CHRISTOPHER SOUTHGATE'S COMPOUND THEODICY: PARALLEL SEARCHINGS

Christopher Southgate proposes that a theological response to the suffering that is built into an evolutionary world requires a compound evolutionary theodicy, made up of four interrelated theological positions. This article proposes a fourfold response to the suffering of nonhuman creation that parallels Southgate's compound theodicy. In its similarities and differences, it is offered in the spirit of a tribute to Christopher Southgate.     

PERCEIVING NATURAL EVIL THROUGH THE LENS OF DIVINE GLORY? A CONVERSATION WITH CHRISTOPHER SOUTHGATE

Finding a way to come to terms with the disvalues in the evolutionary world is a particular challenge in the light of Neo‐Darwinian theories. In this article I trace the shift in Christopher Southgate's work from a focus on theodicy to a theologian of glory. I am critical of his rejection of the tradition of the Fall, his incorporation of disvalues into the work of divine Glory, and the specific theological weight given to scientific content. I offer a critique of Holmes Rolston III's approach to the valuation of nature that I believe has influenced Southgate's theology. Constructively, I offer an alternative that seeks to recover an understanding of the origin of evil and the Adamic event that draws on the work of Paul Ricoeur. I also draw on the work of anthropologist Tim Ingold for an alternative philosophical approach to evolution which opens up a space for a recovery of the concepts of creaturely Sophia and shadow Sophia in the work of Sergius Bulgakov.     

EVOLUTION AND THEODICY: HOW (NOT) TO DO SCIENCE AND THEOLOGY

This article uses Christopher Southgate's work and engagement with other scholars on the topic of evolutionary theodicy as a case study in the dialogue of science and Christian theology. A typology is outlined of ways in which the voices of science and the Christian tradition may be related in a science–theology dialogue, and examples of each position on the typology are given from the literature on evolution and natural evil. The main focus is on Southgate's evolutionary theodicy and the alternative proposal by Neil Messer. By bringing these two accounts into dialogue, some key methodological issues are brought into focus, enabling some conclusions to be drawn about the range and limits of fruitful methodological possibilities for dialogues between science and Christian theology.     

THEODICY: A RESPONSE TO CHRISTOPHER SOUTHGATE

This article is a critical and appreciative interaction with Christopher Southgate's theodicy and theology of glory. I critique in particular his rejection of all dualist moves in theodicy. I question why Southgate can ascribe evil to some human actions, many of which are automatic and unconscious, but not to any other level or form of consciousness. I argue that he may rely too heavily on rational scientific categories, which are not sufficient in themselves to carry the weight of key theological concepts. His use of poetry is powerful and suggestive, but in the end, he may not give it enough epistemic weight.     

The Theodicy of Austin Farrer

This article seeks to place the theodicy of the Anglican theologian Austin Farrer, as expressed in Love Almighty and Ills Unlimited (1962), within the context of philosophical and theological approaches to the so-called “problem of evil”. Farrer's work is initially contrasted with the theodicies of John Hick and Richard Swinburne. This comparison reveals some of the rationalist and foundationalist moral assumptions of modern philosophical theodicy of which Hick and Swinburne are representatives. By contrast, it is argued that Farrer's approach is thoroughly theological and begins not with a pre-conceived ethics, but with God's self-revelation in Jesus Christ. Farrer is thus deemed to have much in common with pre-Enlightenment thinkers such as Augustine and Aquinas. Although Farrer's theodicy is seen to be theological (rather than a philosophical attempt at a resolution of the modern “problem of evil”), it is argued that he resists trends in recent theological approaches to theodicy that claim that God is passible (for example, the work of Jürgen Moltmann). This article defends divine impassibility and argues that, although Farrer's later “metaphysical personalism” implies that God may be personal to the point that he could be said to suffer, his Augustinian notion of the nature of evil as privatio boni strongly implies impassibility. This Farrer is seen to avoid two anthropomorphic approaches to theodicy: one that judges God by the standards of a foundational secular morality, and the other that ascribes certain “personal” emotions to the divine. This article defends Farrer's theological approach to theodicy and his emphasis on ecclesiology and soteriology. However, the lack of a convincing and thorough dogmatic theology is seen to render his theodicy uncompelling. Despite this weakness, it is argued that Farrer's work points theodicy towards a theological encounter with particular narratives of evil and suffering and away from the consideration of a single “problem of evil” by means of “rational”, philosophical enquiry.     

