A causal model for causal priority

Recent attempts to fix the direction of causal priority without reference to the direction of temporal priority have begun with an analysis of the causal relation itself. I offer a method, based on causal modelling theory, designed to determine the direction of causal priority while remaining as agnostic as possible about the nature of the causal relation.     

A sound Cartesian Argument from Doubt for dualism

I put forward a version of the Cartesian Argument from Doubt for mind–body dualism. My version utilizes de re statements, which means that it is not vulnerable to the usual charge of intensional fallacy. The key de re statement is, ‘Body is such that its existence is entailed by Mind’s believing that Body does not exist’, which is false, whereas the respective ‘Mind is such that its existence is entailed by Mind’s believing that Body does not exist’ is true.     

A new argument for skepticism

The traditional argument for skepticism relies on a comparison between a normal subject and a subject in a skeptical scenario: because there is no relevant difference between them, neither has knowledge. Externalists respond by arguing that there is in fact a relevant difference—the normal subject is properly situated in her environment. I argue, however, that there is another sort of comparison available—one between a normal subject and a subject with a belief that is accidentally true—that makes possible a new argument for skepticism. Unlike the traditional form of skeptical argument, this new argument applies equally well to both internalist and externalist theories of knowledge.

Undefeated dualism

In the standard thought experiments, dualism strikes many philosophers as true, including many non-dualists. This ‘striking’ generates prima facie justification: in the absence of defeaters, we ought to believe that things are as they seem to be, i.e. we ought to be dualists. In this paper, I examine several proposed undercutting defeaters for our dualist intuitions. I argue that each proposal fails, since each rests on a false assumption, or requires empirical evidence that it lacks, or overgenerates defeaters. By the end, our prima facie justification for dualism remains undefeated. I close with one objection concerning the dialectical role of rebutting defeaters, and I argue that the prospects for a successful rebutting defeater for our dualist intuitions are dim. Since dualism emerges undefeated, we ought to believe it.     

A Jewish argument for socialized medicine

An analysis of traditional Jewish texts yields neither the capitalist notion of medicine nor the socialist one. Neither alternative is sufficient to ground the respect for the sanctity of the human person as a being created in the image of God that is so rationally appealing. That is why the Jewish ethical tradition, which is based on this respect for the sanctity of human personhood, both individual and collective, is so attractive--if only for its insights, rather than its authority; its guidance, rather than its governance.     

The unfolding argument: Why IIT and other causal structure theories cannot explain consciousness

How can we explain consciousness? This question has become a vibrant topic of neuroscience research in recent decades. A large body of empirical results has been accumulated, and many theories have been proposed. Certain theories suggest that consciousness should be explained in terms of brain functions, such as accessing information in a global workspace, applying higher order to lower order representations, or predictive coding. These functions could be realized by a variety of patterns of brain connectivity. Other theories, such as Information Integration Theory (IIT) and Recurrent Processing Theory (RPT), identify causal structure with consciousness. For example, according to these theories, feedforward systems are never conscious, and feedback systems always are. Here, using theorems from the theory of computation, we show that causal structure theories are either false or outside the realm of science.     

A comment on mill's argument for utilitarianism

This article contains criticisms of various interpretations of Mill's argument for Utilitarianism. An attempt is made to explain how Mill conceived the rationality of his proof, and how his justification of the Principle of Utility differs from a justification of fundamental moral principles on the basis of the logic of ethical discourse.     

A tetrad test for causal indicators

The authors propose a confirmatory tetrad analysis test to distinguish causal from effect indicators in structural equation models. The test uses "nested" vanishing tetrads that are often implied when comparing causal and effect indicator models. The authors present typical models that researchers can use to determine the vanishing tetrads for 4 or more variables. They also provide the vanishing tetrads for mixtures of causal and effect indicators, for models with fewer than 4 indicators per latent variable, or for cases with correlated errors. The authors illustrate the test results for several simulation and empirical examples and emphasize that their technique is a theory-testing rather than a model-generating approach. They also review limitations of the procedure including the indistinguishable tetrad equivalent models, the largely unknown finite sample behavior of the test statistic, and the inability of any procedure to fully validate a model specification.