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1.
Both thinkings on Dao in Chinese philosophy and metaphysics in Western philosophy investigate things on a spiritual level
that transcends experience, but there are incommensurable differences between them. The objective of “metaphysics” is ontological
knowledge about nature from the perspective of epistemological “truth-pursuing”. Western metaphysics is thus a “metaphysics
of nature”. Dao in Chinese philosophy, on the other hand, more often manifests itself in “good-pursuing” by means of the internal,
experiential pursuit of moral stature and spiritual security. Philosophy of Dao is thus a “metaphysics of ethics”. The cause
of this difference can be traced back to the differences between the rational tradition of the West, characterized by the
dualism of the subject and the object, and the moral tradition of China, characterized by the integration of man and nature.
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Translated by Zhang Lin from Lunlixue yanjiu 伦理学研究 (Studies in Ethics), 2007, (4): 62–65 相似文献
2.
Yunyi Zhang 《Frontiers of Philosophy in China》2007,2(2):230-246
When Western science was introduced to modern China, more translated words were used to express fundamental concepts and terms
than borrowed words. The process of academic translation, commensuration, and communication between Western and Chinese philosophy
is a process of comparative philosophical research. Nowadays, however, it seems that Chinese philosophy is evaluated by a
Western Hegelian criterion. This leads to the debate over whether or not China has philosophy. But it is meaningless to argue
about whether or not China has the name of philosophy. The key issue is whether or not China has the actuality of philosophy. Looking at the history of Western philosophy, it seems that the Hegelian definition of philosophy was the
only one that existed in Europe. However, during the last 200 years after Hegel that the two main philosophical trends of
positivism (scientism) and irrationalism developed from anti-Hegelianism or “Spurning Metaphysics.” As metaphysics is being
reconstructed, the ghost of Hegel has reappeared. It is clear that in the future, philosophy will evolve from the development
of human metaphysics or cultural philosophy. It is a process of the “negation of negation”: from traditional metaphysics to
the spurning of metaphysics, and then to human metaphysics.
Translated by Wu Bo from Wenshizhe 文史哲 (Journal of Literature, History and Philosophy), 2005, (3): 18–25 相似文献
3.
Qiyong Guo 《Frontiers of Philosophy in China》2006,1(2):185-203
The representatives of modern Neo-Confucianism all greatly value Yi Zhuan and regard it as one of their spiritual resources, and give their own creative interpretations and transformations. Xiong
Shili’s ontological-cosmological theory takes “qian yuan” as its center; Ma Yifu has a theory of ontology-cultivation centered
on “nature-principle”; Fang Dongmei has a metaphysics of production and reproduction; Mou Zongsan takes the view of “completely
knowing the fathomless and understanding transformation” as a moral metaphysics; and in Tang Junyi there is a theory of the
harmony of doctrines on Heaven and man in which “the knowledge of divine understanding” is its key concept. They employ modern
philosophical concepts and thinking to illustrate the cosmology, ontology, theory of life, theory of human nature, theory
of spiritual worlds, axiology and their connections in Zhou Yi. They affirm that the characteristics of Chinese philosophy that are different from Western philosophy consist in a naturalist
view of vital life, a harmonious view of totality, an axiological view that values exist in natural universe and the world
of fact, the pursuit of Good and Beauty, and intuitive experience of inner world.
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Translated from Zhou Yi Yanjiu 周易研究 (Zhou Yi Studies), 2004 (4) by Hao Changchi 相似文献
4.
Bo Chen 《Frontiers of Philosophy in China》2006,1(4):539-560
The debate on the yan-yi relation was carried out by Chinese philosophers collectively, and the principles and methods in the debate still belong
to a living tradition of Chinese philosophy. From Yijing (Book of Changes), Lunyu (Analects), Laozi and Zhuangzi to Wang Bi, “yi” which cannot be expressed fully by yan (language), is not only “idea” or “meaning” in the human mind, but is also some kind of ontological existence, which is beyond
yan and emblematic symbols, and unspeakable. Thus, the debate on the yan-yi relation refers firstly to metaphysics, secondly to moral philosophy, and then to epistemology and philosophy of language.
