The possibility of pragmatic reasons for belief and the wrong kind of reasons problem

In this paper I argue against the stronger of the two views concerning the right and wrong kind of reasons for belief, i.e. the view that the only genuine normative reasons for belief are evidential. The project in this paper is primarily negative, but with an ultimately positive aim. That aim is to leave room for the possibility that there are genuine pragmatic reasons for belief. Work is required to make room for this view, because evidentialism of a strict variety remains the default view in much of the debate concerning normative reasons for belief. Strict versions of evidentialism are inconsistent with the view that there are genuine pragmatic reasons for belief.

Being unreasonable: Perelman and the problem of fallacies

Most work on fallacies continues to conceptualize fallacious reasoning as involving a breach of a formal or quasi-formal rule. Chaim Perelman's theory of argumentation provides a way to conceptualize fallacies in a completely different way. His approach depends on an understanding of standards of rationality as essentially connected with conceptions of universality. Such an approach allows one to get beyond some of the basic problems of fallacy theory, and turns informal logic toward substantive philosophical questions. I show this by reinterpreting three so-called fallacies - theargumentum ad baculum, equivocation and composition/division - in the light of Perelman's account.     

Predicting uptake of a routine cervical smear test: A comparison of the health belief model and the theory of planned behaviour

Abstract

This paper reports on a study carried out to identify predictors of uptake of cervical screening among 142 women (59% response rate) in inner London. Two social cognition models were used: The Health Belief Model (HBM; Becker, 1974) and the Theory of Planned Behaviour (TPB; Ajzen, 1991) and in addition anticipated affect following non-attendance for screening was assessed. The TPB emerged as by far the superior model for predicting screening intentions, explaining 51% of the variance in comparison with only 4% explained by the HBM variables. However, neither model was able to predict a significant amount of variance in uptake of screening three months later. Possible reasons for the poor prediction of this type of behaviour are discussed.     

Excursions in Rorschachlandia: Surveying the scientific and philosophical landscape of Hermann Rorschach's Psychodiagnostics

This article examines the milieu of Hermann Rorschach's Psychodiagnostics (1921/2021) under development between 1911 and his death in 1922 and explores new evidence about the direction Rorschach's test might have taken after publication of Psychodiagnostics. This includes direct and indirect influences from turn of the century continental philosophy and science and innovative colleagues in the Swiss psychiatric and psychoanalytic societies. The availability of newly translated scholarship, including the correspondence between Ludwig Binswanger and Hermann Rorschach following the 1921 publication of Psychodiagnostics, Binswanger's posthumous 1923 commentary in the International Journal of Psychoanalysis, and recent new translation of Psychodiagnostics, permits a fresh appraisal of the milieu and foundations of Rorschach's development. Understanding these sources and influences opens new vistas in reappraising the nature of Rorschach's “test theory” which Rorschach considered undeveloped at the time of his death. This paper presents new evidence that, under the influence of Rorschach's close colleague, Ludwig Binswanger, the Geisteswissenschaften and phenomenology might have figured prominently in future developments. The paper concludes that Rorschach, preoccupied with considerations of kinesthetic subjectivity in his innovative conceptualization of human movement responses, was a nascent phenomenologist whose untimely death cut short further developments in his theory of the test.     

The relationship between anomalistic belief,misperception of chance and the base rate fallacy

Abstract

A poor understanding of probability may lead people to misinterpret every day coincidences and form anomalistic (e.g., paranormal) beliefs. We investigated the relationship between anomalistic belief (including type of belief) and misperception of chance and the base rate fallacy across both anomalistic and control (i.e., neutral) contexts. Greater anomalistic belief was associated with poorer performance for both types of items; however there were no significant interactions between belief and context. For misperception of chance items, only experiential (vs. theoretical) anomalistic beliefs predicted more errors. In contrast, overall anomalistic belief was positively related to the base rate fallacy but no specific subtype of anomalistic belief was a significant predictor. The results indicate misperception of chance may lead people to interpret coincidental events as having an anomalistic cause, and a poor understanding of base rates may make people more prone to forming anomalistic beliefs.     

