Attitudes and social representations: a theoretical and experimental approach

We propose here to establish the theoretical link between the concepts of ‘attitude’ and ‘social representation’. We shall base our proposal on recent conceptions of the notion of attitude, and on a structural approach to representations which account for their evaluative nature. This theoretical proposal will be followed by two experiments. The first showed that attitudes towards objects are based on the evaluative components of the representation of those objects. The second showed that a change in attitude about an object may be accompanied by changes in the evaluative dimension of its representation. © 1997 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.     

Integrating information from two pictorial animations: Complexity and cognitive prerequisites influence performance

Dividing visual attention between spatially distinct sources of information could either be beneficial (if there is too much information for a single visualization) or detrimental (if interrelated information has to be mentally re‐integrated) for learning. We present a new display technology allowing for the presentation of two distinct animations by avoiding split foci of visual attention: learners are able to switch between animations by moving their head. We examined how 84 naïve learners integrated information in three presentation modes: the ‘vexing‐image’ mode displaying two animations, participants being able to switch between them without shifting the visual focus, a classical ‘split‐screen’ and an ‘overlaid’ condition. Results showed that reduced complexity led to higher performance. Further, we showed that participants with high mental rotation abilities were best in the ‘split‐screen’ mode, whereas participants with low mental rotation abilities benefited most from the ‘vexing‐image’. Theoretical and instructional consequences of these findings are discussed. Copyright © 2010 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.     

Careful What You Wish

Dilip Ninan has raised a puzzle for centered world accounts of de re attitude reports extended to accommodate what he calls “counterfactual attitudes.” As a solution, Ninan introduces multiple centers to the standard centered world framework, resulting in a more robust semantics for de re attitude reports. However, while the so-called multi-centered world proposal solves Ninan’s counterfactual puzzle, this additional machinery is not without problems. In Section 1, I present the centered world account of attitude reports, followed by the extension to counterfactual attitudes which Ninan targets with his puzzle. In Section 2, I pose the counterfactual puzzle and present Ninan’s multi-centered world solution, emphasizing similarities and differences between multi-centered and centered world accounts of attitude reports. In Section 3, I argue the counterfactual attitude wishing falls under the purview of the multi-centered proposal, but that the proposal generates false predictions for wish reports concerning unsatisfiable content. I canvass responses, ultimately concluding Ninan’s proposal requires substantial revisions.     

Irrelevant Cultural Influences on Belief

Recent work in psychology on ‘cultural cognition’ suggests that our cultural background drives our attitudes towards a range of politically contentious issues in science such as global warming. This work is part of a more general attempt to investigate the ways in which our wants, wishes and desires impact on our assessments of information, events and theories. Put crudely, the idea is that we confirm our assessments of the evidence for and against scientific theories with clear political relevance to our pre‐existing political beliefs and convictions. In this article, I explore the epistemological consequences of cultural cognition. What does it mean for the rationality of our beliefs about issues such as global warming? I argue for an unsettling conclusion. Not only are those on the ‘political right’ who reject the scientific consensus on issues like global warming unjustified in doing so, some of those on the ‘political left’ who accept the consensus are also unjustified in doing so. I finish by addressing the practical implications of my conclusions.