EXTINCTION,NATURAL EVIL,AND THE COSMIC CROSS

Did the God of the Bible create a Darwinian world in which violence and suffering (disvalue) are the means by which the good (value) is realized? This is Christopher Southgate's insightful and dramatic formulation of the theodicy problem. In addressing this problem, the Exeter theologian rightly invokes the Theology of the Cross in its second manifestation, that is, we learn from the cross of Jesus Christ that God is present to nonhuman as well as human victims of predation and extinction. God co‐suffers with creatures in their despair, abandonment, physical suffering, and death. What I will add with more force than Southgate is this: the Easter resurrection is a prolepsis of the eschatological new creation, and it is God's new creation which retroactively determines past creation. Although this does not eliminate the theodicy question, it lessens its moral sting.     

Moving Ahead on Southgate’s Compound Only-Way Evolutionary Theodicy

Southgate offers a remarkable evolutionary theodicy that includes six affirmations and arguments; together they form a unique and very persuasive proposal which he terms a “compound only-way evolutionary theodicy.” Here I summarize the arguments and offer critical reflections on them for further development, with an emphasis on the ambiguity in the goodness of creation; the role of thermodynamics in evolutionary biology; the challenge of horrendous evil in nature; and the theological response to theodicy in terms of eschatology, with its own severe challenge from cosmology. Using a text box, I suggest how the 6 arguments create a unique synthetic whole, and how the removal of any one of them would diminish the argument as a whole. I then suggest how Southgate’s treatment of the key question, “Why not just heaven?” adds a crucial seventh argument to produce an even more splendid and promising whole.     

Evolution,Suffering, and Eschatological Redemption: Sollereder,Southgate, and Russell on Theodicy

Two new books helpfully refine the position vaunted by Theistic Evolution. These two books will garner the interest especially of the proleptic school within Theistic Evolution, which affirms (1) the long history of evolution as God's creative work; (2) the Theology of the Cross wherein God shares in the sufferings and even death of all creatures, animals included; (3) Jesus’ Easter resurrection as a prolepsis of the eschatological new creation; and (4) the coincidence of creation with redemption. These two provocative new works are Bethany Sollereder's God, Evolution, and Animal Suffering: Theodicy without a Fall, along with Christopher Southgate's Theology in a Suffering World: Glory and Longing. This article tackles a problem surfacing in the work of both Sollereder and Southgate: when eliminating the fall, the combination of redemption and creation becomes incoherent. Robert John Russell's “fall without a fall” provides greater coherence in the proleptic version of Theistic Evolution.     

ON SOCIAL EVIL AND NATURAL EVIL: IN CONVERSATION WITH CHRISTOPHER SOUTHGATE

In this contribution, the author engages in a conversation with Christopher Southgate on the relationship between social evil and what is called natural “evil.” Theologically, this centers around an understanding of creation and fall. It is argued that Southgate typically treats soteriology and eschatology as themes pertaining to an evolutionary theodicy, whereas an adequate ecotheology would discuss the problem of natural suffering under the rubric of the narrative of God's economy. The question is then how that story is best told.     

