The perception of sex-inconsistent behavior

Sex-role perceptions were approached from an out-of-role attributional framework, with the predictions that out-of-role behavior would be rated more extreme than in-role behavior on sex-role stereotype scales and that out-of-role behavior would be seen as more internally determined. One hundred and twenty male and female college students heard one of four tapes in which the two stimulus persons (SPs), male and female, behaved in sex-role consistent or inconsistent behavior using the dimension of dominance-submission (DM-DF, SM-SF, DM-SF, DF-SM). The DF, compared to the DM, was attributed more masculinity and less femininity. The DF's behavior, compared to the DM, was seen as originating more from internal than situational causes.     

Evaluation as a function of correspondence and hedonic relevance

An experiment was conducted to test and refine some of the implications of Jones and Davis' (1965) model of the attribution process in person perception. Subjects read anecdotes about actors who performed either in-role (low correspondence) or out-of-role (high correspondence) behaviors which were positive, negative, or neutral in the subject's estimation (hedonic relevance). Respect and admiration for the actor were influenced by both hedonic relevance and correspondence (did the action reflect an inner attribute?), but liking and friendship were affected by hedonic relevance only. The implications for the evaluation process in person perception were discussed.     

Informational cues and attributions based on role behavior

A recent experiment by Messick and Reeder (Journal of Experimental Social Psychology, 1972, 18, 482–491) attempted to extend Jones, Davis, and Gergen's (Journal of Abnormal and Social Psychology, 1961, 63, 302–310) classic finding that out-of-role behavior.is more informative for person perception than in-role behavior. It is argued, however, that this study confounded two variables, role performance and occupation. Evidence is presented that the occupation variable alone could have produced Messick and Reeder's results. Both variables seem to affect attributions. The importance of these findings for relating attribution theory and role theory is discussed.     

Inferential processes in the forced compliance situation: A Bayesian analysis

The attribution made by an observer (O) to an actor in the forced compliance situation was regarded as a probability revision process which can be described by a Bayesian inference model. Os' perceptions of the forced compliance situation were analyzed in terms of the input components into the Bayesian model: prior probabilities of the relevant attitudes and the diagnostic values of the behaviors which the actor may choose. In order to test propositions made by attribution theory about such perceptions (Kelley, 1967;Messick, 1971), Os viewed actors under conditions of Low Inducement (LI) and High Inducement (HI). Before observing the actor's decision, Os estimated the prior probabilities of the relevant attitudes and the conditional probabilities of compliance and refusal given each of the attitudes. After observing the actor's decision, Os estimated the posterior probabilities of the attitudes. As expected, in the LI condition, compared to the HI condition, compliance was seen as less probable and more diagnostic about the actor's attitudes, and the posterior probability of the corresponding attitude was higher. Contrary to expectations, within both conditions, compliance, compared to refusal, was seen as less diagnostic and more probable.     

Attributions and other inferences: Processing information about the self versus others

This study focuses on the attributional inferences involved in the comprehension of behaviors and on possible differences between the process of comprehending one's own behaviors and those of another person. Both the content of attributional judgments and the time taken to make the judgments were measured, in a design involving the comprehension of behaviors that were high or low in desirability and distinctiveness and that were understood as the subject's own versus another person's. Results show that the inferential processes in the comprehension of one's own and another's behavior are generally similar. Exceptions are where organized knowledge about the self (a self-schema) is brought into use and where differences in “perspective” between self and other influence processing. Discussion centers on the implications of the results for theories of comprehension and inference, including extensions needed to handle the self/other distinction.     

Subjective probabilities and moral judgments

The two experiments reported here examined the relationship between subjective probability estimates and moral judgments (credit and blame assignment, trait attributions, and behavior evaluations). Subjects read about situations that varied in outcome valence (moral or immoral); in addition, the nature of situational demands (Experiment 1) or behavior frequency (Experiment 2) was varied. In the first experiment, subjective probabilities were related to judgments of immoral behaviors (but not moral behaviors), whereas the situational demands only had an impact on judgments of moral behaviors. Experiment 2 included a wider range of behavioral situations, and the probability estimates and moral judgments were assessed independently. In contrast to the first experiment, subjective probabilities were related to trait and behavior ratings of both moral and immoral acts. Consistent with the first experiment, however, subjective probabilities predicted blame but not credit. Across both studies, the prior expectancies were more strongly related to evaluations of immoral acts than moral acts. Implications for understanding the determinants of judgments of moral and immoral acts are discussed.     