Guided by this view, this paper recalls the source of the debate on the yan-yi relation to Yijing and Lunyu, distinguishes four meanings of “yi” in Chinese philosophy, and reconstructs three arguments. These arguments are the “yan cannot express yi fully” argument, “forget yan once you get yi” argument, and “yan can express yi fully” argument. Finally, this paper exposes and comments on those principles, methods and the general tendency shown in
the debate from the following five aspects: starting point, value-preference, methodology, texts (papers and books), and influences.
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Translated from Jianghai Xuekan 江海学刊 (Jianghai Academic Studies), 2005 (3) 相似文献
5.
Globalization consists of global interculture strengthening local cultures as it depends on them. Globality and locality are
interdependent, and “universal” must be replaced by “inter-versal” as existence inter-exists. Chinese thinking thus must be
Chinese, not Western, as Western thinking must be Western, not “universal”; China must help the West be Western, as the West
must help China be Chinese. As Mrs. Tu speaks English in Chinese syntax, so “sinologists” logicize in Chinese phrases. English
speakers parse her to realize the distinctness of English; Chinese thinkers parse Western “sinologists” to realize the distinctness
of China. Inter-versal parsing toward cultural inter-enrichment occurs in three stages. This is intercultural globalization. 相似文献
6.
Individualism is not only a Western tradition. In the Zhuangzi we can also identify some elements which may be appropriately attributed to “individualism.” However, due to its particular
cultural and philosophical background, Zhuangzian individualism has unique characteristics, which distinguish it from the
variety of other individualist thoughts that have emerged in the West. Zhuangzi has a dynamic and open view on individual
“self,” considering individuals as changing and unique beings rather than fixed and interchangeable “atoms”; he sets the unlimited
Dao as the ultimate source for individuals to conform to, thus releasing individual mind into a realm of infinite openness
and freedom. The Zhuangzian individualism is “inward” rather than “outward,” concentrating on individual spirit rather than
material interests and rights in social reality. The individualism in the Zhuangzi provides a spiritual space for the development of individuality in ancient China. It also provides an alternative understanding
of individual as an existence. 相似文献
7.
Yulie Lou 《Frontiers of Philosophy in China》2006,1(1):66-78
Hu Shi frequently gave lectures on the history of Chinese philosophy, especially the history of ancient Chinese philosophy,
from the year 1919 to 1937. A large number of papers and dissertations published during this period are related to his research
on this topic. In his opinion, there are three characteristics of the history of ancient Chinese philosophy: “ religionalization
of thought,” “Indianization of philosophy,” and “conflict between Chinese thought and Indian thought.” In this paper, I explore
Hu Shi’s deep insight into the religionalization of Confucianism in Han dynasty and into the thought of Taoism in the medieval
times.
Originally published in Chinese Philosophy, volume 15 (May 1992), translated by Han Jianying 相似文献
8.
Zhengyu Sun 《Frontiers of Philosophy in China》2006,1(1):124-132
To explore the development of contemporary Chinese philosophy, fundamentally, is to explore the development of Marxist philosophy
in contemporary China. The disputes over philosophical views in Chinese academic circles during the first half of the twentieth
century have been focused on understanding Marxist philosophy from such aspects as “what kind of philosophy Chinese society
needs,” “the relation of philosophy to science,” and “philosophy as an idea to reflect on one’s life.” These explorations
have provided us a significant ideological insight into the development of Marxist philosophy and contemporary Chinese philosophy;
that is, in contemporary China, Marxist philosophy, as a doctrine of the liberation and all-round development of human beings,
exists not only as a kind of “doctrine” or “academy” but also as a kind of widely accepted “xueyuan (academic cultivations)” among people.
Translated by Zhao Zhiyi from Jourmal of Jilin University (Social Sciences), 2005:1 相似文献
9.
