Prejudice from thin air: The effect of emotion on automatic intergroup attitudes

Two experiments provide initial evidence that specific emotional states are capable of creating automatic prejudice toward outgroups. Specifically, we propose that anger should influence automatic evaluations of outgroups because of its functional relevance to intergroup conflict and competition, whereas other negative emotions less relevant to intergroup relations (e.g., sadness) should not. In both experiments, after minimal ingroups and outgroups were created, participants were induced to experience anger, sadness, or a neutral state. Automatic attitudes toward the in- and outgroups were then assessed using an evaluative priming measure (Experiment 1) and the Implicit Association Test (Experiment 2). As predicted, results showed that anger created automatic prejudice toward the outgroup, whereas sadness and neutrality resulted in no automatic intergroup bias. The implications of these findings for emotion-induced biases in implicit intergroup cognition in particular, and in social cognition in general, are considered.     

Seeing the world with the eyes of the outgroup — The impact of perspective taking on the prototypicality of the ingroup relative to the outgroup

The positive effect of perspective taking on favorable attitudes towards stigmatized individuals and outgroups is well established (Batson et al., 1997). We draw on the ingroup projection model (Mummendey & Wenzel, 1999) to better understand the processes underlying this effect. Based on their egocentric perspective, ingroup and outgroup members have different representations of the superordinate group (perspective divergence) so that the ingroup is perceived as more relatively prototypical of the superordinate group, leading to negative outgroup evaluation. We hypothesize that the positive effect of perspective taking on outgroup attitudes is due to a reduction of relative ingroup prototypicality. Across three studies with different manipulations of perspective taking, we found that participants who were taking the perspective of an outgroup member evaluated the outgroup more positively and were less inclined to perceive their ingroup as more relatively prototypical. The effect of perspective taking on outgroup attitudes was mediated by relative ingroup prototypicality.     

Group identification and outgroup attitudes in four South African ethnic groups: a multidimensional approach

Although Sumner's ethnocentrism hypothesis, which expects stronger group identification to be associated with more negative outgroup attitudes, has been widely accepted, empirical findings have been inconsistent. This research investigates the relationship of four dimensions of ethnocultural group identification previously proposed by Phinney, that is, salience, evaluation, attachment, and involvement, with attitudes to ethnic outgroups in four South African ethnocultural groups (Africans, Afrikaans Whites, English Whites, Indians). The findings supported the factorial independence of the four identification dimensions and indicated that only one, ethnocultural evaluation (ingroup attitudes), was systematically related to outgroup attitudes, but the association could be positive, negative, or zero. Both functionalist and similarity-dissimilarity approaches to intergroup relations seemed to provide plausible explanations for the pattern of relationships obtained between ingroup and outgroup attitudes.     

Distorted body representations in healthy cognition

Delusions and misperceptions about the body are a conspicuous feature of numerous neurological and psychiatric conditions. In stark contrast to such pathological cases, the immediacy and familiarity of our ordinary experience of our body can make it seem as if our representation of our body is highly accurate, even infallible. Recent research has begun to demonstrate, however, that large and systematic distortions of body representation are a normal part of healthy cognition. Here, I describe this research, focusing on distortions of body representations underlying tactile distance perception and position sense. I also discuss evidence for distortions of higher-order body representations, such as the conscious body image. Finally, I will end with a discussion of the potential relations among different body representations and their distortions.     

Young children perceive less humanness in outgroup faces

We investigated when young children first dehumanize outgroups. Across two studies, 5‐ and 6‐year‐olds were asked to rate how human they thought a set of ambiguous doll‐human face morphs were. We manipulated whether these faces belonged to their gender in‐ or gender outgroup (Study 1) and to a geographically based in‐ or outgroup (Study 2). In both studies, the tendency to perceive outgroup faces as less human relative to ingroup faces increased with age. Explicit ingroup preference, in contrast, was present even in the youngest children and remained stable across age. These results demonstrate that children dehumanize outgroup members from relatively early in development and suggest that the tendency to do so may be partially distinguishable from intergroup preference. This research has important implications for our understanding of children's perception of humanness and the origins of intergroup bias.     

