The toiling lily: narrative life,responsibility, and the ontological ground of self-deception

In this essay, I argue that genuine responsibility and ethical self-understanding are possible without narrative—or, at least, that narrative is not always sufficient. In §2, I introduce and clarify a distinction between our ontological subjectivity and everyday practical identity—one made famous by Heidegger and Sartre. On the basis of this distinction, in §3 I argue that narrative is unable to ground ethical choice and decision. For, although acting in light of practical identities is something we do, it cannot wholly capture what it is to be who we are. Irrespective of whatever worldly projects and identities we press into, something about our subjectivity always remains unchanged. Narrative identity, which trades merely on practical identity, thus obscures this ontological dimension of life wherein human action, decision, choice, and responsibility truly originate. By way of conclusion, in §4, I briefly examine depictions of the narrative life found within the authorships of Dostoevsky, Kierkegaard, and Voltaire, illustrating how self-narrative at times invites self-deception and annuls responsibility. A life of genuine responsibility demands more than what the most candid and best intentioned of self-narratives can supply us. Living the good life, I shall intimate, is thus not something that involves mere narrative. It depends, rather, on inwardness.     

Inadequacy of voice recognition as a demonstration of self-deception

Gur and Sackeim (1979) argued that subjects deceived themselves when they failed to recognize their own voices on playback from a tape recorder. This claim is based primarily on the observation that subjects showed a heightened galvanic skin response when their own voices were present regardless of whether recognition took place. The authors suggest that even though subjects may not consciously recognize their own voices, a heightened physiological response implies that true recognition did in fact occur at some other level of cognitive processing. This article describes an experiment demonstrating that results similar to those arrived at by Gur and Sackeim can also be produced when subjects attempt to recognize the voice of a familiar "other." These results suggest that self-deception is not the main factor operating to produce the heightened physiological response.     

The ontological status of minimal entities

Minimal entities are, roughly, those that fall under notions defined by only deflationary principles. In this paper I provide an accurate characterization of two types of minimal entities: minimal properties and minimal facts. This characterization is inspired by both Schiffer’s notion of a pleonastic entity and Horwich’s notion of minimal truth. I argue that we are committed to the existence of minimal properties and minimal facts according to a deflationary notion of existence, and that the appeal to the inferential role reading of the quantifiers does not dismiss this commitment. I also argue that deflationary existence is language-dependent existence—this clarifies why minimalists about properties and facts are not realists about these entities though their language may appear indistinguishable from the language of realists.

Voice recognition with the Apple-Psych system

Use of the IntroVoice I voice recognition board with the Apple-Psych system is described. The device augments the EF ROM, keyboard ROM, and keyboard encoder chip in Apple II series computers and provides speaker-dependent recognition of up to 80 words. IntroVoice II, an upgrade, can recognize up to 160 words. Since the operation of IntroVoice is software-transparent, the Apple-Psych system recognizes the board’s output as console (keyboard) input, making it useful as a response collection device. The keyboard continues to operate normally, in parallel with voice recognition. Problems and solutions for response recognition and timing are discussed, and illustrative experimental data are presented.     

The self-deception of the self-destructive

317 college students as respondents were measured for suicide proneness and self-destructive behaviors and were also asked questions about self-attitudes, value for life, beliefs about suicide and self-destruction, religiosity and dogmatism. Those who score high on suicide proneness and self-destructiveness do not tend to be the same people, and they differ from one another. Correlations and factor analyses suggest the Suicide Prone are aware of their tendencies and are influenced by their value for life and beliefs about suicide and self-destruction. The Self-destructive are tied to negative self-evaluations, are less aware of their self-destructive tendencies, and score significantly higher than the Suicide Prone on dogmatism. Belief structure of the highly dogmatic person may allow those who are self-destructive to deny negative self-attitudes and to be unaware of self-destructive behaviors which are inconsistent with their beliefs.     

