Multivariate modelling and personality organization: A comparative study of the Defense Mechanism Test and linguistic expressions

The main aim of the study is to establish an empirical connection between perceptual defences as measured by the Defense Mechanism Test (DMT)–a projective percept-genetic method–and manifest linguistic expressions based on word pattern analyses. The subjects were 25 psychiatric patients with the diagnoses neurotic personality organization (NPO), borderline personality organization (BPO) and psychotic personality organization (PPO) in accordance with Kernberg's theory. A set of 130 DMT variables and 40 linguistic variables were analyzed by means of partial least squares (PLS) discriminant analysis separately and then pooled together. The overall hypothesis was that it would be possible to define the personality organization of the patients in terms of an amalgam of perceptual defences and word patterns, and that these two kinds of data would confirm each other. The result of the combined PLS analysis revealed a very good separation between the diagnostic groups as measured by the pooled variable sets. Among other things, it was shown that NPO patients are principally characterized by linguistic variables, whereas BPO and PPO patients are better defined by perceptual defences as measured by the DMT method.     

Is recursion language-specific? Evidence of recursive mechanisms in the structure of intentional action

In their 2002 seminal paper Hauser, Chomsky and Fitch hypothesize that recursion is the only human-specific and language-specific mechanism of the faculty of language. While debate focused primarily on the meaning of recursion in the hypothesis and on the human-specific and syntax-specific character of recursion, the present work focuses on the claim that recursion is language-specific. We argue that there are recursive structures in the domain of motor intentionality by way of extending John R. Searle’s analysis of intentional action. We then discuss evidence from cognitive science and neuroscience supporting the claim that motor-intentional recursion is language-independent and suggest some explanatory hypotheses: (1) linguistic recursion is embodied in sensory-motor processing; (2) linguistic and motor-intentional recursions are distinct and mutually independent mechanisms. Finally, we propose some reflections about the epistemic status of HCF as presenting an empirically falsifiable hypothesis, and on the possibility of testing recursion in different cognitive domains.     

Methodological problems in cross-cultural studies of linguistic relativity

Bloom (1981) tested a weak version of the linguistic relativity hypothesis (i.e., "Language affects thinking though it does not determine thinking") in a series of cross-cultural experiments. According to Bloom, Chinese lacks two linguistic devices that are present in English and supposed to be critical in performing theoretical thinking. It was found that the Chinese subjects were outperformed by American counterparts in all the tests designed to assess the ability of theoretical thinking. The results were taken as evidence for the weak version of the linguistic relativity hypothesis. A methodological consideration has revealed, however, that all of his experiments except one are uninterpretable because of the lack of necessary control conditions. In addition, three experiments in the present study have demonstrated that the findings in Bloom's sole interpretable experiment were artifacts due to a methodological flaw. Further theoretical considerations reveal the inadequacy of Bloom's basic methodology and the limitation in the effects of linguistic relativity that may be possible at least theoretically.     

Distinguishing Between Causes and Enabling Conditions—Through Mental Models or Linguistic Cues?

The mental model theory of naive causal understanding and reasoning (Goldvarg & Johnson-Laird, 2001, Cognitive Science, 25, 565–610) claims that people distinguish between causes and enabling conditions on the basis of sets of models that represent possible causal situations. In the tasks used to test this hypothesis, however, the proposed set of models was confounded with linguistic cues that frame which event to assume as given (the enabling condition) and which to consider as responsible for the effect under this assumption (the cause). By disentangling these two factors, we were able to show that when identifying causes and enabling conditions in these tasks, people rely strongly on the linguistic cues but not on the proposed set of models and that this set of models does not even reflect people's typical interpretation of the tasks. We propose an alternative explanation that integrates syntactic and causal considerations.     

