The normatively relativised logical argument from evil

It is widely agreed that the ??Logical?? Argument from Evil (LAFE) is bankrupt. We aim to rehabilitate the LAFE, in the form of what we call the Normatively Relativised Logical Argument from Evil (NRLAFE). There are many different versions of a NRLAFE. We aim to show that one version, what we call the ??right relationship?? NRLAFE, poses a significant threat to personal-omniGod-theism??understood as requiring the belief that there is an omnipotent, omniscient, perfectly good person who has created our world??because it appeals to value commitments theists themselves are likely to endorse. The ultimate success of this NRLAFE will rest on developing a theological ethics of right relationship that rejects as morally flawed the exercise of omnipotence first to sustain horrors and then to redeem them. Yet a vindicated NRLAFE of this sort need not require atheism, but only rejection of the standard conception of God as a personal omniGod.     

The logic of logical revision formalizing dummett's argument

Neil Tennant and Joseph Salerno have recently attempted to rigorously formalize Michael Dummett's argument for logical revision. Surprisingly, both conclude that Dummett commits elementary logical errors, and hence fails to offer an argument that is even prima facie valid. After explicating the arguments Salerno and Tennant attribute to Dummett, I show how broader attention to Dummett's writings on the theory of meaning allows one to discern, and formalize, a valid argument for logical revision. Then, after correctly providing a rigorous statement of the argument, I am able to delineate four possible anti-Dummettian responses. Following recent work by Stewart Shapiro and Crispin Wright, I conclude that progress in the anti-realist's dialectic requires greater clarity about the key modal notions used in Dummett's proof.     

Development of logical reasoning: children's ability to verbally explain the nature of the distinction between logical and nonlogical forms of argument

Previous research by D. Moshman and B. Franks (1986) supported the hypothesis that children do not explicitly understand the nature of the distinction between logical and nonlogical forms of argument. This research examined the performance of 8-11-year-olds (N = 220) on Moshman and Franks's experimental tasks when the children were cued to apply particular comprehension strategies. Findings from 2 experiments indicated that a significant number of children are capable of explicitly recognizing the necessity of logical forms and the indeterminacy of nonlogical forms and that this competence must be distinguished from their tendency to fail to attend to structural relationships between propositions and to monitor the intrusion of extraneous personal knowledge in assessing the validity of an argument. The findings suggest that all of these competencies are important components of the ability to distinguish logical and nonlogical arguments.     

The knowledge argument,the open question argument,and the moral problem

Someone who knew everything about the world’s physical nature could, apparently, suffer from ignorance about various aspects of conscious experience. Someone who knew everything about the world’s physical and mental nature could, apparently, suffer from moral ignorance. Does it follow that there are ways the world is, over and above the way it is physically or psychophysically? This paper defends a negative answer, based on a distinction between knowing the fact that p and knowing that p. This distinction is made intelligible by reference to criterial connections between the possession of moral or phenomenal knowledge, and the satisfaction of cognitively neutral conditions of desire and experiential history. The existence of such connections in the moral case makes for an efficient dissolution of the so-called moral problem.     

Epistemic justification: its subjective and its objective ways

Objective standards for justification or for being a reason would be desirable, but inductive skepticism tells us that they cannot be presupposed. Rather, we have to start from subjective-relative notions of justification and of being a reason. The paper lays out the strategic options we have given this dilemma. The paper explains the requirements for this subject-relative notion and how they may be satisfied. Then it discusses four quite heterogeneous ways of providing more objective standards, which combine without guaranteeing complete success.     

The spatial integration of adolescent identity: its relation to age,education, and subjective well-being

A sense of being the same person through time and social contexts is a central characteristic of identity formation. The spatial integration of identity was investigated in three groups of high school students differing in age and/or educational level. The 294 adolescents chose and ranked personally revealing identity contexts, described their general and context-specific identities, and indicated their subjective sense of well-being. With increasing age and educational level adolescents chose an increasing number of identity contexts. Context-specific identities were found on average to be closely interwoven. There was a positive linear relationship between spatial integration and subjective well-being. The conclusion is that age and education promote the extension of adolescents' identity horizons, provided that their spatial integration is solid enough to absorb the downward effect of a new identity context. A comparison between spatial integration and two measures of exploration and commitment showed that spatial integration is a relatively powerful measure of adolescent identity.     

The influence of argument structure on judgements of argument strength, function, and adequacy

The present study explored the extent to which lay adults consider aspects of argument structure in judging the strength and function of informal arguments and in constructing arguments to meet specific adequacy goals. Across two experiments, college students were presented with base (one-premise) arguments, which were then expanded into convergent, coordinate, and subordinate arguments closely matched in terms of content, believability, and strength. Coordinate arguments were associated with the greatest gains in argument strength via their construction and the greatest loss in strength when one of their premises was falsified. To some degree, the argument types were also judged to perform different functions and to serve different goals. The construction of convergent arguments was associated with building independent lines of support while the construction of subordinate arguments was associated with providing justification for premises. Expansion into a coordinate argument was seen as the best way to improve an argument's persuasiveness. The construction of both coordinate and subordinate arguments was associated with building relevance, explicating assumptions, and completing the meaning of a base argument. Results are discussed in terms of argumentation theory and research.     

