Interpersonal comparison versus persuasive argumentation: A more direct test of alternative explanations for group-induced shifts in individual choice

One class of theories explains group induced shifts in individual choice in terms of interpersonal comparison process. By comparing himself with others a member finds out that his position is uncomfortably discrepant, e.g., he is overly “cautious” or overly “risky”. Knowledge of this discrepancy presumably is necessary and sufficient to induce him to change his initial choice. Another class of theories holds that merely knowing one is different from others is unimportant. Shifts in choice occur because during discussion a member is exposed to persuasive arguments which prior to discussion were not available to him. Thus, if in a factorial design one independently varied (a) the number of others' choices available for comparison and (b) the number of arguments others presented in support of these choices, interpersonal comparison theories would predict the magnitude of the shift to be a function of (a) and not of (b), while theories of persuasive argumentation would predict the opposite. When such an experiment was performed the only reliable main effects were based on the number of arguments, (b), as predicted by persuasive arguments. In no instance did effects involving (a) approach significance.     

What do differences between own,admired, and attributed choices have to do with group induced shifts in choice

Two studies examined certain discrepancies which have been considered important evidence in support of interpersonal comparison (value-adherence) explanations of group induced shifts in choice. These are (a) the differences between a person's own choice and the choice he predicts others would make and (b) the difference between the former and the choice he admires. Findings from the first study indicate that own choices are more extreme than those a person predicts others would make because he is more certain and confident about the former than the latter, not because he wishes to appear to outdo others as interpersonal comparison theories of choice-shift effect would have it. The second study strongly suggests that extreme choices are admired not because they display maximal adherence to a social ideal but because they imply that the person's solution to a problem involving choice is well-founded, that he has persuasive reasons for the choice. On the whole the evidence bodes well for explanations of choice-shift effects based on persuasive argumentation and poorly for those relying on interpersonal comparison processes.     

Testing two classes of theories about group induced shifts in individual choice

One class of theories explains group induced shifts in individual choice in terms of interpersonal comparison process. By comparing himself with others a member finds out that his position is uncomfortably discrepant, e.g., he is overly cautious or overly risky. Knowledge of this discrepancy presumably is necessary and sufficient to induce him to change his initial choice. Another class of theories holds that merely knowing one is different from others is unimportant. Shifts in choice occur because during discussion a member is exposed to persuasive arguments which prior to discussion were not available to him. Two experiments were conducted, the results of which give considerable support to persuasive-argument theories and none to those based on interpersonal comparison: When a member did not know whether others were arguing for their own position or were forced to support a position contrary to the one they had originally chosen, and the former in fact was the case, typical shifts in choice were obtained. However, if a member had to argue for a position contrary to the one he had initially chosen (and thus he would not be able to muster highly persuasive arguments) typical shifts did not occur, even though another's initial choice could be accurately inferred.     

Polarizing effects of social comparison

Does exposure to others' judgments merely elicit conformity to what is observed? Two experiments are reported in which people who were merely exposed to others' responses tended not to conform to the average observed response but to exceed it in the socially preferred direction. These experiments complement social psychology's historic emphasis on conformity by suggesting that not only do people avoid being markedly deviant from others; they also act to differentiate themselves from others toward the extreme that reflects the group ideal.     

Beyond attitude consensus: The social context of persuasion and resistance

The current research presents a new type of social context effect on attitude certainty. It is proposed that when people receive persuasive messages, they appraise their attitudes not only in terms of whether they are shared or not shared by others, but also in terms of whether they are based on similar or dissimilar assessments of the information presented. In two experiments, participants were presented with persuasive messages. In Experiment 1, they were induced to perceive that they responded favorably (persuasion) or unfavorably (resistance) to the message arguments. In Experiment 2, they were allowed to vary in their actual message responses. In both experiments, message response similarity—the degree to which people perceived that their evaluations of persuasive arguments were shared or unshared by others—moderated the classic effect of attitude similarity on attitude certainty. In particular, attitude similarity only affected attitude certainty under conditions of message response similarity. When message responses were believed to be dissimilar, attitude similarity had no effect on attitude certainty.     