Neurocognitive underpinnings of face perception: further evidence of distinct person and group perception processes

A model of social perception is presented and tested. The model is based on cognitive neuroscience models and proposes that the right cerebral hemisphere is more efficient at processing combinations of features whereas the left hemisphere is superior at identifying single features. These processes are hypothesized to produce person and group-based representations, respectively. Individuating or personalizing experience with an outgroup member was expected to facilitate the perception of the individuating features and inhibit the perception of the group features. In the presented study, participants were asked to learn about various ingroup and outgroup targets. Later, participants demonstrated that categorization response speeds to old targets were slower in the left hemisphere than in the right, particularly for outgroup members, as predicted. These findings are discussed for their relevance to models of social perception and stereotyping.     

What Can Spatial Deficits Teach Us About Feature Binding and Spatial Maps?

The “binding problem” is discussed with reference to feature integration and visual search. Neuropsychological and neurophysiological findings support the existence of multiple visual areas within the primate cortex that respond to primary features of objects and spatial locations. Evidence from studies with hemineglect and Balint's syndrome supports the role of spatial attention in feature integration and demonstrates the necessity for an intact, explicitspatial representation. Some implicit spatial maps remain intact but are not sufficient to support the perception of properly bound features. The evidence suggests strong interactions between parietal spatial representations and temporal feature representations in feature integration.     

Group entitativity and similarity: Their differing patterns in perceptions of groups

Three studies were conducted to investigate the relation between perceptions of group entitativity and group similarity. The first two studies tested whether entitativity and similarity would be perceived differently in participants' ingroups and outgroups. Across several different group types, we found that, in comparison to outgroups, ingroups were perceived to be relatively more entitative than outgroups, whereas outgroup members were perceived to be highly similar in comparison to ingroup members. The results of Study 3 showed that manipulation of group entitativity influenced perceptions of group entitativity but not of group similarity, whereas manipulation of similarity influenced perceptions of group similarity but not of group entitativity. The results of these studies provide support for the contention that entitativity and similarity are distinct (though related) concepts that function differently in group perception. Copyright © 2009 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.     

Can Ethical Ideologies Predict Prejudice?

Idealism and relativism were designed to assess different ethical ideological views. Their relation with attitudes toward a variety of outgroups has not been previously studied. Understanding how concerns over ethical principles and consequences are related to prejudiced attitudes could provide some insight into these constructs and into the nature of prejudice. In two studies totaling 311 participants, participants completed measures on ethical ideologies, right-wing authoritarianism, and attitudes toward various outgroups. The differential predictive validities of ethical ideologies, in comparison to right-wing authoritarianism, on prejudicial attitudes toward dangerous, derogated, and dissident outgroup members were examined. We found that both idealism and relativism contributed to predicting attitudes regarding outgroup members, over and above right-wing authoritarianism. As such, people’s personal moral standards and code of conduct for dealing with interpersonal problems and transgressions can partly explain their negative attitudes toward outgroup members. More research is required to determine the unique influence of ethical ideologies over other constructs previously shown to predict prejudice.     

We are, therefore they aren’t: Ingroup construal as a standard of comparison for outgroup judgments

Five studies tested the assumptions: (a) that ingroups are habitually used as a standard of comparison for outgroup judgments, and (b) that outgroup judgments are generally contrasted away from a momentary construal of the ingroup. Results generally support these assumptions. Experiments 1 and 2 demonstrated increased activation levels of ingroup knowledge as a result of corresponding outgroup judgments. Experiments 3 and 4 showed that outgroup judgments depend not only on cognitively accessible outgroup exemplars, but also on accessible ingroup exemplars. Finally, Experiment 5 demonstrated that the impact of accessible ingroup exemplars on outgroup judgments is mediated by changes in the construal of the ingroup, such that: (a) outgroups were judged lower with regard to a given trait the higher participants perceived their ingroup with regard to that trait, and (b) controlling for the effect of ingroup construal attenuated the obtained effects on outgroup judgments.     

