Material Coincidence and the Indiscernibility Problem

It is often said that the same particles can simultaneously make up two or more material objects that differ in kind and in their mental, biological and other qualitative properties. Others wonder how objects made of the same parts in the same arrangement and surroundings could differ in these ways. I clarify this worry and show that attempts to dismiss or solve it miss its point. At most one can argue that it is a problem we can live with.     

From Necessity to Fate: a Fallacy

Though clearly fallacious, the inference from determinism to fatalism (the ``Lazy Argument') has appealed to such minds as Aristotle and his disciple, Alexander of Aphrodisias. It is argued here (1) that determinism does entail a rather similar position, dubbed ``futilism'; and (2) that distinctively Aristotelian determinism entails fatalism for any event to which it applies. The concept of ``fate' is examined along the way.     

Towards a Critique-Friendly Approach to the Straw Man Fallacy Evaluation

In this article I address the following question: When are reformulations in argumentative criticisms reasonable and when do they become fallacious straw men? Following ideas developed in the integrated version of pragma-dialectics, I approach argumentation as an element of agonistic exchanges permeated by arguers?? strategic manoeuvring aimed at effectively defeating the opponent with reasonable means. I propose two basic context-sensitive criteria for deciding on the reasonableness of reformulations: precision of the rules for interpretation (precise vs. loose) and general expectation of cooperativeness (critical vs. constructive). On the basis of analysis of examples taken from online political discussions, I argue that in some contexts, especially those that are critical and loose, what might easily be classified as a straw man following conventional treatment should be taken as a harsh, yet reasonable, strategic argumentative criticism.     

Rejecting the Urge to Theorise in Fallacy Inquiry

In this paper, I examine the incessant call to theory that is evident in fallacy inquiry. I relate the motivations for this call to a desire to attain for fallacy inquiry certain attributes of the theoretical process in scientific inquiry. I argue that these same attributes, when pursued in the context of philosophical inquiry in general and fallacy inquiry in particular, lead to the assumption of a metaphysical standpoint. This standpoint, I contend, is generative of unintelligibility in philosophical discussions of rationality. I claim that this same unintelligibility can be shown to characterise fallacy inquiry, an example of the study of argumentative rationality. The context for my claim is an examination of the theoretical pronouncements of two prominent fallacy theorists, John Woods and Douglas Walton, in relation to the argument from ignorance fallacy. My conclusion takes the form of guidelines for the post-theoretical pursuit of fallacy inquiry.     

Demarcation and the Scientistic Fallacy

Abstract. For many theologians and philosophers, scientism is among the greatest of intellectual sins. In its most commonly cited form, scientism consists in claiming that science is the only source of real knowledge and, therefore, that what science does not discover does not exist. Because the charge of scientism is frequently levied, it is important to be clear about what exactly is being claimed in its name. I argue that scientism can best be understood as a fallacy, specifically as a kind of category mistake. Being clear about this requires an examination of the relationship of scientism to the question of demarcation between science and nonscience, a question that has potential implications for theology.     

Representationalism and the Metonymic Fallacy

Representationalism in cognitive science holds that semantic meaning should be explained by representations in the mind or brain. In this paper it is argued that semantic meaning should instead be explained by an abstract theory of semantic machines -- machines with predicative capability. The concept of a semantic machine (like that of a Turing machine or of Dennett's intentional systems) is not a physical concept -- although it has physical implementations. The predicative competence of semantic machines is defined in terms of independent agreement alone (cf. independent, and yet synchronised, clocks). Abstract theories are analysed as systems of quasi-apriori rules for abstract predicates. A relatively limited number of such theories and a few fundamental dimensions (space, time, mass, etc.) are today assumed to exhaust physical reality. However, that assumption need not be in conflict with predicates that cannot be defined in physical terms – for instance the functional and intentional terms that are crucial for cognitive science.     

Physicalism and the Fallacy of Composition

Physicalism, as I treat it here, holds that every instance of causationreported by the special sciences is shadowed, even rivalled, by causation atthe level of microphysics. The reported 'cause' is embodied in one massive collection of microparticle events; the 'event' in another; the former brings about the latter in accordance with the laws of microphysics. I argue that while individual events in the 'cause' collection bring about individual events in the 'effect' collection, it does not follow, and typically is unbelievable, that the 'cause' collection itself brings anything about. For typically that collection is too sprawling and disconnected from the standpoint of microphysics to do anything. Causings reported by the special sciences can be traced only at that level. This is actually unsurprising, since the objects of such sciences are not mere parcels of microparticles, but genuine wholes with natures of their own.     