Persuasive argumentation and social comparison as determinants of attitude polarization

Several of our studies indicate that persuasive-arguments theory by itself is an adequate explanation of polarization. Sanders and Baron (Journal of Experimental Social Psychology 1977, 13, 303–314) criticize this research. More generally, they contend that both argumentation and comparison are involved, “with persuasive arguments facilitating the shifts motivated by social comparison.” We feel that their critique is unconvincing. Relevant portions of the standard literature are reviewed to demonstrate that social comparison is neither a necessary nor sufficient condition for polarization. Finally, we speculate about how persuasive-arguments theory could be extended to argument-poor settings (e.g., Asch's line comparison situation).     

Motivational bases of choice in three-choice decomposed games

Subjects were presented a series of decomposed games that permitted them to select alternatives that maximize one or more of the following motivational dispositions: (1) own gain (individualism), (2) joint gain (cooperation), (3) relative gain (competition), or (4) minimization of other's gain (aggression). There were two types (cases) of games. Case 1 games permitted the S the same or a greater number of points than the other player across all alternatives; Case 2 games afforded the same or fewer points than the other player across all alternatives. It was found: (1) the motive of minimization of other's gain was negligibly reflected in Ss' choices; (2) the other motives were present and affecting Ss' choices; (3) more competitive and fewer cooperative choices occurred in Case 2 than in Case 1 games; (4) sex of subject affected choice behavior in only one game, where males tended to be more cooperative and females more individualistic; and (5) though information on choice and outcome of others was highly limited, some behavioral imitation occurred within dyads.     

Is social comparison irrelevant for producing choice shifts?

After 15 years of research on group induced shifts in individual choice, two hypotheses, social comparison (involving image maintenance) and persuasive arguments (involving attitude change), have emerged as the leading explanatory contenders. Burnstein and his associates have recently reported a series of studies that they feel clearly establish the persuasive arguments hypothesis as the best explanation for the shifts. The present paper takes issue with their conclusion. A study is presented that supports a social comparison interpretation of one of the experiments reported in Burnstein and Vinokur (Journal of Experimental Social Psychology 1973, 9, 123–137). In addition, a critical analysis of several other key studies reported by Burnstein and his associates yields the conclusion that neither hypothesis completely accounts for the available data. Rather, both image maintenance and attitude change processes may operate in a complementary manner, with persuasive arguments facilitating the shifts motivated by social comparison. Parallels are drawn between the factors that affect choice shifts and those that affect conformity behavior.     

Mediating Role of Memory of Another Person's Choicein Social Influence on Preference

We often tend to fit our subjective preference with those of others after merely being faced with what other people prefer. This is known as social conformity. However, it is still unclear how the impact of such a social influence on subjective preference is modulated by the personal characteristics of the other person (e.g., whether the person is trustworthy) and the explicit memory of those personal characteristics (e.g., remembering who evaluated the objects). To clarify explicit memory's underlying role regarding social influence, we asked participants to evaluate their preference for abstract paintings both before and after observing binary choices made by others whose behaviors could be labeled as trustworthy, neutral, or untrustworthy. The results showed the following: (a) even without explicit memory of who made a choice and which painting was chosen, the participants preferred chosen over unchosen paintings; and (b) such preference changes were modulated by the subjective trustworthiness of others only when they explicitly remembered who made a choice.     

Asymmetric option effects on ease of choice criticism and defense

Individuals often criticize others’ choices and seek to defend their own. In theory, the ease of criticizing a particular choice should correspond to the ease of defending it. However, we demonstrate that differences in the types of arguments put forth in choice criticism and defense result in a systematic discrepancy in the ease with which these tasks are performed. Specifically, criticism arguments tend to be based on norms or conventions, and defense arguments on idiosyncratic tastes or circumstances; accordingly, whether the chosen option is perceived as un/conventional has a significantly greater effect on the ease of choice criticism than on the ease of choice defense. Furthermore, assessing the ease of choice defense increases the choice share of unconventional options, whereas judging the ease of choice criticism has only a small impact on choice. We discuss the implications of our findings with respect to research on reason-based choice in socially-intensive environments.     

