Dimensions of mind

In their papers for this issue, Sterelny and Sutton provide a dimensional analysis of some of the ways in which mental and cognitive activities take place in the world. I add two further dimensions, a dimension of manipulation and of transformation. I also discuss the explanatory dimensions that we might use to explain these cases.     

The embodied mind

Abstract :  This paper considers Fonagy et al's concept of mentalization and contrasts aspects of this with aspects of Bion's model of the mind. The author argues that although mentalization adds to our understanding of mind it has limitations; that it may tend to over-emphasize certain types of external interaction between infant and carer and under-emphasize internal psychobiological processes. What is at issue here is the way in which an infant's carers facilitate the development of meaning out of experience. Bion's concept supposes a relatively 'interior' model in which, in important ways, the carer enables the infant to derive the meaning of his or her experience, whilst on the other hand Fonagy et al tend to talk more in terms of the ways in which the carer endows the infant's experience with meaning. Reference is made to Fordham's concept of states of 'Identity'. Fordham has pointed out that Freud's model is one in which mind is conceived of as evolving out of an infant's complex identifications with his or her carer(s); Jung's model envisages developmentally early states of identity as the means by which inherent capacities are realized.     

The restless mind

This article reviews the hypothesis that mind wandering can be integrated into executive models of attention. Evidence suggests that mind wandering shares many similarities with traditional notions of executive control. When mind wandering occurs, the executive components of attention appear to shift away from the primary task, leading to failures in task performance and superficial representations of the external environment. One challenge for incorporating mind wandering into standard executive models is that it often occurs in the absence of explicit intention--a hallmark of controlled processing. However, mind wandering, like other goal-related processes, can be engaged without explicit awareness; thus, mind wandering can be seen as a goal-driven process, albeit one that is not directed toward the primary task.     

State of mind assessments

This paper describes state of mind assessments as undertaken by child psychotherapists. It considers the similarities and differences with an assessment for an ongoing child psychotherapy treatment intervention and is described here as a ‘package’ that is offered to the family, child and young person and also the referring colleague. It is suggested that the consultative aspect has more weight in a state of mind assessment. The stages of the assessment are outlined and include the initial consultation with the referring colleague, a meeting with parents, three sessions with a child or young person and feeding back to parents with further consultation to the referring colleague. The meaning of the request at any particular time is explored and influences the stance and the approach to the assessment by the therapist. A summary of a case example illustrates the different stages outlined here. The thinking and approach described may be particularly useful to trainees and those starting out as child psychotherapists in child and adolescent mental health services.     

There is more to mind reading than having theory of mind concepts: new directions in theory of mind research

For more than 30 years, researchers have focused on the important transition that children undergo between the ages of 3 and 5, when they start to solve mind‐reading problems that require reasoning about complex mental states, such as beliefs. The main question for debate has been whether, during that transition, children acquire new concepts about how the mind works (i.e. a more sophisticated ‘theory of mind’) or whether their more general cognitive abilities improve and help them deal with the general task demands. Recently, researchers have started to explore mind‐reading abilities in individuals outside of the classic 3–5 age span, showing early theory of mind abilities in ever‐younger children and infants, but also far from flawless performance in adults. In this article, we show how the results of these two new lines of research converge on the idea that there is more to mind reading than having theory of mind concepts: there are various processes required to efficiently implement theory of mind concepts in our reasoning, and there may be, in fact, multiple mind‐reading routes available. We then highlight the emergent new directions for future research. Copyright © 2010 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.     

The networked mind

The paper discusses the role of networks in cognition on two levels: on the level of the organization of ideas, and on the level of interpersonal communication. Any interesting system of ideas forms a network: ideas presented in a linear order (the order forced upon us by verbal expression) will necessarily convey a distorted picture of the underlying patterns of thought. Networks of ideas typically consist of a great number of nodes with just a few links, and a small number of hubs with very many links; that is, they are, to employ Albert-László Barabási’s term, “scale-free.” Barabási fits into a specific tradition: Hungarians had an early influence on the philosophy of networks, and on the philosophy of communication as developed at Marshall McLuhan’s Toronto Circle. In fact, this was the circle in which certain Hungarian and Austrian ideas on mediated collective thinking first came together—a telling testimony to the conditions of disturbed communication and idiosyncratic networking typical of East-Central Europe, past and present. The nodes-and-hubs pattern is characteristic, too, of social networks, in particular of scholarly and scientific networks. The paper analyses the role of “invisible colleges”—informal groups of scientific elites through whom the communication of information both within a field and across fields is channelled. By way of conclusion the notion of a new type of personality, the “network individual,” is discussed: the network individual is the person reintegrated, after centuries of relative isolation induced by the printing press, into the collective thinking of society—the individual whose mind is manifestly mediated, once again, by the minds of those forming his/her smaller or larger community.     

Addictive states of mind

This paper explores the meaning of the pregnancy of the therapist as a challenge to the maintenance of the setting for therapy. The patient I shall describe was born ‘black’ in a ‘white’ family and was thus a challenge to her father's sense of paternity and her parents as a couple. She was the visual evidence of an infidelity. The problem had been denied in various ways, going as far as the attempt to deny her very existence. The therapist's pregnancy signified a betrayal of the ideal of a stable setting which was compounded by an earlier absence through illness. This ‘breaking of rules or promises' was then the setting for a re-working of the patient's story.

Setting, it is argued, can helpfully be seen as the mental space created by the partnership within the therapist between maternal and paternal relating to the ‘baby’ of the therapy. This enables a sense of negotiation and relationship in the creation of setting, which can include disruptions and other babies. At the same time the therapy had to work with a fundamental issue of illegitimacy or lack of belonging and the therapist's response to this. The ‘rules' of setting are a means to ensure a place to belong or attach to, but this work emphasized ‘setting’ and belonging as issues of relationship supported and enabled by our rules of engagement, but not reducible to them.