rorty's Objectivity, Relativism, and Truth: Philosophical Papers, Volume 1 is a collection of papers that explores the implications of philosophical pragmatism in several areas, including natural science, mind—body issues in philosophy, and perspectives on liberal democracy and social change. Similarities between Rorty's pragmatism and Skinner's radical behaviorism are explored in each of these three areas. Although some important and interesting differences are found regarding the role of science in social change, most areas show remarkable similarities between the two systematic perspectives.     

The economics and philosophy of the brain drain: A critical perspective from the periphery

The paper provides a critical perspective on recent contributions to the economics literature, and associated philosophical arguments, that downplay negative effects of skilled migration on developing countries. The assertion that such migration incentivises investment in human capital is shown to rely on shaky theoretical foundations and weak empirical evidence. The associated economic literature suggesting a net positive effect of brain drain is at odds with literatures on the positive effects of human capital and education on economic growth. The manner in which net effects are determined also demonstrates that such contributions are utilitarian in nature. Identifying those who are the worst affected by brain drain, as well as the possible decision of a citizen placed behind the veil of ignorance, supports the view that opposing barriers to brain drain is inconsistent with a Rawlsian social welfare function. The undermining of institutions by skilled emigration is a fundamental consideration neglected by the economics literature without justification and, again, contradicts literatures on growth and institutions within economics. The economic theory of education can also be shown to support the view that depriving governments of the power to limit migration undermines states’ ability to resolve market failures. A number of other issues are identified that deserve greater consideration, including reflexivity in research on brain drain, the political economy of skilled migration and the philosophical status of nation-states. Despite unreliable econometric evidence, there is sufficient basis and justification to act. The paper concludes by briefly sketching possible actions under different degrees of international cooperation.     

Romantic Longings,Moral Ideals,and Democratic Priorities: On Richard Rorty's Use of the Distinction Between the Private and the Public

Abstract

The heart of Richard Rorty's philosophy is his distinction between the private and the public. In the first part of this paper, I highlight the profound influence that the inherited vocabularies of Romanticism and Moralism have had on Rorty's understanding of both the distinction and the problems he intends to solve with it. I also suggest that Rorty shares with Plato, Kant, and Nietzsche philosophical habits that cause him to treat two importantly different problems as one. Once the moral problem is disentangled from the political, it becomes clear that Rorty's distinction is unnecessary to the former and inadequate for the latter. In the second part of the paper, I argue that Rorty's non‐foundationalist pragmatism supports the view that the political problem is best resolved by what I call a democratic mechanism of arbitration. It is the lingering influence of Romanticism and Moralism, I suggest, that is the cause of Rorty's reluctance to embrace fully the political priority of democratic consensus. Finally, I discuss why this analysis of Rorty's liberalism may have implications for the general question of how best to resolve political disputes in pluralist societies.     

Elegant variations: remarks on Rorty's ‘Liberal utopia’

Richard Rorty constructs a vision of the ideal citizen and the ideal society on the basis of three basic concepts: ethnocentrism, liberalism, and irony. This article critically examines his understanding of these three concepts and how he interrelates them. I will argue that Rorty's political philosophy is lacking in internal coherence due to the strong tensions between these fundamental concepts, and that his political ideals may be less desirable than they may appear at first sight. I conclude by briefly sketching an alternative view which retains some elements from Rorty but which may possess greater internal coherence.     

对《罗蒂新实用主义的若干思考》的回应

杨国荣教授的论文<罗蒂新实用主义的若干思考>把我带回到了我今天开始回应的地方.在这篇论文中,他坚持了将"评价"(evaluation)与"认知"(cognition)相结合的一种需要.我对事实与价值的区分十分怀疑,和希拉里·普特南(Hilary Putnam)与约翰·杜威对它的怀疑出于同一理由.所以,确实会对我产生这样一种感觉,即我想将"评价"与"认知"融合起来.但这并不是我想去使用的术语.相对于去说--"你必须拒绝评价与认知,似乎它们是两个分开的东西那样:一个同价值相伴随,而另一个则同实在相接触"--这是西方通常的方式来思考这一问题;我更愿意这样说,存在着两种"知道如何"(know how):其一是评价一种情况,并思考该做什么,以解决由该情况所产生的问题;其二是同其他的人们讨论该做什么,同其他的人们就如何从事合作以努力解决那些问题达成信念上与态度上的共识,并共享你对该情况的评价,然后使得人们变得合作.我并不清楚杨国荣教授是否真的不同意我.我只是会将问题措辞为两种"知道如何":知道如何对待人类以同他们合作,以及知道如何对待非人类事务.这两种"知道如何"实际上是一个紧接着另一个,所以并不存在着这样一个哲学问题,即如何去将这两种"知道如何"结合在一起.我并不对"真理"、"知识"这些概念抱有怀疑,并不是试图把"真理"、"知识"去除掉,而是仅仅试图去除掉关于真理的符合理论,以及这种关于"实在"的概念,即将"实在"当作为可以精确地或过度精确地被表征的东西.我只是怀疑这是否也是杨国荣教授试图捍卫的.     

关于另类科学哲学的思考

A prominent phenomenon in contemporary philosophy of science has been the unexpected rise of alternative philosophers of science. This article analyses in depth such alternative philosophers of science as Paul Feyerabend, Richard Rorty, and Michel Foucault, summarizing the similarities and differences between alternative philosophies of science and traditional philosophy of science so as to unveil the trends in contemporary philosophy of science. With its different principles and foundation, alternative philosophy of science has made breakthroughs in terms of its field of vision, scope, and methodology, and its relationship with science has become more humanistic and pluralistic. Attention should be given to alternative perspectives in the contemporary philosophy of science, and research should be expanded into the fields of the epistemology of science and cognitive science, the sociology of scientific knowledge and scientific anthropology, the scientific cultural philosophy, and scientific ethics.