儒家哲学的现代转型及其在21世纪的价值

面对各种挑战,儒家哲学的现代转型问题仍需要作切实的严肃的思考。儒学已不可能恢复其历史上的“独尊”地位,但它要恢复其活力,成为现代社会多元哲学中的“一元”,就必须完成其现代转型,成为一种现代的“合乎理性的完备性学说”．承担起“人类各种价值的总协调”这一哲学使命。新儒学需要与其他学说进行积极的对话和良性的互动,不仅在“正德”方面突出其价值,而且在“利用”(经济)、“厚生”(生活)、“致知”(科学)和“立制”(政治)等方面与其他学说逐渐达成“重叠的共识”。人类在21世纪将更加提升“交往理性”,更加重视“正德”．儒学在2l世纪将彰显其价值。     

明代道德生活与核心价值观

明代独特的道德生活是有其偏执的政治导向、失序的商品经济发展以及无根社会文化综合作用的结果.究其实质乃是在商品经济发展的过程中,传统儒家的价值观念无力为新的社会经济生产方式提供价值支撑,道德生活中的种种失范现象最终都导源于核心价值观的缺失.     

试论儒家的意义治疗思想

儒家学说中蕴涵着丰富的意义治疗思想。认为人要活得有意义,就必须成就自己的道德生命,成为具有道德的人;人只有通过自己的切身体验将外在的道德规范转化为一种道德信念,才能完成自己的道德使命,实践自己的道德人生;生与死一样,都是求"道"的工具和使命;而是否能够实现生命的意义、是否能够达到理想的人格,主要取决于其生命实践。     

儒家敬畏的核心文化心理特征及其内在理路

儒家围绕敬畏的心理机制、对象、涵育和效用构建了敬畏的理论体系。敬畏是主体在自觉体认崇高价值时所持守的旨在自我超越的既崇敬又谨畏的理性化道德情感; 儒家以内在的道德本心作为敬畏的本根,并将其落实为道德实践中对人伦、自然、生命、职事和人文等的外在崇高价值的敬畏; 儒家敬畏涵育围绕心理动力、内在涵养、外在范导和积习沉淀系统展开,可谓环环相扣、层层递进; 敬畏作为进德修业之基不仅不会戕害自由、尊严与创造,反而是达至无入而不自得的洒落境界的必由之路。     

The Demandingness of Confucianism in the Case of Long-Term Caregiving 1

Trends of recent demographical development show that the world's population is aging at its fastest clip ever. In this paper, I ask whether adult children should support the life of their chronically ill parents as long as it takes, and I analyze the matter with regard to the doctrine of Confucianism.

As the virtue of filial piety plays a central role in the ethics of Confucianism, adult children will face stringent demands while giving care to their chronically ill parents. In this paper, I argue that because of the extreme moral demands Confucians impose on adult children, Confucianism is an objectionable moral theory. I also argue that if Confucianism allows these agents to opt out of the caregiving tasks, it may cause conflict with its own doctrines. For these reasons, I conclude that Confucianism cannot provide a defensible response to the problem of long-term caregiving.     

After Kohlberg: Some implications of an Ethics of Virtue for the theory of moral education and development

It is beyond serious dispute that post-war reflection upon and research into moral education and development has been well nigh dominated by an extensive and ambitious research programme influenced and initiated by the modem cognitive developmental theorist Lawrence Kohlberg — a programme which can also be seen, moreover, as standing in a tradition of philosophical reflection about the nature of moral life going back to such significant enlightenment thinkers as Kant and Rousseau. It will also be familiar, however, that a powerful critique of this essentially liberal conception of the nature of moral life and values has lately gathered momentum under the influence of contemporary post-analytical and communitarian social and moral theorists variously under the spell of Aristotle. In the first place, then, this paper argues that a basically Kohlbergian approach to thinking about moral education is difficult — if not impossible — to sustain in the face of this neo-Aristotelian critique; secondly, however, it attempts to explore the possibilities of an alternative virtue-theoretical basis for understanding the nature of moral life and education.     

Confucian Moral Cultivation,Longevity, and Public Policy

By investigating the link between the Confucian ideal of longevity and moral cultivation, I argue that Confucian moral cultivation is founded on the ideal of harmony, and, in this connection, it promotes a holistic, healthy life, of which longevity is an important component. My argument is internal to Confucianism, in the sense that it aims to show these concepts are coherently constructed within the Confucian philosophical framework; I do not go beyond the Confucian framework to prove its validity. Finally, I show that if these Confucian beliefs are true, they have serious implications for public policy-making in contemporary societies.     