Junping Liu 《Frontiers of Philosophy in China》2006,1(4):517-538
The terminology tianxia has both historical evolution and cultural and philosophical connotations. This concept not only denotes a geographical and
spatial meaning, but also implies the moral construct of metaphysics. A systematic study of its historical and cultural repercussions
can show that the evolution of the meaning “tianxia” not only embodies the cosmological construction, moral belief and self-identity of the Chinese nation, but also manifests
the historical processes of modern China evolving from “tianxia” to a modern nation-state. Meanwhile, the deconstruction of the tianxia cosmology has shattered the old Chinese concept of a single united tianxia, or the whole world under one Heaven. Also, “Confucian China” has been increasingly losing its vitality and strong hold on
the people, while the concept of nation-state has gained its way into people’s consciousness, which has added more diversity
and open-mindedness to the concept of tianxia.
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Translated from Wenshizhe 文史哲 (Literature, History and Philosophy), 2004 (6) by Huang Deyuan 相似文献
10.
Fulin Chao 《Frontiers of Philosophy in China》2006,1(2):161-184
In ancient Chinese thoughts, de is a comparatively complicated idea. Most of the researchers translated it directly into “virtue”, but this translation is
not accurate for our understanding of the idea of “de” in pre-Qin times. Generally speaking, in Pre-Qin times, the idea of “de” underwent three developmental periods. The first is the de of Heaven, the de of ancestors; the second the de of system; and the third the de of spirit and moral conducts. In a long period of history, the idea of “de” never cast off the influence of tian Dao (the way of Heaven). It was in Western Zhou Dynasty that the idea of “de” shook off the dense fog of the mandate of Heaven. However, it was the thinkers in Spring and Autumn Period and Warring States
who made contributions to bring it deep into people’s mind. The ancient Chinese thoughts were mainly concerned with people’s
recognition and development of their own abilities, with people’s seeking harmony and balance between human-beings and nature,
and with people’s seeking harmonious and balanced human relations. The development of the idea of “de” played a very important role in this context.
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Translated from Zhongguo Shehui Kexue 中国社会科学 (China Social Sciences), 2005(4) by Lei Yongqiang 相似文献
11.
王树人 《Frontiers of Philosophy in China》2009,4(1):1-12
To grasp the truth in traditional Chinese classics, we need to uncover the long obscured “xiang” 象 (image) thinking, which has long been overshadowed by Occidentalism. “xiang thinking” is the most fundamental thought of human beings. The logic of linguistics all comes from “xiang thinking”. Through conceptual thinking, people can understand Western classics on metaphysics, yet they may not completely
understand the various schools of Chinese classics. The difference between Chinese and Western ways of thinking originated
in the difference of the basic views developed in the “Axial period”. Since Aristotle, Western metaphysical ideas have all
been manifested in substantiality, objectivity, and being ready-made, whereas Chinese Taiji, Dao, Xin-xing, and Zen were manifested in the non-substantiality, non-objectivity, and non-ready-made-ness of a dynamic whole. To grasp
substance, rational and logical thinking such as definition, judgment, and reasoning is necessary. On the other hand, to grasp
Taiji, Dao, etc., which is a dynamic whole or non-substances, “xiang thinking”, which is related to perception and rich in poetic association, is essential. History has taught us a lesson, i.e.,
when we opened the window to logical thought, we closed that of “xiang thinking”. We should remember the words of Xu Guangqi, i.e., “To mingle harmoniously and understand thoroughly so as to excel”.
Translated by Zhang Lin from Hebei xuekan 河北学刊 (Hebei Academic Journal), 2007, (5): 21–25 相似文献
12.
丁为祥 《Frontiers of Philosophy in China》2009,4(1):13-37
As a pair of important categories in traditional Chinese culture, “ming 命 (destiny or decrees)” and “tian ming 天命 (heavenly ordinances)” mainly refer to the constraints placed on human beings. Both originated from “ling 令 (decrees),” which evolved from “wang ling 王令 (royal decrees)” into “tian ling 天令 (heavenly decrees),” and then became “ming” from a throne because of the decisive role of “heavenly decrees” over a throne. “Ming” and “tian ming” have different definitions: “Ming” represented the limits Heaven placed on the natural lives of human beings and was an objective force that men could not
direct, but was embodied in human beings as their “destiny”; “Tian ming” reflected the moral ideals of human beings in their self-identification; It originated in man but had to be verified by
Heaven, and it was therefore the true ordinance that Heaven placed on human beings. “Ming” and “tian ming” are two perspectives on the traditional relationship between Heaven and human beings, and at the same time Confucians and
Daoists placed different emphasis on them.