Empathy constrained: Prejudice predicts reduced mental simulation of actions during observation of outgroups

Perception-action-coupling refers to the vicarious activation of the neural system for action during perception of action, and is considered important for forms of interpersonal sensitivity, including empathy. We hypothesize that perception-action-coupling is limited to the ingroup: neural motor networks will fire upon the perception of action, but only when the object-person belongs to the ingroup; if the object-person belongs to an outgroup these motor neurons will not fire. Using electroencephalographic oscillations as an index of perception-action-coupling, we found exactly this: participants displayed activity over motor cortex when acting and when observing ingroups act, but not when observing outgroups - an effect magnified by prejudice and for disliked groups (South-Asians, then Blacks, followed by East Asians). These findings provide evidence from brain activity for yet another detrimental aspect of prejudice: a spontaneous and implicit simulation of others’ action states may be limited to close others and, without active effort, may not be available for outgroups.     

Social Categorization and the Perception of Groups and Group Differences

The classification of human beings into distinct groups is a fundamental feature of social perception. Problematic phenomena, such as prejudice, discrimination, and intergroup conflict, are commonly traced back to categorization. We explore the minimal conditions under which categorization occurs and the basic mechanisms by which it affects cognition and behavior. We show that comparisons between groups are not necessary for categorization, reveal the conditions under which people overestimate or underestimate differences between groups, and sketch a model showing how social categorization gives rise to differences in the evaluation of ingroups and outgroups and to differences in the accuracy of judgments of ingroups and outgroups. We conclude with reflections on intergroup conflict and the role of moral judgment in such conflicts.     

From infra-humanization to discrimination: The mediation of symbolic threat needs egalitarian norms

This set of studies tests the link between infra-humanization, symbolic threat, and discrimination within normative contexts. In two experiments, manipulating the degree of humanity of a disliked outgroup has an effect upon the discrimination towards it. The infra-humanized outgroup is more discriminated than the humanized one. Also, the perception of symbolic threat plays the role of a justifying factor for discrimination, and mediates the relationship between degrees of humanity and discrimination. Study 2 further shows that this mediation occurs only when an egalitarian norm is activated, and not when meritocracy is made salient. The discussion focuses on factors likely to prevent infra-humanization of outgroups. It also considers how norms may change the role of threat.     

Learning about the internal structure of categories through classification and feature inference

Previous research on category learning has found that classification tasks produce representations that are skewed toward diagnostic feature dimensions, whereas feature inference tasks lead to richer representations of within-category structure. Yet, prior studies often measure category knowledge through tasks that involve identifying only the typical features of a category. This neglects an important aspect of a category's internal structure: how typical and atypical features are distributed within a category. The present experiments tested the hypothesis that inference learning results in richer knowledge of internal category structure than classification learning. We introduced several new measures to probe learners' representations of within-category structure. Experiment 1 found that participants in the inference condition learned and used a wider range of feature dimensions than classification learners. Classification learners, however, were more sensitive to the presence of atypical features within categories. Experiment 2 provided converging evidence that classification learners were more likely to incorporate atypical features into their representations. Inference learners were less likely to encode atypical category features, even in a “partial inference” condition that focused learners' attention on the feature dimensions relevant to classification. Overall, these results are contrary to the hypothesis that inference learning produces superior knowledge of within-category structure. Although inference learning promoted representations that included a broad range of category-typical features, classification learning promoted greater sensitivity to the distribution of typical and atypical features within categories.     

