Statistical guidelines for studies of the theory of reasoned action and the theory of planned behaviour

Abstract

We identify potential problems in the statistical analysis of social cognition model data, with special emphasis on the theories of reasoned action (TRA) and planned behaviour (TPB). Some statistical guidelines are presented for empirical studies of the TRA and the TPB based upon multiple linear regression and structural equation modelling (SEM). If the model is tested using multiple regression, the assumptions of this technique must be considered and variables transformed if necessary. Adjusted R² (not R²) should be used as a measure of explained variance and semipartial correlations are useful in assessing each component's unique contribution to explained variance. R² is not an indicator of model adequacy and residuals should be examined. Expectancy-value variables that are the product of expectancy and value measures represent the interaction term in a multiple regression and should not be used. SEM approaches make explicit the assumptions of unidimensionality of constructs in the TRA/TPB, assumptions that might usefully be challenged by competing models with multidimensional constructs. Finally, statistical power and sample size should be considered for both approaches. Inattention to any of these aspects of analysis threatens the validity of TRA/TPB research.     

The self and action in theory of mind research

Research on children's developing theories of mind has contributed to our understanding of the developmental relation of self and action (1) by exploring the relation of the development of self knowledge to the development of knowledge of others' minds and (2) by investigating the relation between theory of mind development and the development of action control. We argue that evidence on theory of mind reasoning in children with deficient action control (ADHD-diagnosed children) is especially relevant to the second issue and we present some first evidence supporting the bi-directional hypothesis, that is, the view that theory of mind leads to improved action control which in turn supports the ability to represent mental states on-line.     

An outline of a theory of action systems

It is argued that the traditional psychological construal of the distinction between central ("open loop") and peripheral ("closed loop") neural processes is no longer tenable. A review of the relevant psychobiological research on the control of movement shows that both the central-peripheral dichotomy and the distinction between sensory and motor systems derived from that dichotomy are incompatible with what is known about the processes underlying action. Based on experimental and comparative data, a new theory of action is proposed. The basic concept of this new theory is the action system: Unlike motor systems, action systems involve sensory as well as motor processes; action systems are not organized into response hierarchies, but rather in coalitional structures of adjustable movements and postures. The phylogeny of action systems is discussed, and the eight most important action systems are distinguished in terms of their evolved distinctive functions. The difficulties of developing a taxonomy of actions for functionally specific types of behavior made up of that can be controlled is resolved by showing how kinds of action are differentiated by the kinds of affordances their components help to realize.     

Action and language: Contextual action theory in counselling

Contextual action theory is presented as a conceptual framework useful for grounding the recent work in counselling and career development called Life Design. Based on the premise of the goal-directed nature of human action, this approach has links to language in theories of naive action and attribution, and theory of mind. Contextual action theory has an associated research method that has been used to generate a range of research studies that have described actions and projects in the career development and counselling domains. The link that contextual action theory provides between research and practice allows the identification of five tasks for the counselling practitioner informed by this approach.     

A motivated action theory account of goal orientation

Rapid organizational change is increasing the pressure on employees to continually update their skills and adapt their behavior to new organizational realities. Goal orientation is a promising motivational construct that may explain why some individuals adapt to change better. Unfortunately, the current goal orientation literature is in a state of conceptual and methodological disarray. This presentation reviews the goal orientation literature and identifies numerous conceptual ambiguities, including definitional inconsistencies, dimensional inconsistencies, and inconsistencies in the conceptualization of stability. These conceptual ambiguities result in a confusing array of goal orientation measures and manipulations and ultimately an incoherent empirical database. A dynamic self-regulation model of goal orientation, termed motivated action theory, is presented to integrate the various conceptual perspectives and to provide guidelines for future goal orientation research.     

Creating a research agenda in career counselling: the place of action theory

After identifying historical and current problems in career counselling research, we propose a research agenda based on contextual action theory. This theory has been used as a framework for research in the career field and for general counselling practice. It is advantageous for several reasons including its conceptual basis, its detailed qualitative and quantitative research method, and the significant link it provides between research and practice. It is supported by the action-project method, an integrated set of procedures developed for conducting research. Contextual action theory and the action-project method can address major emerging issues in career counselling, for example the place of emotion and the use of narrative, and advance the research agenda in this field.     

Teleological reasoning in infancy: the nai;ve theory of rational action

Converging evidence demonstrates that one-year-olds interpret and draw inferences about other's goal-directed actions. We contrast alternative theories about how this early competence relates to our ability to attribute mental states to others. We propose that one-year-olds apply a non-mentalistic interpretational system, the 'teleological stance' to represent actions by relating relevant aspects of reality (action, goal-state and situational constraints) through the principle of rational action, which assumes that actions function to realize goal-states by the most efficient means available. We argue that this early inferential principle is identical to the rationality principle of the mentalistic stance - a representational system that develops later to guide inferences about mental states.     

