Attempts to predict intelligent behavior: II. A study of problem solving

In Experiment I a group of pupils from a secondary school was given a test of general intelligence, a test of the ability to categorize objects in a flexible way, and five different problem-solving tasks. Subjects who were successful on the problems had higher scores on the intelligence test than the rest. The Categorizing Test was not, however, a good indicator of success. In Experiment II a comparison was made between scores on different parts of the so-called Family Test. With high school pupils and university students as subjects, correlation coefficients in the neighborhood of 0.40 were found between scores when suggesting possible classifications of objects, and scores when choosing a classification to fit different sets of objects. The triangular form of the scatterplots was taken as an indication that an ability to present different interpretations of one's experience is a necessary, but not sufficient condition for success in problem-solving tasks.     

Using another's gaze as an explicit aid to insight problem solving

Research has shown that implicitly guiding attention via visual cues or unrelated tasks can increase the likelihood of solving insight problems. We examined whether following another person making specific skin-crossing saccades could induce similar attentional shifts and increase solution rates for Duncker's ((1945)) radiation problem. We presented 150 participants with one of three 30-s eye movement patterns from another problem solver: (a) focusing solely on the central tumour; (b) naturally making skin-crossing saccades between the outside area and the tumour from multiple angles; or (c) making deliberate skin-crossing saccades between the outside area and the tumour from multiple angles. Following another person making skin-crossing saccades increased the likelihood of solving the radiation problem. Our results demonstrate that another person's eye movements can promote attentional shifts that trigger insight problem solving.     

Using another's gaze as an explicit aid to insight problem solving

Research has shown that implicitly guiding attention via visual cues or unrelated tasks can increase the likelihood of solving insight problems. We examined whether following another person making specific skin-crossing saccades could induce similar attentional shifts and increase solution rates for Duncker's ((1945) Duncker, K. 1945. On problem solving. Psychological Monographs, 58 (5, Whole No. 270)[Crossref] , [Google Scholar]) radiation problem. We presented 150 participants with one of three 30-s eye movement patterns from another problem solver: (a) focusing solely on the central tumour; (b) naturally making skin-crossing saccades between the outside area and the tumour from multiple angles; or (c) making deliberate skin-crossing saccades between the outside area and the tumour from multiple angles. Following another person making skin-crossing saccades increased the likelihood of solving the radiation problem. Our results demonstrate that another person's eye movements can promote attentional shifts that trigger insight problem solving.     

Attempts to predict intelligent behavior: 1. The Categorizing Test

The possibility of predicting future intelligent behavior by means of a test calling for flexible categorizing of a present situation is discussed. The test, called The Categorizing Test, consisting initially of 22 items, was tried out on 94 S s. The results showed high, positive correlations between the items, suggesting that they to a strong degree tap the same cognitive function, which is interpreted as an ability to categorize flexibly. A shorter 10-item version of the test was compared with a test of verbal intelligence and a flexibility test of a traditional kind. On the whole, high, positive correlations were obtained, with the Categorizing Test apparently occupying a central position. These results constitute validating evidence for The Categorizing Test.     

Priming insight in groups: Facilitating and inhibiting solving an ambiguously worded insight problem

We extend research on the priming of insight by studying group problem solving. Groups of 2–4 participants tried to solve an ambiguously worded problem in the presence of a prime that reinforced the dominant but incorrect interpretation of the problem, a prime that reinforced the uncommon but correct interpretation, or no prime. The paradigm involved participants asking questions of the experimenter that could only be answered “yes” or “no.” In Experiment 1, the prime was present throughout the solving period; in Experiment 2, it was removed prior to the solving period. In both experiments, the primes had their predicted effects. Patterns in the time taken to solve the problem supported the idea that groups stuck at the impasse were more or less able to restructure the problem, depending on the environmental context. Data from the questions asked and questionnaires converged with time taken to solve the problem, consistent with the view that restructuring a problem is an automatic process that produces insight. A comparison of the group data in Experiment 1 with individually tested participants’ data revealed that the insight of the groups benefited from their being able to recognize lines of questions to follow, to listen to answers to questions asked, and to evaluate and reject errors or assumptions.     

