Three aspects of cognitive development

An attempt was made to characterize and explain developmental differences in children's thinking, specifically in their understanding of balance scale problems. Such differences were sought in three domains: existing knowledge about the problems, ability to acquire new information about them, and process-level differences underlying developmental changes in the first two areas. In Experiment 1, four models of rules that might govern children's performance on balance scale problems were proposed. The rules proved to accurately describe individual performance and also to accurately predict developmental trends on different types of balance scale problems. Experiment 2 examined responsiveness to experience; it was found that older and younger children, equated for initial performance on balance scale problems, derived different benefits from identical experience. Experiment 3 examined a potential cause of this discrepancy, that younger children might be less able than older ones to benefit from experience because their encoding of stimuli was less adequate. Independent assessment procedures revealed that the predicted differences in older and younger children's encoding were present; it was also found that these differences were not artifactual and that reducing them also reduced the previously observed differences in responsiveness to experience. It was concluded, therefore, that the encoding hypothesis explained a large part of the developmental difference in ability to acquire new information.     

The sources of developmental differences in children's incidental processing during discrimination trials

Crane and Ross reported that second graders learned more than sixth graders about attributes made relevant after solution of a discrimination task. Here two experiments are reported that enlighten the sources of this developmental difference. Both make use of an experimental technique whereby children verbalize their hypotheses during solution of a discrimination problem. The results indicate that ten-year-olds do not learn about incidental attributes that they tested while irrelevant in the pre-solution period, but that five-year-olds and seven-year-olds do. Children of all three ages process incidental information about attributes that they did not sample pre-solution. With some qualification, the incidentally processed information is retained throughout a five-minute delay interval. The results bear on developmental trends in the distribution of attention and on theoretical accounts of incidental learning in discrimination tasks.     

Age differences in the temporal locus of memory organization in children's recall

Age differences in when (i.e., at input or output) children organize information for recall were investigated in terms of a model specifying that information organized at input is more resistant to forgetting over time than information not organized at input. In Experiment 1, recall of items from categorically related and unrelated lists was assessed either immediately or after a 4-min delay. For 9-year-olds, the effect of delay was comparable for the related and unrelated lists, indicative of spontaneous organization at time of output. In contrast, 13-year-olds showed a significantly smaller delay effect with related than with unrelated lists, indicative of spontaneous organization at time of input. Experiments 2 and 3 demonstrated that, for 9-year-olds, high levels of clustering in and of themselves do not eliminate effects of delayed testing characteristic of output organization, and that when 9-year-olds are biased to organize information at input, delay effects are reduced only when measures are taken to ensure that all the category labels are retrieved.     

The development of children's problem solving in a gears task: A problem space perspective

I examined two contexts of development in children's problem solving: (1) the macro-context of different age cohorts (8–9 vs 11–12 years of age); and (2) the micro-context of an approximately one-hour experimental session. Twenty subjects (even divided across sexes and these two age groups) were individually presented a collection of variously sized gears, a board onto which these gears could be easily attached and rotated, and a knob. Each subject was asked to find all solutions, in which two marked gears were turning the same way, and to represent these solutions graphically. Subjects applied four different problem spaces to the task: the Euclidean, the Kinematic, the Dynamic, and the Topological. The Arithmetic Modifier could be applied to any of these problem spaces, resulting in a numerical characterization of the gear constructions and/or production strategies. The 11–12's tended to shift problem spaces adaptively; the 8–9's seldom did so. Analysis of the pathways of transition between the problem spaces revealed a complex picture of partial or complete incorporation, and substitution.     

Young children's processing of television: Modality differences in the retention of temporal relations

Two experiments were conducted to examine modality differences in pre-schoolers' ability to recognize or recall temporally related events. Results of both experiments demonstrated that temporally related events were remembered more frequently when they were conveyed visually rather than aurally. This modality effect was found both when the semantic content of the auditory and visual sequences was either the same or different, and for shows designed for educational and purely entertainment purposes. The data suggest that children show relatively impoverished integration of the temporal parameters of auditory information, which may contribute to their misunderstandings about the plot of a televison show.     

