Unique contributions of religious and science beliefs on meaning systems in a nationally representative American sample

Individuals often hold beliefs in religion and in science, but how they mutually function is not well-understood. We examined these conjoint influences by examining their relative contributions to individuals' global meaning systems. We also examined whether subgroups of participants could be identified in terms of relative influence of religious or science beliefs on their meaning systems. A nationally representative sample of 300 American adults completed online surveys. Results suggested that science beliefs and religion beliefs comprise separate but only modestly negatively correlated dimensions. Both contributed similarly to the explanation of world assumptions, but only religious beliefs generally predicted goals, values and sense of meaning in life. Latent profile analysis produced a three-profile solution: one profile of moderate science and religious beliefs represented half the sample while the remainder split evenly between predominantly religious and predominantly science beliefs. In general, across most aspects of global meaning, the religious beliefs group was higher than the science beliefs and moderate beliefs in both groups. Results of this first systematic investigation of the separate effects of beliefs in religion and in science on meaning systems suggest that the balance of these beliefs is a potentially important individual difference warranting further investigation and elaboration.     

Measurement of Positive Irrational Beliefs (Positive Cognitive Illusions)

The role of positive irrational beliefs (positive cognitive illusions) in mental health has been debated over several decades. The measurement of such beliefs has usually been through inferential assessment, which has been heavily criticised. This paper sought to establish a measure for the direct assessment of such beliefs and to assess their relationship to subjective wellbeing (SWB). Over two studies this new measure was found to have a factor structure consistent with its design, assessing self-enhancing beliefs, beliefs rejecting imperfection, overly optimistic beliefs, and irrational beliefs of control. When combined, these beliefs account for 17.6 % of the variance with SWB. This is driven largely by a higher order factor, which demonstrates a positive relationship to SWB. However, individually the different types of irrational beliefs demonstrate a variety of relationships with SWB. It is therefore concluded that positive irrational beliefs, when directly assessed, provide a greater depth of information than they do when assessed inferentially.     

Paranormal beliefs: their dimensionality and correlates

Lack of conceptual clarity and multivariate empirical studies has troubled research on superstitious, magical and paranormal beliefs. We defined paranormal beliefs as beliefs in physical, biological or psychological phenomena that feature core ontological properties of another ontological category. The aim was to bring together a range of beliefs and their potential correlates, to analyse whether the beliefs form independent subsets, and to test a structural model of the beliefs and their potential correlates. The results (N = 3261) showed that the beliefs could be best described by one higher‐order factor. There were also four lower‐order factors of paranormal beliefs but their explanatory power was low. Magico‐religious beliefs were best explained by high intuitive thinking, a humanistic world view and low analytical thinking. Copyright © 2006 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.     

Long-term psychological sequelae of smoking cessation and relapse.

The authors examined whether smoking cessation and relapse were associated with changes in stress, negative affect, and smoking-related beliefs. Quitters showed decreasing stress, increasing negative health beliefs about smoking, and decreasing beliefs in smoking's psychological benefits. Quitters became indistinguishable from stable nonsmokers in stress and personalized health beliefs, but quitters maintained stronger beliefs in the psychological benefits of smoking than stable nonsmokers. Relapse was not associated with increases in stress or negative affect However, relapsers increased their positive beliefs about smoking and became indistinguishable from smokers in their beliefs. For quitters, decreased stress and negative beliefs about smoking may help maintain successful cessation. However, for relapsers, declining health risk perceptions may undermine future quit attempts.     

Attitudes and beliefs as verbal behavior

Attitudes and beliefs are analyzed as verbal behavior. It is argued that shaping by a verbal community is an essential part of the formation and maintenance of both attitudes and beliefs, and it is suggested that verbal communities mediate the important shift in control from events in the environment (attitudes and beliefs as tacts) to control by other words (attitudes and beliefs as intraverbals). It appears that both attitudes and beliefs are constantly being socially negotiated through autoclitic functions. That is, verbal communities reinforce (a) reporting general rather than specific attitudes and beliefs, (b) presentation of intraverbals as if they were tacts, and (c) presentation of beliefs as if they were attitudes. Consistency among and between attitudes, beliefs, and behavior is also contingent upon the reinforcing practices of verbal communities. Thus, attitudes and beliefs can be studied as social behavior rather than as private, cognitive processes.     

