Merton’s “True Self”: A Resource for Survivors of Sexual Abuse by Priests

The toxic impact of clergy sexual abuse in childhood and adolescence can be complex and enduring. For some, a particularly painful consequence is noteworthy change in one’s personal identity or sense of self. Survivors frequently experience unrelenting grief over the loss of the “self” that was experienced as “real” prior to the onset of abuse. Memories of days and times when this self was “alive” are often accompanied by strong feelings of affection and joy. Despair over the loss of this identity contrasts sharply with the indifference or hostility felt for the self with which they have been burdened as a consequence of sexual abuse by clergy in childhood. Many struggle with the unbearable conviction that they are fated to live “in the skin” of an identity that is not an authentic expression of the person they were meant to be. This article suggests that the writings of Thomas Merton (1915–1968) may offer a hopeful resource for survivors of clergy sexual abuse and for those working in support of survivors’ recovery. Merton has been described as “the most influential Catholic author of the twentieth century” ). His writings touch the “deeper woundedness of spirit and psyche” (Kilcourse, Cross Curr, 49:87–96, 1999, p. 90) and his elegant examination of the true self lies “at the center of his teaching on the Christian life” (Conn, Pastor Psychol, 46:323–332, 1998, p. 327). For Merton, the true self is indestructible and, because it is “rooted in God” (Merton, The inner experience: Notes on contemplation, Harper Collins, New York, 2003, p. 2), always open to discovery, growth, and transformation. This framework may be especially useful for individuals whose personal identity, as a consequence of sexual abuse in childhood by clergy, is experienced as forever poisoned and beyond redemption.     

A Spiritual Person

When asked in a questionnaire to describe a spiritual person, William James named one instead: Phillips Brooks. This article focuses on Brooks—his life, his sermons, and his poem “O Little Town of Bethlehem”—to make the case that he exemplified James’ view of spirituality as “a susceptibility to ideals, but with a certain freedom to indulge in imagination about them.” It also supports Belzen’s (Mental Health, Religion & Culture, 12:205–222, 2009) view that there is no spirituality in general but only individual manifestations of it, a point that James’ nomination of Brooks implicitly supports.     

Loneliness and innocence: A Kierkegaardian reflection on the paradox of self-realization

In this paper, I explore loneliness as a primordial call to find accord with the self that, as Kierkegaard claims, is born of spirit. I put Kierkegaard’s Anti-Climacan formula, “the more consciousness, the more self,” to work by examining lamentation over loss of the innocent days of youth as symptomatic of primordial loneliness. In loneliness, I argue, we confound loss of naivete (a developmental change) with loss of innocence (a spiritual failing). While each person is fated to lose naivete, no person loses innocence by developmental necessity. Each person loses innocence by his or her own hand in freedom.     

Accuracy of recall among “eyewitnesses” to a simulated robbery: Intrapersonal and stimulus determinants

This study is a laboratory analogue investigation of variables that impinge upon the recall of detail about a simulated act of armed robbery among “eyewitnesses.” Specifically, this study sought to determine (1) whether recall of detail by Ss who watch the videotape of a simulated “armed robbery” taken by surveillance camera in a “convenience” store varies according to (a) the dress and appearance of the presumed “robber,” (b) the gender of the victim of the “robbery,” and/or (c) the gender of the “eyewitness”; and (2) whether such recall varies according to S’s inventoried psychological “needs.” Ss viewed the videotape of the simulated robbery under one of four conditions representing variations in the dress and appearance (“status”) of the alleged offender and the gender of the alleged victim; completed the Personality Adjective Inventory; and responded to a questionnaire concerning details of the alleged offense. Results indicate that the single statistically significant source of variance in accuracy of recall of detail is the experimentally manipulated “status” of the perpetrator; gender of victim and of subject contribute significantly neither in isolation nor in interaction. Inventoried psychological needs for “autonomy” and “change” are significantly but negatively and weakly correlated with accuracy among women Ss, while “change” alone is so correlated among men Ss. Findings are interpreted in accordance with theory and research in experimental social psychology and psychological criminology bearing upon person perception and role expectancy in relation to behavioral stereotypes. This study was supported in part through the Henry Rutgers Scholars Program at Rutgers College of Rutgers-The State University of New Jersey. The authors express their gratitude to Charles Rouse, Steven Gaynor, April Hayes, Erica Gross, Shawn Kimble, Elizabeth Chen, and Stephanie Bonn; Officer Leroy Washington, Rutgers University Police; and most particularly to Dipak Munsaf, proprietor of Krauszer's Food Store in the sixth ward of the city of New Brunswick.     

