LAME SCIENCE? BLIND RELIGION?

In Consecrating Science, Lisa Sideris argues that an anthropocentric and science‐based cosmology encourages human arrogance and diminishes a sense of wonder in human experience immersed in the natural world, as found in diverse cultural and religious traditions. I agree with her that science elevated to a commanding worldview, scientism, is a common and contemporary mistake, to be deplored, a lame science. But I further argue that science has introduced us to the marvels of deep nature and vastly increased our human appreciation of nature as a wonderland at levels great and small. Sideris is right to fear consecrating science. She—and the humanists, sages, and saviors—need also to fear blindness to what science has to teach us about cosmogenesis and wonderland Earth.     

AUGMENTED REALITY,ARTIFICIAL INTELLIGENCE,AND THE RE‐ENCHANTMENT OF THE WORLD

There has recently been a surge of development in augmented reality (AR) technologies that has led to an ecosystem of hardware and software for AR, including tools for artists and designers to accelerate the design of AR content and experiences without requiring complex programming. AR is viewed as a key “disruptive technology” and future display technologies (such as digital eyewear) will provide seamless continuity between reality and the digitally augmented. This article will argue that the technologization of human perception and experience of reality, coupled with the development of artificial intelligence (AI)–based natural language assistants, may lead to a secular re‐enchantment of the world, in the sense outlined by Charles Taylor, where human existence is shaped through AR inhabited by advanced personal and social AI agents in the form of digital avatars and daemons, and that enchantment has been persistent throughout the formation of modernity and is being rekindled by the integration of AI in the plane of AR.     

The Bureaucratization of Spirituality[1]

This paper examines some of the critical contexts within which spiritual, moral, social and cultural education is to be realized. First, I examine the nature of school as a modernist bureaucratic institution. I argue that schools are bound in a self‐referential reality and barely connect with the late modem world. I then discuss the cultural sources of education policy and particularly the employment of nostalgia as a legitimation for neo‐conservative policy and practice. I then discuss school knowledge and in particular the end of liberalism and its replacement with rationalism. I next turn to spiritual, moral and social education and critically discuss its cultural and political formation. Finally, I argue that school is unable to accommodate the spiritual dimension and that critical to its successful inclusion is the re‐establishment of teachers as knowledgeable professionals with their practice grounded in the contemporary world and the real conditions of pupils' lives.

     

SOUL‐MAKING,THEOSIS, AND EVOLUTIONARY HISTORY: AN IRENAEAN APPROACH

In Romans 5, St. Paul claims that death came into the world through Adam's sin. Many have taken this to foist on us a fundamentalist reading of Genesis. If death is the result of human sin, then, apparently, there cannot have been death in the world prior to human sin. This, however, is inconsistent with contemporary evolutionary biology, which requires that death predates the existence of modern humans. Although the relationship between Romans 5, Genesis, and contemporary science has been much discussed—often with goal of dissipating the idea that the two are in conflict—the specific issue of death entering the world through sin has remained difficult to resolve. I argue that the Eastern Orthodox tradition has the resources to respect both Romans 5 and contemporary science. Appealing to a broadly Irenaean notion of soul‐making, and to the idea of theosis, opens up space for an understanding of these passages that is both scientifically informed and Orthodox.     

The Experience of Magic

Despite its enduring popularity, theatrical magic remains all but ignored by art critics, art historians, and philosophers. This is unfortunate, since magic offers a unique and distinctively intellectual aesthetic experience and raises a host of interesting philosophical questions. Thus, this article initiates a philosophical investigation of the experience of magic. Section I dispels two widespread misconceptions about the nature of magic and discusses the sort of depiction it requires. Section II asks, “What cognitive attitude is involved in the experience of magic?” and criticizes three candidate replies; Section III then argues that Tamar Szabó Gendler's notion of “belief‐discordant alief” holds the key to a correct answer. Finally, Section IV develops an account of the experience of magic and explores some of its consequences. The result is a philosophically rich view of the experience of magic that opens new avenues for inquiry and is relevant to core issues in contemporary aesthetics.     