The rise of the nones and the changing relationships between identity,belief, and behavior

ABSTRACT

One of the more remarkable trends of the past 30 years is the dramatic rise of individuals who do not identify with any religious tradition. While this trend has been well documented, some of the underlying dynamics and consequences have not been fully appreciated or explicated. We examine the General Social Survey in the period from 1972 to 2014 to examine how the increase in the ‘nones’ is tied to changes in the strength of religious identity among US adults and, in turn, how the rise of the nones has affected the relationships between religious identity, religious belief, and religious behavior. In particular, we show that, as the percentage of US adults who do not identify with a religion has grown, the correlations between religious identification, belief, and behavior have increased. In short, the rise of the nones has led to more congruence between measures of religion.     

The illusionist and the folk: On the role of conscious planning in intentionality judgments

Illusionism is a prominent hypothesis about action control, according to which acts that we consider voluntary are nevertheless caused by unconscious brain events, and thus our subjective experience of consciously willing them is ultimately illusory. Illusionism can be understood as either an ontological thesis or a phenomenological claim, but both versions are vulnerable to a line of attack based on the role of long-term planning (distal intentions) in action control. According to this objection, the evidence upon which illusionism rests is confined to short-term (proximal) intentions, so it is not sufficient to justify broader conclusions on the causal inefficacy of conscious will. In this essay we reconstruct the logic of this objection against illusionism, clarify why surveying folk intuitions on conscious distal intentions is essential to the debate, and present a study in which the role of conscious planning in intentionality judgment is clearly revealed. We also present other relevant findings, such as a gender effect on intentionality attributions, a moral influence on responsibility judgments, and confirmation of mechanistic incompatibilism.     

父母元情绪理念与青少年问题行为:迷走神经的调节作用

探讨父母元情绪理念与青少年问题行为的关系以及青少年自身迷走神经功能对两者关系的影响。采用“心算任务范式”及问卷法, 对224名青少年及其父母进行测量与调查。结果发现:(1) 母亲情绪教导理念负向预测青少年内外化问题行为, 母亲情绪失控理念正向预测青少年内外化问题行为, 母亲情绪不干涉理念正向预测青少年外化问题行为; 父亲情绪教导理念负向预测青少年内化问题行为, 父亲情绪失控理念正向预测青少年外化问题行为。(2) 当青少年迷走张力较低时, 母亲情绪不干涉理念正向预测青少年外化问题行为; 当青少年迷走抑制较低时, 母亲情绪失控理念正向预测青少年内化、外化问题行为, 父亲情绪失控理念正向预测青少年外化问题行为。综上, 父母元情绪理念能够预测青少年问题行为, 且父母元情绪理念对青少年问题行为影响存在差异。同时, 迷走神经功能对父母元情绪理念与青少年问题行为的关系具有一定调节作用。     

Counterfactual thinking and false belief: the role of executive function

The purpose of the current study was to examine further the relationship between counterfactual thinking and false belief (FB) as examined by Guajardo and Turley-Ames (Cognitive Development, 19 (2004) 53-80). More specifically, the current research examined the importance of working memory and inhibitory control in understanding the relationship between counterfactual thinking and FB. Participants were 3-, 4-, and 5-year-olds (N = 76). Counterfactual thinking statements generated accounted for significant variance in FB performance beyond age and language. Working memory and inhibitory control each partially mediated the relationship between counterfactual thinking and FB performance. The maturation of executive functioning skills is important in children’s developing understanding of counterfactual reasoning and FB.     

Globalization and the contemporary development of Marxist philosophy: precondition, problem domain and research outline

Globalization was just emerging but did not really take shape during Karl Marx’s time. In fact, both Karl Marx and Engels predicted the trend of globalization but did not really live in such a time. Therefore, globalization is still a new issue and a new research area for Marxist philosophy today. Based on the distinctions between some important concepts such as globalization and modernization, this paper probes the problems concerning the development of modernity theory, social morphology and civilization theory, and the Marxist theory of values raised in the process of globalization. The paper also explores some theoretical issues concerning the socialist modernization with Chinese characteristics in the Marxist philosophy, and contemplates possible research areas, angles and methods of Marxist philosophical research in the global era. __________ Translated from Zhexue Yanjiu 哲学研究 (Philosophical Studies), 2005 (9) by Ouyang Kang, Liu Yumei, Zhu Lingling     

