Representation as the Representation of Experience

This essay deals, mainly, with the notion of representation. Representation is associated with texts and, as such, is contrasted to the true singular statement. It is argued that the relationship between the text and what the text represents can never be modeled on the relationship between a true singular statement and what the statement is true of, and, furthermore, that the former relationship is aesthetic while the latter is epistemological in nature. This aesthetic relationship between the represented and its representation is investigated from the perspective of historical writing. This offers an interesting perspective because historical texts are representations, but they also aim at giving us "the truth" about the past. Historical representation, therefore, is the kind of representation coming closest to the cognitive claims traditionally investigated by epistemology. The notion of aesthetic and historical experience is explored in order to define the relationship between historical representation and what it represents.     

Perception and Representation

I oppose the popular view that the phenomenal character of perceptual experience consists in the subject's representing the (putative) perceived object as being so-and-so. The account of perceptual experience I favor instead is a version of the "Theory of Appearing" that takes it to be a matter of the perceived object's appearing to one as so-and-so, where this does not mean that the subject takes or believes it to be so-and-so. This plays no part in my criticisms of Representationalism. I mention it only to be up front as to where I stand. My criticism of the Representationalist position is in sections. (1) There is no sufficient reason for positing a representative function for perceptual experience. It doesn't seem on the face of it to be that, and nothing serves in place of such seeming. (2) Even if it did have such a function, it doesn't have the conceptual resources to represent a state of affairs. (3) Even if it did, it is not suited to represent, e.g., a physical property of color. (4) Finally, even if I am wrong about the first three points, it is still impossible for the phenomenal character of the perceptual experience to consist in it's representing what it does. My central argument for this central claim of the paper is that it is metaphysically, de re possible that one have a certain perceptual experience without it's presenting any state of affairs. And since all identities hold necessarily, this identity claim fails.     

Representation of time

Memory representation for time was studied in two settings. First, an analysis of timing in a laboratory analog of a foraging situation revealed that departure times from a patchy resource followed a Weber Law-like property implied by scalar timing. A trial-by-trial analysis was then pursued in a similar but more structured experimental paradigm, the Peak procedure. Study of covariance structures in the data implicated scalar variance in the memory for time as well as in the decision process, but the correlation pattern ruled out multiple access to memory within a trial.     

Phenomenology without Representation

I criticise a recent variety of argument for the representational theory of experience, which holds that the very idea of perceptual experience entails the representational view. I argue that the representational view is not simply obvious, nor is it contained in the mere idea of the world looking some way. I also clarify and re‐present an argument against the representational view due to Charles Travis.     

Computation without Representation

The received view is that computational states are individuated at least in part by their semantic properties. I offer an alternative, according to which computational states are individuated by their functional properties. Functional properties are specified by a mechanistic explanation without appealing to any semantic properties. The primary purpose of this paper is to formulate the alternative view of computational individuation, point out that it supports a robust notion of computational explanation, and defend it on the grounds of how computational states are individuated within computability theory and computer science. A secondary purpose is to show that existing arguments for the semantic view are defective.     

Representation recovers information

Early agreement within cognitive science on the topic of representation has now given way to a combination of positions. Some question the significance of representation in cognition. Others continue to argue in favor, but the case has not been demonstrated in any formal way. The present paper sets out a framework in which the value of representation use can be mathematically measured, albeit in a broadly sensory context rather than a specifically cognitive one. Key to the approach is the use of Bayesian networks for modeling the distal dimension of sensory processes. More relevant to cognitive science is the theoretical result obtained, which is that a certain type of representational architecture is necessary for achievement of sensory efficiency. While exhibiting few of the characteristics of traditional, symbolic encoding, this architecture corresponds quite closely to the forms of embedded representation now being explored in some embedded/embodied approaches. It becomes meaningful to view that type of representation use as a form of information recovery. A formal basis then exists for viewing representation not so much as the substrate of reasoning and thought, but rather as a general medium for efficient, interpretive processing.     

Representation and rationality

David Lewis (1974, 1994/1999) proposed to reduce the facts about mental representation to facts about sensory evidence, dispositions to act, and rationality. Recently, Robert Williams (2020) and Adam Pautz (2021) have taken up and developed Lewis's project in sophisticated and novel ways. In this paper, we aim to present, clarify, and ultimately object to the core thesis that they all build their own views around. The different sophisticated developments and defenses notwithstanding, we think the core thesis is vulnerable. We pose a dilemma by considering the two sides of a current epistemological controversy over the relation between evidence and rational belief: permissivism vs. uniqueness. As we argue, the prospects for the Lewisian project look dim when either supposition is clearly made.     

Representation and Regress

I defend a Husserlian account of self-consciousness against representationalist accounts: higher-order representationalism and self-representationalism. Of these, self-representationalism is the harder to refute since, unlike higher-order representationalism, it does not incur a regress of self-conscious acts. However, it incurs a regress of intentional contents. I consider, and reject, five strategies for avoiding this regress of contents. I conclude that the regress is inherent to self-representationalism. I close by showing how this incoherence obtrudes in what must be the self-representationalist’s account of the phenomenology of experience.     

问题解决中对问题的外部表征和内部表征

传统观点认为,问题表征是问题解决者构建问题的心理结构,是内在的知识、结构和神经网络,是问题解决的根本机制。但近来研究发现,问题的呈现方式、问题情景的成分和结构也对问题解决行为具有独立的指导、约束或决定作用,因此可以把问题表征划分为外部表征和内部表征。这两种表征具有不同的特征,对问题解决具有不同的作用机制。就学科问题解决来说,当前研究主要集中在表征的结构及影响因素方面,未来一个时期,此方面的研究迫切需要探明外部表征的结构、形式、内容及其与内部表征之间相互作用的机制,并建构适宜的研究方法体系。     

颜色概念的知觉符号表征与命题符号表征

使用启动范式通过两个实验检验颜色概念的表征是知觉符号表征还是命题符号表征.实验l使用显性颜色概念,即颜色词;实验2使用隐性颜色概念,即隐含颜色信息的词.实验结果表明显性颜色概念的表征是知觉符号表征,而隐性颜色概念的表征是命题符号表征.     

Two Threats To Representation

I consider two threats to the idea that on-line intelligent behaviour (the production offluid and adaptable responses to ongoing sensory input) must or should be explainedby appeal to neurally located representations. The first of these threats occurs whenextra-neural factors account for the kind of behavioural richness and flexibility normallyassociated with representation-based control. I show how this anti-representationalchallenge can be met, if we apply the thought that, to be a representational system,an action-oriented neural system must not only be the source of at least some of theobserved behavioural richness and flexibility, it must also feature two architecturaltraits, namely arbitrariness and homuncularity. Unfortunately, however, this solutionopens the door to our second threat to representation. The homuncularity conditionwill not be met by any system in which the causal contribution of each component ismassively context-sensitive and variable over time. I end by discussing the empiricalbet that biological nervous systems will not exhibit this style of causation.     

Representation of Game Algebras

We prove that every abstractly defined game algebra can be represented as an algebra of consistent pairs of monotone outcome relations over a game board. As a corollary we obtain Goranko's result that van Benthem's conjectured axiomatization for equivalent game terms is indeed complete.