Conceptual role semantics and the explanatory role of content

Conclusion I've tried to argue that there is more to representational content than CRS can acknowledge. CRS is attractive, I think, because of its rejection of atomism, and because it is a plausible theory of targets. But those are philosopher's concerns. Someone interested in building a person needs to understand representation, because, as AI researchers have urged for some time, good representation is the secret of good performance. I have just gestured in the direction I think a viable theory of representation must take. I hope, however, to have created some advance sympathy for the gesture by distinguishing the problem of representation from the problem of targets on the one hand, and from the problem truth-conditions for the attitudes on the other.     

The explanatory role of consistency requirements

Synthese - Is epistemic inconsistency a mere symptom of having violated other requirements of rationality—notably, reasons-responsiveness requirements? Or is inconsistency irrational on its...     

The role of contrast in causal and explanatory claims

Following Dretske (1977), there has been a considerable body of literature on the role of contrastive stress in causal claims. Following van Fraassen (1980), there has been a considerable body of literature on the role of contrastive stress in explanations and explanation-requesting why-questions. Amazingly, the two bodies of literature have remained almost entirely disjoint. With an understanding of the contrastive nature of ordinary causal claims, and of the linguistic roles of contrastive stress, it is possible to provide a unified account of both phenomena. I provide such an account from within the framework of a probabilistic theory of causation. Relations of screening-off, long familiar to researchers in probabilistic causality, play a central role in this account.I would like to thank the following people for comments upon earlier drafts of this paper: Frank Arntzenius, Eric Barnes, Nuel Belnap, Alex Byrne, John Carroll, Fiona Cowie, Alan Hájek, David Hilbert, Carl Hoefer, Marc Lange, Wes Salmon, Cindy Stern, Nigel Thomas, and Jim Woodward.     

Mechanisms of eyewitness suggestibility: tests of the explanatory role hypothesis

In a recent paper, Chrobak and Zaragoza (Journal of Experimental Psychology: General, 142(3), 827–844, 2013) proposed the explanatory role hypothesis, which posits that the likelihood of developing false memories for post-event suggestions is a function of the explanatory function the suggestion serves. In support of this hypothesis, they provided evidence that participant-witnesses were especially likely to develop false memories for their forced fabrications when their fabrications helped to explain outcomes they had witnessed. In three experiments, we test the generality of the explanatory role hypothesis as a mechanism of eyewitness suggestibility by assessing whether this hypothesis can predict suggestibility errors in (a) situations where the post-event suggestions are provided by the experimenter (as opposed to fabricated by the participant), and (b) across a variety of memory measures and measures of recollective experience. In support of the explanatory role hypothesis, participants were more likely to subsequently freely report (E1) and recollect the suggestions as part of the witnessed event (E2, source test) when the post-event suggestion helped to provide a causal explanation for a witnessed outcome than when it did not serve this explanatory role. Participants were also less likely to recollect the suggestions as part of the witnessed event (on measures of subjective experience) when their explanatory strength had been reduced by the presence of an alternative explanation that could explain the same outcome (E3, source test + warning). Collectively, the results provide strong evidence that the search for explanatory coherence influences people’s tendency to misremember witnessing events that were only suggested to them.     

Linguistics and the explanatory economy

I present a novel, collaborative, methodology for linguistics: what I call the ‘explanatory economy’. According to this picture, multiple models/theories are evaluated based on the extent to which they complement one another with respect to data coverage. I show how this model can resolve a long-standing worry about the methodology of generative linguistics: that by creating too much distance between data and theory, the empirical credentials of this research program are tarnished. I provide justifications of such methodologically central distinctions as the competence/performance and core/periphery distinction, and then show how we can understand the push for simplicity in the history of generative grammar in this light.

     

The relationship of explanatory flexibility to explanatory style

Traditional cognitive vulnerability-stress models regarding the etiology of depression emphasize the content of the depressed individual’s thoughts. One important cognitive content index, explanatory style, represents the habitual way that individuals assign causes to events that occur in their lives. A more contemporary model, however, emphasizes the cognitive process by which these attributions are made and to what extent the individual can make different attributions depending on the particular context of the event. This process is referred to as explanatory flexibility. Given that both indices of causal explanation are derived from the same assessment instrument, the Attributional Style Questionnaire, the current investigation sought to examine the extent to which the two variables can be differentiated from one another. Results indicated that explanatory style (a measure of cognitive content) and explanatory flexibility (a cognitive process measure) are empirically related, but distinct, constructs.     

Body Mass Index and functional impairment: the explanatory role of anxiety sensitivity among treatment-seeking smokers

Obesity and smoking are highly prevalent public health concerns in the United States. Data indicate that elevated Body Mass Index (BMI) is related to functional impairment. However, there is limited understanding of mechanisms that may explain their comorbidity among smokers. The current study sought to test whether anxiety sensitivity explained the relation between BMI and functional impairment among 420 (46.9% females; M_age = 38 years, SD = 13.42) treatment-seeking, adult smokers. Results indicated that BMI yielded a significant indirect effect through anxiety sensitivity for functional impairment, b = 0.01, SE = .01, 95% CI = [.002, .021]. These findings remained significant after controlling for participant sex, negative affectivity, tobacco dependence, psychopathology, and medical conditions (i.e. hypertension, heart problems, respiratory disease, asthma). Such data provide novel empirical evidence that, among smokers, BMI may be a risk factor for functional impairment indirectly through anxiety sensitivity. Overall, such findings could potentially inform the development of personalized interventions among this particularly vulnerable segment of the smoking population.     