Translated by Huang Deyuan from Zhongguo zhexueshi 中国哲学史 (History of Chinese Philosophy), 2007, (4): 11–21 相似文献
13.
Xize Deng 《Frontiers of Philosophy in China》2011,6(4):609-627
The goal of “(modern) Chinese Philosophy” established during the period of the May 4th Movement is to reestablish the meaning
of life for Chinese people. However, because it takes the approach of interpreting Chinese thinking through a Western lens,
thus forming a discourse pattern of “Chinese A is Western B,” which is only capable of manifesting Western culture, “Chinese
Philosophy” is made logically impossible as the ideological source from which modern Chinese thinkers could construct the
meaning of life. The ideological source of the still lasting traditional lifestyle is Yili Xue 义理学 (The Learning of Righteousness and Principles); whereas that of modern life, which was established as an imitation of
the West, is Western culture. Neither of them takes “Chinese Philosophy” as its ideological source. Therefore, “Chinese Philosophy”
is excluded from the construction of the meaning of life, and falls into the dilemma of life meaning. 相似文献
14.
Liangkang Ni 《Frontiers of Philosophy in China》2007,2(4):547-556
With the help of the natural history of “zero,” and the use of “zero” as a starting point, one may consider two types of metaphysics.
On the one hand, the epistemological metaphysics, based on the perceptual/rational dichotomy, is related to the zero as a
vacancy between numbers. On the other hand, the genetic metaphysics, based on the dichotomy of source-evolution (or origin
and derivate), has much to do with the zero as a number between negative and positive numbers. In this respect, zero represents
the horizon of metaphysics: we can forever approach it, but we cannot ultimately arrive at it. Though serving as the point
of convergence and divergence for all relationships, zero has no definable content of its own. Such is the essence of zero,
and of metaphysics as well.
Translated by Chen Zhengzhi from Tongji Daxue Xuebao (Shehui Kexue Ban) 同济大学学报 (社会科学版) (Tongji University Journal, Social Sciences Edition), 2006, (1): 1–6. 相似文献
15.
Jure Zovko 《Synthese》2008,162(3):425-438
In this article, I discuss the manner in which Dieter Henrich’s theory of subjectivity has emerged from the fundamental questions
of German Idealism, and in what manner and to what extent this theory effects a reinstatement of metaphysics. In so doing,
I shall argue that Henrich’s position represents a viable refutation of the attempt of the physicalist explanation of the
world to prove the concept of the subject to be superfluous. Henrich’s metaphysics of subjectivity is primarily focused on
the ‘ultimate questions’ which also compose “the deep levels of our subjectivity” and concern the factors that should promote
stability in our emotional, moral and intellectual life. I argue with Henrich that the indisputable facticity of our conscious
life is worthy of our special consideration and interpretation, explanation and clarification, just as the deeper meaning
(the individual and collective subconscious structure) hidden beneath the layers of apparent comprehensibility calls for urgent
investigation. Such interpretation and elucidation of life’s meaning has a tripartite character: first, it consists of clarification
of the totality of human experience together with the realities playing a part in it; second, it builds on the process by
which the contents of experience are cognized, and the knowledge thereof which results; thirdly, it embraces the transcendental
precondition enabling each and every one of us to consciously lead our lives—for life, in a human sense, does not merely happen to one. Henrich’s metaphysical foundation of subjectivity is
compared with Kolak‘s position, according to which individual consciousness is not insular, but integrated into the totality
of overall unity that some have called “the Universal Self”, “the Noumenal Self”. 相似文献
16.