Internal Reasons and the Conditional Fallacy

Internalists about normative reasons hold that they are necessarily connected to motives. This view is most plausible when it is construed in a conditional form - that there is a reason for one to perform a certain action guarantees that, at least if one were not rationally defective, one would be motivated to perform it. However, the conditional form that renders internalism plausible also renders it vulnerable to the 'conditional fallacy'. For instance, this conditional form implies that one could have no reason to improve one's rationality, for if one were already fully rational, one would not be motivated to do so. Most internalists have reformulated internalism to solve this problem. However, I argue that these reformulations fail to maintain the theoretical virtue of the internalist doctrine, namely, the virtue it has of showing how reasons can both explain and justify actions.     

Hilary Putnam's Dialectical Thinking: An Application to Fallacy Theory

In recent and not so recent years, fallacy theory has sustained numerous challenges, challenges which have seen the theory charged with lack of systematicity as well as failure to deliver significant insights into its subject matter. In the following discussion, I argue that these criticisms are subordinate to a more fundamental criticism of fallacy theory, a criticism pertaining to the lack of intelligibility of this theory. The charge of unintelligibility against fallacy theory derives from a similar charge against philosophical theories of truth and rationality developed by Hilary Putnam. I examine how Putnam develops this charge in the case of the conception of rationality pursued by logical positivism. Following that examination, I demonstrate the significance of this charge for how we proceed routinely to analyse one informal fallacy, the fallacy of petitio principii. Specifically, I argue that the significance of this charge lies in its issuance of a rejection of the urge to theorise in fallacy inquiry in general and petitio inquiry in particular. My conclusion takes the form of guidelines for the post-theoretical pursuit of fallacy inquiry.     

Feminist Philosophy and the Genetic Fallacy

Feminist philosophy seems to conflict with traditional philosophical methodology. For example, some uses of the concept of gender by feminist philosophers seem to commit the genetic fallacy. I argue that use of the concept of gender need not commit the genetic fallacy, but that the concept of gender is problematic on other grounds.     

Sustainable Development: The Fallacy of a Normatively-Neutral Development Paradigm

Although the concept of 'sustainable development' or SD has been welcomed as a new idea to resolve the immense environmental and developmental problems in the world, it has become apparent that the concept has nothing new to offer to the victims of environmental degradation and poverty. The sustainable development thesis, as it is being promoted now, is based on the premise that environmental problems and poverty can be attenuated and eventually solved by being treated as mere technical problems which then can be ultimately reduced to an environmental management problem. As long as the developmentalist ideology of mere economic growth, which is framed within neoclassical economics, is not challenged and transformed, SD cannot address the problems of environmental degradation and poverty. SD needs to be framed in an alternative discourse for analysing the ecological crisis in order to address the issues of economic injustice and inequality. It will be argued that reducing economic inequality and social injustice, which are the underlying causes for ecological injustice, will render environmental problems more tractable and eventually avoidable.     

Social Cognition and the So-Called Conjunction Fallacy

The so-called ‘conjunction effect’, in which participants incorrectly assert that an instance from the conjunction of two sets is more probable than an instance from one of the two conjoining sets alone, has been a source of debate as to whether it is a genuine fallacy of individual thinking or not. We argue that reasoning about individuals follows a different process than reasoning about sets. 35 participants took part in 3 tasks: a) one involving blocks of different sizes and colours designed to evoke set-based reasoning, b) one where a particular block was ‘individuated’ by stating that it represented a particular person, and c) the original Tversky and Kahneman (Psychological Review 90(4):293–315, 1983) ‘Linda’ problem. As predicted, set-based reasoning was significantly more prevalent for the blocks task than for the other two tasks. Participants’ reasons for their choices suggest that some individuals correctly use set-based logic in one task and a social reasoning process for the other tasks.     

Effing the Ineffable: The Logocentric Fallacy in Argumentation

Words, just because they are words, are not inherently clear. The message they contain becomes clear to those who speak the language and are familiar with the issues and contexts. If the message lacks linguistic clarity the recipient of the message will typically make a query that will bring forth further information intended to clarify. The result might be more words, but it might also involve pointing or drawing, or words that utilize other modes such as references to context, history, and so on. If the ambiguity derives from an inconsistency between, say, words and behaviour, one may look to either mode for clarity. Communication, we must accept, actually occurs in messages, and our ability to transmit information may be limited by any number of factors. When we focus entirely on discursive aspects of communication we limit both the ways in which we receive and ways in which we transmit information. The logocentric fallacy is committed when language, especially in it's most logical guise, is seen to be the only form of rational communication.