The name of the helper: a new look at "Rumpelstiltskin"

The fairy tale of Rumpelstiltskin is studied in conjunction with related tales to provide a fuller understanding of its meaning than previous studies have done. The content of these tales depicts ambivalence about childhood magic and ambivalence about adult reality, which are uneasily resolved by eliminating magic and dwelling in a disenchanted world. Enchantment is retained formally in the telling of the story. To the extent that transference is enchantment, similar conflicts occur during psychoanalysis: is the patient better off adhering to transference or relinquishing it--or can it be integrated with day-to-day experience?     

FROM PRUDENCE TO MORALITY: A Case for the Morality of Some Forms of Nondualistic Mysticism

Several contemporary philosophers have charged that there is a conceptual tension between nondualistic types of mystical awareness—an awareness of some particular conception of the divine as an all‐pervasive unity within which there are no distinct substances—and the social character of morality. However, some nondualistic mystics have conceptualized enlightenment not only as being compatible with moral virtue—specifically, compassion and care—but as providing a foundation for it. I here offer a conceptual model for this grounding, at least according to Dōgen Zenji and Meister Eckhart. Briefly, the model suggests that some forms of nondualistic mystical awareness are accompanied by the mystics' prudential concerns extending to include the well‐being of “others” under their scope. Finally, utilizing this model, I suggest possible responses to two common arguments for the claim that nondualistic mysticism is essentially amoral.     

DEWEY ON EXTENDED COGNITION AND EPISTEMOLOGY

There is a surge of attempts to draw out the epistemological consequences of views according to which cognition is deeply embedded, embodied and/or extended (e‐cog). The principal machinery used for doing so is that of analytic epistemology. Here I argue that Dewey's pragmatic epistemology may be better fit to the task. I start by pointing out the profound similarities between Dewey's view on cognition and that emerging from literature of more recent date. Crucially, the benefit of looking at Dewey is that Dewey, unlike contemporary writers, also devises a corresponding epistemology. I then identify two senses in which contemporary analytic epistemology conflicts with e‐cog—concluding from that the superiority of the Deweyian framework, at least as it concerns accommodating e‐cog.     

The Wonder and Spirit of Phenomenology and Theology: Rubenstein and Derrida on Heidegger's Formal Distinction of Philosophy from Theology

While Heidegger's earlier phenomenological writings inform much contemporary discourse in the continental philosophy of religion, his 1927 essay on ‘Phenomenology and Theology’ offers a largely uncontested distinction between philosophy and theology on the basis of their possibilities as sciences following ontological difference. This paper reconsiders Heidegger's distinction by invoking spirit and wonder, concepts Jacques Derrida and Mary‐Jane Rubenstein have more recently emphasized as central to thought that is open to that which ruptures metaphysical schemas. I contend Heidegger's use of ontological difference as a formal distinction between philosophy and theology distances us from the wonder, spirit, and truth (alētheia) that undoes the binaries behind which we take shelter. However, I temper this critique with the recognition that Heidegger, Derrida, and Rubenstein equally recognize an inescapable repetition of metaphysical thinking in the philosophy of religion.     

THE CREATIVE IMPERATIVE: Religious Ethics and the Formation of Life in Common

Challenging a long‐standing assumption of the separation of ethical from poetic activity, this essay develops the basis for a theory of moral life as inherently and radically creative. A range of contemporary post‐Kantian ethicists—including Ricoeur, Nussbaum, Kearney, and Gutiérrez—are employed to make the argument that moral practice requires a fundamental capability for creative transformation, imagination, and social renewal. In addition, this poetic moral capability can finally be understood only from the primordial religious point of view of the mystery of Creation as such. Humanity as an image of its Creator is called to the endless impossible possibility of the re‐creation of its own complex, plural, and fallen social world. Such a perspective is opposed to views of moral life as the application of law‐like principles or the recovery of past moral histories. Without a better understanding of moral life's radically creative imperative, we miss a vital element of social relations' distinctive humanity.     