Interactive insight problem solving

Insight problem solving was investigated with the matchstick algebra problems developed by Knoblich, Ohlsson, Haider, and Rhenius (1999 Knoblich, G., Ohlsson, S., Haider, H. and Rhenius, D. 1999. Constraint relaxation and chunk decomposition in insight problem solving. Journal of Experimental Psychology: Learning, Memory and Cognition, 25: 1534–1555. [Crossref], [Web of Science ®] , [Google Scholar]). These problems are false equations expressed with Roman numerals that can be made true bymoving one matchstick. In a first group participants examined a static two-dimensional representation of the false algebraic expression and told the experimenter which matchstick should be moved. In a second group, participants interacted with a three-dimensional representation of the false equation. Success rates in the static group for different problem types replicated the pattern of data reported in Knoblich et al. (1999 Knoblich, G., Ohlsson, S., Haider, H. and Rhenius, D. 1999. Constraint relaxation and chunk decomposition in insight problem solving. Journal of Experimental Psychology: Learning, Memory and Cognition, 25: 1534–1555. [Crossref], [Web of Science ®] , [Google Scholar]). However, participants in the interactive group were significantly more likely to achieve insight. Problem-solving success in the static group was best predicted by performance on a test of numeracy, whereas in the interactive group it was best predicted by performance on a test of visuo-spatial reasoning. Implications for process models of problem solving are discussed.     

Effects of subliminal hints on insight problem solving

Two experiments tested a total of 509 participants on insight problems (the radiation problem and the nine-dot problem). Half of the participants were first exposed to a 1-min movie that included a subliminal hint. The hint raised the solution rate of people who did not recognize it. In addition, the way they solved the problem was affected by the hint. In Experiment 3, a novel technique was introduced to address some methodological concerns raised by Experiments 1 and 2. A total of 80 participants solved the 10-coin problem, and half of them were exposed to a subliminal hint. The hint facilitated solving the problem, and it shortened the solution time. Some implications of subliminal priming for research on and theorizing about insight problem solving are discussed.     

The neural basis of insight problem solving: an event-related potential study

The electrophysiological correlates of successful insight problem solving (Chinese logogriphs) were studied in 18 healthy subjects using high-density event-related potentials (ERPs). A new experimental paradigm (learning-testing model) was adopted in order to make subjects find a solution on their own initiative rather than receive an answer passively. Results showed that Successful guessed logogriphs elicited a more positive ERP deflection (P200-600) than did Unsuccessful guessed logogriphs in the time window from 200 to 600 ms after onset of the stimuli. Subsequently Successful logogriphs elicited a more negative ERP deflection than did Unsuccessful logogriphs in the time windows of 1500-2000 ms (N1500-2000) and 2000-2500 ms (N2000-2500). Maps of the P200-600 showed strong activity in the midline parieto-occipital scalp regions. Dipole analysis localized the generator of P200-600 in the left superior temporal gyrus and parietotemporo-occipital cortex areas. The N1500-2000 and N2000-2500 had a distinct activation over left frontal scalp regions. Dipole analysis localized the generator of the N1500-2000 in the anterior cingulate cortex (ACC) and the N2000-2500 in the posterior cingulate cortex (PCC). This result indicates that the parietotemporo-occipital cortex areas might be involved in forming rich associations in the early stage of successful logogriph solving. Then, the ACC might play an important role in the breaking mental set and the forming of novel associations. At last, "Aha" feeling might activate the PCC.     

Acquiring an understanding of design: evidence from children's insight problem solving