Phonemes: Lexical access and beyond

Phonemes play a central role in traditional theories as units of speech perception and access codes to lexical representations. Phonemes have two essential properties: they are ‘segment-sized’ (the size of a consonant or vowel) and abstract (a single phoneme may be have different acoustic realisations). Nevertheless, there is a long history of challenging the phoneme hypothesis, with some theorists arguing for differently sized phonological units (e.g. features or syllables) and others rejecting abstract codes in favour of representations that encode detailed acoustic properties of the stimulus. The phoneme hypothesis is the minority view today. We defend the phoneme hypothesis in two complementary ways. First, we show that rejection of phonemes is based on a flawed interpretation of empirical findings. For example, it is commonly argued that the failure to find acoustic invariances for phonemes rules out phonemes. However, the lack of invariance is only a problem on the assumption that speech perception is a bottom-up process. If learned sublexical codes are modified by top-down constraints (which they are), then this argument loses all force. Second, we provide strong positive evidence for phonemes on the basis of linguistic data. Almost all findings that are taken (incorrectly) as evidence against phonemes are based on psycholinguistic studies of single words. However, phonemes were first introduced in linguistics, and the best evidence for phonemes comes from linguistic analyses of complex word forms and sentences. In short, the rejection of phonemes is based on a false analysis and a too-narrow consideration of the relevant data.     

Lexical neighborhoods and the word-form representations of 14-month-olds

The degree to which infants represent phonetic detail in words has been a source of controversy in phonology and developmental psychology. One prominent hypothesis holds that infants store words in a vague or inaccurate form until the learning of similar–sounding neighbors forces attention to subtle phonetic distinctions. In the experiment reported here, we used a visual fixation task to assess word recognition. We present the first evidence indicating that, in fact, the lexical representations of 14– and 15–month–olds are encoded in fine detail, even when this detail is not functionally necessary for distinguishing similar words in the infant's vocabulary. Exposure to words is sufficient for well–specified lexical representations, even well before the vocabulary spurt. These results suggest developmental continuity in infants' representations of speech: As infants begin to build a vocabulary and learn word meanings, they use the perceptual abilities previously demonstrated in tasks testing the discrimination and categorization of meaningless syllables.     

On the eliminatibility of ideal linguistic entities

With reference to Polish logico-philosophical tradition two formal theories of language syntax have been sketched and then compared with each other. The first theory is based on the assumption that the basic linguistic stratum is constituted by object-tokens (concrete objects perceived through the senses) and that the types of such objects (ideal objects) are derivative constructs. The other is founded on an opposite philosophical orientation. The two theories are equivalent. The main conclusion is that in syntactic researches it is redundant to postulate the existence of abstract linguistic entities. Earlier, in a slightly different form, the idea was presented in [27] and signalled in [26] and [25].To the memory of Jerzy Supecki     

Aversive racism and selection decisions: 1989 and 1999

The present study investigated differences over a 10-year period in whites' self-reported racial prejudice and their bias in selection decisions involving black and white candidates for employment. We examined the hypothesis, derived from the aversive-racism framework, that although overt expressions of prejudice may decline significantly across time, subtle manifestations of bias may persist. Consistent with this hypothesis, self-reported prejudice was lower in 1998–1999 than it was in 1988–1989, and at both time periods, white participants did not discriminate against black relative to white candidates when the candidates' qualifications were clearly strong or weak, but they did discriminate when the appropriate decision was more ambiguous. Theoretical and practical implications are considered.     

Orthographic onsets as functional units of adult word recognition

Five experiments are described. Experiments 1 to 3 used a case-change methodology to test the hypothesis that orthographic onsets serve as units of visual word recognition. It was assumed that presenting words in mixed case would disrupt processing more strongly when the case change occurred within a subunit of word recognition than when the case change occurred between subunits of word recognition. The orthographic onset hypothesis was supported in two of three experiments. The sensitivity of the case-change methodology as a means of testing the orthographic onset hypothesis was examined in two further experiments using case change to disrupt orthographic rimes. Again, mixed results were observed. Given the abundance of evidence that, for skilled readers, ortho-graphic rimes serve as functional units of print and independent arguments that the case-change methodology represents an inherently conservative test of hypotheses concerning multiletter units of print, the current results provide preliminary evidence for the ortho-graphic onset as a functional unit of print.This research was funded by the Australian Research Council. I would like to thank Julie Hansen, Mataji Kennedy, and Anne O'Brien for their assistance with testing. The writing of this paper was completed at Haskins Laboratories, New Haven, Connecticut.     

