Substantial Change and Spatiotemporal Coincidence

Substantial change occurs when a persisting object of some kind either begins or ceases to exist. Typically, this happens when one or more persisting objects of another kind or kinds are subjected to appropriate varieties of qualitative or relational change, as when the particles composing a lump of bronze are rearranged so as to create a statue. However, such transformations also seem to result, very often, in cases of spatiotemporal coincidence, in which two numerically distinct objects of different kinds exist in exactly the same place at the same time, such as a statue and a lump of bronze. Various attempts to resist this way of describing the results of such transformations are examined and found wanting and objections to the possibility of cases of spatiotemporal coincidence are rebutted.     

Lowe's Defence of Constitutionalism

Constitutionalism says that qualitatively different objects can be made of the same matter at once. Critics claim that we should expect such objects to be qualitatively indistinguishable. E.J. Lowe thinks this complaint is based on the false assumption that differences in the way things are at a time must always be grounded in how things are at that time, and that we can answer it by pointing out that different kinds of coinciding objects are subject to different composition principles. I argue that he is mistaken on both counts.     

Persons as Sui Generis Ontological Kinds: Advice to Exceptionists

Many metaphysicians tell us that our world is one in which persisting objects are four‐dimensionally extended in time, and persist by being partially present at each moment at which they exist. Many normative theorists tell us that at least some of our core normative practices are justified only if the relation that holds between a person at one time, and that person at another time, is the relation of strict identity. If these metaphysicians are right about the nature of our world, and these normative theorists are right about what justifies our normative practices, then we should be error theorists about the justification of at least some of our core normative practices and in turn, arguably we should eliminate those practices for which justification is lacking. This paper offers a way of resolving the tension between these two views that does not lead into the grips of error theory. It is a way that is amenable to “exceptionists” about persons: those who think there is something special about persons and the first‐person perspective; that personhood cannot be explained naturalistically, and the first‐person perspective is naturalistically irreducible. The conclusion is thus a conditional: given that one is an exceptionist, an attractive way to resolve this tension is to embrace the view that persons are sui generis ontological kinds.     

Locke on Individuation and the Corpuscular Basis of Kinds1

In this paper, I examine the crucial relationship between Locke’s theory of individuation and his theory of kinds. Locke holds that two material objects—e.g., a mass of matter and an oak tree—can be in the same place at the same time, provided that they are ‘of different kinds’. According to Locke, kinds are nominal essences, that is, general abstract ideas based on objective similarities between particular individuals. I argue that Locke’s view on coinciding material objects is incompatible with his view on kinds. In order for two material objects to be in the same place at the same time, they must differ with respect to at least one nominal essence. However, Locke thinks that it is impossible that x and y have the same real essence but differ with respect to any nominal essence; and coinciding material objects have the same real essence. Therefore, Locke cannot hold what he in fact holds, namely that distinct material objects can be in the same place at the same time.     

Interrupting infants’ persisting object representations: an object‐based limit?

Making sense of the visual world requires keeping track of objects as the same persisting individuals over time and occlusion. Here we implement a new paradigm using 10-month-old infants to explore the processes and representations that support this ability in two ways. First, we demonstrate that persisting object representations can be maintained over brief interruptions from additional independent events - just as a memory of a traffic scene may be maintained through a brief glance in the rearview mirror. Second, we demonstrate that this ability is nevertheless subject to an object-based limit: if an interrupting event involves enough objects (carefully controlling for overall salience), then it will impair the maintenance of other persisting object representations even though it is an independent event. These experiments demonstrate how object representations can be studied via their 'interruptibility', and the results are consistent with the idea that infants' persisting object representations are constructed and maintained by capacity-limited mid-level 'object-files'.     

Self‐generated variability in object images predicts vocabulary growth

Object names are a major component of early vocabularies and learning object names depends on being able to visually recognize objects in the world. However, the fundamental visual challenge of the moment‐to‐moment variations in object appearances that learners must resolve has received little attention in word learning research. Here we provide the first evidence that image‐level object variability matters and may be the link that connects infant object manipulation to vocabulary development. Using head‐mounted eye tracking, the present study objectively measured individual differences in the moment‐to‐moment variability of visual instances of the same object, from infants’ first‐person views. Infants who generated more variable visual object images through manual object manipulation at 15 months of age experienced greater vocabulary growth over the next six months. Elucidating infants’ everyday visual experiences with objects may constitute a crucial missing link in our understanding of the developmental trajectory of object name learning.     