Two approaches to the problems of self-attacking arguments and general odd-length cycles of attack

The problems that arise from the presence of self-attacking arguments and odd-length cycles of attack within argumentation frameworks are widely recognized in the literature on defeasible argumentation. This paper introduces two simple semantics to capture different intuitions about what kinds of arguments should become justified in such scenarios. These semantics are modeled upon two extensions of argumentation frameworks, which we call sustainable and tolerant. Each one is constructed on the common ground of the powerful concept of admissibility introduced by Dung in [P.M. Dung, On the acceptability of arguments and its fundamental role in non-monotonic reasoning, logic programming, and n-person games, Artificial Intelligence 77 (1995) 321–357]. The novelty of this approach consists in viewing the admissibility of a subset of arguments as relative to potentially challenging subsets of arguments. Both sustainable and tolerant semantics are more credulous than preferred semantics (i.e. they justify at least the same arguments, and possibly more). Given certain sufficient conditions they coincide among them as well as with other semantics introduced by Dung.     

Experiences that motivate moral development: The role of cognitive dissonance

It has been found in previous research concerning Kohlberg's stages of moral development that engagement in a “real-life” moral dilemma sometimes leads to an advance in an individual's level of moral thought. It is argued in this study that such moral growth is often motivated by the need to reduce cognitive dissonance, which, it is suggested, frequently accompanies choice and commitment in moral contexts. Subjects in the present study delivered counterattitudinal messages that contained arguments that were either 1 stage higher or 1 stage lower than their characteristic level of moral reasoning. Half of the subjects freely chose to deliver these messages, and half did not. Afterwards, subjects' attitudes toward the issues discussed in their messages and their tendency to conceptualize moral issues in terms of the higher or lower levels of reasoning contained in their messages were assessed. The subjects who (a) had freely chosen to deliver the message, and (b) had delivered the message containing higher level arguments used significantly more advanced moral reasoning after their counterattitudinal advocacy than they had before it. These subjects showed greater change in their attitudes regarding the topic discussed in their message than other subject groups. These results suggest that moral behavior will be likely to promote moral growth (a) if it occurs under circumstances that promote cognitive dissonance (e.g., free choice) and (b) if advanced moral ideas are made salient during the dissonance reduction process.     

Self-generated persuasion: effects of the target and direction of arguments

Previous research has revealed that self-persuasion can occur either through role-playing (i.e., when arguments are generated to convince another person) or, more directly, through trying to convince oneself (i.e., when arguments are generated with oneself as the target). Combining these 2 traditions in the domain of attitude change, the present research investigated the impact on self-persuasion of the specific target of one's own persuasive attempt (i.e., others vs. oneself). We found that the efficacy of self-persuasion depended on whether people believed that they would have to put more or less effort in convincing the self or others. Specifically, we found opposite effects for self-generated arguments depending on whether the topic of persuasion was proattitudinal or counterattitudinal. Across 4 studies, it was shown that when the topic of the message was counterattitudinal, people were more effective in convincing themselves when the intended target of the arguments was themselves versus another person. However, the opposite was the case when the topic was proattitudinal. These effects were shown to stem from the differential effort perceived as necessary and actually exerted in trying to produce persuasion under these conditions.     

The predictive efficiency of Holland's SDS summary codes in terms of career choice: A four-year follow-up

This study was designed to investigate the predictive efficiency of the primary and secondary summary codes of Holland's Self-Directed Search for Educational and Vocational Planning (SDS) in terms of expressed career choice 4 years later. In 1974, 126 voiationally undecided high school seniors were given the SDS, followed by a revision of Trow's Vocational Choice Inventory (VCI) in which they were asked to express a career choice or a state of indecision. In 1978, this same group was mailed a posttest VCI; the responses of 84 subjects were then analyzed. The subjects' expressed career choices on both the 1974 and 1978 VCI were compared to the primary and secondary summary codes on the SDS which they had taken in 1974. Inspection of the responses indicated that 21.4% of the subjects had made career choices predicted by their primary summary codes and 51.2% had made vocational choices found among their secondary summary codes. Only 27.4% chose a career area not predicted by their 1974 SDS results. The results of this study appear to lend support to the validity of using the SDS summary codes to predict eventual career decisions.     