ANIMAL SUFFERING,EVOLUTION, AND THE ORIGINS OF EVIL: TOWARD A “FREE CREATURES” DEFENSE

Does an affirmation of theistic evolution make the task of theodicy impossible? In this article, I will review a number of ancient and contemporary responses to the problem of evil as it concerns animal suffering and suggest a possible way forward which employs the ancient Jewish insight that evil—as resistance to God's will that results in suffering and alienation from God's purposes—precedes the arrival of human beings and already has a firm foothold in the nonhuman animal world long before humans are ever tempted to go astray. This theological intuition is conferred renewed relevance in light of the empirical reality of evolutionary gradualism and continuity and in view of the recent findings of cognitive ethology. Consequently, I suggest that taking biological evolution seriously entails understanding “moral evil” as a prehuman phenomenon that emerges gradually through the actions and intentions of “free creatures” which—as evolutionary history unfolded—increasingly possessed greater levels of freedom and degrees of moral culpability.     

RESPONSE WITH A SELECT BIBLIOGRAPHY

In this response to the articles in this issue, Southgate considers lessons to be learned in respect of science–religion teaching, and about his edited textbook God, Humanity and the Cosmos. He emphasizes the importance of collaborative work in theology. He then considers issues in evolutionary theodicy raised by other contributors, especially eschatology, divine passibility, and the status of the “only way” explanation of evolutionary suffering. Lastly, he engages with critiques of his work based on a preference for characterizing the disvalues of creation in terms of “mysterious fallenness.” The article is followed by a select bibliography of his published work since 1979.     

Christopher Southgate on Glory and Compassion

This article was presented at the 2018 American Academy of Religion conference at a panel honouring the work of Christopher Southgate. The first half is a response to the theology of glory in Southgate’s Theology in a Suffering World (CUP 2018). The second half expands on Southgate’s work on practical theodicy. I argue for a redirection of the work of theodicy toward a compassionate approach, outlined by three principles that are centred around helping those who suffer create their own theodicies. The job of the practical and compassionate theodicist, then, is not to provide answers for why suffering occurs, but rather to offer resources to help others frame their own experience.     

Moral Evil,Freedom and the Goodness of God: Why Kant Abandoned Theodicy

Kant proclaimed that all theodicies must fail in ‘On the Miscarriage of All Philosophical Trials in Theodicy’, but it is mysterious why he did so since he had developed a theodicy of his own during the critical period. In this paper, I offer an explanation of why Kant thought theodicies necessarily fail. In his theodicy, as well as in some of his works in ethics, Kant explained moral evil as resulting from unavoidable limitations in human beings. God could not create finite beings without such limitations and so could not have created humans that were not prone to committing immoral acts. However, the work of Carl Christian Eberhard Schmid showed Kant that given his own beliefs about freedom and the nature of responsibility one could not account for moral evil in this way without tacitly denying that human beings were responsible for their actions. This result is significant not only because it explains an otherwise puzzling shift in Kant's philosophy of religion, but also because it shows that the theodicy essay provides powerful evidence that Kant's thinking about moral evil and freedom underwent fundamental shifts between early works such as the Groundwork and later works like the Religion within the Limits of Mere Reason.     

Reconsidering the concept of theodicy in the context of the post-2011 Japanese earthquake and tsunami

Has the 2011 Tohoku Earthquake given rise to theodicy in Japan? This question would puzzle many scholars of religion for two major reasons. First, theodicy has generally been regarded as an outdated concept, and it is rare to see a lively discussion of it in today's academia except for in theology. Second, typical theodicean questions are unlikely to be asked publicly in Japan, where less than 2 percent of the population follow monotheistic traditions. Despite these assumptions, this article not only reports that ‘apparently’ theodicean public discourses have emerged since the 11 March earthquake, but also attempts to employ the typology of theodicy to analyze them in a thought-provoking and critical manner. It argues that the post-3/11 Japanese voices, which regard the disaster as a divine punishment, use a reverse logic of traditional Western theodicy. Rather than signaling a sudden turn to monotheism, the voices are inclined to imply nativism.     