A temporal same-object advantage in the tunnel effect: facilitated change detection for persisting objects

Meaningful visual experience requires computations that identify objects as the same persisting individuals over time, motion, occlusion, and featural change. This article explores these computations in the tunnel effect: When an object moves behind an occluder, and then an object later emerges following a consistent trajectory, observers irresistibly perceive a persisting object, even when the pre- and postocclusion views contrast featurally. This article introduces a new change detection method for quantifying percepts of the tunnel effect. Observers had to detect color changes in displays where several objects oscillated behind occluders and occasionally changed color. Across comparisons with several types of spatiotemporal gaps, as well as manipulations of occlusion versus implosion, performance was better when objects' kinematics gave the impression of a persisting individual. The results reveal a temporal same-object advantage: better change detection across temporal scene fragments bound into the same persisting object representations. This suggests that persisting objects are the underlying units of visual memory.     

Space and time,not surface features,guide object persistence

Successful visual perception relies on the ability to keep track of distinct entities as the same persisting objects from one moment to the next. This is a computationally difficult process and its underlying nature remains unclear. Here we use the object file framework to explore whether surface feature information (e.g., color, shape) can be used to compute such object persistence. From six experiments we find that spatiotemporal information (location as a function of time) easily determines object files, but surface features do not. The results suggest an unexpectedly strong constraint on the visual system’s ability to compute online object persistence.     

The emergence of kind-based object individuation in infancy

Four experiments investigated whether 12-month-old infants use perceptual property information in a complex object individuation task, using the violation-of-expectancy looking time method (Xu, 2002; Xu & Carey, 1996). Infants were shown two objects with different properties emerge and return behind an occluder, one at a time. The occluder was then removed, revealing either two objects (expected outcome, if property differences support individuation) or one object (unexpected outcome). In Experiments 1-3, infants failed to use color, size, or a combination of color, size, and pattern differences to establish a representation of two distinct objects behind an occluder. In Experiment 4, infants succeeded in using cross-basic-level-kind shape differences to establish a representation of two objects but failed to do so using within-basic-level-kind shape differences. Control conditions found that the methods were sensitive. Infants succeeded when provided unambiguous spatiotemporal information for two objects, and they encoded the property differences during these experiments. These findings suggest that by 12 months, different properties play different roles in a complex object individuation task. Certain salient shape differences enter into the computation of numerical distinctness of objects before other property differences such as color or size. Since shape differences are often correlated with object kind differences, these results converge with others in the literature that suggest that by the end of the first year of life, infants' representational systems begin to distinguish kinds and properties.     

Do 9-month-old infants expect distinct words to refer to kinds?

In 3 experiments, 9-month-old infants' expectations for what distinct count noun labels refer to were investigated. In Experiment 1, a box was opened to reveal 2 objects inside during familiarization: either 2 identical objects or 2 different objects. Test trials followed the same procedure, except before the box was opened, the contents were described using 2 distinct labels ("I see a wug! I see a dak!") or the same label twice ("I see a zav! I see a zav!"). Infants who heard a label repeated twice looked longer at 2 different objects versus 2 identical objects, whereas infants who heard 2 distinct labels showed a different pattern of looking. Experiments 2 and 3 presented infants with object pairs that only differed in shape or color, and it was found that infants expected the different-shaped (but not the different-colored) objects to be labeled by distinct count nouns. Because the property of shape is a cue to kind membership and the property of color is not, these results suggest that even at the beginning of word learning, infants may expect distinct labels to refer to distinct kinds of objects.     

See an object,hear an object file: Object correspondence transcends sensory modality

An important task of perceptual processing is to parse incoming information into distinct units and to keep track of those units over time as the same, persisting representations. Within the study of visual perception, maintaining such persisting object representations is helped by “object files”—episodic representations that store (and update) information about objects' properties and track objects over time and motion via spatiotemporal information. Although object files are typically discussed as visual, here we demonstrate that object–file correspondence can be computed across sensory modalities. An object file can be initially formed with visual input and later accessed with corresponding auditory information, suggesting that object files may be able to operate at a multimodal level of perceptual processing.     