Causal attributions for behaviors consistent or inconsistent with an actor's personality traits: Differences between those offered by actors and observers

The present research was designed to investigate differences in the attributions offered from the actor's perspective and the observer's perspective. It was predicted that causal attributions for behaviors inconsistent with an actor's personality traits would be more situational when offered from the actor's perspective than when offered from the observer's perspective. In contrast, it was predicted that causal attributions for behaviors consistent with an actor's personality traits would be more dispositional when offered from the actor's perspective than when offered from the observer's perspective. Consistent with these hypotheses, extraverts explained introverted behaviors and introverts explained extraverted behaviors more situationally from the actor's perspective than from the observer's perspective. Furthermore, extraverts explained extraverted behaviors and introverts explained introverted behaviors more dispositionally from the actor's perspective than from the observer's perspective. These differences in the attributions offered by actors and observers were attenuated but not eliminated when attributors had access to useful situational information with which to apply the discounting principle.     

Processing alternative explanations of behavior: correction or integration?

Three experiments investigated how activation of knowledge about situational forces affects discounting in dispositional inference tasks. Each experiment varied a different knowledge activation factor--salience, accessibility, or specificity of situational information. In addition, all 3 experiments varied situational demands and cognitive load. The results showed that cognitive load eliminated discounting when situational information was low in salience, accessibility, or specificity. However, when situational information was more salient, accessible, or specific, it produced strong discounting effects even when perceivers were under cognitive load. These results are discussed in terms of correction and integration models of dispositional inferences from behavior.     

Behavior identification as a mediator of dispositional inference.

According to Trope's (1986) 2-stage model, the use of situational information ("A was teased") to identify behavior ("A reacted aggressively") may result in subsequent dispositional inferences ("A is an aggressive person") that seem insensitive to situational information. Two determinants of the situational biasing effect on behavior identification were varied, namely, behavior ambiguity and order of situational and behavioral information. It was found that when behavior was ambiguous and preceded by situational information, the latter affected behavior identification but not dispositional inference; in contrast, when behavior was unambiguous or when it was followed by situational information, the latter affected dispositional inference but not behavior identification. Thus, the same conditions that allowed situational information to bias behavior identification also nullified the effect of situational information on dispositional inference.     

A robust attribution error in the personality domain

The error of inferring dispositional causes for constrained behavior was investigated in the domain of personality. Subjects were randomly assigned to write essays presenting themselves as strongly introverted or extraverted. Within groups, subjects exchanged essays and estimated the actual (self-rated) introversion/extraversion of the writer. The procedure minimized the likelihood of certain factors conducive to correspondent inference, e.g., the low salience of constraint or nonrepresentative sample of dispositions among essay writers. The experiment included an instructional set variable which involved accentuating the situational constraint or reinforcing the subjects' inclination to individuate the writer. In all conditions, a significant pattern of correspondent inference occurred, with attributions aligned to the directionality of the essays. The results, consistent with findings from attitude attribution research, suggest that the direction of the essay provides an initial hypothesis of correspondent inference. Subjects may then use their impression of the essay's extremity as a basis upon which to adjust their attribution in accord with the constraint of the position assignment.     

Driving demands,stress reactivity and driving behavior: An interactional approach

The aim of the present study was to investigate the role of driving demands, neuroticism, and their interaction when predicting driving behavior. More precisely, we strived to examine how driving behaviors (i.e., speeding, winding, tailgating and jerky driving) unfold across low and high driving demands and whether they are contingent on a personality factor that has previously been linked to stress reactivity. In a driving simulator, 50 participants with a valid driver’s license (56.6% female, age: M = 30.13, SD = 10.16) were exposed to driving scenarios of different levels of information processing and vehicle handling demands. Additionally, they filled-out a self-report questionnaire that measured their neuroticism. We found that driving behavior became safer in scenarios that were highly demanding in terms of information processing, while this pattern did not emerge with vehicle handling demands. Moreover, tentative support was found for the notion that individuals high in neuroticism are less able to adapt their behavior to higher information processing demands. The present study offers new insights on driving demands in a simulated driving context and points to the potential importance of exploring interactions between personality and situational factors when understanding driving behavior. Additionally, the results of the present study may be used to adapt driver’s education programs.     