Chun-Chieh Huang 《Dao》2010,9(2):211-223
This article discusses the “contextual turn” in the interpretation of Chinese classics: the contextuality of Confucian classics
in China was latent, tacit, and almost imperceptible; however, it became salient and explicit once the Confucian classics
were introduced to Tokugawa Japan. Many a Japanese Confucian took ideas and values expressed in the Chinese classics and transplanted
them into the context of Japanese politics and thoughts, in light of which the Japanese scholars staked out new interpretations
of the classics. This “contextual turn” involved issues of two levels: the material political order (especially the Chinese-barbarian
distinction) and the abstract political thought (especially the ruler-subject relation). It is pointed out that the Chinese
empire was the Japanese Confucians’ “political foreign country” and “cultural homeland,” and the tension was evidenced by
their interpretations of the term “Zhong’guo” appearing in the Confucian classics. The usual strategy adopted by the Japanese
Confucians in interpreting Chinese classics was to “de-contextualize” them and then to “re-contextualize” them in their own
Japanese environment. 相似文献
17.
Matthew C. Halteman 《Continental Philosophy Review》2006,39(1):35-58
My aim in this paper is to draw Plotinus and Derrida together in a comparison of their respective appropriations of the famous “receptacle” passage in Plato's Timaeus (specifically, Plotinus' discussion of intelligible matter in Enneads 2.4 and Derrida's essay on Timaeus entitled “Kh
ō
ra”). After setting the stage with a discussion of several instructive similarities between their general philosophical projects, I contend that Plotinus and Derrida take comparable approaches both to thinking the origin of the forms and to problematizing the stability of the sensible/intelligible opposition. With these parallels in focus, I go on to explain how examining such points of contact can help us to dismantle the canonical constructs of “Plotinus the metaphysician” and “Derrida the anti-metaphysician” that have obscured important connections between Neoplatonism and deconstruction, and suppressed latent resources within the Platonic tradition itself for deconstructing the dualistic ontology of so-called “Platonic metaphysics.” 相似文献
18.
Ping He 《Frontiers of Philosophy in China》2007,2(2):219-229
From the point of view of the development of Chinese Marxist philosophy, this paper comprehensively analyzes the current phenomenon
of “Return to Marx” by pointing out: (1) the phenomenon of “Return to Marx” meets the need to reconstruct ideology during
the time of social change in China and it is a theoretical manifestation of the shift from planned economy to market economy
in China; (2) the phenomenon of “Return to Marx” embodies the academic path of the past ten years of Chinese Marxist philosophy;
(3) the phenomenon of “Return to Marx” places too much emphasis on logic while too little emphasis on history. This understanding,
the epistemological root of “Return to Marx”, has caused the negative effect and is also worth our attention and further study.
Translated by Zhao Bi from Xuexi Yu Tansuo 学习与探索 (Study & Exploration), 2004, (5): 1–5 相似文献
19.
The present study compared chronic procrastination tendencies claimed by “whitecollar” working adults (n = 141) with rates reported by Harriott and Ferrari ( 1996) of “blue-collar” working adults (n - 211). Participants completed reliable and valid measures of everyday procrastination tendencies (decisional, arousal, and
avoidant), and socio-demographic items at one of several public forums. Results showed no significant difference between classes
of working adults on age, gender, marital status, or the number of children, although “white-collar” workers claimed higher
levels of education than “blue-collar” workers. “White-collar” workers also reported significantly higher scores on all three
forms of chronic procrastination than “blue-collar” workers. It seems that professional employees report procrastination more
frequently than unskilled workers. Further research is needed to explore the causes and consequences associated with differences
in chronic procrastination by occupational group. 相似文献
20.
Tobias Hansson Wahlberg 《Erkenntnis》2010,72(2):267-280
In this paper I explore how the tenseless copula is to be interpreted in sentences of the form “a is F at t”, where “a” denotes a persisting, changeable object, “F” stands for a prima facie intrinsic property and “t” for a B-time. I argue that the interpretation of the copula depends on the logical role assigned to the time clause. Having
rejected the idea that the time clause is to be treated as a sentence operator, I argue: (1) that if “at t” is thought of as being associated with “a” or “F”, then the tenseless copula is most plausibly read as an “is” simpliciter; and (2) that if “at t” is treated as being associated with the copula, then the tenseless copula is most plausibly understood as expressing a disjunction
of tensed copulas. I end the paper by explaining the importance of the issue. I indicate the ramifications interpretation
of the tenseless copula has for the so-called problem of temporary intrinsics. 相似文献