Adolescents' evaluative beliefs of failure: explorations in a Chinese Singaporean sample

Our study explored evaluative beliefs of failure to see whether positive and negative beliefs of failure are bivariate in nature within three domains of an adolescent's life (academic, social, and athletic) and how such beliefs are differentially linked to the importance of a domain, the frequency of failure in a domain, and the extremity of negative emotions experienced when encountering failure in a domain. A total of 163 Chinese Singaporean students in Secondary 3 and 4 (Grades 9 and 10) from two Singapore schools participated in the study by completing a questionnaire. Results from various analyses converged to demonstrate that evaluative beliefs could be distinguished by both valence (positive and negative) and domain (academic, social, and athletic). The six evaluative beliefs were also distinguished from failure attributions. While there was consensus in what constituted negative beliefs of failure across domains, positive beliefs of failure showed some domain specificity, with unique aspects in particular domains (e.g., the inevitability of failure only in the academic domain). Positive and negative beliefs in the different domains were correlated among themselves, but positive and negative beliefs were uncorrelated within (except for academic) and across domains. Positive and negative beliefs were also differentially linked to domain importance, failure frequency, and extremity of negative emotion. Unexpectedly, domain importance was not linked to negative beliefs but was linked to positive beliefs, while positive and negative beliefs showed domain-specific links with failure frequency. As expected, however, negative beliefs were (positively) linked to extremity of negative emotions while positive beliefs were not linked to such extremity. The conceptual, substantive, and practical implications of these results are discussed.     

Mathematics,Morality, and Self‐Effacement

I argue that certain species of belief, such as mathematical, logical, and normative beliefs, are insulated from a form of Harman‐style debunking argument whereas moral beliefs, the primary target of such arguments, are not. Harman‐style arguments have been misunderstood as attempts to directly undermine our moral beliefs. They are rather best given as burden‐shifting arguments, concluding that we need additional reasons to maintain our moral beliefs. If we understand them this way, then we can see why moral beliefs are vulnerable to such arguments while mathematical, logical, and normative beliefs are not—the very construction of Harman‐style skeptical arguments requires the truth of significant fragments of our mathematical, logical, and normative beliefs, but requires no such thing of our moral beliefs. Given this property, Harman‐style skeptical arguments against logical, mathematical, and normative beliefs are self‐effacing; doubting these beliefs on the basis of such arguments results in the loss of our reasons for doubt. But we can cleanly doubt the truth of morality.     

Cognitive ability and political beliefs in the United States

Recent evidence indicates that cognitive ability has a monotonically positive relation to socially liberal beliefs and some measures of fiscally conservative beliefs, and that it has a non-monotonic relation to other measures of fiscally conservative beliefs. This study examines the relationship between cognitive ability and political beliefs in a recent, nationally representative sample of American adults. It finds that cognitive ability is positively associated with both socially liberal beliefs and fiscally conservative beliefs. The relationships with socially liberal beliefs are monotonically positive. In contrast, some of the relationships with fiscally conservative beliefs are non-monotonic: Americans of highest ability are less fiscally conservative than those of high ability. The association between cognitive ability and a dimension of fiscal conservatism is reduced substantially when controlling for socio-economic position.     

Beliefs About Older Workers' Learning and Development Behavior in Relation to Beliefs About Malleability of Skills,Age‐Related Decline,and Control1

This study investigated beliefs about older workers' ability and inclination to develop career‐relevant skills, concepts that have not been empirically examined previously in any depth. Two sets of distinct but conceptually related variables were examined in relation to these beliefs. First, participants' implicit theory of abilities (whether they are fixed or changeable) was investigated, and was not found to predict beliefs about older workers' ability or inclination to develop. Second, their beliefs about the age‐related decline of learning‐relevant abilities and the controllability of such decline were examined. Beliefs about the decline of such abilities significantly predicted beliefs about older workers' ability to develop and beliefs about their inclination to develop. A significant relationship was also found between beliefs about controllability of decline and beliefs about older workers' learning goal orientation. Implicit theories significantly predicted beliefs about controllability of decline. These results empirically link research on beliefs about age‐related decline of abilities with the older worker stereotype literature. The results also link literature on beliefs about controllability of decline with literature on implicit theories of skill malleability.     