Collective self-esteem consequences of outgroup derogation when a valued social identity is on trial

A structural equation model tested the role of degree of identification with a group (Americans) and level of collective self-esteem as determinants of outgroup derogation under identity-threatening and non-threatening conditions. High identification and reductions in collective self-esteem following a threat to that identity lead to outgroup derogation, but level of collective self-esteem did not predict outgroup derogation in the no-threat condition. The consequences of derogating both threat-relevant (Russians) and threat-irrelevant nationalities for subsequent self-esteem were assessed. As predicted by social identity theory, higher amounts of derogation of the threat-relevant outgroup in the identity-threatened condition elevated subsequent collective self-esteem. Derogation of threat-irrelevant outgroups did not have this positive esteem consequence; in fact, increased derogation of irrelevant outgroups reduced subsequent self-esteem. In the no-threat condition, amount of derogation directed towards either type of outgroup did not significantly influence subsequent self-esteem, with the overall pattern being opposite to what was observed in the threat condition. Implications for theories concerning self-processes as instigators of outgroup derogation and the consequences of intergroup comparisons for collective self-esteem are discussed.     

Social representations,group affiliation,and projection: Knowing the limits of validity

It is argued that social representations and similar constructs can only be conceived of as mental structures containing meta-information about the group, within which the representation was formed and where it is part of social identity. The most important information will be to know the limits of its validity, that is, to know to which social group a representation pertains. Experiments on social projection have shown that people tend to project their opinions onto others, if they are perceived as being similar in background values. Such projection cannot be expected with idiosyncratic attitudes and beliefs. Consequently it is hypothesized that idiosyncratic and private attitudes, opinions, etc., are not attributed to specific social groups, whereas knowledge pertaining to social representations the subject subscribes to is projected onto the ingroup and less on the outgroup. This effect is expected to be independent of the relative number of people holding this opinion. This is what was found in a quasi-experimental questionnaire study. Implications of the findings are discussed with regard to the definition and criteria ofsociul representations and to the structure of the theory.     

Meaning in music: Deviations from expectations in music prompt outgroup derogation

Encountering stimuli that violate expectations can elicit compensatory behavior. One notable result of such compensatory responses is the derogation of outgroups. The present research investigated for the first time if music that defies expectations fosters the derogation of outgroups. In Study 1, exposure to unconventional relative to conventional music increased wagers placed in favor of an ingroup winning a hypothetical rugby match against an outgroup. In extension of this finding, Study 2 revealed that unconventional music led to lower allocated budgets for support of a minority. Study 3 confirmed that music led to harsher punishments of a hypothetical outgroup offender after being exposed to an unconventional edit of a music piece relative to its regular version. The consequences of these findings are discussed in relation to intergroup relations and theories of meaning maintenance. Copyright © 2013 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.     

Intentional weighting: a basic principle in cognitive control

Human perception and action are tailored to the situation at hand, and thus reflect the current intentions of the perceiver/actor. We suggest that this is achieved by an “intentional-weighting” mechanism. It operates on the cognitive representations of the features of perceived events and produced event—perceptions and actions that is. Intention- or goal-related feature dimensions are weighted more strongly, so that feature values defined on the respective dimension have a stronger impact on information processing, and stimulus and response selection in particular. This article discusses what intentional weighting is, how such a mechanism may work, and how it relates to available research on attention, action planning, and executive control.     

Can ingroup affirmation relieve outgroup derogation?

Intergroup hostilities are an important social concern in multicultural societies and the global community. Individuals with dispositionally high Personal Need for Structure (PNS) are particularly inclined toward outgroup derogation [Schaller, M., Boyd, C., Yohannes, J., O’Brien, M. (1995). The prejudiced personality revisited: Personal need for structure and formation of erroneous group stereotypes. Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, 68, 544-555]. The present research demonstrates that ingroup affirmation can eliminate high PNS individuals’ tendency toward outgroup derogation. Spontaneous (Study 1) and experimentally manipulated affirmations (Study 2) of consensual, positive ingroups eliminated the high PNS tendency to derogate outgroup targets. Study 3 experimentally manipulated the two key elements that are presumably bolstered by ingroup affirmations—self-certainty and self-worth—independent of the group context. The high PNS tendency to derogate outgroups was relieved only in the combined certainty and worth affirmation condition, just as it had been relieved in Study 2 by the ingroup affirmation. Results suggest a paradoxical strategy for relieving derogation of outgroups by affirming ingroups.