Patterns of adolescent involvement in problem behaviors: Relationship to self-efficacy,social competence,and life events

Using a sample of 556 adolescents from a suburban community, patterns of various adolescent problem behaviors (e.g., delinquent behavior, smoking, use of alcohol or drugs) and their links to self-efficacy, social competence, and life events were examined. Cluster analysis was conducted to identify four subgroups of adolescents who showed distinct patterns of problem behaviors. These clusters were compared on the measures of self-efficacy, social competence, and life events. Overall results suggest there are meaningful links between adolescents’ problem behavior patterns and self-efficacy, the amount and quality of participation in various after school activities, and life events. For example, a subgroup of adolescents who showed uniformly low prevalence of all problem behaviors reported more positive academic self-efficacy, more active participation in sports and nonsports activities, more positive life events, and fewer negative events than adolescents who were involved in multiple problem behaviors. Implications for prevention and future research on adolescent problem behaviors are discussed.     

Belief,Apparitions, and Rationality: The Social Scientific Study of Religion after Wittgenstein<Subscript>1</Subscript>

The goal I pursue is to redefine the study of religious epistemology on the basis of an ethnomethodological extension of Wittgenstein. This approach shows that the nature of religious belief and its relation to facts, proofs, and empirical reality are matters that are dealt with by ordinary members of society. The examination of this lay epistemology reveals that – far from being a settled and established entity – religious belief is a polymorphous phenomenon. Religious belief is a pragmatic resource whose configuration is shaped to allow the accomplishment of interactional moves within specific contexts. I defend this thesis by analyzing accounts pertaining to a contemporary religious apparition claim.     

Testing the domain-specificity of a theory of mind deficit in brain-injured patients: evidence for consistent performance on non-verbal, "reality-unknown" false belief and false photograph tasks

To test the domain-specificity of "theory of mind" abilities we compared the performance of a case-series of 11 brain-lesioned patients on a recently developed test of false belief reasoning () and on a matched false photograph task, which did not require belief reasoning and which addressed problems with existing false photograph methods. A strikingly similar pattern of performance was shown across the false belief and false photograph tests. Patients who were selectively impaired on false belief tasks were also impaired on false photograph tasks; patients spared on false belief tasks also showed preserved performance with false photographs. In some cases the impairment on false belief and false photograph tasks coincided with good performance on control tasks matched for executive demands. We discuss whether the patients have a domain-specific deficit in reasoning about representations common to both false belief and false photograph tasks.     

Accidentally True Beliefs and the Williamsonian Mental State of Knowing

In this paper, I will explore some philosophical implications of Williamson’s thesis that knowing is a state of mind (KSM). Using the fake barn case, I will introduce a way to evaluate Williamson’s KSM thesis and determine whether the Williamsonian mental state of knowing can be plausibly distinguished from certain other similar but epistemologically distinctive states of mind (i.e., accidentally true beliefs). Then, some tentative externalist accounts of the supposed differences between the Williamsonian mental state of knowing and accidentally true beliefs will be critically assessed, implying that the evaluated traditional versions of externalism in semantics and epistemology do not fit well with Williamson’s KSM thesis. Ultimately, I suggest that the extended-mind or extended-knower approach may be more promising, which indicates that active externalism would be called for by Williamson’s KSM thesis.     

Perceptions of personal sex discrimination: the role of belief in a just world and situational ambiguity

The roles of belief in a just world (BJW) and discrimination against ones' group in perceptions of personal discrimination were examined. Female participants (n = 63) were personally discriminated against in a laboratory setting. We manipulated whether the experimenter appeared to discriminate against other participants, which presumably made the presence of personal discrimination less ambiguous, or did not appear to discriminate against others, which presumably made personal discrimination more ambiguous. In the no group discrimination condition, but not in the group discrimination condition, participants' perceptions of being personally discriminated against depended on individual differences in BJW: Women with a strong BJW perceived less personal discrimination than those with a weak BJW. Also, strong BJW women in the group discrimination condition perceived less personal discrimination than strong BJW women in the no group discrimination condition.