WONDER BETWEEN TWO: AN IRIGARAYAN READING OF GENESIS 2:231

Luce Irigaray, in the course of engagement with René Descartes, argues that we must return wonder to its first locus—that of sexual difference. I suggest that Irigaray's notion of wonder finds resonance in the poetic declaration of the first man in Genesis 2:23. While the creation narratives affirm the equality of woman and man, they also affirm the irreducibility of woman and man to each other. This insistence on wonder has implication for communicative exchange between woman and man. I also argue, however, against Irigaray, that wonder is as appropriate between humans and God as between the sexes.     

A critique of the ontology of consumer enchantment

The concept of enchantment offers a plausible explanation of the lures and thrills of consumer culture. We examine the theoretical foundation of the concept through a critique of Ritzer's enchantment thesis. We begin by assessing the enchantment/disenchantment discourse through a review of the main theoretical contributions to the area, first summarizing Max Weber's initial outline of the notion of disenchantment in the Protestant Ethic and Spirit of Capitalism. We then consider Colin Campbell's critique of Weber and George Ritzer's development in Enchanting a Disenchanted World. Finally, we apply Jean Baudrillard's Order of Simulacra to further resolve some of the open questions concerning the possibility of enchantment in contemporary consumer culture. Copyright © 2013 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.     

Re-enchanting the body: overcoming the melancholy of anatomy

I argue here that Weberian disenchantment is manifest in the triumph of instrumental reason and the expansion of analytic enquiry, which now dominates not simply those sciences upon which medicine depends, but medical practice itself. I suggest ways that analytic enquiry, also referred to here as anatomical reasoning, are part of a particular ideology—a way of seeing, speaking about, and inhabiting the world—that often fails to serve the health of patients because it is incapable of “seeing” them in the moral sense described by Iris Murdoch and others. I use the work of James Elkins and Wendell Berry to call for the recovery of a way of seeing the human body as both other and more than an object of scientific enquiry and social control.     

Brain transplants and possible worlds: A response to Beck

I am very grateful to Simon Beck for his thoughtful response to my paper “Transplanting Brains?” (2016). Needless to say, he raises more issues than I can hope to answer in a brief response. While Beck seemingly feels that the deck has been stacked against him, I think that the majority of his criticisms result from misconceptions and misunderstandings that I intend to straighten out in what follows. Before proceeding, I would like to draw attention to a worry that is lurking in the shadows. Perhaps Beck and I talk at cross purposes. While Beck is concerned with a metaphysical theory of personal identity that supposedly holds across all possible worlds—and as such places heavy importance on counterfactuals and intuitions—I am concerned only with the natural world with the aim of generating empirically substantiated hypotheses about how things really are when it comes to persons persisting through time. Now, here is a disclaimer: If the natural world does not exhaust reality, then my discussion is only partial. It goes without saying that most contemporary philosophers given a choice between going with science and going with intuitions, go with science.     

Challenging the Objectivist Paradigm: Teaching Biblical Theology with J.R.R. Tolkien,C.S. Lewis,and Guillermo del Toro

The dissimilarity that exists between the historical and cultural situation of North American college students and the world described by the biblical authors poses a problem for theological and religious education. While the biblical authors tell fantastic stories of miracle and magic, the scientific and technological paradigm prevalent in western culture emphasizes the gathering of objective facts in the name of efficiency and pragmatism. Theological education tends to respond to this situation by embracing either a program of historical criticism or a form of Biblicism, both of which reinforce an objectivist approach to education. What is needed in theological education is an approach that “re‐mythologizes” the Bible, enabling students to hear the theological message of the text addressed to their cultural and historical situation. One way this approach can be encouraged is through the teaching of the biblical text in conversation with the contemporary stories found in popular culture.     