Divide and conquer: how object files adapt when a persisting object splits into two

Coherent visual experience requires not only segmenting incoming visual input into a structured scene of objects, but also binding discrete views of objects into dynamic representations that persist across time and motion. However, surprisingly little work has explored the principles that guide the construction and maintenance of such persisting object representations. What causes a part of the visual field to be treated as the same object over time? In the cognitive development literature, a key principle of object persistence is cohesion: An object must always maintain a single bounded contour. Here we demonstrate for the first time that mechanisms of adult midlevel vision are affected by cohesion violations. Using the object-file framework, we tested whether object-specific preview benefits-a hallmark of persisting object representations-are obtained for dynamic objects that split into two during their motion. We found that these preview benefits do not fully persist through such cohesion violations without incurring significant performance costs. These results illustrate how cohesion is employed as a constraint that guides the maintenance of object representations in adult midlevel vision.     

A visual short-term memory advantage for faces

What determines how much can be stored in visual short-term memory (VSTM)? Studies of VSTM have focused largely on stimulus-based properties such as the number or complexity of the items stored. Recent work also suggests that capacity is severely reduced for items within the same category. However, the importance for VSTM capacity of more qualitative differences in processing for different categories has not been investigated. For example, faces are processed more holistically than other objects. In Experiments 1 and 2, we show that the processing of faces, objects that are crucial socially and for which we possess considerable expertise, overcomes these limitations. More faces can be stored in VSTM than objects from other complex nonface categories. As in prior studies, at short encoding durations we found that capacity for faces was less than that for other categories. However, at longer encoding durations, capacity for faces exceeded that for nonface objects, and this advantage was specific to upright faces. Because inversion reduces holistic processing, the interaction of orientation with VSTM capacity—which occurred for faces but not objects in Experiment 3—suggests that it is holistic processing that confers an advantage for face VSTM when sufficient encoding time is allowed.     

Endurantism, Perdurantism and Special Relativity

There are two main theories about the persistence of objects through time. Endurantists hold that objects are three-dimensional, have only spatial parts, and wholly exist at each moment of their existence. Perdurantists hold that objects are four-dimensional, have temporal parts, and exist only partly at each moment of their existence. We argue that endurantism is poorly suited to describe the persistence of objects in a world governed by special relativity, and it can accommodate a relativistic world only at a high price not worth paying. Perdurantism, on the other hand, fits beautifully with our current scientific understanding of the world. We use only the implications of the Lorentz transformations, without appeal to geometrical interpretations, dimensional analogies or auxiliary premises like temporal eternalism.     

Encoding 'regular' and 'random' sequences of views of novel three-dimensional objects

When we look at an object as we move or the object moves, our visual system is presented with a sequence of different views of the object. It has been suggested that such regular temporal sequences of views of objects contain information that can aid in the process of representing and recognising objects. We examined whether seeing a series of perspective views of objects in sequence led to more efficient recognition than seeing the same views of objects but presented in a random order. Participants studied images of 20 novel three-dimensional objects rotating in depth under one of two study conditions. In one study condition, participants viewed an ordered sequence of views of objects that was assumed to mimic important aspects of how we normally encounter objects. In the other study condition, participants were presented the same object views, but in a random order. It was expected that studying a regular sequence of views would lead to more efficient recognition than studying a random presentation of object views. Although subsequent recognition accuracy was equal for the two groups, differences in reaction time between the two study groups resulted. Specifically, the random study group responded reliably faster than the sequence study group. Some possible encoding differences between the two groups are discussed.     

Artifacts and natural kinds: children's judgments about whether objects are owned

People's behavior in relation to objects depends on whether they are owned. But how do people judge whether objects are owned? We propose that people expect human-made objects (artifacts) to be more likely to be owned than naturally occurring objects (natural kinds), and we examine the development of these expectations in young children. Experiment 1 found that when shown pictures of familiar kinds of objects, 3-year-olds expected artifacts to be owned and inanimate natural kinds to be non-owned. In Experiments 2A and 2B, 3-6-year-olds likewise had different expectations about the ownership of unfamiliar artifacts and natural kinds. Children at all ages viewed unfamiliar natural kinds as non-owned, but children younger than 6 years of age only endorsed artifacts as owned at chance rates. In Experiment 3, children saw the same pictures but were also told whether objects were human-made. With this information provided, even 3-year-olds viewed unfamiliar artifacts as owned. Finally, in Experiment 4, 4- and 5-year-olds chose unfamiliar artifacts over natural kinds when judging which object in a pair belongs to a person, but not when judging which the person prefers. These experiments provide first evidence about how children judge whether objects are owned. In contrast to claims that children think about natural kinds as being similar to artifacts, the current findings reveal that children have differing expectations about whether they are owned.     