When 2–3% really matters: The (un)importance of religiosity in psychotherapy

Previous research suggests that clients’ religious beliefs are commonly excluded from therapeutic practice. Often, this exclusion is attributed to practitioners’ lack of knowledge or appropriate skills. Such analyses, however, have little regard for the interactional aspects of the therapist/client encounter. Drawing upon work within discursive social psychology, we argue that the exclusion of religious beliefs does not reflect therapists’ lack of knowledge or awareness but can more usefully be seen as the discursive accomplishment of marginalizing clients’ beliefs. Six practising psychotherapists were interviewed about religious beliefs within the therapeutic process. Participants construct religious beliefs as important but relevant only to restricted categories of clients. They rework religious beliefs as compatible with accepted practice, or construct particular groups of clients as incompatible with the process. Training and other requirements are reformulated in terms of spiritual beliefs rather than religious beliefs. These constructions display awareness of religious beliefs while marginalizing their relevance in practice. Inclusion of clients’ religious beliefs to best effect will require more psychotherapy to engage more constructively with religion than it does at present.     

Predicting global and topic‐specific certainty beliefs: Domain‐specificity and the role of the academic environment

Background. Epistemological beliefs are subjective theories of the structure and acquisition of knowledge. The instruments used to measure epistemological beliefs in educational psychology (see Duell & Schommer‐Aikins, 2001 ) typically consist of questionnaires tapping general, decontextualized beliefs about knowledge or knowledge acquisition in a specific field or in general. Aims. Using specific theories as stimuli, we determine the degree of topic‐specificity of certainty beliefs as well as the association between certainty beliefs and the learning environment. Sample. Participants were 662 upper secondary school students (Study 1) and 211 college students (Study 2). Method. A global instrument and a topic‐specific instrument were used to collect responses to up to 10 stimulus theories. Factor analysis, multiple regression analysis and multi‐level modelling were carried out. Results. Students' topic‐specific certainty beliefs varied markedly across the stimulus theories. Furthermore, students in different academic environments differed more strongly on global certainty beliefs than on topic‐specific certainty beliefs, and global certainty beliefs were only loosely connected to topic‐specific certainty beliefs. Conclusion. Researchers should critically assess the validity of decontextualized global questionnaires for assessing certainty beliefs. If possible, global measures should be complemented by topic‐specific measures.     

Gender differences in smoking: A longitudinal study of beliefs predicting smoking in 11–15 year olds

This longitudinal study investigated differences in beliefs and perceived behavioural control between smokers and non-smokers in a large sample of adolescents. Positive and negative instrumental beliefs, normative beliefs, perceived behavioural control (PBC) and smoking status were assessed in the same participants at 11, 13 and 15 years of age. Prospective analyses among non-smokers revealed that for boys, negative instrumental beliefs in non-smokers at age 11 predicted smoking at age 15 years. For girls, normative beliefs and PBC in non-smokers at age 11 predicted smoking status at age 13; normative beliefs at age 11 predicted smoking at age 15; and positive instrumental beliefs and normative beliefs at age 13 predicted smoking status at age 15. Cross-sectional data revealed that smokers were significantly more likely than non-smokers to endorse positive instrumental beliefs, less likely to agree with negative instrumental belief items, more likely than non-smokers to perceive social pressure to smoke, and less likely to report control over smoking, and that female smokers reported less control over smoking and fewer negative instrumental beliefs than all other groups including male smokers at age 13. The need for belief-based preventative interventions that are age- and gender-relevant is discussed.     

Why Do People Fail to Adopt Environmental Protective Behaviors? Toward a Taxonomy of Environmental Amotivation1

Individuals' reasons for their lack of motivation toward environmental protective behaviors were proposed: amotivation because of strategy, capacity, effort, and helplessness beliefs. Confirmatory factor analyses and correlations between the four types of amotivation and constructs related to the environment supported the validity of the constructs. A structural model in which helplessness beliefs could be predicted by the other sets of beliefs, and wherein strategy and ability beliefs resulted from effort beliefs, was tested. All estimated parameters were significant, with the exception of one link: amotivation because of effort beliefs did not display a significant relationship with helplessness beliefs. The importance of understanding why individuals may be amotivated and the strategies liable to help reduce their lack of motivation are discussed.     