Wonder,Mystery, and Meaning

Abstract

This paper explores the connection between wonder and meaning, in particular ‘the meaning of life’, a connection that, despite strong intrinsic connections between wonder and the (philosophical) search for meaning has not yet received any sustained attention. Does wonder ‘merely’ inspire our search for meaning, or does it also point the way towards meaning? In exploring this question I first engage with Hannah Arendt, then examine the suggestion (by Josef Pieper and Rachel Carson, among others) that the meaning wonder points us to lies in connecting us with the mystery of existence. Can there be meaning in mystery, or is wonder––as a state of being lost for words in the face of mystery––rather antithetical to meaning? This discussion leads to the idea, emphasized in recent writing on wonder, that wonder (also) depends on the meaning we ascribe to things. In the final section I discuss wonder as a potential source of meaning in life, then return to the question whether it can also point towards a deeper meaning of life. I conclude that no purely rational justification can be given for this view, but that this need not detract from the importance of wonder in our lives.     

VIRTUE EPISTEMOLOGY AND EPISTEMIC LUCK,REVISITED

Abstract: In this article I return to an argument that I presented in earlier work to the effect that virtue epistemology is at worse false and at best unmotivated. In the light of recent responses to this argument from such figures as John Greco, Guy Axtell, and Kelly Becker, I here re‐state and re‐evaluate this argument. In the process the original argument is refined and supplemented in key respects and some of the main charges against it are shown to be unfounded. Nevertheless, I also argue that at least one of the objections to the original argument—due to Becker—may well be on the right lines, and I draw some conclusions in this regard.     

Derrida's “Antigonanette”: On the Quasi‐Transcendental

In this article, I rely both on Derrida's 1974 work Glas, as well as Derrida's 1971–72 lecture course, “La famille de Hegel,” to argue that the concept of the quasi‐transcendental is central to Derrida's reading of Hegel and to trace its implications beyond the Hegelian system. I follow Derrida's analysis of the role of Antigone—or, as the lecture course has it, “Antigonanette”—in Hegel's thought to argue that the quasi‐transcendental indicates a re(con)striction of empirical difference into the transcendental, which is thereby only ever provisionally transcendental. I then argue that the economy of difference indicated by the quasi‐transcendental is neither a general economy, nor is it in each case singular, but rather it ambivalently oscillates between these two. Finally, I treat the temporality of the quasi‐transcendental, arguing that the economy of difference indicated by the quasi‐transcendental is not prior to the re(con)striction of empirical difference, but is paradoxically produced by it by being retroactively constituted. I take up this analysis for the sake of describing what I contend is the quasi‐transcendental structure of constitutive exclusion, a way of understanding the conceptual structure of political bodies, and the political structure of concepts.     

Explaining action∗

This paper is an attempt to re‐interpret some of the results of contemporary studies of action and explanation by philosophers who may loosely be called ‘post‐Wittgensteinian’, e.g. G. E. M. Anscombe, A. Kenny, A. I. Melden. One of the themes which recurs in these’ discussions is that of the non‐contingent connection between desires, intentions, etc., and the actions which we explain by them — although not all the authors concerned understand this in the same way, and many would not accept the term ‘non‐contingent connection’. The thesis that there is a non‐contingent connection between, e.g., desire and action is strongly contested, and I attempt in this paper to show (a) that our language for the factors which we cite in explaining action, desires, intentions (Sect. II), feelings (Sect. III), sensations (Sect. IV), etc. is inescapably dispositional in a strong sense, i.e. that it characterizes these factors as disposing us to act in certain ways. But I argue (b) that this does nothing to show that these factors are not causes of the actions they explain (Sect. I). The seeming oddity of causes which are non‐contingently linked with their consequences is explained when we see (c) that the account of action embedded in our ordinary language is teleological, i.e. refers us ultimately to the inclinations of the subject, and intentional (Sects. V and VI).