The influence of argument structure on judgements of argument strength,function, and adequacy

The present study explored the extent to which lay adults consider aspects of argument structure in judging the strength and function of informal arguments and in constructing arguments to meet specific adequacy goals. Across two experiments, college students were presented with base (one-premise) arguments, which were then expanded into convergent, coordinate, and subordinate arguments closely matched in terms of content, believability, and strength. Coordinate arguments were associated with the greatest gains in argument strength via their construction and the greatest loss in strength when one of their premises was falsified. To some degree, the argument types were also judged to perform different functions and to serve different goals. The construction of convergent arguments was associated with building independent lines of support while the construction of subordinate arguments was associated with providing justification for premises. Expansion into a coordinate argument was seen as the best way to improve an argument's persuasiveness. The construction of both coordinate and subordinate arguments was associated with building relevance, explicating assumptions, and completing the meaning of a base argument. Results are discussed in terms of argumentation theory and research.     

The relationships between Internet addiction, subjective vitality, and subjective happiness

The aim of the present study is to examine the relationships between Internet addiction, subjective vitality, and subjective happiness. The participants were 328 university students who completed a questionnaire package that included the Online Cognition Scale, the Subjective Vitality Scale, and the Subjective Happiness Scale. According to the results, subjective vitality and subjective happiness were negatively predicted by Internet addiction. On the other hand, subjective happiness was positively predicted by subjective vitality. In addition, subjective vitality mediated the relationship between Internet addiction and subjective happiness. Results were discussed in light of the literature.     

Emergence: logical, functional and dynamical

Philosophical accounts of emergence have been explicated in terms of logical relationships between statements (derivation) or static properties (function and realization). Jaegwon Kim is a modern proponent. A property is emergent if it is not explainable by (or reducible to) the properties of lower level components. This approach, I will argue, is unable to make sense of the kinds of emergence that are widespread in scientific explanations of complex systems. The standard philosophical notion of emergence posits the wrong dichotomies, confuses compositional physicalism with explanatory physicalism, and is unable to represent the type of dynamic processes (self-organizing feedback) that both generate emergent properties and express downward causation.     

The cost of closure: logical realism,anti-exceptionalism,and theoretical equivalence

Philosophers of science often assume that logically equivalent theories are theoretically equivalent. I argue that two theses, anti-exceptionalism about logic (which says, roughly, that logic is not a priori, that it is revisable, and that it is not special or set apart from other human inquiry) and logical realism (which says, roughly, that differences in logic reflect genuine metaphysical differences in the world) make trouble for this commitment, as well as a closely related commitment to theories being closed under logical consequence. I provide three arguments. The first two show that anti-exceptionalism about logic provides an epistemic challenge to both the closure and the equivalence claims; the third shows that logical realism provides a metaphysical challenge to both the closure and the equivalence claims. Along the way, I show that there are important methodological upshots for metaphysicians and philosophers of logic, in particular, lessons about certain conceptions of naturalism as constraining the possibilities for metaphysics and the philosophy of logic.

     

Induction: Representation,strategy and argument

In order to be a general theory of human cognition, the theory of mental models needs to accommodate a variety of forms of reasoning in addition to deduction. The mental model theory of induction is a crucial step in establishing generality. After suggesting that the theory of mental models can also account for abduction and analogy, the paper points out that inductive performance is likely to be constrained both by the nature of the representation used and by strategic factors. Since human cognition involves the communication of arguments, a final section explores the relationship between the theory of mental models and the notion of an argument. It proposes that models can contain tokens of inductive arguments which can be referred to in the course of other arguments.     

The cosmological argument,sufficient reason,and why-questions

Summary To sum up the main results of this study: I have disentangled two distinct patterns of argument that Taylor runs together in his attempt to show that there is a reason or explanation for the world as a whole. The first is based on the causal dependency of things in the world, the second is based on their logical contingency. It seems to make the most sense of Taylor's discussion if we interpret him not as invoking the principle of sufficient reason at the crucial juncture, but as using these arguments to give backing to that principle by showing that it applies to the world in its totality. However, these arguments do not succeed in doing that. The first fails because it depends on a remote analogy between the world as a whole and the physical objects in the world. Concerning the second, an analysis of the logic of why-questions about the existence of things has revealed that the logical contingency of something is not a ground for thinking it has an explanation. The only promising interpretation of the principle of sufficient reason that we have found is as a causal principle pertaining to things in nature.