SOUTHGATE'S COMPOUND ONLY‐WAY EVOLUTIONARY THEODICY: DEEP APPRECIATION AND FURTHER DIRECTIONS

Christopher Southgate offers a remarkable evolutionary theodicy that includes six affirmations and arguments; together they form a unique and very persuasive proposal which he terms a “compound evolutionary theodicy.” Here I summarize the arguments and offer critical reflections on them for further development, with an emphasis on the ambiguity in the goodness of creation; the role of thermodynamics in evolutionary biology; the challenge of horrendous evil in nature; and the theological response to theodicy in terms of eschatology, with its own severe challenge from cosmology.     

Genetic Virtue Program: An Unfeasible Neo-Pelagian Theodicy?

In his article, “Genetic Engineering, Virtue-First Enhancement, and Neo-Irenaean Theodicy,” Mark Walker has ventured farther into science more than most when it comes to exploring theodicy. After exposing the Achilles heel of the traditional free-will defense, Walker develops the Irenaean and Augustinian responses to the anthropic problem. Most importantly for this discussion, Walker proceeds to propose Genetic-First-Enhancement as part of his neo-Irenaean theodicy formulation. Overall, there are two major concerns I raised: the impossibility of a gradient morality in the presence of free will, and the scientific impossibility of Genetic Virtue Program. However, my claims are falsifiable if future genetic modifications do indeed improve morality. Before that is proven, I agree with Walker that, yes, we should play God, albeit, with his proposed virtue-first program.     

MALEBRANCHE AND LEIBNIZ ON THE BEST OF ALL POSSIBLE WORLDS

In this article I explore Leibniz's claim in the Theodicy that on the essential points Malebranche's theodicy “reduces to” his own view. This judgment may seem to be warranted given that both thinkers emphasize that evils are justified by the fact that they follow from the simple and uniform laws that govern that world which is worthy of divine creation. However, I argue that Leibniz's theodicy differs in several crucial respects from Malebranche's. I begin with a qualified endorsement of Charles Larmore's recent claim that remarks in Malebranche's correspondence with Leibniz indicate that their theodicies rely on incompatible conceptions of the moral rationality of divine action. I also attempt to go beyond Larmore's discussion in highlighting further differences concerning the sort of freedom involved in the divine act of creation. My conclusion is that these differing conceptions of divine morality and divine freedom reveal that in contrast to the case of Leibniz, Malebranche's theodicy not only does not require that God create anything at all, but also is compatible with the result that the world he decides to create is not uniquely the best possible.     

Creation,Redemption and Theodicy in the Work of Christopher Southgate

This paper analyzes the work of Christopher Southgate with a view toward interpreting his insights into the integrity of creation, redemption and theodicy in light of Saint Augustine's theology. Drawing on various contributions that Southgate has made, this paper seeks to establish parallels, connections and some agreement between his work and the great African bishop without papering over the obvious disagreements over the Fall, Original Sin, the premises of salvation and biblical hermeneutics.     

A Response to Sollereder and Allen

In this brief response to the papers of Sollereder and Allen in this issue, Southgate considers the state of the debate on evolutionary theodicy, and specifically the source of the disvalues in creation. He responds to Allen’s Augustinian suggestions by reference to a recent article on Augustine and theodicy by Stan Rosenberg. He ends by reflecting on the journey in his own thinking in relation to suffering.     

Malebranche and the General Will of God

Central to Nicolas Malebranche’s theodicy is the distinction between general volitions and particular volitions. One of the fundamental claims of his theodicy is that although God created a world with suffering and evil, God does not will these things by particular volitions, but only by general volitions. Commentators disagree about how to interpret Malebranche’s distinction. According to the ‘general content’ interpretation, the difference between general volitions and particular volitions is a difference in content. General volitions have general laws as their content and particular volitions have particular contents. The ‘particular content’ interpretation holds that all of God’s volitions have particular contents. The difference between general and particular volitions is whether the content of the volition is in accordance with the laws that God has established. A proper interpretation of this distinction is essential to understanding Malebranche’s theodicy, as well as his account of occasionalism and God’s causal activity in the world. In this paper, I defend the ‘particular content’ interpretation of the distinction.