Responsibility and the explanatory view of consequences

Conclusion I conclude that the explanatory view of consequences is a fruitful one.This view accounts for our common sense view that actions are, in some sense, sufficient for their consequences. It shows in a concrete and illuminating manner that we are or may be responsible for a vast number of events no matter how innocently our actions may be described. It allows for the fact that individuals lack responsibility for consequences of collective actions, thereby explaining a generally felt double effect built into our social morality. It brings into light and explains the fact that some degree of determinism seems to be presupposed if people are ever morally responsible for any events whatsoever. Finally, the explanatory view of consequences yields precise and attractive interpretations of the open and the closed views of responsibility.     

Self-ratings of health: The influence of age and smoking status and the role of different explanatory models

Abstract

The influence of five background variables (age-group. sex. work status. smoking status. household income) on four health ratings (current self-rating. estimated age/sex average rating, best possible self-rating. health satisfaction self-rating) was investigated in the context of a local survey with 377 respondents. Main effects of age-group. smoking status and work status on current health self-ratings were obtained as predicted. Age-group was also found to affect age/sex average ratings. health satisfaction and best possible health self-ratings, with smoking status also influencing the last of these. Mediation of the obtained effects was also examined by controlling for three independent self-report measures of health status in the analyses. Two relevant theoretical notions were examined in analysing the data. The health satisfaction findings as a function of age-group proved consistent with Multiple Discrepancies Theory. Strong support was obtained for a social representations approach. particularly through the direct effects (unmediated by the independent health status measures) of age-group on age/sex average health ratings and best possible health self-ratings. This suggests the contribution of a social consensus about age as having a negative influence on health status. Directions for further research are briefly outlined.     

Interparental conflict and children's school adjustment: the explanatory role of children's internal representations of interparental and parent-child relationships

This study examined how children's insecure internal representations of interparental and parent-child relationships served as explanatory mechanisms in multiple pathways linking interparental conflict and parent emotional unavailability with the emotional and classroom engagement difficulties the children had in their adjustment to school. With their parents, 229 kindergarten children (127 girls and 102 boys, mean age = 6.0 years, SD = .50, at Wave 1) participated in this multimethod, 3-year longitudinal investigation. Findings revealed that children's insecure representations of the interparental relationship were a significant intervening mechanism in associations between observational ratings of interparental conflict and child and teacher reports on children's emotional and classroom difficulties in school over a 2-year period. Moreover, increased parental emotional unavailability accompanying high levels of interparental conflict was associated with children's insecure representations of the parent-child relationship and children's difficulties in classroom engagement at school entry. The findings highlight the importance of understanding the intrinsic processes that contribute to difficulties with stage-salient tasks for children who are experiencing interparental discord.     

On the explanatory power of hallucination

Pautz (Perceiving the world , 2010) has argued that the most prominent naive realist account of hallucination—negative epistemic disjunctivism—cannot explain how hallucinations enable us to form beliefs about perceptually presented properties. He takes this as grounds to reject both negative epistemic disjunctivism and naive realism. Our aims are two: First, to show that this objection is dialectically ineffective against naive realism, and second, to draw morals from the failure of this objection for the dispute over the nature of perceptual experience at large.

     

Mental causation and explanatory exclusion

Kim argues that we can never have more than one complete and independent explanation for a single event. The existence of both mental and physical explanations for behavior would seem to violate this principle. We can avoid violating it only if we suppose that mental causal relationships supervene on physical causal relationships. I argue that although his solution is attractive in many respects, it will not do as it stands. I propose an alternate understanding of supervenient causation which preserves the advantages of Kim's account while avoiding the problems. My analysis involves appeal to counterfactuals. Any counterfactual analysis must confront the problem that mental states appear to be screened off from causal relevance by physical states. I argue that screening off is not a problem, because cases in which mental states appear to be screened off are cases in which background conditions are not held constant.     

Statistical relevance and explanatory classification

Numerous philosophers, among them Carl G. Hempel and Wesley C. Salmon, have attempted to explicate the notion of explanatory relevance in terms of the statistical relevance of various properties of an individual to the explanandum property itself (or what is here called narrow statistical relevance). This approach seems plausible if one assumes that to explain an occurrence is to show that it was to be expected or to exhibit its degree of expectability and the factors which influence its expectability. But considerations of narrow statistical relevance do not provide an adequate basis for explanatory classification, and the aforementioned views of explanation are accordingly mistaken. Explanatory classification must provide at least a partial account of the nature of a thing, and such an account will generally go beyond what is required as a basis for correct expectation.     

Access Problems and explanatory overkill

I argue that recent attempts to deflect Access Problems for realism about a priori domains such as mathematics, logic, morality, and modality using arguments from evolution result in two kinds of explanatory overkill: (1) the Access Problem is eliminated for contentious domains, and (2) realist belief becomes viciously immune to arguments from dispensability, and to non-rebutting counter-arguments more generally.