Showing our seams: A reply to Eric Funkhouser

In a recent paper published in this journal, Eric Funkhouser argues that some of our beliefs have the primary function of signaling to others, rather than allowing us to navigate the world. Funkhouser’s case is persuasive. However, his account of beliefs as signals is underinclusive, omitting both beliefs that are signals to the self and less than full-fledged beliefs as signals. The latter set of beliefs, moreover, has a better claim to being considered as constituting a psychological kind in its own right than the set of beliefs Funkhouser identifies.     

Unconscious Evidence

Can beliefs that are not consciously formulated serve as part of an agent's evidence for other beliefs? A common view says no, any belief that is psychologically immediate is also epistemically immediate. I argue that some unconscious beliefs can serve as evidence, but other unconscious beliefs cannot. Person‐level beliefs can serve as evidence, but subpersonal beliefs cannot. I try to clarify the nature of the personal/subpersonal distinction and to show how my proposal illuminates various epistemological problems and provides a principled framework for solving other problems.     

A moral reason to be a mere theist: improving the practical argument

This paper is an attempt to improve the practical argument for beliefs in God. Some theists, most famously Kant and William James, called our attention to a particular set of beliefs, the Jamesian-type beliefs, which are justified by virtue of their practical significance, and these theists tried to justify theistic beliefs on the exact same ground. I argue, contra the Jamesian tradition, that theistic beliefs are different from the Jamesian-type beliefs and thus cannot be justified on the same ground. I also argue that the practical argument, as it stands, faces a problem of self-defeat. I then construct a new practical argument that avoids both problems. According to this new argument, theistic beliefs are rational to accept because such beliefs best supply us with motivation strong enough to carry out demanding moral tasks.     

On Rational Beliefs in Rational Emotive Behavior Therapy: A Theoretical Perspective

In this paper, a number of theoretical issues concerning rational beliefs in REBT will be discussed. In particular, a distinction will be made between rational beliefs which appear rational but are only partially rational (called here, partially formed rational beliefs) and rational beliefs that are fully rational (called here, fully formed rational beliefs). Making this distinction has a number of benefits. For example, it helps explain how people transform their partially formed rational beliefs into irrational beliefs and it provides authors of counseling and psychotherapy textbooks with clear, accurate information to pass on to their readership (Dryden 2012). A number of other issues concerning rational beliefs will also be discussed.     

Fear or Moral Indignation? Predicting Attitudes Toward Parolees1

Instrumental beliefs, value-expressive beliefs, and attitudes related to parolees were investigated in 2 contexts. In Study I, students (N= 180) responded to value-expressive measures in a mass survey and then, a month later, read 2 scenarios and completed measures of instrumental beliefs, attitudes, and intentions. Instrumental beliefs were better predictors of behavioral attitudes than were value-expressive beliefs. In Study 2, the format of the measures was altered and all measures were administered concurrently. As in Study I, results showed that instrumental beliefs were consistent and strong predictors of attitudes toward parolees. Attitudes related to parolees appear to be based more on practical concerns (instrumental beliefs) than on moral or symbolic issues (value-expressive beliefs).     

Cognitive organization of favorable and unfavorable beliefs about performing a behavior

Intentions to perform behaviors are influenced by beliefs about their consequences, but researchers have not addressed how such beliefs are cognitively organized. In 3 experiments, the authors tested the hypothesis that beliefs are organized according to whether they are favorable or unfavorable in regard to performing a behavior. In Experiment 1, a group of U.S. students first read a list of beliefs favorable and unfavorable to going to a vacation resort and then listed their beliefs about condom use. In Experiment 2, another group of U.S. students listed their beliefs about condom use. In Experiment 3, a 3rd group of U.S. students listed their beliefs about a novel behavior (asking the experimenter for candy). The results of all 3 experiments were consistent with the hypothesis that people cognitively organize their beliefs according to whether they are favorable or unfavorable to the behavior in question.