Social action theory for a public health psychology

Many illnesses can be prevented or limited by altering personal behavior, and public health planners have turned to psychology for guidance in fostering self-protective activity. A social theory of personal action provides an integrative framework for applying psychology to public health, disclosing gaps in our current understanding of self-regulation, and generating guidelines for improving health promotion at the population level. A social action view emphasizes social interdependence and interaction in personal control of health-endangering behavior and proposes mechanisms by which environmental structures influence cognitive action schemas, self-goals, and problem-solving activities critical to sustained behavioral change. Social action theory clarifies relationships between social and personal empowerment and helps explain stages of self-change.     

Extraterrestrial beliefs and experiences: an application of the theory of reasoned action

The authors expanded the applicability of I. Ajzen and M. Fishbein's (1980) theory of reasoned action by assessing the participants' beliefs, attitudes, and experiences related to sightings of unidentified flying objects (UFOs) and to alien abductions. The authors designed and administered a survey on UFO phenomena to 398 Canadian students. The survey contains items relating to each component of Ajzen and Fishbein's model, as well as scales that evaluate paranormal beliefs and social desirability. A majority of the sample believed in UFOs, although most had never seen one. However, only a minority believed in alien abductions--again, most without having had any reported experience. According to path analyses, UFO beliefs originated from societal forces rather than from personal experiences as the model would predict.     

The libertarian predicament: a plea for action theory

Synthese - Libertarians in the contemporary free will debate find themselves under attack from two angles. They face the challenge of defending the necessity of indeterminism for freedom against...     

Infant attention to intentional action predicts preschool theory of mind

This research examines whether there are continuities between infant social attention and later theory of mind. Forty-five children were studied as infants and then again as 4-year-olds. Measures of infant social attention (decrement of attention during habituation to displays of intentional action) significantly predicted later theory of mind (false-belief understanding). Possibly, this longitudinal association could have been explained by more general developments in IQ, verbal competence, or executive function (rather than continuities in the realm of social cognition). However, the association remained significant and undiminished even when IQ, verbal competence, and executive function were controlled. The findings thus provide strong support for an important continuity in social cognition separable from continuities in more general information processing.     

A behavioral quantal theory of brain function: an alternative to Lashley's continuity theory of mass action

A behavioral quantal theory of brain function is formulated on the basis of a newly discovered step-wise relationship invariably present among the findings of three experiments by Tsai, et al. on the effects of (1) cerebral decortication, (2) cranial x-radiation, as well as (3) insulin, metrazol, and electroconvulsive shocks upon white rats' adaptive behavior during their learning of successive habit reversals and one-trial reversal problems. Confirmatory results from earlier investigators who studied effects of various current strengths of ECS upon learning and retention of various maze habits are also cited in support of the behavioral quantal theory of brain function which is proposed here as a close-up, more refined alternative to Lashley's continuity theory of mass action.     

Motivational mindsets versus reasons for action: implications for the dimensionality debate in self-determination theory

Motivation and Emotion - Within self-determination theory, motivation has been treated as a unidimensional (autonomy continuum) and multidimensional (types of motivation) construct. We propose that...     

Situated agency: towards an affordance-based,sensorimotor theory of action

Recent empirical findings from social psychology, ecological psychology, and embodied cognitive science indicate that situational factors crucially shape the course of human behavior. For instance, it has been shown that finding a dime, being under the influence of an authority figure, or just being presented with food in easy reach often influences behavior tremendously. These findings raise important new questions for the philosophy of action: Are these findings a threat to classical conceptions of human agency? Are humans passively pushed around by situational factors, or are there agential aspects in the way we spontaneously experience and react to situations? How can one conceptualize the pervasive influence of situational factors on human action? What are situations in the first place, and how should the influence of these situations on action be thought of? This paper sets out to develop a new conceptual repertoire for thinking about the influence of situations on action, drawing on research from ecological psychology as well as from embodied and enactive cognitive science. The key proposal is the development of a philosophical sensorimotor account of agency: Action, it is proposed, should be conceived of as constant dynamical interaction of agential and environmental factors – factors which should all be conceptualized in new ways.     

Experience,action and representations: Critical realism and the enactive theory of vision

This paper defends a dynamic model of the way in which perception is integrated with action, a model I refer to as ‘the navigational account’. According to this account, employing vision and other forms of distance perception, a creature acquires information about its surroundings via the senses, information that enables it to select and navigate routes through its environment, so as to attain objects that satisfy its needs. This form of perceptually guided activity should be distinguished from other kinds of semi-automatic responses to visual stimuli that do not necessarily involve conscious experiences. It essentially involves inner states, which involve both the awareness of phenomenal qualities, and also a representational component. The navigational account is compared here with the enactive approach to perception, which opposes the view that perceptual experiences are inner states. This paper argues that a full account of perception raises a number of different questions. One central explanatory project concerns questions about the kinds of processes that currently enable a creature to identify and respond appropriately to distant objects: the answer, it is argued, lies in acknowledging the role of conscious inner representations in guiding navigational behaviour through complex environments. The fact that perception and action are interdependent does not conflict with the claim that inner representational states comprise an essential stage in visual processing.