��Justice is happiness��?��An analysis of Plato��s strategies in response to challenges from the sophists

The challenge from the sophists with whom Plato is confronted is: Who can prove that the just man without power is happy whereas the unjust man with power is not? This challenge concerns the basic issue of politics: the relationship between justice and happiness. Will the unjust man gain the exceptional “happiness of the strong” by abusing his power and by injustice? The gist of Plato’s reply is to speak not of “justice” but of “intrinsic justice,” i.e., the strength of virtue which, in his account, is the fundamental good of man. Nevertheless, many contend that intrinsic justice is actually injustice, for the division of power in the state is undemocratic while in the soul, the suppression of desire by the reason. Plato’s advocacy of hierarchical, elite political system has enraged democrats, while his idea of “philosopher king” has enraged the aristocrats as well. So, who will appreciate Plato’s effort?     

Well-being and Spirituality from a Korean Perspective: Based on the Study of Culture and Subjective Well-being

Criteria for well-being and spirituality are culturally bound. In this article, therefore, the notions of well-being and spirituality were reconsidered from a Korean perspective. Two major conceptual approaches that pertain to “subjective well-being” research in social psychology provide the methodological framework for this study. While “bottom-up” approaches focus on how external events and situations influence happiness, “top-down” approaches center on diverse variables within an individual and his or her culture. Noting the cultural differences between American and Korean self-construals (i.e., independence vs. interdependence), the author argues that Koreans need to construct “top-down” approaches to both well-being and spirituality. Reviewing Robert Emmon’s concept of “spiritual intelligence,” the author also suggests an integrative model for spirituality and well-being in Korea.     

The Purpose and Neurobiology of Theory of Mind Functions

Theory of Mind (ToM) refers to a cognitive process which allows an individual to “place him/herself” in the other person’s “mind,” so as to comprehend the latter’s cognitive and emotional status, so as to predict his/her behavior and emotional response to a particular situation. ToM is necessary for everyday interaction among individuals and accounts for such human traits as empathy, compassion, and deceit. It is also particularly important in the relationship between a healer and his or her client, as well as in the God–human relationship. Recent research in the area of neurosciences has identified a specific brain “system” responsible for ToM, as well as described how these functions may be affected in certain neuropsychiatric conditions. In this article, we discuss the definition and neurobiological substrate of ToM. In addition, we discuss the cognitive steps important to achieve an “accurate” theory of mind, its relevance to “self-knowledge,” and its limitations. We also review some of the data concerning abnormalities and “distortion” of ToM in neuropsychiatric disorders and aberrant human behavior.     

Incarnational Christian psychology and psychotherapy: What do we believe and what do we do?

The following paper proposes a viewpoint regarding the working assumptions, theology and practice for an “incarnational” psychology or “Christian psychology,” particularly with regard to psychotherapy. This essay is primarily meant to be an affirmation and guide for those Christian psychologists and others working in the allied professions. However, both veteran theorists and newcomers to such inquiry will benefit from this essay. Discussion begins with the dynamic of surrendering and receiving a personal relationship with Jesus Christ. The understanding of the unique person as soul: in mind, body, life and spirit is discussed. In addition, the working of the incarnate Holy Spirit is elaborated for both therapist and patient in the regenerative and therapeutic process. Psychopathology is reframed in reference to the Judeo-Christian revelation of sin and evil. In addition, truth, falsity and psychopathology are considered in light of the essentially regenerated man/woman or “new creation” in Christ. Some practical examples for psychotherapeutic intervention are offered, including the unique role of the Christian psychologist and his or her relationship with both patient and Christ. Seven major assumptions of “incarnational” or Christian psychology, which diverge from purely secular (psychological) theory and practice, are presented. Lastly, Christian psychology is distinguished from both “integrated” psychology and theology; and Biblical counseling.

Confucianism between Tradition and Modernity, Religion, and Secularization: Questions to Tu Weiming

The article discusses central assumptions of Tu Weiming’s program of overcoming the “enlightenment mentality” and throws a critical light on his conceptions of religious or spiritual Confucianism, of a Confucian modernity, and of the “multiple modernities” theory in general. It defends a unitary rather than multiple concept of modernity in terms of the realization of a morally controlled “principle of free subjectivity” and tries to show how Confucianism, understood as a secular ethics, could contribute to this goal.     