The nature of hemispheric specialization for prosody perception

Recent evidence suggests a relative right-hemispheric specialization for emotional prosody perception, whereas linguistic prosody perception is under bilateral control. It is still unknown, however, how the hemispheric specialization for prosody perception might arise. Two main hypotheses have been put forward. Cue-dependent hypotheses, on the one hand, propose that hemispheric specialization is driven by specialization for the non-prosody-specific processing of acoustic cues. The functional lateralization hypothesis, on the other hand, proposes that hemispheric specialization is dependent on the communicative function of prosody, with emotional and linguistic prosody processing being lateralized to the right and left hemispheres, respectively. In the present study, the functional lateralization hypothesis of prosody perception was systematically tested by instructing one group of participants to evaluate the emotional prosody, and another group the linguistic prosody dimension of bidimensional prosodic stimuli in a dichotic-listening paradigm, while event-related potentials were recorded. The results showed that the right-ear advantage was associated with decreased latencies for an early negativity in the contralateral hemisphere. No evidence was found for functional lateralization. These findings suggest that functional lateralization effects for prosody perception are small and support the structural model of dichotic listening.     

Grammatical Encoding in Aphasia: Evidence from a “Processing Prosthesis”

Agrammatic aphasia is characterized by severely reduced grammatical structure in spoken and written language, often accompanied by apparent insensitivity to grammatical structure in comprehension. Does agrammatism represent loss of linguistic competence or rather performance factors such as memory or resource limitations? A considerable body of evidence supports the latter hypothesis in the domain of comprehension. Here we present the first strong evidence for the performance hypothesis in the domain of production: an augmentative communication system that markedly increases the grammatical structure of agrammatic speech while providing no linguistic information, functioning merely to reduce on-line processing demands. Copyright 2000 Academic Press and Unisys Corporation.     

Last night I had the strangest dream: Varieties of rational thought processes in dream reports

From the neurophysiological perspective, thinking in dreaming and the quality of dream thought have been considered hallucinatory, bizarre, illogical, improbable, or even impossible. This empirical phenomenological research concentrates on testing whether dream thought can be defined as rational in the sense of an intervening mental process between sensory perception and the creation of meaning, leading to a conclusion or to taking action. From 10 individual dream journals of male participants aged 22–59 years and female participants aged 25–49 years, we delimited four dreams per journal and randomly selected five thought units from each dream for scoring. The units provided a base for testing a hypothesis that the thought processes of dream construction are rational. The results support the hypothesis and demonstrate that eight fundamental rational thought processes can be applied to the dreaming process.     

The communicative function of ambiguity in language

We present a general information-theoretic argument that all efficient communication systems will be ambiguous, assuming that context is informative about meaning. We also argue that ambiguity allows for greater ease of processing by permitting efficient linguistic units to be re-used. We test predictions of this theory in English, German, and Dutch. Our results and theoretical analysis suggest that ambiguity is a functional property of language that allows for greater communicative efficiency. This provides theoretical and empirical arguments against recent suggestions that core features of linguistic systems are not designed for communication.     

The probabilistic analysis of language acquisition: theoretical, computational, and experimental analysis

There is much debate over the degree to which language learning is governed by innate language-specific biases, or acquired through cognition-general principles. Here we examine the probabilistic language acquisition hypothesis on three levels: We outline a novel theoretical result showing that it is possible to learn the exact generative model underlying a wide class of languages, purely from observing samples of the language. We then describe a recently proposed practical framework, which quantifies natural language learnability, allowing specific learnability predictions to be made for the first time. In previous work, this framework was used to make learnability predictions for a wide variety of linguistic constructions, for which learnability has been much debated. Here, we present a new experiment which tests these learnability predictions. We find that our experimental results support the possibility that these linguistic constructions are acquired probabilistically from cognition-general principles.     