The human ability to make tools and use them to solve problems may not be zoologically unique, but it is certainly extraordinary. Yet little is known about the conceptual machinery that makes humans so competent at making and using tools. Do adults and children have concepts specialized for understanding human-made artifacts? If so, are these concepts deployed in attempts to solve novel problems? Here we present new data, derived from problem-solving experiments, which support the following. (i) The structure of the child's concept of artifact function changes profoundly between ages 5 and 7. At age 5, the child's conceptual machinery defines the function of an artifact as any goal a user might have; by age 7, its function is defined by the artifact's typical or intended use. (ii) This conceptual shift has a striking effect on problem-solving performance, i.e. the child's concept of artifact function appears to be deployed in problem solving. (iii) This effect on problem solving is not caused by differences in the amount of knowledge that children have about the typical use of a particular tool; it is mediated by the structure of the child's artifact concept (which organizes and deploys the child's knowledge). In two studies, children between 5 and 7 years of age were matched for their knowledge of what a particular artifact "is for", and then given a problem that can only be solved if that tool is used for an atypical purpose. All children performed well in a baseline condition. But when they were primed by a demonstration of the artifact's typical function, 5-year-old children solved the problem much faster than 6-7-year-old children. Because all children knew what the tools were for, differences in knowledge alone cannot explain the results. We argue that the older children were slower to solve the problem when the typical function was primed because (i) their artifact concept plays a role in problem solving, and (ii) intended purpose is central to their concept of artifact function, but not to that of the younger children.     

Dog and owner characteristics predict training success

Animal Cognition - Teaching owners how to train their dogs is an important part of maintaining the health and safety of dogs and people. Yet we do not know what behavioral characteristics of dogs...     

Multiple paths to transfer and constraint relaxation in insight problem solving

In two experiments participants received various training methods designed to relax constraints present in the Four-Tree problem (deBono, 1967 deBono, E. 1967. The use of lateral thinking, London: Jonathan Cape.  [Google Scholar]), a difficult insight problem. Geometry misconceptions were corrected via direct instruction. Participants’ difficulty with developing three-dimensional representations was addressed via spontaneous analogical transfer (Experiment 1) or via cued analogical transfer (Experiment 2). We found that, while both training methods were effective, alleviating multiple constraints was more effective than the alleviation of single constraints via training programmes (c.f. Kershaw & Ohlsson, 2004 Kershaw, T. C. and Ohlsson, S. 2004. Multiple causes of difficulty in insight: The case of the nine-dot problem. Journal of Experimental Psychology: Learning Memory and Cognition, 30: 3–13. doi: 10.1037/0278-7393.30.1.3[Crossref], [PubMed], [Web of Science ®] , [Google Scholar]). Providing single difficulty hints was ineffective in promoting solution. Implications for multiple paths to transfer (Nokes, 2009 Nokes, T. J. 2009. Mechanisms of knowledge transfer. Thinking & Reasoning, 15: 1–36. doi: 10.1080/13546780802490186[Taylor & Francis Online], [Web of Science ®] , [Google Scholar]; Nokes & Ohlsson, 2005 Nokes, T. J. and Ohlsson, S. 2005. Comparing multiple paths to mastery: What is learned?. Cognitive Science, 29: 769–796. doi: 10.1207/s15516709cog0000_32[Crossref], [PubMed], [Web of Science ®] , [Google Scholar]) and multiple constraints are discussed.     

Improving insight and non‐insight problem solving with brief interventions

Developing brief training interventions that benefit different forms of problem solving is challenging. In earlier research, Chrysikou (2006) showed that engaging in a task requiring generation of alternative uses of common objects improved subsequent insight problem solving. These benefits were attributed to a form of implicit transfer of processing involving enhanced construction of impromptu, on‐the‐spot or ‘ad hoc’ goal‐directed categorizations of the problem elements. Following this, it is predicted that the alternative uses exercise should benefit abilities that govern goal‐directed behaviour, such as fluid intelligence and executive functions. Similarly, an indirect intervention – self‐affirmation (SA) – that has been shown to enhance cognitive and executive performance after self‐regulation challenge and when under stereotype threat, may also increase adaptive goal‐directed thinking and likewise should bolster problem‐solving performance. In Experiment 1, brief single‐session interventions, involving either alternative uses generation or SA, significantly enhanced both subsequent insight and visual–spatial fluid reasoning problem solving. In Experiment 2, we replicated the finding of benefits of both alternative uses generation and SA on subsequent insight problem‐solving performance, and demonstrated that the underlying mechanism likely involves improved executive functioning. Even brief cognitive– and social–psychological interventions may substantially bolster different types of problem solving and may exert largely similar facilitatory effects on goal‐directed behaviours.     