Did Kant Respect Persons?

The illusion that Kant respects persons comes from ascribing contemporary meanings to purely technical terms within his second formulation of the categorical imperative, “[A]ct so that you treat humanity, whether in your own person or in that of another, always as an end and never as a means only”. When we realize that “humanity” means rational nature and “person” means the supersensible self (homo noumenon), we find that we are to respect, not human selves in all their diversity (homo phaenomenon), but rational selves in all their sameness, in their unvarying conformity to the universal principles of pure practical reason. Contemporary individualism gets no support from Kant. This revised version was published online in August 2006 with corrections to the Cover Date.     

Awakening to Dreams

The author recounts how shamanic dream incubation and lucid dreaming aided both his psychic healing in therapy and his physical healing of cancer through dream journeying in the imaginal. The imaginal is the realm of spirit and soul to the shaman, the unconscious to Freud, the archetypes of the collective unconscious to Jung, and transitional space between the “me” and “not-me” to Winnicott.Louis Hagood, M.A., in Psychoanalytic Studies from The New School, is a member of the National Psychological Association for Psychoanalysts, The Association for the Study of Dreams and the Friends of the Institute for Noetic Sciences and practices psychoanalysis in New York City. Correspondence to Louis Hagood, lhagood@oxbridge.com.     

On the notion of home and the goals of palliative care

The notion of home is well known from our everyday experience, and plays a crucial role in all kinds of narratives about human life, but is hardly ever systematically dealt with in the philosophy of medicine and health care. This paper is based upon the intuitively positive connotation of the term “home.” By metaphorically describing the goal of palliative care as “the patient’s coming home,” it wants to contribute to a medical humanities approach of medicine. It is argued that this metaphor can enrich our understanding of the goals of palliative care and its proper objectives. Four interpretations of “home” and “coming home” are explored: (1) one’s own house or homelike environment, (2) one’s own body, (3) the psychosocial environment, and (4) the spiritual dimension, in particular, the origin of human existence. Thinking in terms of coming home implies a normative point of view. It represents central human values and refers not only to the medical-technical and care aspects of health care, but also to the moral context.     

Another conversion. Stanisław Brzozowski’s ‘diary’ as an early instance of the post-secular turn to religion

This essay is an attempt to analyze an important decision Brzozowski took at the end of his life, i.e. his late turn towards Catholicism, which, despite his own objections, we should nonetheless call a religious conversion. The main reason why Brzozowski resisted the traditional rhetoric of conversion lies in his often repeated conviction that faith cannot invalidate life, because “what is not biographical, does not exist at all.” Brzozowski, therefore, rejects conversion understood as a radical and abrupt revolution of the soul, which annuls everything that happened before, and turns to a model of religiosity (“Catholicism, undoubtedly”) which preserves his entire biographical past. In this manner, Brzozowski seeks his own formula of faith, more adequate to the “situation” of the modern man who lives in and through History. I argue that the model of “conversion without conversion” Brzozowski chose as representative of modern man is typically, though avant la lettre, post-secular: closer to the Jewish sources of past-oriented tschuva than to the mystical timelessness of traditionally Christian metanoia. The idea that redemption consists not in a liberation of a pure spirit but in a patient working-through of the universal history of creation is an implicit credo of the whole modern age, first fully articulated by Brzozowski and only later in the writings of Hermann Cohen, Franz Rosenzweig, and Walter Benjamin. Brzozowski emerges as a relatively early precursor of the future post-secular option whose advocates, like the author of The Diary, will not allow themselves to “lose a single moment,” either of their lives or the world’s history.     