Toward a Gongfu Reconstruction of Confucianism —Responses to Comments by Huang Yong,Fan Ruiping,and Wang Qingjie

Responding to comments of my recent book, Understanding the Analects of Confucius, by Huang Yong, Fan Ruiping, and Wang Qingjie, this paper looks to highlight one of its major features—that it is a contemporary continuation of the Chinese tradition of doing commentary both as a way of allowing classic texts to unfold their rich meanings in the context of different times, and as a way for the commentator to express his or her own views. It strives to explain how a gongfu reconstruction of Confucianism can explain the apparent inconsistency between advocating rule-like instructions next to its encouragement of the art of flexibility, and to reveal what is more fundamental about Confucianism—rather than a system of rigid moral rules, it is an art of life. This gongfu interpretation would lead to the view that Confucianism does not depend on metaphysical truths as its justification, although it does need to hold metaphysical views as a way of affirming its values, which are justified through the excellence of life to which they lead. While the gongfu approach more accurately reflects Confucius’ own philosophical orientation, and it is therefore used to determine technical details such as what interpretations to put into translation of a text and what interpretations to list in the annotations as alternatives, it is, in the author’s humble view, also a unique contribution that the Chinese tradition can offer to world philosophy.     

The a Priori Value and Feeling in Max Scheler and Wang Yangming

Following Mou Zongsan’s interpretation of Wang Yangming, this paper investigates the phenomenology of values and moral emotions in Max Scheler and the Confucian learning of heart, especially Wang Yangming. Part I illustrates the meaning of moral emotions in Confucianism and introduces Wang Yangming’s idea of pure knowing (liangzhi 良知). Part II introduces Max Scheler’s idea of a priori value and feeling in order to explain how pure knowing could be both immanent and transcendental, both subjective and objective. Part III explores the phenomena of value and feeling in Confucianism and Wang Yangming, giving a Schelerian interpretation of Wang Yangming’s teaching of four verses. Similar to Max Scheler, Confucian learning of heart affirms the intentional structure between hierarchy of values on the one hand and loving, preferring, and feeling of values on the other hand. This paper intends to clarify the basic structure of Wang Yangming’s thought; therefore, analyses on detailed moral emotions will be left to discussion in the future.     

略论王学与中国传统伦理道德的危机

中国传统伦理道德发展到明中叶出现了反映当时市民社会道德要求的新的因素,这些因素从传统伦理道德中引发出所谓叛逆的学说,从而导致了传统伦理道德的危机。这一发展倾向,是从中兴理学的王守仁开始,至其后学泰州学派而发展到极端。它导致了传统道德的失范、伦理思想对生活的贴近和对工商市民道德要求的认同。     

简论佛教伦理思想的基本观点

佛教是关于人生解脱的宗教,其宗教理论中包含着浓郁的伦理思想,反映了与中国本土儒家伦理思想不同的价值观念,共同构成了中国传统伦理思想的主要内容。它对人生的基本态度、观察和评价世界的道德理性、对待众生和万物的价值观念及其树立的理想人格,反映出佛教伦理思想的基本观点。     

儒学是人类中心主义吗?

儒学主张“以人为中心”,是指以人的问题为中心,解决人与自然的关系问题,不是以人的利益为中心,主宰、掠夺自然的人类中心主义。儒学提倡以人与自然和谐统一为特征的德性主体,不是提倡以人与自然分离、对立为特征的认识和价值主体。儒学承认自然界的内在价值,同情、尊重一切生命的生存与权利,以“万物一体”为最高追求。     

忧乐圆融：儒家忧乐思想的核心特质

儒家肯定感性忧乐的自然合理性,但是认为感性忧乐有待于外,陷溺于感性忧乐,容易使人流于以物役心的异化状态。儒家忧乐思想的根本形态是德性忧乐,德性忧乐的根据是本心自足之德性。儒家以德性之忧作为德行修养的内在心理动力,德性之乐是在德性彰明过程中本心情感的自然涌现,可以统摄和超越感性忧乐,实现忧乐圆融。     

孟子与马斯洛思想中理想人格的比较

中国儒家主要代表之一的孟子,和西方人本主义心理学创始人之一的马斯洛,这两位身处不同时空的学者在各自的思想中塑造的理想人格却具备了许多共通之处。该文从理想人格的提出、形成基础、特征以及实现途径几个方面进行了比较,从而为现代社会理想人格的塑造提供有益启示。     