A test of parallel versus serial processing applied to memory retrieval

Townsend has identified necessary and sufficient conditions that reaction time distributions meet if they are produced by two underlying processes that are parallel and within-stage independent. This paper describes an attempt to use one of these conditions to assess the assumption of independent parallel memory retrieval in Anderson's ACT theory. In the experimental test, subjects studied profession-location pairs, with each profession and location included in two pairs. One pair had a high frequency of presentation and the other had low. When cued with a profession (or location), subjects responded with the first of the two studied locations (or professions) that came to mind. The reaction times to these responses were used to test the ACT assumption of independent parallel search. The problems encountered in trying to apply Townsend's abstract test to a concrete situation included the need to consider mixtures and convolutions of distributions and empirical, rather than theoretical, distributions. These difficulties are discussed at length and some formal analyses concerning their effect on the test are given. Despite these problems, we were able to use Townsend's test and the results of the experiment support the within-stage independent parallel assumption of ACT.     

Span and rate of apprehension in children and adults.

Children and adults quantified random patterns of dots, under unlimited exposure duration. For adults and children two distinct processes appear to operate. For adults the quantification of collections of from one to three dots is essentially errorless, and proceeds at the rate of 46 msec per item, while the quantification rate for from 4 to 10 dots is 307 msec per dot. For children the same operating ranges appear to hold, however children are much slower. The lower slope is 195 msec per dot, while the upper is 1049. Although the results for adults and children are similar except for the overall rates, the nature of the isomorphism between children and adults is unclear.     

Repetition of cues in children's oddity learning and transfer

The hypothesis that repetition of specific cues interferes with oddity learning was directly tested by comparing two groups of preschool (3 to 5 years of age) children, one with repeated cues and the other with new cues on every trial. Repetition of cues retarded oddity learning confirming previous speculation based on error analyses. Performance on postsolution transfer trials with repeated cues was not affected by conditions of acquisition. Significant age effects were found in oddity acquisition, while there was only weak evidence for agerelated performance differences on transfer trials. Transfer performance on trials with repetition of cues was not related to whether or not the children were informed of such repetition. The results were related to theories of oddity acquisition and transfer.     

Knowledge of one's own responding and the relation of such knowledge to learning: A developmental study

First-, third-, fifth-grade children, and college students (ages 6, 8, 10, and 19 years) acquired a paired-associate list under the study-test procedure to a one error-less trial criterion. In addition, as each pair was presented the individual indicated whether he/she had that pair correct on the immediately preceding trial (postdiction responses). The data were interpreted in terms of a discrimination-utilization hypothesis which postulates that individuals discriminate their own correct and incorrect responses on a given trial and use this information for distributing processing effort on the subsequent trial. Analyses involving the accuracy of postdiction responses, the relation of postdiction accuracy to acquisition, and the consideration of the acquisition data in terms of a two-stage model led to the conclusion that older children and adults may use the discrimination-utilization strategy but younger children tend not to use it, probably because of both mediation and production deficiencies.     

Eye fixations and cognitive processes

This paper presents a theoretical account of the sequence and duration of eye fixation during a number of simple cognitive tasks, such as mental rotation, sentence verification, and quantitative comparison. In each case, the eye fixation behavior is linked to a processing model for the task by assuming that the eye fixates the referent of the symbol being operated on.     

Self-directed attention and the comparison of self with standards

Several theorists have assumed that self-directed attention causes a comparison between one's present behavior or state and whatever is salient and relevant as a standard of comparison. Indirect evidence bearing on this assumption was gathered in a series of four studies by monitoring subjects' tendencies to access concrete information needed to make such behavior-standard comparisons. Self-focus was varied in two of these studies by experimental manipulations: a mirrored surface, and a live observer. In the other two studies, self-focus was operationalized in terms of subjects' dispositional tendencies to direct attention to themselves (self-consciousness). Consistent with expectations, in Experiments 1 and 2, self-directed attention led to increased frequency of referring to drawings of geometric figures when attempting to reproduce them. In Experiments 3 and 4, self-focused attention increased subjects' tendencies to seek out information about ostensible performance norms reflecting the behavior of other subjects, also as predicted.     

Negative transfer in children's recall of categorized materials

A negative transfer paradigm was used to assess kindergarten, third-, and sixth-grade (approximately 5, 9, and 12 years old) children's use of category relations in lists presented for recall. Negative transfer effects increased with age, with kindergarten children showing no evidence of interference relative to a control group.     

Categorical and spatial modes of representation in young children's recall

Preschool children aged 4 and 6 were asked to recall a set of line drawings under two conditions: pictures blocked in category groups, and pictures blocked in noncategory groups. For 4-year-olds, the blocking condition made no difference in the structure of their recall; but for the 6-year-olds, the category blocking served as a support for category clustering of their recall lists. No purely spatial clustering appeared at either age. It was concluded that 6-year-olds' use of classes is closely linked to concrete spatial arrangement of objects.     