Willful ignorance and self-deception

Willful ignorance is an important concept in criminal law and jurisprudence, though it has not received much discussion in philosophy. When it is mentioned, however, it is regularly assumed to be a kind of self-deception. In this article I will argue that self-deception and willful ignorance are distinct psychological kinds. First, some examples of willful ignorance are presented and discussed, and an analysis of the phenomenon is developed. Then it is shown that current theories of self-deception give no support to the idea that willful ignorance is a kind of self-deception. Afterwards an independent argument is adduced for excluding willful ignorance from this category. The crucial differences between the two phenomena are explored, as are the reasons why they are so easily conflated.     

Voice recognition by matching to sample

Voice recognition was assessed by a matching to sample procedure in 30 right-handed adults with normal hearing. The subject was required to indicate which of three voices speaking a nonsense syllable matched the speaker of a sample vowel. Subjects were able to recognize voices with reasonable accuracy, but there were no significant differences as a function of ears or practice, and performance was not markedly affected by knowledge of results or mode of response. There was a significant difference as a function of the temporal position of the matching voice, with recognition being most accurate when the matching voice was first and least accurate when it was third. Further research is necessary to determine whether voice recognition should be classified as the type of verbal ability associated with the cerebral hemisphere dominant for speech, or whether it is the type of nonverbal auditory ability associated with the nonspeech hemisphere.This research was supported in part by grant MA-1652 from the Medical Research Council of Canada.     

A relational theory of self-deception

The authors argue that the fragmentary model of consciousness implied in the term ‘self-deception’ has provided the chief metaphor for explaining the apparent discrepancies that can arise between the evaluation of a motivated observer and the evaluation of a less interested external observer. Though self-deception models have explained these discrepancies in terms of both a dualistic opaque consciousness and in terms of cognitive and affective processes, all of these accounts seem to rest on the same essential fragmentation of the psyche. The authors argue that a relational model of consciousness, one that claims the indissolubility of cognition and affect, object and perception, and of past, present, and future can account for the apparent discrepancies involved in the paradigmatic cases of self-deception in a more parsimonious and phenomenologically faithful way than more objectivist and fragmented accounts of self-deception.     

The evolution and psychology of self-deception

In this article we argue that self-deception evolved to facilitate interpersonal deception by allowing people to avoid the cues to conscious deception that might reveal deceptive intent. Self-deception has two additional advantages: It eliminates the costly cognitive load that is typically associated with deceiving, and it can minimize retribution if the deception is discovered. Beyond its role in specific acts of deception, self-deceptive self-enhancement also allows people to display more confidence than is warranted, which has a host of social advantages. The question then arises of how the self can be both deceiver and deceived. We propose that this is achieved through dissociations of mental processes, including conscious versus unconscious memories, conscious versus unconscious attitudes, and automatic versus controlled processes. Given the variety of methods for deceiving others, it should come as no surprise that self-deception manifests itself in a number of different psychological processes, and we discuss various types of self-deception. We then discuss the interpersonal versus intrapersonal nature of self-deception before considering the levels of consciousness at which the self can be deceived. Finally, we contrast our evolutionary approach to self-deception with current theories and debates in psychology and consider some of the costs associated with self-deception.     

Voice recognition and the posterior cingulate: An fMRI study of prosopagnosia

Voices, in addition to faces, enable person identification. Voice recognition has been shown to evoke a distributed network of brain regions that includes, in addition to the superior temporal sulcus (STS), the anterior temporal pole, fusiform face area (FFA), and posterior cingulate gyrus (pCG). Here we report an individual (MS) with acquired prosopagnosia who, despite bilateral damage to much of this network, demonstrates the ability to distinguish voices of several well‐known acquaintances from voices of people that he has never heard before. Functional magnetic resonance imaging (fMRI) revealed that, relative to speech‐modulated noise, voices rated as familiar and unfamiliar by MS elicited enhanced haemodynamic activity in the left angular gyrus, left posterior STS, and posterior midline brain regions, including the retrosplenial cortex and the dorsal pCG. More interestingly, relative to noise and unfamiliar voices, the familiar voices elicited greater haemodynamic activity in the left angular gyrus and medial parietal regions including the dorsal pCG and precuneus. The findings are consistent with theories implicating the pCG in recognizing people who are personally familiar, and furthermore suggest that the pCG region of the voice identification network is able to make functional contributions to voice recognition even though other areas of the network, namely the anterior temporal poles, FFA, and the right parietal lobe, may be compromised.