中庸的文化心理特征及其实践理路

中庸是中国人的核心文化心理特质,主要呈现为两种形态：理想中庸和现实中庸。对理想中庸的理论研究能够夯实现实中庸实证研究的理论基础。中庸具有相互融通的三维内涵：执两用中,用中为常道,中和可常行。中庸具有德性的本质规定性,显现为三个方面的文化心理特征：执两用中的中庸认知,执中致和的中庸情感,刚柔并济的中庸人格。中庸具有鲜明的实践品格,礼仪制度是中庸实践的客观根据,籍由观照本心所作出的道德判断是中庸实践的主观根据,择善而固执是中庸实践的现实路径。     

A foundation beam for studying morality from a personological point of view: Are individual differences in moral behaviors and thoughts consistent?

Morality is a topic of burgeoning scientific interest, and the relevance of personological factors to moral behavior has interdisciplinary implications for the social sciences, public policy, and philosophy. However, relatively little research has investigated the role of personological factors in moral life, perhaps because of lingering skepticism about the robustness of moral traits. The purpose of this paper is to determine whether morality is consistent across many occasions of everyday life, implying that personological factors play an important role in moral behavior. A novel method of assessing moral behaviors was developed and employed in two experience sampling studies (4075 total observations). Results showed that moral behavior is consistent in many different ways, suggesting that personological factors substantially impact moral life.     

Traditional Confucianism in modern China: Ma Yifu’s ethical thought

Modern neo-Confucianism is studied at two levels, one is at the historical level and the other at the academic level. Modern neo-Confucianism at the historical level was developed in the modern context, but its basic content belongs to the traditional Confucianism or the study of Confucian classics. Modern neo-Confucianism at the academic level recognizes both the deficiencies of the traditional Confucianism and rationality of western learning, and dedicates itself to the modernization of Confucianism. Though Ma Yifu’s moral philosophy is developed in the context of modern Chinese culture, it fails to deal with the problem of modern transformation of Confucian ethical values and its content still belongs to the traditional Confucianism. So it should be labeled as the modern neo-Confucianism in the historical sense. In this paper, the author makes a systematic exploration and an evaluation of Ma Yifu’s ethical thought. __________ Translated from Lunlixue Yanjiu 伦理学研究 (Studies in Ethics), Vol. 18, 2005 (4) by Yang Xu     

儒家德育课程思想对现代思想道德教育的价值

探讨儒家德育课程思想,不仅可以使我们充分认识儒家思想的精华和糟粕,而且可以使我们从中探求其之所以长期占据我国传统思想文化统治地位的原因,寻求其中所蕴含的深刻的民族文化心理,对我国当前思想道德教育提供有益的借鉴和启示。     

儒家伦理的基德和荣格的道德观

作为中国传统文化之主体的儒家伦理,已经确立了中国传统文化的"基德"或"母德",这是在长达2000多年历史发展中形成的,经过先秦时期的百家争鸣,形成了独树一帜的儒家思想,董仲舒提出"抑黜百家、独尊儒术"的建议,确立了儒家在中国社会的统治地位。经过以后历代的兼收并蓄和对立融合,发展成为儒、道、佛融合一体的宋明理学,近代中国社会对儒家思想的批判性发展,促使人们对儒家伦理思想进行时代的反思。荣格的分析心理学思想为东西方道德观的比较提供了一种独特的研究视角。     

Morality and the philosophy of life in Guyau and Bergson

In this essay I examine the contribution a philosophy of life is able to make to our understanding of morality, including our appreciation of its evolution or development and its future. I focus on two contributions, namely, those of Jean-Marie Guyau and Henri Bergson. In the case of Guyau I show that he pioneers the naturalistic study of morality through a conception of life; for him the moral progress of humanity is bound up with an increasing sociability, involving both the intensification of life and its expansion. In the case of Bergson I show that he also pioneers a novel naturalistic appreciation of morality, one that is keen to demonstrate morality’s two sources and so as to give us a firm grasp of the chances of a moral progress on the part of humanity. I suggest that of the two appreciations of morality Bergson’s is the richer since it contains a set of critical reflections on humanity’s condition that is lacking in Guyau. I conclude by suggesting that Bergson’s idea that modern humanity is confronted with the decision whether it wishes to continue living or not has lost none of its relevance today.