Smart and easy: Co-occurring activation of spontaneous trait inferences and spontaneous situational inferences

Social perceivers have been shown to draw spontaneous trait inferences (STI’s) about the behavior of an actor as well as spontaneous situational inferences (SSI’s) about the situation the actor is in. In two studies, we examined inferences about behaviors that allow for both an STI and an SSI. In Experiment 1, using a probe recognition paradigm, we found activation of both STI’s and SSI’s. In Experiment 2, using a relearning paradigm, we again found activation of both STI’s and SSI’s, regardless of temporarily activated processing goals. Results are discussed in light of three-stage models of the process of social inference.     

A mile in moccasins: how situational experience diminishes dispositionism in social inference

In four studies, this article investigates the impact of situational experience on social inference. Participants without firsthand experience of a situation made more extreme and erroneous inferences about the personalities of people behaving in that situation than did participants with firsthand experience. Firsthand experience, thus, appears to diminish dispositionism in social inference because it informs people about the situational constraints that guide behavior. Across all studies, participants also displayed holier-than-thou biases, overpredicting how generously they would act relative to predictions about their peers and also relative to how they actually acted when the situation came.     

Dispositional attribution: multiple inferences about motive-related traits

This research views dispositional inference as a process whereby perceivers integrate multiple inferences about a target person's motives and traits. The findings suggest that although perceived motives may stimulate extra attributional processing (S. Fein, 1996), the content of the inferred motive is important as well. Perceivers learned about situational forces implying that a target person had free choice, no choice, or an ulterior motive for helpful behavior. Inferences about the target's helpfulness differed depending on whether the target's behavior was attributed to an obedience motive (no-choice condition) or to a selfish motive (ulterior-motive condition). In general, inferences about motives were more predictive of dispositional inferences than were global causal attributions (to situational vs. dispositional forces) or base rate assumptions.     

The automatic and co-occurring activation of multiple social inferences

People make a variety of automatic inferences when observing others' actions. These include inferences about stable dispositions as well as transitory goal states and social situations. However, models of social inference have rarely considered whether different types of automatic inferences can co-occur. We present three experiments in which participants were incidentally exposed to texts depicting behaviors that afforded inferences about actors' traits and the social situations these actors were experiencing. Results from lexical decision and probe-recognition tasks revealed heightened activation of both trait and situational inferences; furthermore, this co-occurring activation was spontaneous, unconscious, and independent of processing resources or specific impression-formation goals. A fourth experiment extended these findings by showing that when participants were asked to make deliberate attributional judgments of the same set of behaviors, typical goal-directed biases reflecting the selection of either trait or situational interpretations emerged. Implications for social inference processes are discussed.     

The other way around: Effects of causal attributions on estimates of consensus,distinctiveness, and consistency

It was hypothesized that the attributed cause of a given person's behavior will affect inferences about its generalizability over persons (consensus), stimuli (distinctiveness), and circumstances (consistency). Moreover, these effects were expected to parallel the effects of consensus, distinctiveness, and consistency information on causal attributions. Experiment 1 provided support for these predictions but also showed that attribution affected consensus judgments less than it affected judgments of distinctiveness and consistency, particularly when consensus was not the first characteristic estimated. Using a different set of stimulus materials and a different manipulation of attribution, Experiments 2 and 3 provided further evidence for the effects of attribution on inferences of consensus information. Experiment 3 indicated that the false consensus effect—actors' tendency to assume that the majority of people share their behavior—may be due to actors' tendency to attribute their behavior to situational factors. Implications of the present studies for biased estimates of consensus and the use of consensus and attribution as mediating variables are discussed.     

Trust-suspicion and gender differences in interpersonal functioning

Responses on self-report questionnaires (Study 1) and in a dyadic game (Study 2) were observed to investigate relationships of trust-suspicion (T-S), locus of control (I-E), and situational contingencies to styles of interpersonal functioning. Generalized T-S predicted cooperative/competitive interactional choices among the male college student samples (p ? .01). However, T-S predicted females' interpersonal behaviors only when they were in a reactive, defensive position. T-S did not relate to actual behaviors when females were allowed to select/initiate cooperative or competitive exchanges. Situational rules (p ? .025) and I-E (p ? .01) predicted all subjects' behaviors when in a choice, but not defensive, position.