Extent,multiplying, and proportionality rules in children's judgments of area

The study examined children's use of multiplying and proportionality rules in judgments of area. In two experiments children judged the area of rectangles. Seven-year-olds used linear extent as an index of area. Eight- and nine-year-olds replaced the extent rule with the height × width rule. In a third experiment 8-through 11-year-olds were presented with a rectangle and a horizontal line representing the width of a second rectangle. Children were asked to indicate the height that would make the second rectangle equal in area to the first. The correct response was proportional to the product of the ratio of the widths of the two rectangles and the height of the first rectangle. Graphical and statistical analyses indicated that children applied the ratio rule to these judgments. The implications for Piaget's theory of cognitive development were discussed.     

Modeling strategy shifts in a problem-solving task

A computer simulation model was fitted to human laboratory data for the Missionaries and Cannibals task to explain (1) the effects upon problem performance of giving a hint, and (2) the effects of solving the problem a second time after one successful solution had been achieved. Most of the variance in the relative frequencies of different moves can be explained by positing that the effect of the hint, or of previous experience in solving the problem, is to cause subjects to switch more promptly from a strategy of balancing the numbers of missionaries and cannibals on both sides of the river, to a means-ends strategy.     

The functional equivalence of problem solving skills

The tower of Hanoi problem is used to show that, even in simple problem environments, numerous distinct solution strategies are available, and different subjects may learn different strategies. Four major classes of solution strategies are described for the problem. Different strategies have different degrees of transferability, place different burdens on short-term memory and on perception, and require different learning processes for their acquisition. The analysis underscores the importance of subject-by-subject analysis of “what is learned” in understanding human behavior in problem-solving situations, and provides a technique for describing subjects' task performance programs in detail.     

Subtraction and the solution of open sentence problems

This paper is concerned with the processes used by children in solving open sentence problems of the form x + u = y (Type 1) and u + x = y (Type 2). Three models for reaction times to these problems are proposed. The first assumes they are solved by an incrementing process, the second assumes a decrementing process, while the third assumes that the subject increments or decrements, depending on which is quickest. Two experiments designed to evaluate these models are reported. It is shown, by means of a series of regression analyses that the third model gives the best account of the success latencies to Type 1 problems. This model predicts that times will be a linear function of the minimum of x and y ? x. It is also shown that none of the models give an adequate account of the latency data for Type 2 problems. Some possible reasons for this difference are discussed, together with some evidence that indicates that Type 1 problems and ordinary subtraction problems are solved by the same process.     

Self-consciousness,self-report of aggressiveness,and aggression

Private self-consciousness consists of attending to one's thoughts, feelings, and motives. Public self-consciousness consists of attending to oneself as a social object. The effect of dispositional self-consciousness on the accuracy of self-reports was studied in research on aggression. High- and low-private self-conscious subjects rated their own aggressiveness. Several weeks later their aggressive behavior was objectively measured. The correlation between self-report of aggressiveness and aggressive behavior was significantly higher for high-than for low-private self-conscious subjects. The correlation between self-report and behavior was unaffected by public self-consciousness. The implications of these findings for self-consciousness theory and personality dispositions are discussed.     

Imaging,empathy, and causal attribution

Three studies were conducted to test whether imagery accounts for the effects of empathy on attributions, that is, whether attributers construct and scan a mental image of social scenarios the same way that actual participants scan a real environment. According to this interpretation, attributers “see” the world as the participant does and make vicarious attributions. An alternative interpretation holds that subjects base vicarious attributions on recreating the motivations and affect of the actor, so that imaging is irrelevant to empathy and attributions. In the first study, subjects who imagined a story from the perspective of a particular character later showed differential recall of story details as a function of role, but not differential attributions. In Experiment 2, role-taking subjects showed clear effects of imaged perspective on recall for story details, but no effects on attributions of causality for an accident. Further, recall and attribution were uncorrelated. In the last study, empathy and imagery role-taking instructions produced independent effects: imagers showed pronounced perspective-relevant recall and empathizers did not. Neither showed unambiguous vicarious attributions. Recall and attribution were again uncorrelated. These studies suggest that the imagery explanation of empathy effects is untenable, and imply that the recall of perspective-relevant details is unlikely to mediate attributions of causality in imaginary scenarios.