An exposition of Zhou Yi studies in modern Neo-Confucianism

The representatives of modern Neo-Confucianism all greatly value Yi Zhuan and regard it as one of their spiritual resources, and give their own creative interpretations and transformations. Xiong Shili’s ontological-cosmological theory takes “qian yuan” as its center; Ma Yifu has a theory of ontology-cultivation centered on “nature-principle”; Fang Dongmei has a metaphysics of production and reproduction; Mou Zongsan takes the view of “completely knowing the fathomless and understanding transformation” as a moral metaphysics; and in Tang Junyi there is a theory of the harmony of doctrines on Heaven and man in which “the knowledge of divine understanding” is its key concept. They employ modern philosophical concepts and thinking to illustrate the cosmology, ontology, theory of life, theory of human nature, theory of spiritual worlds, axiology and their connections in Zhou Yi. They affirm that the characteristics of Chinese philosophy that are different from Western philosophy consist in a naturalist view of vital life, a harmonious view of totality, an axiological view that values exist in natural universe and the world of fact, the pursuit of Good and Beauty, and intuitive experience of inner world. __________ Translated from Zhou Yi Yanjiu 周易研究 (Zhou Yi Studies), 2004 (4) by Hao Changchi     

Meaning(fullness) Without Metaphysics: Another Look at Hume’s “Meaning Empiricism”

Although Hume has no developed semantic theory, in the heyday of analytic philosophy he was criticized for his “meaning empiricism,” which supposedly committed him to a private world of ideas, led him to champion a genetic account of meaning instead of an analytic one, and confused “impressions” with “perceptions of an objective realm.” But another look at Hume’s “meaning empiricism” reveals that his criterion for cognitive content, the cornerstone both of his resolutely anti-metaphysical stance and his naturalistic “science of human nature,” provides the basis for a successful response to his critics. Central to his program for reforming philosophy, Hume’s use of the criterion has two distinct aspects: a critical or negative aspect, which assesses the content of the central notions of metaphysical theories to demonstrate their unintelligibility; and a constructive or positive aspect, which accurately determines the cognitive content of terms and ideas.     

Zhu Xi’s Spiritual Practice as the Basis of His Central Philosophical Concepts

This article attempts to connect three aspects of Zhu Xi’s 朱熹 (1130–1200) life and work: (1) the “spiritual crisis” he experienced in his thirties; (2) his identification of Zhou Dunyi 周敦頤 (1017–1073) as the first true Confucian sage since Mencius; and (3) his concepts of taiji 太極 and li 理. The argument is that (1) the spiritual crisis that Zhu Xi discussed with Zhang Shi 張栻 (1133–1180) and the other “gentlemen of Hunan” from about 1167 to 1169, which was resolved by an understanding of what we might call the “interpenetration”of the mind’s stillness and activity (dong-jing 動靜) or equilibrium and harmony (zhong-he 中和), (2) led directly to his realization that Zhou Dunyi’s thought provided a cosmological basis for that resolution, and (3) this in turn led Zhu Xi to understand (or construct) the meaning of taiji in terms of the polarity of yin and yang; i.e. the “Supreme Polarity” as the most fundamental ordering principle (li 理).     

Persons,animals, and identity

The paper is concerned with how neo-Lockean accounts of personal identity should respond to the challenge of animalist accounts. Neo-Lockean accounts that hold that persons can change bodies via brain transplants or cerebrum transplants are committed to the prima facie counterintuitive denial that a person is an (biologically individuated) animal. This counterintuitiveness can be defused by holding that a person is biological animal (on neo-Lockean views) if the “is” is the “is” of constitution rather than the “is” of identity, and that a person is identical with an animal in a sense of “animal” different from that which requires the persistence conditions of animals to be biological. Another challenge is the “too many minds problem”: if persons and their coincident biological animals share the same physical properties, and mental properties supervene on physical properties, the biological animal will share the mental properties of the person, and so should itself be a person. The response to this invokes a distinction between “thin” properties, which are shared by coincident entities, and “thick” properties which are not so shared. Mental properties, and their physical realizers, are thick, not thin, so are not properties persons share with their bodies or biological animals. The paper rebuts the objection that neo-Lockean accounts cannot explain how persons can have physical properties. To meet a further problem it is argued that the biological properties of persons and those of biological animals are different because of differences in their causal profiles.     

The temporality of Merleau-Ponty’s intertwining

In his last work, The Visible and the Invisible, Merleau-Ponty explored the fact that we believe that perception occurs in our heads (“in the recesses of a body”) and, hence, assert that the perceptual world is “in” us, while also believing that we are “in” the world we perceive.  In this article, I examine how this intertwining of self and world justifies the faith we have in perception. I shall do so by considering a number of examples.  In each case, the object “in itself” will turn out to be neither within us nor outside of us, but rather at the intersection set by the intertwining. I will then turn to what this disclosure of this object reveals about human temporality and, indeed, about human being as a place (or “clearing”) that permits disclosure.