Dynamics and constraints in insight problem solving

This article reports 2 experiments that investigated performance on a novel insight problem, the 8-coin problem. The authors hypothesized that participants would make certain initial moves (strategic moves) that seemed to make progress according to the problem instructions but that nonetheless would guarantee failure to solve the problem. Experiment 1 manipulated the starting state of the problem and showed that overall solution rates were lower when such strategic moves were available. Experiment 2 showed that failure to capitalize on visual hints about the correct first move was also associated with the availability of strategic moves. The results are interpreted in terms of an information-processing framework previously applied to the 9-dot problem. The authors argue that in addition to the operation of inappropriate constraints, a full account of insight problem solving must incorporate a dynamic that steers solution-seeking activity toward the constraints.     

Attempts to predict intelligent behavior: III. The relative importance of divergent and convergent production

Scores on a test built on Raaheim's (1974) theory of problem solving and intelligence (the Family Test, Part I) were correlated with scores of divergent and convergent production within the same ideational area (the Family Test, Parts II and III). The results indicate that both divergent and convergent production contribute to the solution of the problem-solving tasks. To expand the findings to a broader field of intelligence research scores on the tests of divergent and convergent production were correlated with school achievement. Multiple correlations of 0.61 (males) and 0.67 (females) were found between school achievement and the two tests. Comparisons of groups with scores above and below the means of the two tests show that school achievement depends on the combination of divergent and convergent production, suggesting that, although the two types of production reflect two different aspects of intellectual activity, as a rule they work together in the process of intelligent adjustment.     

Individual differences in problem solving via insight

The purpose of the present work was to identify general problem solving skills that underlie the production of insight. One hundred and eighteen participants completed insight problems, analogies, series-completion problems and the Remote Associates Test. Scores on all measures were related to performance on the insight problems (Pearson r's ranged from .31 to .47, p < .008). These findings are consistent with the notion that the abilities to apprehend relations and fluency of thought are involved in insightful problem solving.     

Intuition in insight and noninsight problem solving

People’s metacognitions, both before and during problem solving, may be of importance in motivating and guiding problem-solving behavior. These metacognitions could also be diagnostic for distinguishing among different classes of problems, each perhaps controlled by different cognitive processes. In the present experiments, intuitions on classic insight problems were compared with those on noninsight and algebra problems. The findings were as follows: (1) subjective feeling of knowing predicted performance on algebra problems but not on insight problems; (2) subjects’ expectations of performance greatly exceeded their actual performance, especially on insight problems; (3) normative predictions provided a better estimate of individual performance than did subjects’ own predictions, especially on the insight problems; and, most importantly, (4) the patterns-of-warmth ratings, which reflect subjects’ feelings of approaching solution, differed for insight and noninsight problems. Algebra problems and noninsight problems showed a more incremental pattern over the course of solving than did insight problems. In general, then, the data indicated that noninsight problems were open to accurate predictions of performance, whereas insight problems were opaque to such predictions. Also, the phenomenology of insight-problem solution was characterized by a sudden, unforeseen flash of illumination. We propose that the difference in phenomenology accompanying insight and noninsight problem solving, as empirically demonstrated here, be used to define insight.     

Individual differences in problem solving via insight

The purpose of the present work was to identify general problem solving skills that underlie the production of insight. One hundred and eighteen participants completed insight problems, analogies, series-completion problems and the Remote Associates Test. Scores on all measures were related to performance on the insight problems (Pearson r's ranged from .31 to .47, p < .008). These findings are consistent with the notion that the abilities to apprehend relations and fluency of thought are involved in insightful problem solving.     

Incentives improve performance on both incremental and insight problem solving

An increasing number of studies are showing a connection between emotion and motivation and cognitive processes. Most of these studies, however, have been correlational in nature, limiting the conclusions that can be drawn. We directly manipulated motivation through the use of an incentive and investigated its effects on insight and incremental problem solving. In four experiments we found that an incentive (the opportunity to leave the experiment early) increased problem-solving performance for all problems presented, regardless of problem type. Additionally, we found evidence that the incentive increased recall memory, indicating more thorough processing for participants in the incentive condition. This study provides evidence that incentives influence problem solving and implies that motivation should not be ignored when investigating cognitive processes.