lhr,dir, or mir? On the acquisition of pronouns in German children

The present study tested the hypothesis that the linguistic complexity of pronouns corresponds to the order in which children acquire them. Linguistic complexity was defined by three principles of linguistic contrast, namely the proximal-nonproximal, singular-nonsingular, and speaker-nonspeaker contrasts.In an experimental naming task, 55 German children aged 3;5 to 6;5 were asked to express the possessive relationship between different participants in a communication situation and particular objects by means of personal pronouns in the dative case, used from the speaker's point of view. The results showed a strong correspondence between the predicted and actual order of correct use of pronouns, and provide evidence for the precedence of the proximal-nonproximal over the singular-nonsingular contrast.     

The Mental Representation of Human Action

Various theories of moral cognition posit that moral intuitions can be understood as the output of a computational process performed over structured mental representations of human action. We propose that action plan diagrams—“act trees”—can be a useful tool for theorists to succinctly and clearly present their hypotheses about the information contained in these representations. We then develop a methodology for using a series of linguistic probes to test the theories embodied in the act trees. In Study 1, we validate the method by testing a specific hypothesis (diagrammed by act trees) about how subjects are representing two classic moral dilemmas and finding that the data support the hypothesis. In Studies 2–4, we explore possible explanations for discrete and surprising findings that our hypothesis did not predict. In Study 5, we apply the method to a less well‐studied case and show how new experiments generated by our method can be used to settle debates about how actions are mentally represented. In Study 6, we argue that our method captures the mental representation of human action better than an alternative approach. A brief conclusion suggests that act trees can be profitably used in various fields interested in complex representations of human action, including law, philosophy, psychology, linguistics, neuroscience, computer science, robotics, and artificial intelligence.     

A chronometric study of sentence processing in deaf children

It has been consistently reported the deaf children have tremendous problems in reading English sentences. Three experiments were conducted in the present study to investigate the nature of deaf children's reading inability. The first experiment looked into the letter-decoding process. It was found that deaf subjects took longer than normal-hearing subjects in encoding and decoding alphabetic letters. The second experiment employed a sentence-picture verification paradigm. The results showed that deaf subjects adopted a visual-imagery coding strategy rather than a general linguistic coding strategy as described by H. H. Clark and W. Chase (Cognitive Psychology, 1972, 3, 472–517) and by P. A. Carpenter and M. A. Just (Memory and Cognition, 1975, 3, 465–473). However, when the sentence was presented in manual signs (Experiment 3), deaf subjects' verification time showed that they adopted a general linguistic coding strategy. Thus, deaf subjects are capable of linguistic coding strategy, but they do not apply it to process printed English sentences. A second-language hypothesis was advanced to account for the obtained data. Deaf children's reading inability was also discussed from this perspective.     

Grammatical encoding in aphasia: evidence from a "processing prosthesis"

Agrammatic aphasia is characterized by severely reduced grammatical structure in spoken and written language, often accompanied by apparent insensitivity to grammatical structure in comprehension. Does agrammatism represent loss of linguistic competence or rather performance factors such as memory or resource limitations? A considerable body of evidence supports the latter hypothesis in the domain of comprehension. Here we present the first strong evidence for the performance hypothesis in the domain of production: an augmentative communication system that markedly increases the grammatical structure of agrammatic speech while providing no linguistic information, functioning merely to reduce on-line processing demands.     

Irrealist Cognitivism

This paper argues that normative claims are truth-apt contents of cognition – propositions about what there is reason to believe, to do or to feel – but that their truth is not a matter of correspondence or representation. We do not have to choose between realism about the normative and non-cognitivism about it. The universality of reasons, combined with the spontaneity of normative responses, suffices to give normative claims the distinctive link to a 'convergence commitment' which characterises any genuine judgement; an accurate epistemology of normative discourse need postulate no faculty of receptivity to a special domain of normative fact. Some general arguments for the view that cognitivism about a domain of discourse imposes realism about it are considered and rejected.