How Can Modifications of Meaning Influence Argumentation? The Concept and Typology of Semantic Arguments

The aim of this article is to show how modifications of meaning can influence argumentation. I present the basic concept of so-called ‘semantic argumentation,’ its definition, and its different variants. I analyse the various kinds of argument in which meanings of terms are modified in support of a persuasive goal. The analysis of different semantic arguments reveals certain structures and patterns that are needed to construct a typology of such arguments. I thus outline a basic concept of argumentation based on modifications of meaning, before presenting various examples of such arguments together with an analysis of their structures, and then, finally, constructing a typology for them.

     

Age and sex differences in the development of children's occupational reasoning

The purpose of this study was an investigation of age and sex differences in the thinking processes that underlie children's occupational choices and their perception of adult roles. Subjects were 48 nursery school children (24 3-year-olds and 24 4-year-olds) and 48 third graders, all middle class, evenly divided by sex. Subjects were interviewed, using a modified form of Van Den Daele's Ego Ideal interview, on what they wanted to be when they grew up, their reasons for their choices, and their knowledge of means and ends regarding their choices. They were also asked what they would want to be if they were of the opposite sex. Tape-recorded responses were evaluated according to Van Den Daele's Ego Ideal levels. Analyses of variance indicated significant (p < .0001) changes of level with age. Sex differences were less pronounced and inconsistent. The range of occupations tended to increase with age, and both boys and girls expressed a broader range of choices for themselves than they did for the opposite sex. The study demonstrates that the process of vocational development is related to cognitive development; children's choices and reasoning reflect their changing modes of understanding the world.     

Affiliation of opposite-sexed strangers

This study examined the effects of a subject's sex and affiliative tendency and the other's physical attractiveness on the cross-sexual interaction of strangers. Although previous studies showed that one's interest in an opposite-sexed other is a function of the other's physical attractiveness, the actual behavior of individuals in the presence of attractive and unattractive others had not been systematically examined. Subjects were individually placed in a 5-min waiting situation with a physically attractive or unattractive target of the opposite sex who behaved in a standard way. Conversations were recorded and subsequently analyzed; subjects also provided their impressions of the targets following the waiting period. Physical attractiveness of the opposite-sexed other did not significantly influence the subject's verbal affiliative behavior, but the combined influence of a subject's sex and affiliative tendency was predictive of cross-sexual affiliation. Although physical attractiveness did not account for differences in affiliative behavior, subjects preferred attractive over unattractive targets as potential dates or marriage partners.     

Do the right thing: but only if others do so

Social norms play an important role in individual decision making. We argue that two different expectations influence our choice to obey a norm: what we expect others to do (empirical expectations) and what we believe others think we ought to do (normative expectations). Little is known about the relative importance of these two types of expectation in individuals' decisions, an issue that is particularly important when normative and empirical expectations are in conflict (e.g., systemic corruption, high crime cities). In this paper, we report data from Dictator game experiments where we exogenously manipulate dictators' expectations in the direction of either selfishness or fairness. When normative and empirical expectations are in conflict, we find that empirical expectations about other dictators' choices significantly predict a dictator's own choice. However, dictators' expectations regarding what other dictators think ought to be done do not have a significant impact on their decisions after controlling for empirical expectations. Our findings about the crucial influence of empirical expectations are important for designing institutions or policies aimed at discouraging undesirable behavior. Copyright © 2008 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.     

The effect of normative beliefs on anticipated emotions.

In 3 experiments, Ss were asked how they would or should make hypothetical decisions and how they would react emotionally to the options or outcomes. The choices were those in which departures from proposed normative models had previously been found: omission bias, status quo bias, and the person-causation effect. These effects were found in all judgments, including judgments of anticipated emotion. Arguments against the departures affected judgments of anticipated emotion as well as decisions, even though the arguments were entirely directed at the question of what should be done. In all but one study, effects of these arguments on anticipated emotion were as strong as their effects on decisions or normative beliefs. Thus, in many situations, people think that their emotional reactions will fall into line with their normative beliefs. In other situations, some people think that their emotional reactions have a life of their own. It is suggested that both normative beliefs and anticipated emotions affect decisions.