Young children's discovery of spatial classification

Around the age of 18 months, children begin to classify objects spatially by kind, placing objects of the same kind close together in space and placing unlike objects apart. This behavior may be symbolic in the sense that children use spatial proximity to represent similarity. We examined the possibility that spatial classification is discovered during play—that the external products of play lead children to use space to represent similarity. Experiment 1 was a longitudinal study of four children's classification behaviors, observed from the age of 16 to 21 months. Results suggest that play with one kind of object to the exclusion of another kind leads to the discovery of spatial classification. Experiment 2 examined how children's tendencies to interact with one category might promote spatial classification of multiple categories. Twenty-four 18-month-old children who did not yet spatially classify objects by kind participated. Children who were given the experience of playing with two kinds of objects in a context that promoted interaction with only one kind were more likely to demonstrate spontaneous spatial classification of multiple kinds in a subsequent test period. Children who played equally with both kinds did not show heightened spontaneous classification. The results further suggest that comparison of different kinds during play is critical to the spontaneous occurrence of spatial classification.     

Are objects required for object-files? Roles of segmentation and spatiotemporal continuity in computing object persistence

Two central tasks of visual processing are (1) to segment undifferentiated retinal images into discrete objects, and (2) to represent those objects as the same persisting individuals over time and motion. Here we explore the interaction of these two types of processing in the context of object files—mid-level visual representations that “stick” to moving objects on the basis of spatiotemporal properties. Object files can be revealed by object-specific preview benefits (OSPBs), wherein a “preview” of information on a moving object speeds the recognition of that information at a later point when it appears again on the same object (compared to when it reappears on a different moving object), beyond display-wide priming. Here we explore the degree of segmentation required to establish object files in the first place. Surprisingly, we find that no explicit segmentation is required until after the previews disappear, when using purely motion-defined objects (consisting of random elements on a random background). Moreover, OSPBs are observed in such displays even after moderate (but not long) delays between the offset of the preview information and the onset of the motion. These effects indicate that object files can be established without initial static segmentation cues, so long as there is spatiotemporal continuity between the previews and the eventual appearance of the objects. We also find that top-down strategies can sometimes mimic OSPBs, but that these strategies can be eliminated by novel manipulations. We discuss how these results alter our understanding of the nature of object files, and also why researchers must take care to distinguish “true OSPBs” from “illusory OSPBs”.     

Evidence for kind representations in the absence of language: experiments with rhesus monkeys (Macaca mulatta)

How do we come to recognize and represent different kinds of objects in the world? Some developmental psychologists have hypothesized that learning language plays a crucial role in this capacity. If this hypothesis were correct, then non-linguistic animals should lack the capacity to represent objects as kinds. Previous research with rhesus monkeys (Macaca mulatta) has shown that this species can successfully individuate different kinds of objects - monkeys who saw one kind of object hidden inside a box searched longer after finding a different kind of object. However, in these studies and the infant studies on which they were based, the objects to be individuated differed both in kind and in properties. Thus, subjects in these experiments may not be representing the kinds of objects per se, but instead only their immediate perceptual properties. Here, we show that rhesus monkeys successfully individuate different kinds of objects even when their perceptual properties are held constant. Although these data provide the best evidence to date that language is not necessary to represent kinds, we discuss our findings in terms of possible associative hypotheses as well.     

Can shape be perceived by dynamic touch?

The possibility that some aspects of the shapes of solid objects can be perceived through dynamic touch, even when the objects are not touched, but simply wielded with a handle, was investigated in four experiments. Wooden solids were constructed of three sizes and five shapes: hemisphere, cylinder, parallelepiped, cone, and pyramid. Experiments 1 and 2 involved comparisons (judgments of same or different) between and among wielded objects of the same mass. In Experiments 3 and 4, subjects were required to wield an object and to select a match from a visible arrangement of objects of the five shapes; the wielded objects were of two sizes, each different from that of the visible objects. The success of subjects at these tasks, and the patternings of errors, are seen to involve the characteristic moment of inertia profiles of each shape, and a ratio of the object's resistances to rotation around orthogonal axes is shown to be a strong predictor of performance in the identification experiments. The results are discussed with reference to dynamic touch and to the notion of shape invariants that do not reduce to aspects of object surface.